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author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> | 2006-12-05 01:22:39 (GMT) |
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committer | Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> | 2006-12-06 15:46:46 (GMT) |
commit | 39a21dd1b0eec3f5eac84ee42bda5ab4915098ae (patch) | |
tree | 9dff827542f01a22fbb5742c367c5483e927a378 /net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | |
parent | ca54f896454852f0bc8d50e6e4c55d9defedbd0a (diff) | |
download | linux-fsl-qoriq-39a21dd1b0eec3f5eac84ee42bda5ab4915098ae.tar.xz |
rpcgss: krb5: clean up some goto's, etc.
Remove some unnecessary goto labels; clean up some return values; etc.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c | 68 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c index 6d508d7..63b06ee 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, if (kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_NONE && kctx->sealalg != SEAL_ALG_DES) { dprintk("RPC: gss_krb5_seal: kctx->sealalg %d not supported\n", kctx->sealalg); - goto out_err; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; } blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->enc); @@ -178,12 +178,12 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, buf->pages = pages; if (make_checksum("md5", krb5_hdr, 8, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize, &md5cksum)) - goto out_err; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; buf->pages = tmp_pages; if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) - goto out_err; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; memcpy(krb5_hdr + 16, md5cksum.data + md5cksum.len - KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH, KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH); @@ -196,15 +196,13 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, * and encrypt at the same time: */ if ((krb5_make_seq_num(kctx->seq, kctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xff, seq_send, krb5_hdr + 16, krb5_hdr + 8))) - goto out_err; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (gss_encrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, offset + headlen - blocksize, pages)) - goto out_err; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; return ((kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE); -out_err: - return GSS_S_FAILURE; } u32 @@ -220,7 +218,6 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) s32 seqnum; unsigned char *ptr; int bodysize; - u32 ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; void *data_start, *orig_start; int data_len; int blocksize; @@ -230,11 +227,11 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) ptr = (u8 *)buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; if (g_verify_token_header(&kctx->mech_used, &bodysize, &ptr, buf->len - offset)) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if ((*ptr++ != ((KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG>>8)&0xff)) || (*ptr++ != (KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &0xff)) ) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */ @@ -246,18 +243,18 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) /* Sanity checks */ if ((ptr[4] != 0xff) || (ptr[5] != 0xff)) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if (sealalg == 0xffff) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; /* in the current spec, there is only one valid seal algorithm per key type, so a simple comparison is ok */ if (sealalg != kctx->sealalg) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; /* there are several mappings of seal algorithms to sign algorithms, but few enough that we can try them all. */ @@ -266,45 +263,39 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) || (kctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD && signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if (gss_decrypt_xdr_buf(kctx->enc, buf, ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base)) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - ret = make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, buf, - ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum); - if (ret) - goto out; + if (make_checksum("md5", ptr - 2, 8, buf, + ptr + 22 - (unsigned char *)buf->head[0].iov_base, &md5cksum)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; - ret = krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, - md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len); - if (ret) - goto out; + if (krb5_encrypt(kctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, + md5cksum.data, md5cksum.len)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; - if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) { - ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - goto out; - } + if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + 14, 8)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ now = get_seconds(); - ret = GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; if (now > kctx->endtime) - goto out; + return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; /* do sequencing checks */ - ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - if ((ret = krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, - &seqnum))) - goto out; + if (krb5_get_seq_num(kctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction, + &seqnum)) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; if ((kctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) || (!kctx->initiate && direction != 0)) - goto out; + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; /* Copy the data back to the right position. XXX: Would probably be * better to copy and encrypt at the same time. */ @@ -317,11 +308,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *ctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf) buf->head[0].iov_len -= (data_start - orig_start); buf->len -= (data_start - orig_start); - ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; if (gss_krb5_remove_padding(buf, blocksize)) - goto out; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE; -out: - return ret; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } |