From 8dd5ca532c2d2c2b85f16bc038ebfff05b8853e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2010 22:11:38 -0500 Subject: befs: fix leak Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c index 33baf27..34ddda8 100644 --- a/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c +++ b/fs/befs/linuxvfs.c @@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ befs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) brelse(bh); unacquire_priv_sbp: + kfree(befs_sb->mount_opts.iocharset); kfree(sb->s_fs_info); unacquire_none: -- cgit v0.10.2 From 4b06e5b9ad8abb20105b2b25e42c509ebe9b2d76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jun'ichi Nomura Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2010 09:56:22 +0900 Subject: freeze_bdev: don't deactivate successfully frozen MS_RDONLY sb Thanks Thomas and Christoph for testing and review. I removed 'smp_wmb()' before up_write from the previous patch, since up_write() should have necessary ordering constraints. (I.e. the change of s_frozen is visible to others after up_write) I'm quite sure the change is harmless but if you are uncomfortable with Tested-by/Reviewed-by on the modified patch, please remove them. If MS_RDONLY, freeze_bdev should just up_write(s_umount) instead of deactivate_locked_super(). Also, keep sb->s_frozen consistent so that remount can check the frozen state. Otherwise a crash reported here can happen: http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/1/16/37 http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/1/28/53 This patch should be applied for 2.6.32 stable series, too. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Tested-by: Thomas Backlund Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c index 73d6a73..d11d028 100644 --- a/fs/block_dev.c +++ b/fs/block_dev.c @@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ struct super_block *freeze_bdev(struct block_device *bdev) if (!sb) goto out; if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) { - deactivate_locked_super(sb); + sb->s_frozen = SB_FREEZE_TRANS; + up_write(&sb->s_umount); mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex); return sb; } @@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb) BUG_ON(sb->s_bdev != bdev); down_write(&sb->s_umount); if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) - goto out_deactivate; + goto out_unfrozen; if (sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs) { error = sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs(sb); @@ -321,11 +322,11 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb) } } +out_unfrozen: sb->s_frozen = SB_UNFROZEN; smp_wmb(); wake_up(&sb->s_wait_unfrozen); -out_deactivate: if (sb) deactivate_locked_super(sb); out_unlock: -- cgit v0.10.2 From 1e41568d7378d1ba8c64ba137b9ddd00b59f893a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 05:43:08 -0500 Subject: Take ima_path_check() in nfsd past dentry_open() in nfsd_open() Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index c194793..325959e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -752,6 +752,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, flags, current_cred()); if (IS_ERR(*filp)) host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp); + host_err = ima_path_check(&(*filp)->f_path, + access & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); out_nfserr: err = nfserrno(host_err); out: @@ -2127,7 +2129,6 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp, */ path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt; path.dentry = dentry; - err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); nfsd_out: return err? nfserrno(err) : 0; } -- cgit v0.10.2 From 8eb988c70e7709b7bd1a69f0ec53d19ac20dea84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 15:35:41 -0500 Subject: fix ima breakage The "Untangling ima mess, part 2 with counters" patch messed up the counters. Based on conversations with Al Viro, this patch streamlines ima_path_check() by removing the counter maintaince. The counters are now updated independently, from measuring the file, in __dentry_open() and alloc_file() by calling ima_counts_get(). ima_path_check() is called from nfsd and do_filp_open(). It also did not measure all files that should have been measured. Reason: ima_path_check() got bogus value passed as mask. [AV: mea culpa] [AV: add missing nfsd bits] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 94a5e60..cd77b63 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -1736,8 +1736,7 @@ do_last: if (nd.root.mnt) path_put(&nd.root); if (!IS_ERR(filp)) { - error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode & - (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + error = ima_path_check(filp, acc_mode); if (error) { fput(filp); filp = ERR_PTR(error); @@ -1797,8 +1796,7 @@ ok: } filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd); if (!IS_ERR(filp)) { - error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode & - (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + error = ima_path_check(filp, acc_mode); if (error) { fput(filp); filp = ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index 325959e..32477e3 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -752,8 +752,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, flags, current_cred()); if (IS_ERR(*filp)) host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp); - host_err = ima_path_check(&(*filp)->f_path, - access & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + host_err = ima_path_check(*filp, access); out_nfserr: err = nfserrno(host_err); out: diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 99dc6d5..aa55a8f 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct linux_binprm; extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode); -extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask); +extern int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file); @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) return; } -static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) +static inline int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a89f44d..75aee18 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ out: return found; } +/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. + * + * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, + * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. + * + * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results + * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * + * In either case invalidate the PCR. + */ +enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; +static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + switch (error) { + case TOMTOU: + if (iint->readcount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "ToMToU"); + break; + case OPEN_WRITERS: + if (iint->writecount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "open_writers"); + break; + } +} + /* * Update the counts given an fmode_t */ @@ -99,6 +129,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode) } /* + * ima_counts_get - increment file counts + * + * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only + * invalidate the PCR for measured files: + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, + * could result in a file measurement error. + * + */ +void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + int rc; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { + ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name); + goto out; + } + ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name); +out: + ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); +} + +/* * Decrement ima counts */ static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, @@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); } -/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. - * - * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, - * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. - * - * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results - * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. - * - * In either case invalidate the PCR. - */ -enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; -static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, - struct ima_iint_cache *iint, - struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *filename) -{ - switch (error) { - case TOMTOU: - if (iint->readcount > 0) - ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", - "ToMToU"); - break; - case OPEN_WRITERS: - if (iint->writecount > 0) - ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", - "open_writers"); - break; - } -} - -static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename) -{ - int rc = 0; - - ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); - - rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); - if (!rc) - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); - return rc; -} - -/** - * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. - * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured - * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE - * - * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the - * ima_must_measure() policy decision. - * - * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only - * invalidate the PCR for measured files: - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, - * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. - * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, - * could result in a file measurement error. - * - * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. - * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) - */ -int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) -{ - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - struct file *file = NULL; - int rc; - - if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return 0; - iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); - if (!iint) - return 0; - - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - - rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); - if (rc < 0) - goto out; - - if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0)) - ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, - path->dentry->d_name.name); - - if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ) - goto out; - - ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, - path->dentry->d_name.name); - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { - struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry); - struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt); - - file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE, - current_cred()); - if (IS_ERR(file)) { - int audit_info = 0; - - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, - dentry->d_name.name, - "add_measurement", - "dentry_open failed", - 1, audit_info); - file = NULL; - goto out; - } - rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name); - } -out: - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - if (file) - fput(file); - kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check); - static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int mask, int function) { @@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ out: return rc; } -/* - * ima_counts_get - increment file counts - * - * - for IPC shm and shmat file. - * - for nfsd exported files. - * - * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary - * imbalance messages. - */ -void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) -{ - struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; - struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - - if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return; - iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); - if (!iint) - return; - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - - kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get); - /** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) @@ -369,6 +296,27 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } +/** + * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * @file: pointer to the file to be measured + * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE + * + * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision. + * + * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. + * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) + */ +int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + int rc; + + rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), + PATH_CHECK); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check); + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; -- cgit v0.10.2 From 54bb6552bd9405dc7685653157a4ec260c77a71c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2009 15:29:01 -0500 Subject: ima: initialize ima before inodes can be allocated ima wants to create an inode information struct (iint) when inodes are allocated. This means that at least the part of ima which does this allocation (the allocation is filled with information later) should before any inodes are created. To accomplish this we split the ima initialization routine placing the kmem cache allocator inside a security_initcall() function. Since this makes use of radix trees we also need to make sure that is initialized before security_initcall(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index dac44a9..4cb47a1 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -657,9 +657,9 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void) proc_caches_init(); buffer_init(); key_init(); + radix_tree_init(); security_init(); vfs_caches_init(totalram_pages); - radix_tree_init(); signals_init(); /* rootfs populating might need page-writeback */ page_writeback_init(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c41afe6..aa25a7e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const char *cause, int result, int info); /* Internal IMA function definitions */ -void ima_iintcache_init(void); int ima_init(void); void ima_cleanup(void); int ima_fs_init(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c index fa592ff..0d83edc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c @@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; int rc = 0; - if (!ima_initialized) - return 0; - iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); if (!iint) return -ENOMEM; @@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - if (!ima_initialized) - return; spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode); spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); @@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1); } -void __init ima_iintcache_init(void) +static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void) { iint_cache = kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); + return 0; } +security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 75aee18..eb1cf64 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -321,7 +321,6 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; - ima_iintcache_init(); error = ima_init(); ima_initialized = 1; return error; -- cgit v0.10.2 From 9bbb6cad0173e6220f3ac609e26beb48dab3b7cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:02:40 -0500 Subject: ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check ima_path_check actually deals with files! call it ima_file_check instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index cd77b63..d62fdc8 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -1736,7 +1736,7 @@ do_last: if (nd.root.mnt) path_put(&nd.root); if (!IS_ERR(filp)) { - error = ima_path_check(filp, acc_mode); + error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode); if (error) { fput(filp); filp = ERR_PTR(error); @@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ ok: } filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd); if (!IS_ERR(filp)) { - error = ima_path_check(filp, acc_mode); + error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode); if (error) { fput(filp); filp = ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index 32477e3..97d79ef 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, flags, current_cred()); if (IS_ERR(*filp)) host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp); - host_err = ima_path_check(*filp, access); + host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, access); out_nfserr: err = nfserrno(host_err); out: diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index aa55a8f..975837e 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct linux_binprm; extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode); -extern int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask); +extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file); @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) return; } -static inline int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask) +static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index eb1cf64..b76e1f0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * * File: ima_main.c * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap, - * and ima_path_check. + * and ima_file_check. */ #include #include @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) */ -int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask) +int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { int rc; @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ int ima_path_check(struct file *file, int mask) PATH_CHECK); return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); static int __init init_ima(void) { -- cgit v0.10.2 From 1e93d0052d9a6b3d0b382eedceb18b519d603baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:02:41 -0500 Subject: ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to *file* since they always deal with struct file. This patch renames some of the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6434f0d..6cd6dae 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description: lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] - base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION] + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK] mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value uid:= decimal value @@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description: measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC - measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files - open for read by root in inode_permission. + open for read by root in do_filp_open. Examples of LSM specific definitions: @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description: dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t - measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ - measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ Smack: - measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index aa25a7e..47fb65d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref); void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 3cd58b6..2a5e0bc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out: * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) - * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) + * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b76e1f0..294b005 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) if (!iint) return; mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); if (rc < 0) goto out; @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), - PATH_CHECK); + FILE_CHECK); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e127839..4759d0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, }; @@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_func: audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); - if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) - entry->func = PATH_CHECK; + if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; + /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */ + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) entry->func = FILE_MMAP; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) -- cgit v0.10.2 From 89068c576bf324ef6fbd50dfc745148f7def202c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 03:07:29 -0500 Subject: Take ima_file_free() to proper place. Hooks: Just Say No. Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 69652c5..b98404b 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file) if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); security_file_free(file); + ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL)) cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); fops_put(file->f_op); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 24e060b..122b748 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) void security_file_free(struct file *file) { security_ops->file_free_security(file); - if (file->f_dentry) - ima_file_free(file); } int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) -- cgit v0.10.2