From aa3c487f355ff1477b8369d9f0b9860387ae21d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Engelhardt Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2009 15:35:10 +0100 Subject: netfilter: xt_socket: make module available for INPUT chain This should make it possible to test for the existence of local sockets in the INPUT path. References: http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=125380481517129&w=2 Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt Signed-off-by: Balazs Scheidler Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c b/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c index 362afbd..6a90256 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c @@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ static struct xt_match socket_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = { .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_IPV4, .match = socket_mt_v0, - .hooks = 1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING, + .hooks = (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) | + (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN), .me = THIS_MODULE, }, { @@ -201,7 +202,8 @@ static struct xt_match socket_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = { .family = NFPROTO_IPV4, .match = socket_mt_v1, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_socket_mtinfo1), - .hooks = 1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING, + .hooks = (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) | + (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN), .me = THIS_MODULE, }, }; -- cgit v0.10.2 From 9481721be10a1bfd1ee9ccf507eecd7f37caa5ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 21:14:31 +0100 Subject: netfilter: remove synchronize_net() calls in ip_queue/ip6_queue nf_unregister_queue_handlers() already does a synchronize_rcu() call, we dont need to do it again in callers. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c index c156db2..9811a45 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c @@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ cleanup_netlink_notifier: static void __exit ip_queue_fini(void) { nf_unregister_queue_handlers(&nfqh); - synchronize_net(); + ipq_flush(NULL, 0); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c index 1cf3f0c..a82016f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c @@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ cleanup_netlink_notifier: static void __exit ip6_queue_fini(void) { nf_unregister_queue_handlers(&nfqh); - synchronize_net(); + ipq_flush(NULL, 0); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL -- cgit v0.10.2 From 5ae27aa2b16478a84d833ab4065798e752941c5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Changli Gao Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 14:51:31 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: avoid additional compare. Signed-off-by: Changli Gao Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 7c9ec3d..8e572d7 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -511,11 +511,17 @@ static noinline int early_drop(struct net *net, unsigned int hash) cnt++; } - if (ct && unlikely(nf_ct_is_dying(ct) || - !atomic_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))) - ct = NULL; - if (ct || cnt >= NF_CT_EVICTION_RANGE) + if (ct != NULL) { + if (likely(!nf_ct_is_dying(ct) && + atomic_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))) + break; + else + ct = NULL; + } + + if (cnt >= NF_CT_EVICTION_RANGE) break; + hash = (hash + 1) % nf_conntrack_htable_size; } rcu_read_unlock(); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 76ac894080019c6619d3c3bf615db42a43a77f32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hannes Eder Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 15:51:19 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_nat_helper: tidy up adjust_tcp_sequence The variable 'other_way' gets initialized but is not read afterwards, so remove it. Pass the right arguments to a pr_debug call. While being at tidy up a bit and it fix this checkpatch warning: WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements Signed-off-by: Hannes Eder Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c index 09172a6..5bf6a92 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c @@ -41,18 +41,14 @@ adjust_tcp_sequence(u32 seq, struct nf_conn *ct, enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) { - int dir; - struct nf_nat_seq *this_way, *other_way; + enum ip_conntrack_dir dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); struct nf_conn_nat *nat = nfct_nat(ct); + struct nf_nat_seq *this_way = &nat->seq[dir]; - pr_debug("adjust_tcp_sequence: seq = %u, sizediff = %d\n", seq, seq); - - dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); - - this_way = &nat->seq[dir]; - other_way = &nat->seq[!dir]; + pr_debug("adjust_tcp_sequence: seq = %u, sizediff = %d\n", + seq, sizediff); - pr_debug("nf_nat_resize_packet: Seq_offset before: "); + pr_debug("adjust_tcp_sequence: Seq_offset before: "); DUMP_OFFSET(this_way); spin_lock_bh(&nf_nat_seqofs_lock); @@ -63,13 +59,13 @@ adjust_tcp_sequence(u32 seq, * retransmit */ if (this_way->offset_before == this_way->offset_after || before(this_way->correction_pos, seq)) { - this_way->correction_pos = seq; - this_way->offset_before = this_way->offset_after; - this_way->offset_after += sizediff; + this_way->correction_pos = seq; + this_way->offset_before = this_way->offset_after; + this_way->offset_after += sizediff; } spin_unlock_bh(&nf_nat_seqofs_lock); - pr_debug("nf_nat_resize_packet: Seq_offset after: "); + pr_debug("adjust_tcp_sequence: Seq_offset after: "); DUMP_OFFSET(this_way); } -- cgit v0.10.2 From dee5817e88ac8195e5938d6671f434a071e35698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2009 17:04:00 +0100 Subject: netfilter: remove unneccessary checks from netlink notifiers The NETLINK_URELEASE notifier is only invoked for bound sockets, so there is no need to check ->pid again. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c index 9811a45..9f07870 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_queue.c @@ -497,8 +497,7 @@ ipq_rcv_nl_event(struct notifier_block *this, { struct netlink_notify *n = ptr; - if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && - n->protocol == NETLINK_FIREWALL && n->pid) { + if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && n->protocol == NETLINK_FIREWALL) { write_lock_bh(&queue_lock); if ((n->net == &init_net) && (n->pid == peer_pid)) __ipq_reset(); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c index a82016f..47a3623 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_queue.c @@ -499,8 +499,7 @@ ipq_rcv_nl_event(struct notifier_block *this, { struct netlink_notify *n = ptr; - if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && - n->protocol == NETLINK_IP6_FW && n->pid) { + if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && n->protocol == NETLINK_IP6_FW) { write_lock_bh(&queue_lock); if ((n->net == &init_net) && (n->pid == peer_pid)) __ipq_reset(); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index f900dc3..3aa66b2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -666,8 +666,7 @@ nfulnl_rcv_nl_event(struct notifier_block *this, { struct netlink_notify *n = ptr; - if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && - n->protocol == NETLINK_NETFILTER && n->pid) { + if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && n->protocol == NETLINK_NETFILTER) { int i; /* destroy all instances for this pid */ diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index 7a9dec9..7e3fa4106 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -574,8 +574,7 @@ nfqnl_rcv_nl_event(struct notifier_block *this, { struct netlink_notify *n = ptr; - if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && - n->protocol == NETLINK_NETFILTER && n->pid) { + if (event == NETLINK_URELEASE && n->protocol == NETLINK_NETFILTER) { int i; /* destroy all instances for this pid */ -- cgit v0.10.2 From c4832c7bbc3f7a4813347e871d7238651bf437d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 10:34:39 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_ct_tcp: improve out-of-sync situation in TCP tracking Without this patch, if we receive a SYN packet from the client while the firewall is out-of-sync, we let it go through. Then, if we see the SYN/ACK reply coming from the server, we destroy the conntrack entry and drop the packet to trigger a new retransmission. Then, the retransmision from the client is used to start a new clean session. This patch improves the current handling. Basically, if we see an unexpected SYN packet, we annotate the TCP options. Then, if we see the reply SYN/ACK, this means that the firewall was indeed out-of-sync. Therefore, we set a clean new session from the existing entry based on the annotated values. This patch adds two new 8-bits fields that fit in a 16-bits gap of the ip_ct_tcp structure. This patch is particularly useful for conntrackd since the asynchronous nature of the state-synchronization allows to have backup nodes that are not perfect copies of the master. This helps to improve the recovery under some worst-case scenarios. I have tested this by creating lots of conntrack entries in wrong state: for ((i=1024;i<65535;i++)); do conntrack -I -p tcp -s 192.168.2.101 -d 192.168.2.2 --sport $i --dport 80 -t 800 --state ESTABLISHED -u ASSURED,SEEN_REPLY; done Then, I make some TCP connections: $ echo GET / | nc 192.168.2.2 80 The events show the result: [UPDATE] tcp 6 60 SYN_RECV src=192.168.2.101 dst=192.168.2.2 sport=33220 dport=80 src=192.168.2.2 dst=192.168.2.101 sport=80 dport=33220 [ASSURED] [UPDATE] tcp 6 432000 ESTABLISHED src=192.168.2.101 dst=192.168.2.2 sport=33220 dport=80 src=192.168.2.2 dst=192.168.2.101 sport=80 dport=33220 [ASSURED] [UPDATE] tcp 6 120 FIN_WAIT src=192.168.2.101 dst=192.168.2.2 sport=33220 dport=80 src=192.168.2.2 dst=192.168.2.101 sport=80 dport=33220 [ASSURED] [UPDATE] tcp 6 30 LAST_ACK src=192.168.2.101 dst=192.168.2.2 sport=33220 dport=80 src=192.168.2.2 dst=192.168.2.101 sport=80 dport=33220 [ASSURED] [UPDATE] tcp 6 120 TIME_WAIT src=192.168.2.101 dst=192.168.2.2 sport=33220 dport=80 src=192.168.2.2 dst=192.168.2.101 sport=80 dport=33220 [ASSURED] and tcpdump shows no retransmissions: 20:47:57.271951 IP 192.168.2.101.33221 > 192.168.2.2.www: S 435402517:435402517(0) win 5840 20:47:57.273538 IP 192.168.2.2.www > 192.168.2.101.33221: S 3509927945:3509927945(0) ack 435402518 win 5792 20:47:57.273608 IP 192.168.2.101.33221 > 192.168.2.2.www: . ack 3509927946 win 92 20:47:57.273693 IP 192.168.2.101.33221 > 192.168.2.2.www: P 435402518:435402524(6) ack 3509927946 win 92 20:47:57.275492 IP 192.168.2.2.www > 192.168.2.101.33221: . ack 435402524 win 362 20:47:57.276492 IP 192.168.2.2.www > 192.168.2.101.33221: P 3509927946:3509928082(136) ack 435402524 win 362 20:47:57.276515 IP 192.168.2.101.33221 > 192.168.2.2.www: . ack 3509928082 win 108 20:47:57.276521 IP 192.168.2.2.www > 192.168.2.101.33221: F 3509928082:3509928082(0) ack 435402524 win 362 20:47:57.277369 IP 192.168.2.101.33221 > 192.168.2.2.www: F 435402524:435402524(0) ack 3509928083 win 108 20:47:57.279491 IP 192.168.2.2.www > 192.168.2.101.33221: . ack 435402525 win 362 I also added a rule to log invalid packets, with no occurrences :-) . Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h b/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h index 4352fee..ece22e9 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tcp.h @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ struct ip_ct_tcp u_int32_t last_ack; /* Last sequence number seen in opposite dir */ u_int32_t last_end; /* Last seq + len */ u_int16_t last_win; /* Last window advertisement seen in dir */ + /* For SYN packets while we may be out-of-sync */ + u_int8_t last_wscale; /* Last window scaling factor seen */ + u_int8_t last_flags; /* Last flags set */ }; #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index 97a82ba..9cc6b5c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -908,23 +908,54 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, /* b) This SYN/ACK acknowledges a SYN that we earlier * ignored as invalid. This means that the client and * the server are both in sync, while the firewall is - * not. We kill this session and block the SYN/ACK so - * that the client cannot but retransmit its SYN and - * thus initiate a clean new session. + * not. We get in sync from the previously annotated + * values. */ - spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock); - if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_TCP)) - nf_log_packet(pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL, - "nf_ct_tcp: killing out of sync session "); - nf_ct_kill(ct); - return NF_DROP; + old_state = TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT; + new_state = TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_RECV; + ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].td_end = + ct->proto.tcp.last_end; + ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].td_maxend = + ct->proto.tcp.last_end; + ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].td_maxwin = + ct->proto.tcp.last_win == 0 ? + 1 : ct->proto.tcp.last_win; + ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].td_scale = + ct->proto.tcp.last_wscale; + ct->proto.tcp.seen[ct->proto.tcp.last_dir].flags = + ct->proto.tcp.last_flags; + memset(&ct->proto.tcp.seen[dir], 0, + sizeof(struct ip_ct_tcp_state)); + break; } ct->proto.tcp.last_index = index; ct->proto.tcp.last_dir = dir; ct->proto.tcp.last_seq = ntohl(th->seq); ct->proto.tcp.last_end = segment_seq_plus_len(ntohl(th->seq), skb->len, dataoff, th); - + ct->proto.tcp.last_win = ntohs(th->window); + + /* a) This is a SYN in ORIGINAL. The client and the server + * may be in sync but we are not. In that case, we annotate + * the TCP options and let the packet go through. If it is a + * valid SYN packet, the server will reply with a SYN/ACK, and + * then we'll get in sync. Otherwise, the server ignores it. */ + if (index == TCP_SYN_SET && dir == IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL) { + struct ip_ct_tcp_state seen = {}; + + ct->proto.tcp.last_flags = + ct->proto.tcp.last_wscale = 0; + tcp_options(skb, dataoff, th, &seen); + if (seen.flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_WINDOW_SCALE) { + ct->proto.tcp.last_flags |= + IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_WINDOW_SCALE; + ct->proto.tcp.last_wscale = seen.td_scale; + } + if (seen.flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_SACK_PERM) { + ct->proto.tcp.last_flags |= + IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_SACK_PERM; + } + } spin_unlock_bh(&ct->lock); if (LOG_INVALID(net, IPPROTO_TCP)) nf_log_packet(pf, 0, skb, NULL, NULL, NULL, -- cgit v0.10.2 From 3a0429292daa0e1ec848bd26479f5e48b0d54a42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 10:43:57 +0100 Subject: netfilter: xtables: fix conntrack match v1 ipt-save output commit d6d3f08b0fd998b647a05540cedd11a067b72867 (netfilter: xtables: conntrack match revision 2) does break the v1 conntrack match iptables-save output in a subtle way. Problem is as follows: up = kmalloc(sizeof(*up), GFP_KERNEL); [..] /* * The strategy here is to minimize the overhead of v1 matching, * by prebuilding a v2 struct and putting the pointer into the * v1 dataspace. */ memcpy(up, info, offsetof(typeof(*info), state_mask)); [..] *(void **)info = up; As the v2 struct pointer is saved in the match data space, it clobbers the first structure member (->origsrc_addr). Because the _v1 match function grabs this pointer and does not actually look at the v1 origsrc, run time functionality does not break. But iptables -nvL (or iptables-save) cannot know that v1 origsrc_addr has been overloaded in this way: $ iptables -p tcp -A OUTPUT -m conntrack --ctorigsrc 10.0.0.1 -j ACCEPT $ iptables-save -A OUTPUT -p tcp -m conntrack --ctorigsrc 128.173.134.206 -j ACCEPT (128.173... is the address to the v2 match structure). To fix this, we take advantage of the fact that the v1 and v2 structures are identical with exception of the last two structure members (u8 in v1, u16 in v2). We extract them as early as possible and prevent the v2 matching function from looking at those two members directly. Previously reported by Michel Messerschmidt via Ben Hutchings, also see Debian Bug tracker #556587. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_conntrack.c b/net/netfilter/xt_conntrack.c index 6dc4652..ae66305 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_conntrack.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_conntrack.c @@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ ct_proto_port_check(const struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2 *info, } static bool -conntrack_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) +conntrack_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par, + u16 state_mask, u16 status_mask) { const struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2 *info = par->matchinfo; enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; @@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ conntrack_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) if (test_bit(IPS_DST_NAT_BIT, &ct->status)) statebit |= XT_CONNTRACK_STATE_DNAT; } - if (!!(info->state_mask & statebit) ^ + if (!!(state_mask & statebit) ^ !(info->invert_flags & XT_CONNTRACK_STATE)) return false; } @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ conntrack_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) return false; if ((info->match_flags & XT_CONNTRACK_STATUS) && - (!!(info->status_mask & ct->status) ^ + (!!(status_mask & ct->status) ^ !(info->invert_flags & XT_CONNTRACK_STATUS))) return false; @@ -192,11 +193,17 @@ conntrack_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) static bool conntrack_mt_v1(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) { - const struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2 *const *info = par->matchinfo; - struct xt_match_param newpar = *par; + const struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo1 *info = par->matchinfo; - newpar.matchinfo = *info; - return conntrack_mt(skb, &newpar); + return conntrack_mt(skb, par, info->state_mask, info->status_mask); +} + +static bool +conntrack_mt_v2(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2 *info = par->matchinfo; + + return conntrack_mt(skb, par, info->state_mask, info->status_mask); } static bool conntrack_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) @@ -209,45 +216,11 @@ static bool conntrack_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) return true; } -static bool conntrack_mt_check_v1(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) -{ - struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo1 *info = par->matchinfo; - struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2 *up; - int ret = conntrack_mt_check(par); - - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - up = kmalloc(sizeof(*up), GFP_KERNEL); - if (up == NULL) { - nf_ct_l3proto_module_put(par->family); - return -ENOMEM; - } - - /* - * The strategy here is to minimize the overhead of v1 matching, - * by prebuilding a v2 struct and putting the pointer into the - * v1 dataspace. - */ - memcpy(up, info, offsetof(typeof(*info), state_mask)); - up->state_mask = info->state_mask; - up->status_mask = info->status_mask; - *(void **)info = up; - return true; -} - static void conntrack_mt_destroy(const struct xt_mtdtor_param *par) { nf_ct_l3proto_module_put(par->family); } -static void conntrack_mt_destroy_v1(const struct xt_mtdtor_param *par) -{ - struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2 **info = par->matchinfo; - kfree(*info); - conntrack_mt_destroy(par); -} - static struct xt_match conntrack_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = { { .name = "conntrack", @@ -255,8 +228,8 @@ static struct xt_match conntrack_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = { .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo1), .match = conntrack_mt_v1, - .checkentry = conntrack_mt_check_v1, - .destroy = conntrack_mt_destroy_v1, + .checkentry = conntrack_mt_check, + .destroy = conntrack_mt_destroy, .me = THIS_MODULE, }, { @@ -264,7 +237,7 @@ static struct xt_match conntrack_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = { .revision = 2, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_conntrack_mtinfo2), - .match = conntrack_mt, + .match = conntrack_mt_v2, .checkentry = conntrack_mt_check, .destroy = conntrack_mt_destroy, .me = THIS_MODULE, -- cgit v0.10.2 From 3666ed1c4837fd6906da0224c5373d7a2186a193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Perches Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 23:17:06 +0100 Subject: netfilter: net/ipv[46]/netfilter: Move && and || to end of previous line Compile tested only. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 27774c9..0663276 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -384,11 +384,11 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS)); /* Unconditional return/END. */ - if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - && (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, - ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) - && t->verdict < 0 - && unconditional(&e->arp)) || visited) { + if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) && + (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, + ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && + t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) || + visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, int newpos = t->verdict; if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, - ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 - && newpos >= 0) { + ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && + newpos >= 0) { if (newpos > newinfo->size - sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) { duprintf("mark_source_chains: " @@ -559,8 +559,8 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e, { unsigned int h; - if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 - || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) { + if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 || + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1251,8 +1251,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, int ret, off, h; duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e); - if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 - || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) { + if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 || + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index cde755d..572330a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ ip_packet_match(const struct iphdr *ip, #define FWINV(bool, invflg) ((bool) ^ !!(ipinfo->invflags & (invflg))) if (FWINV((ip->saddr&ipinfo->smsk.s_addr) != ipinfo->src.s_addr, - IPT_INV_SRCIP) - || FWINV((ip->daddr&ipinfo->dmsk.s_addr) != ipinfo->dst.s_addr, - IPT_INV_DSTIP)) { + IPT_INV_SRCIP) || + FWINV((ip->daddr&ipinfo->dmsk.s_addr) != ipinfo->dst.s_addr, + IPT_INV_DSTIP)) { dprintf("Source or dest mismatch.\n"); dprintf("SRC: %pI4. Mask: %pI4. Target: %pI4.%s\n", @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ ip_packet_match(const struct iphdr *ip, } /* Check specific protocol */ - if (ipinfo->proto - && FWINV(ip->protocol != ipinfo->proto, IPT_INV_PROTO)) { + if (ipinfo->proto && + FWINV(ip->protocol != ipinfo->proto, IPT_INV_PROTO)) { dprintf("Packet protocol %hi does not match %hi.%s\n", ip->protocol, ipinfo->proto, ipinfo->invflags&IPT_INV_PROTO ? " (INV)":""); @@ -246,11 +246,11 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(struct ipt_entry *s, struct ipt_entry *e, } else if (s == e) { (*rulenum)++; - if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - && strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, - IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 - && t->verdict < 0 - && unconditional(&s->ip)) { + if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) && + strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, + IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && + t->verdict < 0 && + unconditional(&s->ip)) { /* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */ *comment = *chainname == hookname ? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY] @@ -388,8 +388,8 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, back = get_entry(table_base, back->comefrom); continue; } - if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) - && !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) { + if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) && + !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) { /* Save old back ptr in next entry */ struct ipt_entry *next = ipt_next_entry(e); next->comefrom = (void *)back - table_base; @@ -473,11 +473,11 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)); /* Unconditional return/END. */ - if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - && (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, - IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) - && t->verdict < 0 - && unconditional(&e->ip)) || visited) { + if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) && + (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, + IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && + t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) || + visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, @@ -524,8 +524,8 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, int newpos = t->verdict; if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, - IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 - && newpos >= 0) { + IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && + newpos >= 0) { if (newpos > newinfo->size - sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) { duprintf("mark_source_chains: " @@ -735,8 +735,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e, { unsigned int h; - if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 - || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) { + if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 || + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1548,8 +1548,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, int ret, off, h; duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e); - if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 - || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) { + if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 || + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c index 2e4f98b..40ca2d2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c @@ -303,9 +303,9 @@ clusterip_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_target_param *par) /* special case: ICMP error handling. conntrack distinguishes between * error messages (RELATED) and information requests (see below) */ - if (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP - && (ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED - || ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED+IP_CT_IS_REPLY)) + if (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP && + (ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED || + ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED + IP_CT_IS_REPLY)) return XT_CONTINUE; /* ip_conntrack_icmp guarantees us that we only have ICMP_ECHO, @@ -362,8 +362,8 @@ static bool clusterip_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) return false; } - if (e->ip.dmsk.s_addr != htonl(0xffffffff) - || e->ip.dst.s_addr == 0) { + if (e->ip.dmsk.s_addr != htonl(0xffffffff) || + e->ip.dst.s_addr == 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "CLUSTERIP: Please specify destination IP\n"); return false; } @@ -495,14 +495,14 @@ arp_mangle(unsigned int hook, struct clusterip_config *c; /* we don't care about non-ethernet and non-ipv4 ARP */ - if (arp->ar_hrd != htons(ARPHRD_ETHER) - || arp->ar_pro != htons(ETH_P_IP) - || arp->ar_pln != 4 || arp->ar_hln != ETH_ALEN) + if (arp->ar_hrd != htons(ARPHRD_ETHER) || + arp->ar_pro != htons(ETH_P_IP) || + arp->ar_pln != 4 || arp->ar_hln != ETH_ALEN) return NF_ACCEPT; /* we only want to mangle arp requests and replies */ - if (arp->ar_op != htons(ARPOP_REPLY) - && arp->ar_op != htons(ARPOP_REQUEST)) + if (arp->ar_op != htons(ARPOP_REPLY) && + arp->ar_op != htons(ARPOP_REQUEST)) return NF_ACCEPT; payload = (void *)(arp+1); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ECN.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ECN.c index f7e2fa0..549e206 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ECN.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ECN.c @@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ ecn_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_target_param *par) if (!set_ect_ip(skb, einfo)) return NF_DROP; - if (einfo->operation & (IPT_ECN_OP_SET_ECE | IPT_ECN_OP_SET_CWR) - && ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) + if (einfo->operation & (IPT_ECN_OP_SET_ECE | IPT_ECN_OP_SET_CWR) && + ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) if (!set_ect_tcp(skb, einfo)) return NF_DROP; @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ static bool ecn_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) einfo->ip_ect); return false; } - if ((einfo->operation & (IPT_ECN_OP_SET_ECE|IPT_ECN_OP_SET_CWR)) - && (e->ip.proto != IPPROTO_TCP || (e->ip.invflags & XT_INV_PROTO))) { + if ((einfo->operation & (IPT_ECN_OP_SET_ECE|IPT_ECN_OP_SET_CWR)) && + (e->ip.proto != IPPROTO_TCP || (e->ip.invflags & XT_INV_PROTO))) { printk(KERN_WARNING "ECN: cannot use TCP operations on a " "non-tcp rule\n"); return false; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c index acc44c6..ee128ef 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_LOG.c @@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info, if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) printk("FRAG:%u ", ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET); - if ((logflags & IPT_LOG_IPOPT) - && ih->ihl * 4 > sizeof(struct iphdr)) { + if ((logflags & IPT_LOG_IPOPT) && + ih->ihl * 4 > sizeof(struct iphdr)) { const unsigned char *op; unsigned char _opt[4 * 15 - sizeof(struct iphdr)]; unsigned int i, optsize; @@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info, /* Max length: 11 "URGP=65535 " */ printk("URGP=%u ", ntohs(th->urg_ptr)); - if ((logflags & IPT_LOG_TCPOPT) - && th->doff * 4 > sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { + if ((logflags & IPT_LOG_TCPOPT) && + th->doff * 4 > sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { unsigned char _opt[4 * 15 - sizeof(struct tcphdr)]; const unsigned char *op; unsigned int i, optsize; @@ -238,9 +238,9 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info, printk("TYPE=%u CODE=%u ", ich->type, ich->code); /* Max length: 25 "INCOMPLETE [65535 bytes] " */ - if (ich->type <= NR_ICMP_TYPES - && required_len[ich->type] - && skb->len-iphoff-ih->ihl*4 < required_len[ich->type]) { + if (ich->type <= NR_ICMP_TYPES && + required_len[ich->type] && + skb->len-iphoff-ih->ihl*4 < required_len[ich->type]) { printk("INCOMPLETE [%u bytes] ", skb->len - iphoff - ih->ihl*4); break; @@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info, } /* Max length: 10 "MTU=65535 " */ - if (ich->type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH - && ich->code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) + if (ich->type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH && + ich->code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) printk("MTU=%u ", ntohs(ich->un.frag.mtu)); } break; @@ -407,8 +407,8 @@ ipt_log_packet(u_int8_t pf, if (in && !out) { /* MAC logging for input chain only. */ printk("MAC="); - if (skb->dev && skb->dev->hard_header_len - && skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) { + if (skb->dev && skb->dev->hard_header_len && + skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) { int i; const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb); for (i = 0; i < skb->dev->hard_header_len; i++,p++) diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_MASQUERADE.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_MASQUERADE.c index dada086..650b540 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_MASQUERADE.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_MASQUERADE.c @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ masquerade_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_target_param *par) ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); nat = nfct_nat(ct); - NF_CT_ASSERT(ct && (ctinfo == IP_CT_NEW || ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED - || ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED + IP_CT_IS_REPLY)); + NF_CT_ASSERT(ct && (ctinfo == IP_CT_NEW || ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED || + ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED + IP_CT_IS_REPLY)); /* Source address is 0.0.0.0 - locally generated packet that is * probably not supposed to be masqueraded. diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c index c93ae44..5113b8f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_REJECT.c @@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ static bool reject_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) return false; } else if (rejinfo->with == IPT_TCP_RESET) { /* Must specify that it's a TCP packet */ - if (e->ip.proto != IPPROTO_TCP - || (e->ip.invflags & XT_INV_PROTO)) { + if (e->ip.proto != IPPROTO_TCP || + (e->ip.invflags & XT_INV_PROTO)) { printk("ipt_REJECT: TCP_RESET invalid for non-tcp\n"); return false; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c index d32cc4b..399061c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c @@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ static void ipt_ulog_packet(unsigned int hooknum, else *(pm->prefix) = '\0'; - if (in && in->hard_header_len > 0 - && skb->mac_header != skb->network_header - && in->hard_header_len <= ULOG_MAC_LEN) { + if (in && in->hard_header_len > 0 && + skb->mac_header != skb->network_header && + in->hard_header_len <= ULOG_MAC_LEN) { memcpy(pm->mac, skb_mac_header(skb), in->hard_header_len); pm->mac_len = in->hard_header_len; } else diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ecn.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ecn.c index 6289b64..2a1e56b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ecn.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ecn.c @@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ static bool ecn_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) if (info->invert & IPT_ECN_OP_MATCH_MASK) return false; - if (info->operation & (IPT_ECN_OP_MATCH_ECE|IPT_ECN_OP_MATCH_CWR) - && ip->proto != IPPROTO_TCP) { + if (info->operation & (IPT_ECN_OP_MATCH_ECE|IPT_ECN_OP_MATCH_CWR) && + ip->proto != IPPROTO_TCP) { printk(KERN_WARNING "ipt_ecn: can't match TCP bits in rule for" " non-tcp packets\n"); return false; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c index 036047f..fae78c3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c @@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ ipt_local_hook(unsigned int hook, u_int32_t mark; /* root is playing with raw sockets. */ - if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) - || ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) + if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) || + ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) return NF_ACCEPT; /* Save things which could affect route */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c index 99eb76c6..3bd3d63 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_security.c @@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ ipt_local_out_hook(unsigned int hook, int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) { /* Somebody is playing with raw sockets. */ - if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) - || ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) + if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) || + ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) return NF_ACCEPT; return ipt_do_table(skb, hook, in, out, dev_net(out)->ipv4.iptable_security); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmp.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmp.c index d71ba76..e3dd936 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmp.c @@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ static const u_int8_t invmap[] = { static bool icmp_invert_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *orig) { - if (orig->dst.u.icmp.type >= sizeof(invmap) - || !invmap[orig->dst.u.icmp.type]) + if (orig->dst.u.icmp.type >= sizeof(invmap) || + !invmap[orig->dst.u.icmp.type]) return false; tuple->src.u.icmp.id = orig->src.u.icmp.id; @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ static bool icmp_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb, [ICMP_ADDRESS] = 1 }; - if (ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.u.icmp.type >= sizeof(valid_new) - || !valid_new[ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.u.icmp.type]) { + if (ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.u.icmp.type >= sizeof(valid_new) || + !valid_new[ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.u.icmp.type]) { /* Can't create a new ICMP `conn' with this. */ pr_debug("icmp: can't create new conn with type %u\n", ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.dst.u.icmp.type); @@ -201,11 +201,11 @@ icmp_error(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, } /* Need to track icmp error message? */ - if (icmph->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH - && icmph->type != ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH - && icmph->type != ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED - && icmph->type != ICMP_PARAMETERPROB - && icmph->type != ICMP_REDIRECT) + if (icmph->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH && + icmph->type != ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH && + icmph->type != ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED && + icmph->type != ICMP_PARAMETERPROB && + icmph->type != ICMP_REDIRECT) return NF_ACCEPT; return icmp_error_message(net, skb, ctinfo, hooknum); @@ -238,17 +238,17 @@ static const struct nla_policy icmp_nla_policy[CTA_PROTO_MAX+1] = { static int icmp_nlattr_to_tuple(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { - if (!tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_TYPE] - || !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_CODE] - || !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_ID]) + if (!tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_TYPE] || + !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_CODE] || + !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_ID]) return -EINVAL; tuple->dst.u.icmp.type = nla_get_u8(tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_TYPE]); tuple->dst.u.icmp.code = nla_get_u8(tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_CODE]); tuple->src.u.icmp.id = nla_get_be16(tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMP_ID]); - if (tuple->dst.u.icmp.type >= sizeof(invmap) - || !invmap[tuple->dst.u.icmp.type]) + if (tuple->dst.u.icmp.type >= sizeof(invmap) || + !invmap[tuple->dst.u.icmp.type]) return -EINVAL; return 0; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_standalone.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_standalone.c index 5f41d01..5678e95 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_standalone.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_standalone.c @@ -197,11 +197,11 @@ nf_nat_out(unsigned int hooknum, (ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo)) != NULL) { enum ip_conntrack_dir dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); - if (ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u3.ip != - ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u3.ip - || ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all != - ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u.all - ) + if ((ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u3.ip != + ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u3.ip) || + (ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u.all != + ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u.all) + ) return ip_xfrm_me_harder(skb) == 0 ? ret : NF_DROP; } #endif diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index cc9f8ef..480d7f8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ ip6_packet_match(const struct sk_buff *skb, #define FWINV(bool, invflg) ((bool) ^ !!(ip6info->invflags & (invflg))) if (FWINV(ipv6_masked_addr_cmp(&ipv6->saddr, &ip6info->smsk, - &ip6info->src), IP6T_INV_SRCIP) - || FWINV(ipv6_masked_addr_cmp(&ipv6->daddr, &ip6info->dmsk, - &ip6info->dst), IP6T_INV_DSTIP)) { + &ip6info->src), IP6T_INV_SRCIP) || + FWINV(ipv6_masked_addr_cmp(&ipv6->daddr, &ip6info->dmsk, + &ip6info->dst), IP6T_INV_DSTIP)) { dprintf("Source or dest mismatch.\n"); /* dprintf("SRC: %u. Mask: %u. Target: %u.%s\n", ip->saddr, @@ -277,11 +277,11 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(struct ip6t_entry *s, struct ip6t_entry *e, } else if (s == e) { (*rulenum)++; - if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - && strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, - IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 - && t->verdict < 0 - && unconditional(&s->ipv6)) { + if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) && + strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, + IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && + t->verdict < 0 && + unconditional(&s->ipv6)) { /* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */ *comment = *chainname == hookname ? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY] @@ -418,8 +418,8 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, back = get_entry(table_base, back->comefrom); continue; } - if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) - && !(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) { + if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) && + !(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) { /* Save old back ptr in next entry */ struct ip6t_entry *next = ip6t_next_entry(e); next->comefrom = (void *)back - table_base; @@ -505,11 +505,11 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS)); /* Unconditional return/END. */ - if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - && (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, - IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) - && t->verdict < 0 - && unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) { + if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) && + (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, + IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) && + t->verdict < 0 && + unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) { unsigned int oldpos, size; if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, @@ -556,8 +556,8 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, int newpos = t->verdict; if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, - IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 - && newpos >= 0) { + IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && + newpos >= 0) { if (newpos > newinfo->size - sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) { duprintf("mark_source_chains: " @@ -767,8 +767,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e, { unsigned int h; - if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 - || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) { + if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 || + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1584,8 +1584,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, int ret, off, h; duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e); - if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 - || (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) { + if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 || + (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) { duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit); return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c index 7018cac..b285fdf 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_LOG.c @@ -249,8 +249,8 @@ static void dump_packet(const struct nf_loginfo *info, /* Max length: 11 "URGP=65535 " */ printk("URGP=%u ", ntohs(th->urg_ptr)); - if ((logflags & IP6T_LOG_TCPOPT) - && th->doff * 4 > sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { + if ((logflags & IP6T_LOG_TCPOPT) && + th->doff * 4 > sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { u_int8_t _opt[60 - sizeof(struct tcphdr)]; const u_int8_t *op; unsigned int i; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_REJECT.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_REJECT.c index 5a7f00c..8311ca3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_REJECT.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_REJECT.c @@ -223,8 +223,8 @@ static bool reject_tg6_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) return false; } else if (rejinfo->with == IP6T_TCP_RESET) { /* Must specify that it's a TCP packet */ - if (e->ipv6.proto != IPPROTO_TCP - || (e->ipv6.invflags & XT_INV_PROTO)) { + if (e->ipv6.proto != IPPROTO_TCP || + (e->ipv6.invflags & XT_INV_PROTO)) { printk("ip6t_REJECT: TCP_RESET illegal for non-tcp\n"); return false; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_ah.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_ah.c index 3a82f24..ac0b7c6 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_ah.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_ah.c @@ -77,17 +77,14 @@ static bool ah_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) ahinfo->hdrres, ah->reserved, !(ahinfo->hdrres && ah->reserved)); - return (ah != NULL) - && - spi_match(ahinfo->spis[0], ahinfo->spis[1], - ntohl(ah->spi), - !!(ahinfo->invflags & IP6T_AH_INV_SPI)) - && - (!ahinfo->hdrlen || - (ahinfo->hdrlen == hdrlen) ^ - !!(ahinfo->invflags & IP6T_AH_INV_LEN)) - && - !(ahinfo->hdrres && ah->reserved); + return (ah != NULL) && + spi_match(ahinfo->spis[0], ahinfo->spis[1], + ntohl(ah->spi), + !!(ahinfo->invflags & IP6T_AH_INV_SPI)) && + (!ahinfo->hdrlen || + (ahinfo->hdrlen == hdrlen) ^ + !!(ahinfo->invflags & IP6T_AH_INV_LEN)) && + !(ahinfo->hdrres && ah->reserved); } static bool ah_mt6_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_frag.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_frag.c index 673aa0a..7b91c25 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_frag.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_frag.c @@ -70,41 +70,36 @@ frag_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) pr_debug("res %02X %02X%04X %02X ", fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_RES, fh->reserved, ntohs(fh->frag_off) & 0x6, - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_RES) - && (fh->reserved || (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & 0x06)))); + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_RES) && + (fh->reserved || (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & 0x06)))); pr_debug("first %02X %02X %02X ", fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_FST, ntohs(fh->frag_off) & ~0x7, - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_FST) - && (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & ~0x7))); + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_FST) && + (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & ~0x7))); pr_debug("mf %02X %02X %02X ", fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_MF, ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF, - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_MF) - && !((ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF)))); + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_MF) && + !((ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF)))); pr_debug("last %02X %02X %02X\n", fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_NMF, ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF, - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_NMF) - && (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF))); - - return (fh != NULL) - && - id_match(fraginfo->ids[0], fraginfo->ids[1], - ntohl(fh->identification), - !!(fraginfo->invflags & IP6T_FRAG_INV_IDS)) - && - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_RES) - && (fh->reserved || (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & 0x6))) - && - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_FST) - && (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & ~0x7)) - && - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_MF) - && !(ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF)) - && - !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_NMF) - && (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF)); + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_NMF) && + (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF))); + + return (fh != NULL) && + id_match(fraginfo->ids[0], fraginfo->ids[1], + ntohl(fh->identification), + !!(fraginfo->invflags & IP6T_FRAG_INV_IDS)) && + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_RES) && + (fh->reserved || (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & 0x6))) && + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_FST) && + (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & ~0x7)) && + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_MF) && + !(ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF)) && + !((fraginfo->flags & IP6T_FRAG_NMF) && + (ntohs(fh->frag_off) & IP6_MF)); } static bool frag_mt6_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c index 356b8d6..b77307f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c @@ -92,16 +92,13 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_match_param *par) !((rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_RES) && (((const struct rt0_hdr *)rh)->reserved))); - ret = (rh != NULL) - && + ret = (rh != NULL) && (segsleft_match(rtinfo->segsleft[0], rtinfo->segsleft[1], rh->segments_left, - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_SGS))) - && + !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_SGS))) && (!(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_LEN) || ((rtinfo->hdrlen == hdrlen) ^ - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_LEN))) - && + !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_LEN))) && (!(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_TYP) || ((rtinfo->rt_type == rh->type) ^ !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_TYP))); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_filter.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_filter.c index 6f4383a..ad378ef 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_filter.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_filter.c @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ ip6t_local_out_hook(unsigned int hook, { #if 0 /* root is playing with raw sockets. */ - if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) - || ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) { + if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) || + ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) { if (net_ratelimit()) printk("ip6t_hook: happy cracking.\n"); return NF_ACCEPT; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c index 0ad9143..a929c19 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ ip6t_local_out_hook(unsigned int hook, #if 0 /* root is playing with raw sockets. */ - if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) - || ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) { + if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr) || + ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) { if (net_ratelimit()) printk("ip6t_hook: happy cracking.\n"); return NF_ACCEPT; @@ -122,11 +122,11 @@ ip6t_local_out_hook(unsigned int hook, ret = ip6t_do_table(skb, hook, in, out, dev_net(out)->ipv6.ip6table_mangle); - if (ret != NF_DROP && ret != NF_STOLEN - && (memcmp(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &saddr, sizeof(saddr)) - || memcmp(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, &daddr, sizeof(daddr)) - || skb->mark != mark - || ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit != hop_limit)) + if (ret != NF_DROP && ret != NF_STOLEN && + (memcmp(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &saddr, sizeof(saddr)) || + memcmp(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, &daddr, sizeof(daddr)) || + skb->mark != mark || + ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit != hop_limit)) return ip6_route_me_harder(skb) == 0 ? ret : NF_DROP; return ret; diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c index 642dcb1..0f3df45 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_icmpv6.c @@ -244,18 +244,18 @@ static const struct nla_policy icmpv6_nla_policy[CTA_PROTO_MAX+1] = { static int icmpv6_nlattr_to_tuple(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { - if (!tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_TYPE] - || !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_CODE] - || !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_ID]) + if (!tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_TYPE] || + !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_CODE] || + !tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_ID]) return -EINVAL; tuple->dst.u.icmp.type = nla_get_u8(tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_TYPE]); tuple->dst.u.icmp.code = nla_get_u8(tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_CODE]); tuple->src.u.icmp.id = nla_get_be16(tb[CTA_PROTO_ICMPV6_ID]); - if (tuple->dst.u.icmp.type < 128 - || tuple->dst.u.icmp.type - 128 >= sizeof(invmap) - || !invmap[tuple->dst.u.icmp.type - 128]) + if (tuple->dst.u.icmp.type < 128 || + tuple->dst.u.icmp.type - 128 >= sizeof(invmap) || + !invmap[tuple->dst.u.icmp.type - 128]) return -EINVAL; return 0; -- cgit v0.10.2