/* * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation * * Author: * Mimi Zohar * Kylene Hall * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: evm_main.c * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr, * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK XATTR_NAME_SMACK, #endif XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL }; /* * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr * * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. (For performance, * use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the * HMAC.) * * Returns integrity status */ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; int rc; if (iint->hmac_status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN) return iint->hmac_status; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); if (rc < 0) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (u8 *)&xattr_data, sizeof xattr_data, GFP_NOFS); if (rc < 0) goto err_out; iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; return iint->hmac_status; err_out: switch (rc) { case -ENODATA: /* file not labelled */ iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; break; case -EINVAL: iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; default: iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } return iint->hmac_status; } static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) { char **xattrname; int namelen; int found = 0; namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen) && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) { found = 1; break; } if (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) { found = 1; break; } } return found; } /** * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr * @dentry: object of the verify xattr * @xattr_name: requested xattr * @xattr_value: requested xattr value * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length * * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC. * * Returns the xattr integrity status. * * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. */ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; enum integrity_status status; if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; status = evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, iint); return status; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); /* * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed. */ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; } return 0; } /** * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * * Prevent 'security.evm' from being modified */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } /** * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Prevent 'security.evm' from being removed. */ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. * * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's * i_mutex lock. */ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); return; } /** * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); return; } /** * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status * * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID * changes. * * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { if (!evm_initialized) return; if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); return; } /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm */ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; int rc; if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); evm_xattr->name = kstrdup(XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS); return 0; out: kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); static struct crypto_hash *tfm_hmac; /* preload crypto alg */ static int __init init_evm(void) { int error; tfm_hmac = crypto_alloc_hash(evm_hmac, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n"); goto err; } err: return error; } static void __exit cleanup_evm(void) { evm_cleanup_secfs(); crypto_free_hash(tfm_hmac); } /* * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes */ static int __init evm_display_config(void) { char **xattrname; for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname); return 0; } pure_initcall(evm_display_config); late_initcall(init_evm); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");