From 03cc0789a690eb9ab07070376252961caeae7441 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2016 14:56:58 -0400 Subject: do_splice_to(): cap the size before passing to ->splice_read() pipe capacity won't exceed 2G anyway. Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c index 9947b5c..a6b87b7 100644 --- a/fs/splice.c +++ b/fs/splice.c @@ -1143,6 +1143,9 @@ static long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos, if (unlikely(ret < 0)) return ret; + if (unlikely(len > MAX_RW_COUNT)) + len = MAX_RW_COUNT; + if (in->f_op->splice_read) splice_read = in->f_op->splice_read; else -- cgit v0.10.2 From 357f435d8a0d32068c75f3c7176434d992b3adb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2016 19:05:19 -0400 Subject: fix the copy vs. map logics in blk_rq_map_user_iov() Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/block/blk-map.c b/block/blk-map.c index a54f054..b9f88b7 100644 --- a/block/blk-map.c +++ b/block/blk-map.c @@ -9,24 +9,6 @@ #include "blk.h" -static bool iovec_gap_to_prv(struct request_queue *q, - struct iovec *prv, struct iovec *cur) -{ - unsigned long prev_end; - - if (!queue_virt_boundary(q)) - return false; - - if (prv->iov_base == NULL && prv->iov_len == 0) - /* prv is not set - don't check */ - return false; - - prev_end = (unsigned long)(prv->iov_base + prv->iov_len); - - return (((unsigned long)cur->iov_base & queue_virt_boundary(q)) || - prev_end & queue_virt_boundary(q)); -} - int blk_rq_append_bio(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq, struct bio *bio) { @@ -125,31 +107,18 @@ int blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq, struct rq_map_data *map_data, const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask) { - struct iovec iov, prv = {.iov_base = NULL, .iov_len = 0}; - bool copy = (q->dma_pad_mask & iter->count) || map_data; + bool copy = false; + unsigned long align = q->dma_pad_mask | queue_dma_alignment(q); struct bio *bio = NULL; struct iov_iter i; int ret; - if (!iter || !iter->count) - return -EINVAL; - - iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) { - unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base; - - if (!iov.iov_len) - return -EINVAL; - - /* - * Keep going so we check length of all segments - */ - if ((uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q)) || - iovec_gap_to_prv(q, &prv, &iov)) - copy = true; - - prv.iov_base = iov.iov_base; - prv.iov_len = iov.iov_len; - } + if (map_data) + copy = true; + else if (iov_iter_alignment(iter) & align) + copy = true; + else if (queue_virt_boundary(q)) + copy = queue_virt_boundary(q) & iov_iter_gap_alignment(iter); i = *iter; do { diff --git a/include/linux/uio.h b/include/linux/uio.h index fd9bcfe..1b5d1cd 100644 --- a/include/linux/uio.h +++ b/include/linux/uio.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ size_t copy_from_iter(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i); size_t copy_from_iter_nocache(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i); size_t iov_iter_zero(size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *); unsigned long iov_iter_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i); +unsigned long iov_iter_gap_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i); void iov_iter_init(struct iov_iter *i, int direction, const struct iovec *iov, unsigned long nr_segs, size_t count); void iov_iter_kvec(struct iov_iter *i, int direction, const struct kvec *kvec, diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c index 5fecddc..ca5316e 100644 --- a/lib/iov_iter.c +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c @@ -569,6 +569,25 @@ unsigned long iov_iter_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(iov_iter_alignment); +unsigned long iov_iter_gap_alignment(const struct iov_iter *i) +{ + unsigned long res = 0; + size_t size = i->count; + if (!size) + return 0; + + iterate_all_kinds(i, size, v, + (res |= (!res ? 0 : (unsigned long)v.iov_base) | + (size != v.iov_len ? size : 0), 0), + (res |= (!res ? 0 : (unsigned long)v.bv_offset) | + (size != v.bv_len ? size : 0)), + (res |= (!res ? 0 : (unsigned long)v.iov_base) | + (size != v.iov_len ? size : 0)) + ); + return res; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(iov_iter_gap_alignment); + ssize_t iov_iter_get_pages(struct iov_iter *i, struct page **pages, size_t maxsize, unsigned maxpages, size_t *start) -- cgit v0.10.2 From 10c64cea04d3c75c306b3f990586ffb343b63287 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2016 01:11:55 -0400 Subject: atomic_open(): fix the handling of create_error * if we have a hashed negative dentry and either CREAT|EXCL on r/o filesystem, or CREAT|TRUNC on r/o filesystem, or CREAT|EXCL with failing may_o_create(), we should fail with EROFS or the error may_o_create() has returned, but not ENOENT. Which is what the current code ends up returning. * if we have CREAT|TRUNC hitting a regular file on a read-only filesystem, we can't fail with EROFS here. At the very least, not until we'd done follow_managed() - we might have a writable file (or a device, for that matter) bound on top of that one. Moreover, the code downstream will see that O_TRUNC and attempt to grab the write access (*after* following possible mount), so if we really should fail with EROFS, it will happen. No need to do that inside atomic_open(). The real logics is much simpler than what the current code is trying to do - if we decided to go for simple lookup, ended up with a negative dentry *and* had create_error set, fail with create_error. No matter whether we'd got that negative dentry from lookup_real() or had found it in dcache. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.6+ Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 1d9ca2d..b458992 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -2942,22 +2942,10 @@ no_open: dentry = lookup_real(dir, dentry, nd->flags); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) return PTR_ERR(dentry); - - if (create_error) { - int open_flag = op->open_flag; - - error = create_error; - if ((open_flag & O_EXCL)) { - if (!dentry->d_inode) - goto out; - } else if (!dentry->d_inode) { - goto out; - } else if ((open_flag & O_TRUNC) && - d_is_reg(dentry)) { - goto out; - } - /* will fail later, go on to get the right error */ - } + } + if (create_error && !dentry->d_inode) { + error = create_error; + goto out; } looked_up: path->dentry = dentry; -- cgit v0.10.2 From 6a480a7842545ec520a91730209ec0bae41694c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Wed, 4 May 2016 14:04:13 -0400 Subject: ecryptfs: fix handling of directory opening First of all, trying to open them r/w is idiocy; it's guaranteed to fail. Moreover, assigning ->f_pos and assuming that everything will work is blatantly broken - try that with e.g. tmpfs as underlying layer and watch the fireworks. There may be a non-trivial amount of state associated with current IO position, well beyond the numeric offset. Using the single struct file associated with underlying inode is really not a good idea; we ought to open one for each ecryptfs directory struct file. Additionally, file_operations both for directories and non-directories are full of pointless methods; non-directories should *not* have ->iterate(), directories should not have ->flush(), ->fasync() and ->splice_read(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c index feef8a9..f024040 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c @@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ static int ecryptfs_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) .sb = inode->i_sb, }; lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file); - lower_file->f_pos = ctx->pos; rc = iterate_dir(lower_file, &buf.ctx); ctx->pos = buf.ctx.pos; if (rc < 0) @@ -223,14 +222,6 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) } ecryptfs_set_file_lower( file, ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->lower_file); - if (d_is_dir(ecryptfs_dentry)) { - ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This is a directory\n"); - mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex); - crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED); - mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex); - rc = 0; - goto out; - } rc = read_or_initialize_metadata(ecryptfs_dentry); if (rc) goto out_put; @@ -247,6 +238,45 @@ out: return rc; } +/** + * ecryptfs_dir_open + * @inode: inode speciying file to open + * @file: Structure to return filled in + * + * Opens the file specified by inode. + * + * Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise + */ +static int ecryptfs_dir_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + /* Private value of ecryptfs_dentry allocated in + * ecryptfs_lookup() */ + struct ecryptfs_file_info *file_info; + struct file *lower_file; + + /* Released in ecryptfs_release or end of function if failure */ + file_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + ecryptfs_set_file_private(file, file_info); + if (unlikely(!file_info)) { + ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, + "Error attempting to allocate memory\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + lower_file = dentry_open(ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(ecryptfs_dentry), + file->f_flags, current_cred()); + if (IS_ERR(lower_file)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to initialize " + "the lower file for the dentry with name " + "[%pd]; rc = [%ld]\n", __func__, + ecryptfs_dentry, PTR_ERR(lower_file)); + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, file_info); + return PTR_ERR(lower_file); + } + ecryptfs_set_file_lower(file, lower_file); + return 0; +} + static int ecryptfs_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t td) { struct file *lower_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file); @@ -267,6 +297,19 @@ static int ecryptfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return 0; } +static int ecryptfs_dir_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + fput(ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file)); + kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_file_info_cache, + ecryptfs_file_to_private(file)); + return 0; +} + +static loff_t ecryptfs_dir_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) +{ + return vfs_llseek(ecryptfs_file_to_lower(file), offset, whence); +} + static int ecryptfs_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) { @@ -346,20 +389,16 @@ const struct file_operations ecryptfs_dir_fops = { #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl, #endif - .open = ecryptfs_open, - .flush = ecryptfs_flush, - .release = ecryptfs_release, + .open = ecryptfs_dir_open, + .release = ecryptfs_dir_release, .fsync = ecryptfs_fsync, - .fasync = ecryptfs_fasync, - .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, - .llseek = default_llseek, + .llseek = ecryptfs_dir_llseek, }; const struct file_operations ecryptfs_main_fops = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, .read_iter = ecryptfs_read_update_atime, .write_iter = generic_file_write_iter, - .iterate = ecryptfs_readdir, .unlocked_ioctl = ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl, #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_ioctl = ecryptfs_compat_ioctl, -- cgit v0.10.2 From 99d825822eade8d827a1817357cbf3f889a552d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 16:25:35 -0400 Subject: get_rock_ridge_filename(): handle malformed NM entries Payloads of NM entries are not supposed to contain NUL. When we run into such, only the part prior to the first NUL goes into the concatenation (i.e. the directory entry name being encoded by a bunch of NM entries). We do stop when the amount collected so far + the claimed amount in the current NM entry exceed 254. So far, so good, but what we return as the total length is the sum of *claimed* sizes, not the actual amount collected. And that can grow pretty large - not unlimited, since you'd need to put CE entries in between to be able to get more than the maximum that could be contained in one isofs directory entry / continuation chunk and we are stop once we'd encountered 32 CEs, but you can get about 8Kb easily. And that's what will be passed to readdir callback as the name length. 8Kb __copy_to_user() from a buffer allocated by __get_free_page() Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 0.98pl6+ (yes, really) Signed-off-by: Al Viro diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c index 5384ceb..98b3eb7 100644 --- a/fs/isofs/rock.c +++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c @@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ int get_rock_ridge_filename(struct iso_directory_record *de, int retnamlen = 0; int truncate = 0; int ret = 0; + char *p; + int len; if (!ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock) return 0; @@ -267,12 +269,17 @@ repeat: rr->u.NM.flags); break; } - if ((strlen(retname) + rr->len - 5) >= 254) { + len = rr->len - 5; + if (retnamlen + len >= 254) { truncate = 1; break; } - strncat(retname, rr->u.NM.name, rr->len - 5); - retnamlen += rr->len - 5; + p = memchr(rr->u.NM.name, '\0', len); + if (unlikely(p)) + len = p - rr->u.NM.name; + memcpy(retname + retnamlen, rr->u.NM.name, len); + retnamlen += len; + retname[retnamlen] = '\0'; break; case SIG('R', 'E'): kfree(rs.buffer); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 54d5ca871e72f2bb172ec9323497f01cd5091ec7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 01:16:37 +0200 Subject: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Cc: # v4.2+ diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 17cb6b1..081d3d6 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -840,16 +840,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_path); int vfs_open(const struct path *path, struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { - struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; - struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = vfs_select_inode(path->dentry, file->f_flags); - file->f_path = *path; - if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE) { - inode = dentry->d_op->d_select_inode(dentry, file->f_flags); - if (IS_ERR(inode)) - return PTR_ERR(inode); - } + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return PTR_ERR(inode); + file->f_path = *path; return do_dentry_open(file, inode, NULL, cred); } diff --git a/include/linux/dcache.h b/include/linux/dcache.h index 4bb4de8..7e9422c 100644 --- a/include/linux/dcache.h +++ b/include/linux/dcache.h @@ -565,4 +565,16 @@ static inline struct dentry *d_real(struct dentry *dentry) return dentry; } +static inline struct inode *vfs_select_inode(struct dentry *dentry, + unsigned open_flags) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + + if (inode && unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE)) + inode = dentry->d_op->d_select_inode(dentry, open_flags); + + return inode; +} + + #endif /* __LINUX_DCACHE_H */ -- cgit v0.10.2 From 9409e22acdfc9153f88d9b1ed2bd2a5b34d2d3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 01:16:37 +0200 Subject: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2) should do nothing and return success. This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs layer. Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()). The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get the underlying inodes. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Cc: # v4.2+ diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 1d9ca2d..3ef87d6 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -4213,7 +4213,11 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, bool new_is_dir = false; unsigned max_links = new_dir->i_sb->s_max_links; - if (source == target) + /* + * Check source == target. + * On overlayfs need to look at underlying inodes. + */ + if (vfs_select_inode(old_dentry, 0) == vfs_select_inode(new_dentry, 0)) return 0; error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 3c9fe8cdff1b889a059a30d22f130372f2b3885f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 01:16:37 +0200 Subject: vfs: add lookup_hash() helper Overlayfs needs lookup without inode_permission() and already has the name hash (in form of dentry->d_name on overlayfs dentry). It also doesn't support filesystems with d_op->d_hash() so basically it only needs the actual hashed lookup from lookup_one_len_unlocked() So add a new helper that does unlocked lookup of a hashed name. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 3ef87d6..1a1ea79 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -2267,6 +2267,33 @@ int vfs_path_lookup(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_path_lookup); /** + * lookup_hash - lookup single pathname component on already hashed name + * @name: name and hash to lookup + * @base: base directory to lookup from + * + * The name must have been verified and hashed (see lookup_one_len()). Using + * this after just full_name_hash() is unsafe. + * + * This function also doesn't check for search permission on base directory. + * + * Use lookup_one_len_unlocked() instead, unless you really know what you are + * doing. + * + * Do not hold i_mutex; this helper takes i_mutex if necessary. + */ +struct dentry *lookup_hash(const struct qstr *name, struct dentry *base) +{ + struct dentry *ret; + + ret = lookup_dcache(name, base, 0); + if (!ret) + ret = lookup_slow(name, base, 0); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(lookup_hash); + +/** * lookup_one_len - filesystem helper to lookup single pathname component * @name: pathname component to lookup * @base: base directory to lookup from @@ -2337,7 +2364,6 @@ struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *name, struct qstr this; unsigned int c; int err; - struct dentry *ret; this.name = name; this.len = len; @@ -2369,10 +2395,7 @@ struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *name, if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - ret = lookup_dcache(&this, base, 0); - if (!ret) - ret = lookup_slow(&this, base, 0); - return ret; + return lookup_hash(&this, base); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(lookup_one_len_unlocked); diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h index 77d0170..ec5ec28 100644 --- a/include/linux/namei.h +++ b/include/linux/namei.h @@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ extern int kern_path_mountpoint(int, const char *, struct path *, unsigned int); extern struct dentry *lookup_one_len(const char *, struct dentry *, int); extern struct dentry *lookup_one_len_unlocked(const char *, struct dentry *, int); +struct qstr; +extern struct dentry *lookup_hash(const struct qstr *, struct dentry *); extern int follow_down_one(struct path *); extern int follow_down(struct path *); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 38b78a5f18584db6fa7441e0f4531b283b0e6725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Wed, 11 May 2016 01:16:37 +0200 Subject: ovl: ignore permissions on underlying lookup MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Generally permission checking is not necessary when overlayfs looks up a dentry on one of the underlying layers, since search permission on base directory was already checked in ovl_permission(). More specifically using lookup_one_len() causes a problem when the lower directory lacks search permission for a specific user while the upper directory does have search permission. Since lookups are cached, this causes inconsistency in behavior: success depends on who did the first lookup. So instead use lookup_hash() which doesn't do the permission check. Reported-by: Ignacy Gawędzki Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 5d972e6..791235e 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -411,9 +411,7 @@ static inline struct dentry *ovl_lookup_real(struct dentry *dir, { struct dentry *dentry; - inode_lock(dir->d_inode); - dentry = lookup_one_len(name->name, dir, name->len); - inode_unlock(dir->d_inode); + dentry = lookup_hash(name, dir); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { if (PTR_ERR(dentry) == -ENOENT) -- cgit v0.10.2