From af601e4623d0303bfafa54ec728b7ae8493a8e1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2006 14:08:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] SE Linux audit events

Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index fbc21d6..8868c96 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@
 #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
 #define AUDIT_AVC_PATH		1402	/* dentry, vfsmount pair from avc */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD	1403	/* Policy file load */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS	1404	/* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE	1405	/* Changes to booleans */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index b5fa02d..5eba666 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/major.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
 
@@ -126,6 +127,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value, 
+			selinux_enforcing,
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
 		if (selinux_enforcing)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
@@ -176,6 +181,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = selinux_disable();
 		if (length < 0)
 			goto out;
+		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+			"selinux=0 auid=%u",
+			audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 	}
 
 	length = count;
@@ -261,6 +269,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		length = ret;
 	else
 		length = count;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+		"policy loaded auid=%u",
+		audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
 out:
 	up(&sel_sem);
 	vfree(data);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8a76492..d877cd1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1758,19 +1758,22 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
+				policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+				!!values[i],
+				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
+		}
 		if (values[i]) {
 			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
 		} else {
 			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
 		}
-		if (i != 0)
-			printk(", ");
-		printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
-		       policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
 	}
-	printk(" }\n");
 
 	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
 		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
-- 
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