From 13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:28:04 -0800 Subject: security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 59820f8..0ae4b14 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -702,6 +702,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference. * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode. * Return 0 if successful. + * @kernel_fw_from_file: + * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware). + * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing + * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware + * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed + * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER. + * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents. + * @size length of the firmware contents. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @kernel_module_request: * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. @@ -1568,6 +1577,7 @@ struct security_operations { void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); + int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file); int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -1840,6 +1850,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); +int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file); int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -2366,6 +2377,12 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred, return 0; } +static inline int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, + char *buf, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { return 0; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index e76373d..a74fde6 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return 0; } +static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { return 0; @@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 31614e9..35d37d0 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -845,6 +845,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode); } +int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + return security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file); + int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 6593d9245bc66e6e3cf4ba6d365a7833110c1402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:06:00 -0800 Subject: firmware_class: perform new LSM checks This attaches LSM hooks to the existing firmware loading interfaces: filesystem-found firmware and demand-loaded blobs. On errors, loads are aborted and the failure code is returned to userspace. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c index d276e33..63f165c 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_class.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_class.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -308,12 +309,17 @@ static int fw_read_file_contents(struct file *file, struct firmware_buf *fw_buf) if (rc != size) { if (rc > 0) rc = -EIO; - vfree(buf); - return rc; + goto fail; } + rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); + if (rc) + goto fail; fw_buf->data = buf; fw_buf->size = size; return 0; +fail: + vfree(buf); + return rc; } static int fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, @@ -617,6 +623,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev, { struct firmware_priv *fw_priv = to_firmware_priv(dev); struct firmware_buf *fw_buf; + ssize_t written = count; int loading = simple_strtol(buf, NULL, 10); int i; @@ -640,6 +647,8 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev, break; case 0: if (test_bit(FW_STATUS_LOADING, &fw_buf->status)) { + int rc; + set_bit(FW_STATUS_DONE, &fw_buf->status); clear_bit(FW_STATUS_LOADING, &fw_buf->status); @@ -649,10 +658,23 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev, * see the mapped 'buf->data' once the loading * is completed. * */ - if (fw_map_pages_buf(fw_buf)) + rc = fw_map_pages_buf(fw_buf); + if (rc) dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n", __func__); + else + rc = security_kernel_fw_from_file(NULL, + fw_buf->data, fw_buf->size); + + /* + * Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit + * is ignored and we set ABORT only on failure. + */ list_del_init(&fw_buf->pending_list); + if (rc) { + set_bit(FW_STATUS_ABORT, &fw_buf->status); + written = rc; + } complete_all(&fw_buf->completion); break; } @@ -666,7 +688,7 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev, } out: mutex_unlock(&fw_lock); - return count; + return written; } static DEVICE_ATTR(loading, 0644, firmware_loading_show, firmware_loading_store); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 10:39:48 -0400 Subject: ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel. This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's integrity. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Kees Cook diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 4c3efe4..d0d0c57 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Description: option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] + [FIRMWARE_CHECK] mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6) @@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ Description: measure func=BPRM_CHECK measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 - measure func=MODULE_CHECK uid=0 + measure func=MODULE_CHECK + measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK appraise fowner=0 The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 1b7f268..7cf5e9b 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_module_check(struct file *file); +extern int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); #else static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -46,6 +47,11 @@ static inline int ima_module_check(struct file *file) return 0; } +static inline int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c42056e..57da4bd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, FIRMWARE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags); @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void); #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02 #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x04 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x08 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 59ac902..86bfd5c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return iint->ima_bprm_status; case MODULE_CHECK: return iint->ima_module_status; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + return iint->ima_firmware_status; case FILE_CHECK: default: return iint->ima_file_status; @@ -94,6 +96,9 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, case MODULE_CHECK: iint->ima_module_status = status; break; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + iint->ima_firmware_status = status; + break; case FILE_CHECK: default: iint->ima_file_status = status; @@ -113,6 +118,9 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) case MODULE_CHECK: iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); break; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + iint->flags |= (IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; case FILE_CHECK: default: iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 0d69643..2917f98 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -319,6 +319,17 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file) return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK); } +int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + if (!file) { + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + return 0; + } + return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK); +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index cea84d8..07099a8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { @@ -241,6 +242,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE; case MODULE_CHECK: return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE; case FILE_CHECK: default: return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; @@ -486,6 +489,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = MODULE_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK; else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0)) entry->func = MMAP_CHECK; @@ -636,6 +641,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK) ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; + else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) + ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 09c440d..19b8e31 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 #define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE 0x00004000 #define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE 0x00010000 +#define IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED 0x00020000 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE) + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE | \ + IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE) #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED) + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | \ + IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISED) enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -104,6 +108,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_firmware_status:4; enum integrity_status evm_status:4; struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 35d37d0..e41b1a8 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -847,7 +847,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) { - return security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); + int ret; + + ret = security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file); -- cgit v0.10.2