From 3b05ac3824ed9648c0d9c02d51d9b54e4e7e874f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2014 16:49:24 +0300 Subject: ipvs: uninitialized data with IP_VS_IPV6 The app_tcp_pkt_out() function expects "*diff" to be set and ends up using uninitialized data if CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 is turned on. The same issue is there in app_tcp_pkt_in(). Thanks to Julian Anastasov for noticing that. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ftp.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ftp.c index 1d5341f..5d3daae 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ftp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ftp.c @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ static int ip_vs_ftp_out(struct ip_vs_app *app, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, struct nf_conn *ct; struct net *net; + *diff = 0; + #ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 /* This application helper doesn't work with IPv6 yet, * so turn this into a no-op for IPv6 packets @@ -191,8 +193,6 @@ static int ip_vs_ftp_out(struct ip_vs_app *app, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, return 1; #endif - *diff = 0; - /* Only useful for established sessions */ if (cp->state != IP_VS_TCP_S_ESTABLISHED) return 1; @@ -322,6 +322,9 @@ static int ip_vs_ftp_in(struct ip_vs_app *app, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, struct ip_vs_conn *n_cp; struct net *net; + /* no diff required for incoming packets */ + *diff = 0; + #ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 /* This application helper doesn't work with IPv6 yet, * so turn this into a no-op for IPv6 packets @@ -330,9 +333,6 @@ static int ip_vs_ftp_in(struct ip_vs_app *app, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, return 1; #endif - /* no diff required for incoming packets */ - *diff = 0; - /* Only useful for established sessions */ if (cp->state != IP_VS_TCP_S_ESTABLISHED) return 1; -- cgit v0.10.2 From 7b5bca4676c7cd78b0f1ef8a132ef3ba9863c9ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: leroy christophe Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 13:20:14 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: fix port natting in little endian archs Make sure this fetches 16-bits port data from the register. Remove casting to make sparse happy, not needed anymore. Signed-off-by: leroy christophe Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv4.c index ff2d23d..6ecfce6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv4.c @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ static void nft_redir_ipv4_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, memset(&mr, 0, sizeof(mr)); if (priv->sreg_proto_min) { - mr.range[0].min.all = (__force __be16) - data[priv->sreg_proto_min].data[0]; - mr.range[0].max.all = (__force __be16) - data[priv->sreg_proto_max].data[0]; + mr.range[0].min.all = + *(__be16 *)&data[priv->sreg_proto_min].data[0]; + mr.range[0].max.all = + *(__be16 *)&data[priv->sreg_proto_max].data[0]; mr.range[0].flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv6.c index 2433a6b..11820b6 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_redir_ipv6.c @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ static void nft_redir_ipv6_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, memset(&range, 0, sizeof(range)); if (priv->sreg_proto_min) { - range.min_proto.all = (__force __be16) - data[priv->sreg_proto_min].data[0]; - range.max_proto.all = (__force __be16) - data[priv->sreg_proto_max].data[0]; + range.min_proto.all = + *(__be16 *)&data[priv->sreg_proto_min].data[0]; + range.max_proto.all = + *(__be16 *)&data[priv->sreg_proto_max].data[0]; range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED; } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c index afe2b0b..aff54fb1 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c @@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ static void nft_nat_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } if (priv->sreg_proto_min) { - range.min_proto.all = (__force __be16) - data[priv->sreg_proto_min].data[0]; - range.max_proto.all = (__force __be16) - data[priv->sreg_proto_max].data[0]; + range.min_proto.all = + *(__be16 *)&data[priv->sreg_proto_min].data[0]; + range.max_proto.all = + *(__be16 *)&data[priv->sreg_proto_max].data[0]; range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED; } -- cgit v0.10.2 From 8ca3f5e974f2b4b7f711589f4abff920db36637a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 00:14:47 +0100 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: fix race between confirmation and flush Commit 5195c14c8b27c ("netfilter: conntrack: fix race in __nf_conntrack_confirm against get_next_corpse") aimed to resolve the race condition between the confirmation (packet path) and the flush command (from control plane). However, it introduced a crash when several packets race to add a new conntrack, which seems easier to reproduce when nf_queue is in place. Fix this race, in __nf_conntrack_confirm(), by removing the CT from unconfirmed list before checking the DYING bit. In case race occured, re-add the CT to the dying list This patch also changes the verdict from NF_ACCEPT to NF_DROP when we lose race. Basically, the confirmation happens for the first packet that we see in a flow. If you just invoked conntrack -F once (which should be the common case), then this is likely to be the first packet of the flow (unless you already called flush anytime soon in the past). This should be hard to trigger, but better drop this packet, otherwise we leave things in inconsistent state since the destination will likely reply to this packet, but it will find no conntrack, unless the origin retransmits. The change of the verdict has been discussed in: https://www.marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=141588039530056&w=2 Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index a116748..46d1b26 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -611,16 +611,15 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) */ NF_CT_ASSERT(!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)); pr_debug("Confirming conntrack %p\n", ct); - /* We have to check the DYING flag inside the lock to prevent - a race against nf_ct_get_next_corpse() possibly called from - user context, else we insert an already 'dead' hash, blocking - further use of that particular connection -JM */ + /* We have to check the DYING flag after unlink to prevent + * a race against nf_ct_get_next_corpse() possibly called from + * user context, else we insert an already 'dead' hash, blocking + * further use of that particular connection -JM. + */ + nf_ct_del_from_dying_or_unconfirmed_list(ct); - if (unlikely(nf_ct_is_dying(ct))) { - nf_conntrack_double_unlock(hash, reply_hash); - local_bh_enable(); - return NF_ACCEPT; - } + if (unlikely(nf_ct_is_dying(ct))) + goto out; /* See if there's one in the list already, including reverse: NAT could have grabbed it without realizing, since we're @@ -636,8 +635,6 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) zone == nf_ct_zone(nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h))) goto out; - nf_ct_del_from_dying_or_unconfirmed_list(ct); - /* Timer relative to confirmation time, not original setting time, otherwise we'd get timer wrap in weird delay cases. */ @@ -673,6 +670,7 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb) return NF_ACCEPT; out: + nf_ct_add_to_dying_list(ct); nf_conntrack_double_unlock(hash, reply_hash); NF_CT_STAT_INC(net, insert_failed); local_bh_enable(); -- cgit v0.10.2 From 9ea2aa8b7dba9e99544c4187cc298face254569f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sun, 4 Jan 2015 15:20:29 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch Make sure there is enough room for the nfnetlink header in the netlink messages that are part of the batch. There is a similar check in netlink_rcv_skb(). Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c index 13c2e17..c6619d4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c @@ -321,7 +321,8 @@ replay: nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); err = 0; - if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) { + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) || + skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) { err = -EINVAL; goto ack; } -- cgit v0.10.2 From 62924af247e95de7041a6d6f2d06cdd05152e2dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sun, 4 Jan 2015 15:20:41 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink: relax strict multicast group check from netlink_bind Relax the checking that was introduced in 97840cb ("netfilter: nfnetlink: fix insufficient validation in nfnetlink_bind") when the subscription bitmask is used. Existing userspace code code may request to listen to all of the existing netlink groups by setting an all to one subscription group bitmask. Netlink already validates subscription via setsockopt() for us. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c index c6619d4..1aa7049 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_bind(int group) int type; if (group <= NFNLGRP_NONE || group > NFNLGRP_MAX) - return -EINVAL; + return 0; type = nfnl_group2type[group]; -- cgit v0.10.2 From a2f18db0c68fec96631c10cad9384c196e9008ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Sun, 4 Jan 2015 15:14:22 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us. [ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159! [ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi [ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98 [ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010 [...] [ 353.375018] Call Trace: [ 353.375046] [] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540 [ 353.375101] [] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0 [ 353.375150] [] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0 [ 353.375200] [] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790 [ 353.375253] [] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0 [ 353.375300] [] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70 [ 353.375357] [] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30 [ 353.375410] [] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0 [ 353.375459] [] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400 [ 353.375510] [] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90 [ 353.375563] [] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20 [ 353.375616] [] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0 [ 353.375667] [] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80 [ 353.375719] [] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d [ 353.375776] [] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20 [ 353.375823] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to make sure no references to chains are held anymore. Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 129a8da..3b3ddb4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -713,16 +713,12 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) struct nft_chain *chain, *nc; struct nft_set *set, *ns; - list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, nc, &ctx->table->chains, list) { + list_for_each_entry(chain, &ctx->table->chains, list) { ctx->chain = chain; err = nft_delrule_by_chain(ctx); if (err < 0) goto out; - - err = nft_delchain(ctx); - if (err < 0) - goto out; } list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &ctx->table->sets, list) { @@ -735,6 +731,14 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) goto out; } + list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, nc, &ctx->table->chains, list) { + ctx->chain = chain; + + err = nft_delchain(ctx); + if (err < 0) + goto out; + } + err = nft_deltable(ctx); out: return err; -- cgit v0.10.2