diff options
author | Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com> | 2006-11-08 23:04:26 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net> | 2006-12-03 05:21:34 (GMT) |
commit | 67f83cbf081a70426ff667e8d14f94e13ed3bdca (patch) | |
tree | 776a40733eacb9071478f865e6791daa3f6fd602 /security | |
parent | 6b877699c6f1efede4545bcecc367786a472eedb (diff) | |
download | linux-fsl-qoriq-67f83cbf081a70426ff667e8d14f94e13ed3bdca.tar.xz |
SELinux: Fix SA selection semantics
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.
With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 101 |
4 files changed, 68 insertions, 73 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 0148d15..558795b 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -886,12 +886,6 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, return 1; } -static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, - struct xfrm_policy *xp) -{ - return 1; -} - static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall) { return 0; @@ -1126,7 +1120,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); - set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5bbd599..956137b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2889,7 +2889,8 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ -static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) +static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; struct iphdr _iph, *ih; @@ -2907,6 +2908,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; + if (proto) + *proto = ih->protocol; + switch (ih->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; @@ -2950,7 +2954,8 @@ out: #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ -static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) +static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { u8 nexthdr; int ret = -EINVAL, offset; @@ -2971,6 +2976,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad if (offset < 0) goto out; + if (proto) + *proto = nexthdr; + switch (nexthdr) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; @@ -3007,13 +3015,13 @@ out: #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, - char **addrp, int *len, int src) + char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto) { int ret = 0; switch (ad->u.net.family) { case PF_INET: - ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad); + ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret || !addrp) break; *len = 4; @@ -3023,7 +3031,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) case PF_INET6: - ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad); + ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret || !addrp) break; *len = 16; @@ -3494,7 +3502,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]"; ad.u.net.family = family; - err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1); + err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL); if (err) goto out; @@ -3820,6 +3828,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, struct avc_audit_data ad; struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + u8 proto; sk = skb->sk; if (!sk) @@ -3831,7 +3840,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; ad.u.net.family = family; - err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0); + err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto); if (err) goto out; @@ -3845,7 +3854,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, if (err) goto out; - err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); + err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto); out: return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; } @@ -4764,7 +4773,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete, .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup, .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, - .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match, .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session, #endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 2750236..ebd7246 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl); -int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, - struct xfrm_policy *xp); - /* * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket) @@ -38,7 +35,7 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk) int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad); int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct avc_audit_data *ad); + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb); int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); #else @@ -49,7 +46,7 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, } static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct avc_audit_data *ad) + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 8fef742..9b77714 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -115,71 +115,40 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * struct flowi *fl) { u32 state_sid; - u32 pol_sid; - int err; + int rc; - if (xp->security) { - if (!x->security) - /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */ - return 0; - else - state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; - pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid; - } else + if (!xp->security) if (x->security) /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */ return 0; else /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */ return 1; - - err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, - NULL); - - if (err) - return 0; - - err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, - NULL)? 0:1; - - return err; -} - -/* - * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow - * can use a given security association. - */ - -int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, - struct xfrm_policy *xp) -{ - int rc = 0; - u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; - - if (!xp->security) - if (!xfrm->security) - return 1; - else - return 0; else - if (!xfrm->security) + if (!x->security) + /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */ return 0; + else + if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */ + return 0; - /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ - if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) { - if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) - return 0; + state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; - sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; - } + if (fl->secid != state_sid) + return 0; - rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL)? 0:1; + /* + * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check + * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and + * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened + * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. + */ + return rc; } @@ -481,6 +450,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, } } + /* + * This check even when there's no association involved is + * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a + * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless + * explicitly allowed by policy. + */ + rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); @@ -492,10 +468,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, * If we have no security association, then we need to determine * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination. * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been - * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook. + * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above. */ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct avc_audit_data *ad) + struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) { struct dst_entry *dst; int rc = 0; @@ -514,6 +490,27 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, } } + switch (proto) { + case IPPROTO_AH: + case IPPROTO_ESP: + case IPPROTO_COMP: + /* + * We should have already seen this packet once before + * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the + * unlabeled check. + */ + goto out; + default: + break; + } + + /* + * This check even when there's no association involved is + * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a + * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless + * explicitly allowed by policy. + */ + rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); out: |