diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c | 101 |
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c index eafa8e5..8e2f9bc 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c @@ -59,6 +59,17 @@ * struct sembuf loses its padding with EABI. Since arrays of them are * used they have to be copyed to remove the padding. Compatibility wrappers * provided below. + * + * sys_bind: + * sys_connect: + * sys_sendmsg: + * sys_sendto: + * sys_socketcall: + * + * struct sockaddr_un loses its padding with EABI. Since the size of the + * structure is used as a validation test in unix_mkname(), we need to + * change the length argument to 110 whenever it is 112. Compatibility + * wrappers provided below. */ #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -67,6 +78,8 @@ #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/eventpoll.h> #include <linux/sem.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> +#include <linux/net.h> #include <asm/ipc.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> @@ -337,3 +350,91 @@ asmlinkage int sys_oabi_ipc(uint call, int first, int second, int third, return sys_ipc(call, first, second, third, ptr, fifth); } } + +asmlinkage long sys_oabi_bind(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addrlen) +{ + sa_family_t sa_family; + if (addrlen == 112 && + get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 && + sa_family == AF_UNIX) + addrlen = 110; + return sys_bind(fd, addr, addrlen); +} + +asmlinkage long sys_oabi_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addrlen) +{ + sa_family_t sa_family; + if (addrlen == 112 && + get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 && + sa_family == AF_UNIX) + addrlen = 110; + return sys_connect(fd, addr, addrlen); +} + +asmlinkage long sys_oabi_sendto(int fd, void __user *buff, + size_t len, unsigned flags, + struct sockaddr __user *addr, + int addrlen) +{ + sa_family_t sa_family; + if (addrlen == 112 && + get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 && + sa_family == AF_UNIX) + addrlen = 110; + return sys_sendto(fd, buff, len, flags, addr, addrlen); +} + +asmlinkage long sys_oabi_sendmsg(int fd, struct msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags) +{ + struct sockaddr __user *addr; + int msg_namelen; + sa_family_t sa_family; + if (msg && + get_user(msg_namelen, &msg->msg_namelen) == 0 && + msg_namelen == 112 && + get_user(addr, &msg->msg_name) == 0 && + get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 && + sa_family == AF_UNIX) + { + /* + * HACK ALERT: there is a limit to how much backward bending + * we should do for what is actually a transitional + * compatibility layer. This already has known flaws with + * a few ioctls that we don't intend to fix. Therefore + * consider this blatent hack as another one... and take care + * to run for cover. In most cases it will "just work fine". + * If it doesn't, well, tough. + */ + put_user(110, &msg->msg_namelen); + } + return sys_sendmsg(fd, msg, flags); +} + +asmlinkage long sys_oabi_socketcall(int call, unsigned long __user *args) +{ + unsigned long r = -EFAULT, a[6]; + + switch (call) { + case SYS_BIND: + if (copy_from_user(a, args, 3 * sizeof(long)) == 0) + r = sys_oabi_bind(a[0], (struct sockaddr __user *)a[1], a[2]); + break; + case SYS_CONNECT: + if (copy_from_user(a, args, 3 * sizeof(long)) == 0) + r = sys_oabi_connect(a[0], (struct sockaddr __user *)a[1], a[2]); + break; + case SYS_SENDTO: + if (copy_from_user(a, args, 6 * sizeof(long)) == 0) + r = sys_oabi_sendto(a[0], (void __user *)a[1], a[2], a[3], + (struct sockaddr __user *)a[4], a[5]); + break; + case SYS_SENDMSG: + if (copy_from_user(a, args, 3 * sizeof(long)) == 0) + r = sys_oabi_sendmsg(a[0], (struct msghdr __user *)a[1], a[2]); + break; + default: + r = sys_socketcall(call, args); + } + + return r; +} |