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path: root/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
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2009-09-23eCryptfs: Validate global auth tok keysTyler Hicks
When searching through the global authentication tokens for a given key signature, verify that a matching key has not been revoked and has not expired. This allows the `keyctl revoke` command to be properly used on keys in use by eCryptfs. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2009-09-23eCryptfs: Filename encryption only supports password auth tokensTyler Hicks
Returns -ENOTSUPP when attempting to use filename encryption with something other than a password authentication token, such as a private token from openssl. Using filename encryption with a userspace eCryptfs key module is a future goal. Until then, this patch handles the situation a little better than simply using a BUG_ON(). Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2009-09-23eCryptfs: Handle unrecognized tag 3 cipher codesTyler Hicks
Returns an error when an unrecognized cipher code is present in a tag 3 packet or an ecryptfs_crypt_stat cannot be initialized. Also sets an crypt_stat->tfm error pointer to NULL to ensure that it will not be incorrectly freed in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat(). Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2009-09-23eCryptfs: Fix lockdep-reported AB-BA mutex issueRoland Dreier
Lockdep reports the following valid-looking possible AB-BA deadlock with global_auth_tok_list_mutex and keysig_list_mutex: ecryptfs_new_file_context() -> ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() -> mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); -> ecryptfs_add_keysig() -> mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); vs ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() -> mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); -> ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig() -> mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); ie the two mutexes are taken in opposite orders in the two different code paths. I'm not sure if this is a real bug where two threads could actually hit the two paths in parallel and deadlock, but it at least makes lockdep impossible to use with ecryptfs since this report triggers every time and disables future lockdep reporting. Since ecryptfs_add_keysig() is called only from the single callsite in ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(), the simplest fix seems to be to move the lock of keysig_list_mutex back up outside of the where global_auth_tok_list_mutex is taken. This patch does that, and fixes the lockdep report on my system (and ecryptfs still works OK). The full output of lockdep fixed by this patch is: ======================================================= [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2 ------------------------------------------------------- gdm/2640 is trying to acquire lock: (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 but task is already holding lock: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81217728>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff8108c897>] check_prev_add+0x2a7/0x370 [<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff8121526a>] ecryptfs_add_keysig+0x5a/0xb0 [<ffffffff81213299>] ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs+0x59/0xb0 [<ffffffff81214b06>] ecryptfs_new_file_context+0xa6/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8120e42a>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x4a/0x140 [<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0 [<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110 [<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0 [<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140 [<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff -> #0 (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffff8108c675>] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370 [<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff812177d5>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0 [<ffffffff81212f49>] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120 [<ffffffff8121306d>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200 [<ffffffff8120e44b>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140 [<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0 [<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110 [<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0 [<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140 [<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by gdm/2640: #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8113cb8b>] do_filp_open+0x3cb/0xae0 #1: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81217728>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0 stack backtrace: Pid: 2640, comm: gdm Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8108b988>] print_circular_bug_tail+0xa8/0xf0 [<ffffffff8108c675>] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370 [<ffffffff81094912>] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60 [<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750 [<ffffffff81017275>] ? print_context_stack+0x85/0x140 [<ffffffff81089c68>] ? find_usage_backwards+0x38/0x160 [<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430 [<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff8108b0b0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x0/0xb0 [<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff8108c02c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81125b0d>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfd/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8108c34d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x14d/0x190 [<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60 [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90 [<ffffffff812177d5>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0 [<ffffffff81212f49>] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120 [<ffffffff8121306d>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200 [<ffffffff81210240>] ? ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0x60/0xe0 [<ffffffff8120e44b>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140 [<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60 [<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0 [<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110 [<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0 [<ffffffff8129a93e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0 [<ffffffff8155410b>] ? _spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40 [<ffffffff81139e9b>] ? getname+0x3b/0x240 [<ffffffff81148a5a>] ? alloc_fd+0xfa/0x140 [<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140 [<ffffffff81553b8f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2009-07-28eCryptfs: parse_tag_3_packet check tag 3 packet encrypted key sizeRamon de Carvalho Valle
The parse_tag_3_packet function does not check if the tag 3 packet contains a encrypted key size larger than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES. Signed-off-by: Ramon de Carvalho Valle <ramon@risesecurity.org> [tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Added printk newline and changed goto to out_free] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.27 and 30) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-07-28eCryptfs: Check Tag 11 literal data buffer sizeTyler Hicks
Tag 11 packets are stored in the metadata section of an eCryptfs file to store the key signature(s) used to encrypt the file encryption key. After extracting the packet length field to determine the key signature length, a check is not performed to see if the length would exceed the key signature buffer size that was passed into parse_tag_11_packet(). Thanks to Ramon de Carvalho Valle for finding this bug using fsfuzzer. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.27 and 30) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-01ecryptfs: use kzfree()Johannes Weiner
Use kzfree() instead of memset() + kfree(). Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-03-14eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename keyTyler Hicks
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK. This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: kerneldoc for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet()Michael Halcrow
Kerneldoc updates for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet(). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Fix data types (int/size_t)Michael Halcrow
Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will never be larger than int). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Replace %Z with %zMichael Halcrow
%Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-01-06eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packetsMichael Halcrow
This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename. Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower filesystem. Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are already near the maximum filename length. In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that directory. Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development of this patchset. This patch: A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag 70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-20eCryptfs: Allocate up to two scatterlists for crypto ops on keysMichael Halcrow
I have received some reports of out-of-memory errors on some older AMD architectures. These errors are what I would expect to see if crypt_stat->key were split between two separate pages. eCryptfs should not assume that any of the memory sent through virt_to_scatterlist() is all contained in a single page, and so this patch allocates two scatterlist structs instead of one when processing keys. I have received confirmation from one person affected by this bug that this patch resolves the issue for him, and so I am submitting it for inclusion in a future stable release. Note that virt_to_scatterlist() runs sg_init_table() on the scatterlist structs passed to it, so the calls to sg_init_table() in decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key() are redundant. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Paulo J. S. Silva <pjssilva@ime.usp.br> Cc: "Leon Woestenberg" <leon.woestenberg@gmail.com> Cc: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-16eCryptfs: remove netlink transportTyler Hicks
The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace transport. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24ecryptfs: propagate key errors up at mount timeEric Sandeen
Mounting with invalid key signatures should probably fail, if they were specifically requested but not available. Also fix case checks in process_request_key_err() for the right sign of the errnos, as spotted by Jan Tluka. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29eCryptfs: integrate eCryptfs device handle into the module.Michael Halcrow
Update the versioning information. Make the message types generic. Add an outgoing message queue to the daemon struct. Make the functions to parse and write the packet lengths available to the rest of the module. Add functions to create and destroy the daemon structs. Clean up some of the comments and make the code a little more consistent with itself. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: printk fixes] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-06eCryptfs: change the type of cipher_code from u16 to u8Trevor Highland
Only the lower byte of cipher_code is ever used, so it makes sense for its type to be u8. Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-12-18ecryptfs: initialize new auth_tokens before teardownEric Sandeen
ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat() checks whether each auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key is nonzero and if so puts that key. However, in some early mount error paths nothing has initialized the pointer, and we try to key_put() garbage. Running the bad cipher tests in the testsuite exposes this, and it's happy with the following change. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-22Update fs/ to use sg helpersJens Axboe
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: remove assignments in if-statementsMichael Halcrow
Remove assignments in if-statements. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: make needlessly global symbols staticMichael Halcrow
Andrew Morton wrote: > Please check that all the newly-added global symbols do indeed need > to be global. Change symbols in keystore.c and crypto.o to static if they do not need to be global. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: remove unnecessary variable initializationsMichael Halcrow
Andrew Morton wrote: > > struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL; > > This initialisation looks like it's here to kill bogus gcc warning > (if it is, it should have been commented). Please investigate > uninitialized_var() and __maybe_unused sometime. Remove some unnecessary variable initializations. There may be a few more such intializations remaining in the code base; a future patch will take care of those. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: kerneldoc fixes for crypto.c and keystore.cMichael Halcrow
Andrew Morton wrote: From: mhalcrow@us.ibm.com <mhalcrow@halcrow.austin.ibm.com> > > +/** > > + * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key > > + * with the given auth_tok. > > * > > * Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise. > > */ > > That comment purports to be a kerneldoc-style comment. But > > - kerneldoc doesn't support multiple lines on the introductory line > which identifies the name of the function (alas). So you'll need to > overflow 80 cols here. > > - the function args weren't documented > > But the return value is! People regularly forget to do that. And > they frequently forget to document the locking prerequisites and the > permissible calling contexts (process/might_sleep/hardirq, etc) > > (please check all ecryptfs kerneldoc for this stuff sometime) This patch cleans up some of the existing comments and makes a couple of line break tweaks. There is more work to do to bring eCryptfs into full kerneldoc-compliance. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16ecryptfs: printk warning fixesAndrew Morton
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_1_packet': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:557: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_3_packet': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:690: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'parse_tag_11_packet': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:836: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_1_packet': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1413: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_11_packet': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1472: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'write_tag_3_packet': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 2 has type 'size_t' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1663: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'long unsigned int' fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function 'ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set': fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1778: warning: passing argument 2 of 'write_tag_11_packet' from incompatible pointer type fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options': fs/ecryptfs/main.c:363: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 3 has type 'size_t' Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: fix Tag 11 writing codeMichael Halcrow
Fix up the Tag 11 writing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. It looks like the packet length was 1 shorter than it should have been, chopping off the last byte of the key identifier. This is largely inconsequential, since it is not much more likely that a key identifier collision will occur with 7 bytes rather than 8. This patch fixes the packet to use the full number of bytes that were originally intended to be used for the key identifier. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: fix Tag 11 parsing codeMichael Halcrow
Fix up the Tag 11 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Pay attention to *8* bytes for the key identifier (literal data), no more, no less. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: fix Tag 3 parsing codeMichael Halcrow
Fix up the Tag 3 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: fix Tag 1 parsing codeMichael Halcrow
Fix up the Tag 1 parsing code to handle size limits and boundaries more explicitly. Initialize the new auth_tok's flags. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Josef Sipek <jsipek@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping auth toksMichael Halcrow
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() when wiping the authentication token list. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16eCryptfs: add key list structure; search keyringMichael Halcrow
Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-16[PATCH] eCryptfs: Reduce stack usage in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set()Michael Halcrow
eCryptfs is gobbling a lot of stack in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() because it allocates a temporary memory-hungry ecryptfs_key_record struct. This patch introduces a new kmem_cache for that struct and converts ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() to use it. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-14[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.hTim Schmielau
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes. There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the course of cleaning it up. To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble. Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha, arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig, allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted by unnecessarily included header files). Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12[PATCH] eCryptfs: open-code flag checking and manipulationMichael Halcrow
Open-code flag checking and manipulation. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-12[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet managementMichael Halcrow
Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request packets from the userspace daemon. [akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-02-11[PATCH] Transform kmem_cache_alloc()+memset(0) -> kmem_cache_zalloc().Robert P. J. Day
Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call. Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com> Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2006-12-07[PATCH] slab: remove SLAB_KERNELChristoph Lameter
SLAB_KERNEL is an alias of GFP_KERNEL. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-31[PATCH] eCryptfs: Cipher code to new crypto APIMichael Halcrow
Update cipher block encryption code to the new crypto API. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-31[PATCH] eCryptfs: Clean up crypto initializationMichael Halcrow
Clean up the crypto initialization code; let the crypto API take care of the key size checks. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-04[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/KconfigMichael Halcrow
eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux. It is derived from Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating stacked filesystems. eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key management and policy features. eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the encrypted file itself. [akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes] [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix] [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates] [pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates] [rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes] [akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven] Signed-off-by: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>