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Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.
A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.
Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.
Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.
This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.
This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.
After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs update from Al Viro:
- big one - consolidation of descriptor-related logics; almost all of
that is moved to fs/file.c
(BTW, I'm seriously tempted to rename the result to fd.c. As it is,
we have a situation when file_table.c is about handling of struct
file and file.c is about handling of descriptor tables; the reasons
are historical - file_table.c used to be about a static array of
struct file we used to have way back).
A lot of stray ends got cleaned up and converted to saner primitives,
disgusting mess in android/binder.c is still disgusting, but at least
doesn't poke so much in descriptor table guts anymore. A bunch of
relatively minor races got fixed in process, plus an ext4 struct file
leak.
- related thing - fget_light() partially unuglified; see fdget() in
there (and yes, it generates the code as good as we used to have).
- also related - bits of Cyrill's procfs stuff that got entangled into
that work; _not_ all of it, just the initial move to fs/proc/fd.c and
switch of fdinfo to seq_file.
- Alex's fs/coredump.c spiltoff - the same story, had been easier to
take that commit than mess with conflicts. The rest is a separate
pile, this was just a mechanical code movement.
- a few misc patches all over the place. Not all for this cycle,
there'll be more (and quite a few currently sit in akpm's tree)."
Fix up trivial conflicts in the android binder driver, and some fairly
simple conflicts due to two different changes to the sock_alloc_file()
interface ("take descriptor handling from sock_alloc_file() to callers"
vs "net: Providing protocol type via system.sockprotoname xattr of
/proc/PID/fd entries" adding a dentry name to the socket)
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (72 commits)
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE should be a loff_t
compat: fs: Generic compat_sys_sendfile implementation
fs: push rcu_barrier() from deactivate_locked_super() to filesystems
btrfs: reada_extent doesn't need kref for refcount
coredump: move core dump functionality into its own file
coredump: prevent double-free on an error path in core dumper
usb/gadget: fix misannotations
fcntl: fix misannotations
ceph: don't abuse d_delete() on failure exits
hypfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative
vfs: delete surplus inode NULL check
switch simple cases of fget_light to fdget
new helpers: fdget()/fdput()
switch o2hb_region_dev_write() to fget_light()
proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing files
make get_file() return its argument
vhost_set_vring(): turn pollstart/pollstop into bool
switch prctl_set_mm_exe_file() to fget_light()
switch xfs_find_handle() to fget_light()
switch xfs_swapext() to fget_light()
...
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There's no reason to call rcu_barrier() on every
deactivate_locked_super(). We only need to make sure that all delayed rcu
free inodes are flushed before we destroy related cache.
Removing rcu_barrier() from deactivate_locked_super() affects some fast
paths. E.g. on my machine exit_group() of a last process in IPC
namespace takes 0.07538s. rcu_barrier() takes 0.05188s of that time.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a mostly modest set of changes to enable basic user namespace
support. This allows the code to code to compile with user namespaces
enabled and removes the assumption there is only the initial user
namespace. Everything is converted except for the most complex of the
filesystems: autofs4, 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, fuse, gfs2, ncpfs,
nfs, ocfs2 and xfs as those patches need a bit more review.
The strategy is to push kuid_t and kgid_t values are far down into
subsystems and filesystems as reasonable. Leaving the make_kuid and
from_kuid operations to happen at the edge of userspace, as the values
come off the disk, and as the values come in from the network.
Letting compile type incompatible compile errors (present when user
namespaces are enabled) guide me to find the issues.
The most tricky areas have been the places where we had an implicit
union of uid and gid values and were storing them in an unsigned int.
Those places were converted into explicit unions. I made certain to
handle those places with simple trivial patches.
Out of that work I discovered we have generic interfaces for storing
quota by projid. I had never heard of the project identifiers before.
Adding full user namespace support for project identifiers accounts
for most of the code size growth in my git tree.
Ultimately there will be work to relax privlige checks from
"capable(FOO)" to "ns_capable(user_ns, FOO)" where it is safe allowing
root in a user names to do those things that today we only forbid to
non-root users because it will confuse suid root applications.
While I was pushing kuid_t and kgid_t changes deep into the audit code
I made a few other cleanups. I capitalized on the fact we process
netlink messages in the context of the message sender. I removed
usage of NETLINK_CRED, and started directly using current->tty.
Some of these patches have also made it into maintainer trees, with no
problems from identical code from different trees showing up in
linux-next.
After reading through all of this code I feel like I might be able to
win a game of kernel trivial pursuit."
Fix up some fairly trivial conflicts in netfilter uid/git logging code.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (107 commits)
userns: Convert the ufs filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert the udf filesystem to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ubifs to use kuid/kgid
userns: Convert squashfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert reiserfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert jfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert jffs2 to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert hpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert btrfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert bfs to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert affs to use kuid/kgid wherwe appropriate
userns: On alpha modify linux_to_osf_stat to use convert from kuids and kgids
userns: On ia64 deal with current_uid and current_gid being kuid and kgid
userns: On ppc convert current_uid from a kuid before printing.
userns: Convert s390 getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
userns: Convert s390 hypfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binder ipc to use kuids
userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids
userns: Add user namespace support to IMA
userns: Convert EVM to deal with kuids and kgids in it's hmac computation
...
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Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Fixes a regression caused by:
821f749 eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model
That patch reverted some code (specifically, 32001d6f) that was
necessary to properly handle open() -> mmap() -> close() -> dirty pages
-> munmap(), because the lower file could be closed before the dirty
pages are written out.
Rather than reapplying 32001d6f, this approach is a better way of
ensuring that the lower file is still open in order to handle writing
out the dirty pages. It is called from ecryptfs_release(), while we have
a lock on the lower file pointer, just before the lower file gets the
final fput() and we overwrite the pointer.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1047261
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Artemy Tregubenko <me@arty.name>
Tested-by: Artemy Tregubenko <me@arty.name>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs
Pull ecryptfs fixes from Tyler Hicks:
- Fixes a bug when the lower filesystem mount options include 'acl',
but the eCryptfs mount options do not
- Cleanups in the messaging code
- Better handling of empty files in the lower filesystem to improve
usability. Failed file creations are now cleaned up and empty lower
files are converted into eCryptfs during open().
- The write-through cache changes are being reverted due to bugs that
are not easy to fix. Stability outweighs the performance
enhancements here.
- Improvement to the mount code to catch unsupported ciphers specified
in the mount options
* tag 'ecryptfs-3.6-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
eCryptfs: check for eCryptfs cipher support at mount
eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model
eCryptfs: Initialize empty lower files when opening them
eCryptfs: Unlink lower inode when ecryptfs_create() fails
eCryptfs: Make all miscdev functions use daemon ptr in file private_data
eCryptfs: Remove unused messaging declarations and function
eCryptfs: Copy up POSIX ACL and read-only flags from lower mount
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... and keep the sodding requests on stack - they are small enough.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pass mount flags to sget() so that it can use them in initialising a new
superblock before the set function is called. They could also be passed to the
compare function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The issue occurs when eCryptfs is mounted with a cipher supported by
the crypto subsystem but not by eCryptfs. The mount succeeds and an
error does not occur until a write. This change checks for eCryptfs
cipher support at mount time.
Resolves Launchpad issue #338914, reported by Tyler Hicks in 03/2009.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/338914
Signed-off-by: Tim Sally <tsally@atomicpeace.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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When the eCryptfs mount options do not include '-o acl', but the lower
filesystem's mount options do include 'acl', the MS_POSIXACL flag is not
flipped on in the eCryptfs super block flags. This flag is what the VFS
checks in do_last() when deciding if the current umask should be applied
to a newly created inode's mode or not. When a default POSIX ACL mask is
set on a directory, the current umask is incorrectly applied to new
inodes created in the directory. This patch ignores the MS_POSIXACL flag
passed into ecryptfs_mount() and sets the flag on the eCryptfs super
block depending on the flag's presence on the lower super block.
Additionally, it is incorrect to allow a writeable eCryptfs mount on top
of a read-only lower mount. This missing check did not allow writes to
the read-only lower mount because permissions checks are still performed
on the lower filesystem's objects but it is best to simply not allow a
rw mount on top of ro mount. However, a ro eCryptfs mount on top of a rw
mount is valid and still allowed.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1009207
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Beller <stefanbeller@googlemail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Now that ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() is no longer using
ecryptfs_header_cache_2 to read in metadata, the kmem_cache can be
removed and the ecryptfs_header_cache_1 kmem_cache can be renamed to
ecryptfs_header_cache.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Only unlock and d_add() new inodes after the plaintext inode size has
been read from the lower filesystem. This fixes a race condition that
was sometimes seen during a multi-job kernel build in an eCryptfs mount.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36002
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
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These functions should live in inode.c since their focus is on inodes
and they're primarily used by functions in inode.c.
Also does a simple cleanup of ecryptfs_inode_test() and rolls
ecryptfs_init_inode() into ecryptfs_inode_set().
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
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For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and
multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The
lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first
lookup through the lifetime of the inode.
This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds
reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not
currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such
as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is
opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the
term persistent file are changed to lower file.
Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file
and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs
the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it.
This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3
client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs
inode is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
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A requested key is write locked in order to prevent modifications on the
authentication token while it is being used.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Authentication tokens content may change if another requestor calls the
update() method of the corresponding key. The new function
ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() retrieves the authentication token from
the provided key and verifies if it is still valid before being used to
encrypt or decrypt an eCryptfs file.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
[tyhicks: Minor formatting changes]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Change the write path to encrypt the data only when the page is written to
disk in ecryptfs_writepage. Previously, ecryptfs encrypts the page in
ecryptfs_write_end which means that if there are multiple write requests to
the same page, ecryptfs ends up re-encrypting that page over and over again.
This patch minimizes the number of encryptions needed.
Signed-off-by: Thieu Le <thieule@chromium.org>
[tyhicks: Changed NULL .drop_inode sop pointer to generic_drop_inode]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Add __attribute__((format... to __ecryptfs_printk
Make formats and arguments match.
Add casts to (unsigned long long) for %llu.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
[tyhicks: 80 columns cleanup and fixed typo]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch initializes the 'magic' field of ecryptfs filesystems to
ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
[tyhicks: merge with 66cb76666d69]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Stephen Rothwell reports that the vfs merge broke the build of ecryptfs.
The breakage comes from commit 66cb76666d69 ("sanitize ecryptfs
->mount()") which was obviously not even build tested. Tssk, tssk, Al.
This is the minimal build fixup for the situation, although I don't have
a filesystem to actually test it with.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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kill ecryptfs_read_super(), reorder code allowing to use
normal d_alloc_root() instead of opencoding it.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Reduce some branches and memory accesses in dcache lookup by adding dentry
flags to indicate common d_ops are set, rather than having to check them.
This saves a pointer memory access (dentry->d_op) in common path lookup
situations, and saves another pointer load and branch in cases where we
have d_op but not the particular operation.
Patched with:
git grep -E '[.>]([[:space:]])*d_op([[:space:]])*=' | xargs sed -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)->d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\1, \2);/' -e 's/\([^\t ]*\)\.d_op = \(.*\);/d_set_d_op(\&\1, \2);/' -i
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6:
eCryptfs: Print mount_auth_tok_only param in ecryptfs_show_options
ecryptfs: added ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only mount parameter
ecryptfs: checking return code of ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig()
ecryptfs: release keys loaded in ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig()
eCryptfs: Clear LOOKUP_OPEN flag when creating lower file
ecryptfs: call vfs_setxattr() in ecryptfs_setxattr()
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This patch adds a new mount parameter 'ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only' to
force ecryptfs to use only authentication tokens which signature has
been specified at mount time with parameters 'ecryptfs_sig' and
'ecryptfs_fnek_sig'. In this way, after disabling the passthrough and
the encrypted view modes, it's possible to make available to users only
files encrypted with the specified authentication token.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
[Tyler: Clean up coding style errors found by checkpatch]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This is a seriously simplified patch from Eric Sandeen; copy of
rationale follows:
===
mounting stacked ecryptfs on ecryptfs has been shown to lead to bugs
in testing. For crypto info in xattr, there is no mechanism for handling
this at all, and for normal file headers, we run into other trouble:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
IP: [<ffffffffa015b0b3>] ecryptfs_d_revalidate+0x43/0xa0 [ecryptfs]
...
There doesn't seem to be any good usecase for this, so I'd suggest just
disallowing the configuration.
Based on a patch originally, I believe, from Mike Halcrow.
===
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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First of all, get_sb_nodev() grabs anon dev minor and we
never free it in ecryptfs ->kill_sb(). Moreover, on one
of the failure exits in ecryptfs_get_sb() we leak things -
it happens before we set ->s_root and ->put_super() won't
be called in that case. Solution: kill ->put_super(), do
all that stuff in ->kill_sb(). And use kill_anon_sb() instead
of generic_shutdown_super() to deal with anon dev leak.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This ensures that dirty data gets flushed properly.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
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implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This get_nlinks parameter was never used by the only mainline user,
ecryptfs; and it has never been used by unionfs or wrapfs either.
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* do ima_get_count() in __dentry_open()
* stop doing that in followups
* move ima_path_check() to right after nameidata_to_filp()
* don't bump counters on it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The unencrypted files are being measured. Update the counters to get
rid of the ecryptfs imbalance message. (http://bugzilla.redhat.com/519737)
Reported-by: Sachin Garg
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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If the lower inode is read-only, don't attempt to open the lower file
read/write and don't hand off the open request to the privileged
eCryptfs kthread for opening it read/write. Instead, only try an
unprivileged, read-only open of the file and give up if that fails.
This patch fixes an oops when eCryptfs is mounted on top of a read-only
mount.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically
unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon
umount. This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for
ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Copies the lower inode attributes to the upper inode before passing the
upper inode to d_instantiate(). This is important for
security_d_instantiate().
The problem was discovered by a user seeing SELinux denials like so:
type=AVC msg=audit(1236812817.898:47): avc: denied { 0x100000 } for
pid=3584 comm="httpd" name="testdir" dev=ecryptfs ino=943872
scontext=root:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=root:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 tclass=file
Notice target class is file while testdir is really a directory,
confusing the permission translation (0x100000) due to the wrong i_mode.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils
userspace package versions 61 or later support this option.
When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper
will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption
in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user
interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the
mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will
then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting
by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has
already entered for encrypting the file contents.
When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for
the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key
must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes
care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount
helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring
with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.
The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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more nameidata eviction
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and
makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
transport.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser
tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in
all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst
exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.
This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm
since then.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Kmem cache passed to constructor is only needed for constructors that are
themselves multiplexeres. Nobody uses this "feature", nor does anybody uses
passed kmem cache in non-trivial way, so pass only pointer to object.
Non-trivial places are:
arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c
arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c
This is flag day, yes.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/slab.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ubifs]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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