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Delegate the random insertion to the forced threaded interrupt
handler. Store the return IP of the hard interrupt handler in the irq
descriptor and feed it into the random generator as a source of
entropy.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org
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[ Upstream commit 51c37a70aaa3f95773af560e6db3073520513912 ]
For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have
a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15.
Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced
a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the
errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions.
However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as:
"return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1),
__seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15
would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually
be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise
an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect
that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured.
Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel.
[1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
[2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Fixes: 697f8d0348a6 ("random32: seeding improvement")
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason. So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
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After finishing a naming transition, remove unused backward
compatibility wrapper macros
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Definitions and macros for implementing soreusport.
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add functions to get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes.
The difference from get_random_bytes() is that it generates pseudo-random
numbers by prandom_u32(). It doesn't consume the entropy pool, and the
sequence is reproducible if the same rnd_state is used. So it is suitable
for generating random bytes for testing.
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows:
void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */
u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */
void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed);
/* rename from prandom32_seed() */
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
/* rename from prandom32() */
The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from
assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only
prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by
prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security
exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o.
And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the
requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both
prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion
is getting worse.
As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for
pseudo-random number library.
Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is
difficult to rename too many users at once.
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
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With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.
[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
rand_initialize_irq() ]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
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Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.
The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)
It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
--- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.
Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.
This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.
For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
in question. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.
This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.
(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)
Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
* 'x86-rdrand-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled
x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRAND
random: Add support for architectural random hooks
Fix up trivial conflicts in drivers/char/random.c: the architectural
random hooks touched "get_random_int()" that was simplified to use MD5
and not do the keyptr thing any more (see commit 6e5714eaf77d: "net:
Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5").
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Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed
random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the
architecture random number generator interfaces for the
userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus
eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool
pointer.
Changes in version 3:
- Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes().
- Changes the hooks to inlines.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
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IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline
__seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32()
function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules.
prandom32() is useful as a privately-seeded pseudo random number generator
that can give the same result every time it is initialized.
For FCoE FC-BB-6 VN2VN mode self-selected unique FC address generation, we
need an pseudo-random number generator seeded with the 64-bit world-wide
port name. A truly random generator or one seeded with randomness won't
do because the same sequence of numbers should be generated each time we
boot or the link comes up.
A prandom32_seed() inline function is added to the header file. It is
inlined not for speed, but so the function won't be expanded in the base
kernel, but only in the module that uses it.
Signed-off-by: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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fix the following 'make headers_check' warning:
usr/include/linux/random.h:39: found __[us]{8,16,32,64} type without #include <linux/types.h>
Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@gmail.com>
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those two functions only used in that C file
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Impact: build fix
fix:
In file included from /home/mingo/tip/arch/m68k/amiga/amiints.c:39:
/home/mingo/tip/include/linux/interrupt.h:21: error: expected identifier or '('
/home/mingo/tip/arch/m68k/amiga/amiints.c: In function 'amiga_init_IRQ':
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Impact: new feature
Problem on distro kernels: irq_desc[NR_IRQS] takes megabytes of RAM with
NR_CPUS set to large values. The goal is to be able to scale up to much
larger NR_IRQS value without impacting the (important) common case.
To solve this, we generalize irq_desc[NR_IRQS] to an (optional) array of
irq_desc pointers.
When CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=y is used, we use kzalloc_node to get irq_desc,
this also makes the IRQ descriptors NUMA-local (to the site that calls
request_irq()).
This gets rid of the irq_cfg[] static array on x86 as well: irq_cfg now
uses desc->chip_data for x86 to store irq_cfg.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Make net_random() more widely available by calling it random32
akpm: hopefully this will permit the removal of carta_random32. That needs
confirmation from Stephane - this code looks somewhat more computationally
expensive, and has a different (ie: callee-stateful) interface.
[akpm@osdl.org: lots of build fixes, cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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Renaming it to inet6_hash_connect, making it possible to ditch
dccp_v6_hash_connect and share the same code with TCP instead.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Renaming it to inet_hash_connect, making it possible to ditch
dccp_v4_hash_connect and share the same code with TCP instead.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Code contributed by Stephen Hemminger.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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