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2011-01-13Merge branch 'for-next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial * 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (43 commits) Documentation/trace/events.txt: Remove obsolete sched_signal_send. writeback: fix global_dirty_limits comment runtime -> real-time ppc: fix comment typo singal -> signal drivers: fix comment typo diable -> disable. m68k: fix comment typo diable -> disable. wireless: comment typo fix diable -> disable. media: comment typo fix diable -> disable. remove doc for obsolete dynamic-printk kernel-parameter remove extraneous 'is' from Documentation/iostats.txt Fix spelling milisec -> ms in snd_ps3 module parameter description Fix spelling mistakes in comments Revert conflicting V4L changes i7core_edac: fix typos in comments mm/rmap.c: fix comment sound, ca0106: Fix assignment to 'channel'. hrtimer: fix a typo in comment init/Kconfig: fix typo anon_inodes: fix wrong function name in comment fix comment typos concerning "consistent" poll: fix a typo in comment ... Fix up trivial conflicts in: - drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-core.c (moved to iwl-legacy.c) - fs/ext4/ext4.h Also fix missed 'diabled' typo in drivers/net/bnx2x/bnx2x.h while at it.
2011-01-10headers: kobject.h reduxAlexey Dobriyan
Remove kobject.h from files which don't need it, notably, sched.h and fs.h. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-10headers: path.h reduxAlexey Dobriyan
Remove path.h from sched.h and other files. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-11-01tree-wide: fix comment/printk typosUwe Kleine-König
"gadget", "through", "command", "maintain", "maintain", "controller", "address", "between", "initiali[zs]e", "instead", "function", "select", "already", "equal", "access", "management", "hierarchy", "registration", "interest", "relative", "memory", "offset", "already", Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2010-09-07AppArmor: Fix security_task_setrlimit logic for 2.6.36 changesJohn Johansen
2.6.36 introduced the abilitiy to specify the task that is having its rlimits set. Update mediation to ensure that confined tasks can only set their own group_leader as expected by current policy. Add TODO note about extending policy to support setting other tasks rlimits. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: core policy routinesJohn Johansen
The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policyJohn Johansen
AppArmor policy is loaded in a platform independent flattened binary stream. Verify and unpack the data converting it to the internal format needed for enforcement. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: mediation of non file objectsJohn Johansen
ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: functions for domain transitionsJohn Johansen
AppArmor routines for controling domain transitions, which can occur at exec or through self directed change_profile/change_hat calls. Unconfined tasks are checked at exec against the profiles in the confining profile namespace to determine if a profile should be attached to the task. Confined tasks execs are controlled by the profile which provides rules determining which execs are allowed and if so which profiles should be transitioned to. Self directed domain transitions allow a task to request transition to a given profile. If the transition is allowed then the profile will be applied, either immeditately or at exec time depending on the request. Immeditate self directed transitions have several security limitations but have uses in setting up stub transition profiles and other limited cases. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: file enforcement routinesJohn Johansen
AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: userspace interfacesJohn Johansen
The /proc/<pid>/attr/* interface is used for process introspection and commands. While the apparmorfs interface is used for global introspection and loading and removing policy. The interface currently only contains the files necessary for loading policy, and will be extended in the future to include sysfs style single per file introspection inteface. The old AppArmor 2.4 interface files have been removed into a compatibility patch, that distros can use to maintain backwards compatibility. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: dfa match engineJohn Johansen
A basic dfa matching engine based off the dfa engine in the Dragon Book. It uses simple row comb compression with a check field. This allows AppArmor to do pattern matching in linear time, and also avoids stack issues that an nfa based engine may have. The dfa engine uses a byte based comparison, with all values being valid. Any potential character encoding are handled user side when the dfa tables are created. By convention AppArmor uses \0 to separate two dependent path matches since \0 is not a valid path character (this is done in the link permission check). The dfa tables are generated in user space and are verified at load time to be internally consistent. There are several future improvements planned for the dfa engine: * The dfa engine may be converted to a hybrid nfa-dfa engine, with a fixed size limited stack. This would allow for size time tradeoffs, by inserting limited nfa states to help control state explosion that can occur with dfas. * The dfa engine may pickup the ability to do limited dynamic variable matching, instead of fixing all variables at policy load time. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: contexts used in attaching policy to system objectsJohn Johansen
AppArmor contexts attach profiles and state to tasks, files, etc. when a direct profile reference is not sufficient. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.John Johansen
Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for AppArmor uses for auditing. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-02AppArmor: misc. base functions and definesJohn Johansen
Miscellaneous functions and defines needed by AppArmor, including the base path resolution routines. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>