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Corrects an error code so that it is valid to pass to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <linux_4ever@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@halo.namei>
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We don't need to check for NULL pointers before calling kfree().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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A small fix to the SELinux/NetLabel glue code to ensure that the NetLabel
cache is utilized when possible. This was broken when the SELinux/NetLabel
glue code was reorganized in the last kernel release.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Typo fixes errror -> error
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die@googlemail.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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xfrm_audit_log() expects the context string to be null-terminated
which currently doesn't happen with user-supplied contexts.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Fix memory leak in security_netlbl_cache_add()
Note: The Coverity checker gets credit for spotting this one.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Selinux folks had been complaining about the lack of AVC_PATH
records when audit is disabled. I must admit my stupidity - I assumed
that avc_audit() really couldn't use audit_log_d_path() because of
deadlocks (== could be called with dcache_lock or vfsmount_lock held).
Shouldn't have made that assumption - it never gets called that way.
It _is_ called under spinlocks, but not those.
Since audit_log_d_path() uses ab->gfp_mask for allocations,
kmalloc() in there is not a problem. IOW, the simple fix is sufficient:
let's rip AUDIT_AVC_PATH out and simply generate pathname as part of main
record. It's trivial to do.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f222d44bb7e2f0a559f2906191a0862d7 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.
This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
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These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an
access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the
ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel is
in use. The changes to the policy are straight forward with the following
necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG defined as
"netlabel_peer_t"):
allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
The policy for unlabeled traffic would be:
allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included in
the latest SELinux Reference Policy release 20070629 or later. Users who make
use of NetLabel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their policy to avoid
network problems. Users who do not make use of NetLabel will not notice any
difference.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Create a new NetLabel KAPI interface, netlbl_enabled(), which reports on the
current runtime status of NetLabel based on the existing configuration. LSMs
that make use of NetLabel, i.e. SELinux, can use this new function to determine
if they should perform NetLabel access checks. This patch changes the
NetLabel/SELinux glue code such that SELinux only enforces NetLabel related
access checks when netlbl_enabled() returns true.
At present NetLabel is considered to be enabled when there is at least one
labeled protocol configuration present. The result is that by default NetLabel
is considered to be disabled, however, as soon as an administrator configured
a CIPSO DOI definition NetLabel is enabled and SELinux starts enforcing
NetLabel related access controls - including unlabeled packet controls.
This patch also tries to consolidate the multiple "#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL"
blocks into a single block to ease future review as recommended by Linus.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Introduce is_owner_or_cap() macro in fs.h, and convert over relevant
users to it. This is done because we want to avoid bugs in the future
where we check for only effective fsuid of the current task against a
file's owning uid, without simultaneously checking for CAP_FOWNER as
well, thus violating its semantics.
[ XFS uses special macros and structures, and in general looked ...
untouchable, so we leave it alone -- but it has been looked over. ]
The (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) check in generic_permission() and
exec_permission_lite() is left alone, because those operations are
covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. Similarly operations
falling under the purview of CAP_CHOWN and CAP_LEASE are also left alone.
Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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NetLabel"
This reverts commit 9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0.
It bit people like Michal Piotrowski:
"My system is too secure, I can not login :)"
because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux
policies.
As a result, quoth James Morris:
"Can you please revert this patch?
We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others.
Sorry for the hassle."
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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These changes will make NetLabel behave like labeled IPsec where there is an
access check for both labeled and unlabeled packets as well as providing the
ability to restrict domains to receiving only labeled packets when NetLabel
is in use. The changes to the policy are straight forward with the
following necessary to receive labeled traffic (with SECINITSID_NETMSG
defined as "netlabel_peer_t"):
allow mydom_t netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
The policy for unlabeled traffic would be:
allow mydom_t unlabeled_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom;
These policy changes, as well as more general NetLabel support, are included
in the SELinux Reference Policy SVN tree, r2352 or later. Users who enable
NetLabel support in the kernel are strongly encouraged to upgrade their
policy to avoid network problems.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.
This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Inode numbers are unsigned long and so need to %lu as format string of printf.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Oed <tobias.oed@octant-fr.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one. These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results. It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.
The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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During the LSPP testing we found that it was possible for
policydb_destroy() to take 10+ seconds of kernel time to complete.
Basically all policydb_destroy() does is walk some (possibly long) lists
and free the memory it finds. Turning off slab debugging config options
made the problem go away since the actual functions which took most of
the time were (as seen by oprofile)
> 121202 23.9879 .check_poison_obj
> 78247 15.4864 .check_slabp
were caused by that. So I decided to also add some voluntary schedule
points in that code so config voluntary preempt would be enough to solve
the problem. Something similar was done in places like
shmem_free_pages() when we have to walk a list of memory and free it.
This was tested by the LSPP group on the hardware which could reproduce
the problem just loading a new policy and was found to not trigger the
softlock detector. It takes just as much processing time, but the
kernel doesn't spend all that time stuck doing one thing and never
scheduling.
Someday a better way to handle memory might make the time needed in this
function a lot less, but this fixes the current issue as it stands
today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The structure is as follows (relative to selinuxfs root):
/class/file/index
/class/file/perms/read
/class/file/perms/write
...
Each class is allocated 33 inodes, 1 for the class index and 32 for
permissions. Relative to SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET, the inode of the index file
DIV 33 is the class number. The inode of the permission file % 33 is the
index of the permission for that class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Specify the inode counter explicitly in sel_make_dir(), rather than always
using sel_last_ino.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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sel_remove_bools() will also be used by the object class discovery, rename
it for more general use.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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running policy
Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes,
and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class.
Signed-off-by: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The current NetLabel code has some redundant APIs which allow both
"struct socket" and "struct sock" types to be used; this may have made
sense at some point but it is wasteful now. Remove the functions that
operate on sockets and convert the callers. Not only does this make
the code smaller and more consistent but it pushes the locking burden
up to the caller which can be more intelligent about the locks. Also,
perform the same conversion (socket to sock) on the SELinux/NetLabel
glue code where it make sense.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Fix several typos in help text in Kconfig* files.
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
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Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.
Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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While researching the tty layer pid leaks I found a weird case in selinux when
we drop a controlling tty because of inadequate permissions we don't do the
normal hangup processing. Which is a problem if it happens the session leader
has exec'd something that can no longer access the tty.
We already have code in the kernel to handle this case in the form of the
TIOCNOTTY ioctl. So this patch factors out a helper function that is the
essence of that ioctl and calls it from the selinux code.
This removes the inconsistency in handling dropping of a controlling tty and
who knows it might even make some part of user space happy because it received
a SIGHUP it was expecting.
In addition since this removes the last user of proc_set_tty outside of
tty_io.c proc_set_tty is made static and removed from tty.h
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
selinux: preserve boolean values across policy reloads
selinux: change numbering of boolean directory inodes in selinuxfs
selinux: remove unused enumeration constant from selinuxfs
selinux: explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes
selinux: export initial SID contexts via selinuxfs
selinux: remove userland security class and permission definitions
SELinux: move security_skb_extlbl_sid() out of the security server
MAINTAINERS: update selinux entry
SELinux: rename selinux_netlabel.h to netlabel.h
SELinux: extract the NetLabel SELinux support from the security server
NetLabel: convert a BUG_ON in the CIPSO code to a runtime check
NetLabel: cleanup and document CIPSO constants
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At present, the userland policy loading code has to go through contortions to preserve
boolean values across policy reloads, and cannot do so atomically.
As this is what we always want to do for reloads, let the kernel preserve them instead.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@mentalrootkit.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Change the numbering of the booleans directory inodes in selinuxfs to
provide more room for new inodes without a conflict in inode numbers and
to be consistent with how inode numbering is done in the
initial_contexts directory.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove the unused enumeration constant, SEL_AVC, from the sel_inos
enumeration in selinuxfs.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Explicitly number all selinuxfs inodes to prevent a conflict between
inodes numbered using last_ino when created with new_inode() and those
labeled explicitly.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Make the initial SID contexts accessible to userspace via selinuxfs.
An initial use of this support will be to make the unlabeled context
available to libselinux for use for invalidated userspace SIDs.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel
as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission
definitions and userland definitions may change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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In the beginning I named the file selinux_netlabel.h to avoid potential
namespace colisions. However, over time I have realized that there are several
other similar cases of multiple header files with the same name so I'm changing
the name to something which better fits with existing naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to
SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for
various reasons is not really ideal. This patch makes an effort to extract as
much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Switch cb_lock to mutex and allow netlink kernel users to override it
with a subsystem specific mutex for consistent locking in dump callbacks.
All netlink_dump_start users have been audited not to rely on any
side-effects of the previously used spinlock.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For the common "(struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data" sequence, so that we reduce the
number of direct accesses to skb->data and for consistency with all the other
cast skb member helpers.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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So that it is also an offset from skb->head, reduces its size from 8 to 4 bytes
on 64bit architectures, allowing us to combine the 4 bytes hole left by the
layer headers conversion, reducing struct sk_buff size to 256 bytes, i.e. 4
64byte cachelines, and since the sk_buff slab cache is SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN...
:-)
Many calculations that previously required that skb->{transport,network,
mac}_header be first converted to a pointer now can be done directly, being
meaningful as offsets or pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For the quite common 'skb->nh.raw - skb->data' sequence.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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have it return the buffer it had allocated
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Always initialize *scontext and *scontext_len in security_sid_to_context.
(via http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/2/23/135)
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Below is a patch which demotes many printk lines to KERN_DEBUG from
KERN_INFO. It should help stop the spamming of logs with messages in
which users are not interested nor is there any action that users should
take. It also promotes some KERN_INFO to KERN_ERR such as when there
are improper attempts to register/unregister security modules.
A similar patch was discussed a while back on list:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=116656343500003&r=1&w=2
This patch addresses almost all of the issues raised. I believe the
only advice not taken was in the demoting of messages related to
undefined permissions and classes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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I goofed and when reenabling the fine grained selinux labels for
sysctls and forgot to add the "/sys" prefix before consulting
the policy database. When computing the same path using
proc_dir_entries we got the "/sys" for free as it was part
of the tree, but it isn't true for clt_table trees.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table
initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are
initializing.
[akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.
To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.
Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace a small number of expressions with a call to the "container_of()"
macro.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@steeleye.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <Joel.Becker@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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