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2014-03-12SELinux: Increase ebitmap_node size for 64-bit configurationWaiman Long
commit a767f680e34bf14a36fefbbb6d85783eef99fd57 upstream. Currently, the ebitmap_node structure has a fixed size of 32 bytes. On a 32-bit system, the overhead is 8 bytes, leaving 24 bytes for being used as bitmaps. The overhead ratio is 1/4. On a 64-bit system, the overhead is 16 bytes. Therefore, only 16 bytes are left for bitmap purpose and the overhead ratio is 1/2. With a 3.8.2 kernel, a boot-up operation will cause the ebitmap_get_bit() function to be called about 9 million times. The average number of ebitmap_node traversal is about 3.7. This patch increases the size of the ebitmap_node structure to 64 bytes for 64-bit system to keep the overhead ratio at 1/4. This may also improve performance a little bit by making node to node traversal less frequent (< 2) as more bits are available in each node. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
2014-03-12SELinux: Reduce overhead of mls_level_isvalid() function callWaiman Long
commit fee7114298cf54bbd221cdb2ab49738be8b94f4c upstream. While running the high_systime workload of the AIM7 benchmark on a 2-socket 12-core Westmere x86-64 machine running 3.10-rc4 kernel (with HT on), it was found that a pretty sizable amount of time was spent in the SELinux code. Below was the perf trace of the "perf record -a -s" of a test run at 1500 users: 5.04% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_get_bit 1.96% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mls_level_isvalid 1.95% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] find_next_bit The ebitmap_get_bit() was the hottest function in the perf-report output. Both the ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions were, in fact, called by mls_level_isvalid(). As a result, the mls_level_isvalid() call consumed 8.95% of the total CPU time of all the 24 virtual CPUs which is quite a lot. The majority of the mls_level_isvalid() function invocations come from the socket creation system call. Looking at the mls_level_isvalid() function, it is checking to see if all the bits set in one of the ebitmap structure are also set in another one as well as the highest set bit is no bigger than the one specified by the given policydb data structure. It is doing it in a bit-by-bit manner. So if the ebitmap structure has many bits set, the iteration loop will be done many times. The current code can be rewritten to use a similar algorithm as the ebitmap_contains() function with an additional check for the highest set bit. The ebitmap_contains() function was extended to cover an optional additional check for the highest set bit, and the mls_level_isvalid() function was modified to call ebitmap_contains(). With that change, the perf trace showed that the used CPU time drop down to just 0.08% (ebitmap_contains + mls_level_isvalid) of the total which is about 100X less than before. 0.07% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_contains 0.05% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ebitmap_get_bit 0.01% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] mls_level_isvalid 0.01% ls [kernel.kallsyms] [k] find_next_bit The remaining ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions calls are made by other kernel routines as the new mls_level_isvalid() function will not call them anymore. This patch also improves the high_systime AIM7 benchmark result, though the improvement is not as impressive as is suggested by the reduction in CPU time spent in the ebitmap functions. The table below shows the performance change on the 2-socket x86-64 system (with HT on) mentioned above. +--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+ | Workload | mean % change | mean % change | mean % change | | | 10-100 users | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users | +--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+ | high_systime | +0.1% | +0.9% | +2.6% | +--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+ Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
2014-03-05SELinux: bigendian problems with filename trans rulesEric Paris
commit 9085a6422900092886da8c404e1c5340c4ff1cbf upstream. When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian. On x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from le32_to_cpu. So the values are all screwed up. Write the values in le format like it should have been to start. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
2014-02-20SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.Stephen Smalley
commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 upstream. Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-02-13SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policyTetsuo Handa
commit 8ed814602876bec9bad2649ca17f34b499357a1c upstream. Hello. I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 . [ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing ebitmap_set_bit() call. ---------- >>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900 Subject: SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks memory if hashtab_insert() returns error. unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8): comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk. backtrace: [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360 [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70 [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500 [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750 [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will show below message and the boot sequence freezes. systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-25SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt
commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream. While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore
selinux_ip_postroute() commit c0828e50485932b7e019df377a6b0a8d1ebd3080 upstream. Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore
commit 817eff718dca4e54d5721211ddde0914428fbb7c upstream. Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov
commit c0c1439541f5305b57a83d599af32b74182933fe upstream. selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-01-09selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson
commit 46d01d63221c3508421dd72ff9c879f61053cffc upstream. Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-20selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore
commit 446b802437f285de68ffb8d6fac3c44c3cab5b04 upstream. In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-20selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore
commit 47180068276a04ed31d24fe04c673138208b07a9 upstream. In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-12-04selinux: correct locking in selinux_netlbl_socket_connect)Paul Moore
commit 42d64e1add3a1ce8a787116036163b8724362145 upstream. The SELinux/NetLabel glue code has a locking bug that affects systems with NetLabel enabled, see the kernel error message below. This patch corrects this problem by converting the bottom half socket lock to a more conventional, and correct for this call-path, lock_sock() call. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Not tainted ------------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1928 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by ping/731: #0: (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-...}, at: [...] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<...>] netlbl_conn_setattr stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 731 Comm: ping Not tainted 3.11.0-rc3+ #19 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000001 ffff88006f659d28 ffffffff81726b6a ffff88003732c500 ffff88006f659d58 ffffffff810e4457 ffff88006b845a00 0000000000000000 000000000000000c ffff880075aa2f50 ffff88006f659d90 ffffffff8169bec7 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81726b6a>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [<ffffffff810e4457>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xe7/0x120 [<ffffffff8169bec7>] cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x187/0x1a0 [<ffffffff8170f317>] netlbl_conn_setattr+0x187/0x190 [<ffffffff8170f195>] ? netlbl_conn_setattr+0x5/0x190 [<ffffffff8131ac9e>] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xae/0xc0 [<ffffffff81303025>] selinux_socket_connect+0x135/0x170 [<ffffffff8119d127>] ? might_fault+0x57/0xb0 [<ffffffff812fb146>] security_socket_connect+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff815d3ad3>] SYSC_connect+0x73/0x130 [<ffffffff81739a85>] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [<ffffffff810e5e2d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [<ffffffff81373d4e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [<ffffffff815d52be>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81739a59>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-11-29Revert "ima: policy for RAMFS"Mimi Zohar
commit 08de59eb144d7c41351a467442f898d720f0f15f upstream. This reverts commit 4c2c392763a682354fac65b6a569adec4e4b5387. Everything in the initramfs should be measured and appraised, but until the initramfs has extended attribute support, at least measured. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2013-10-16apparmor: fix bad lock balance when introspecting policyJohn Johansen
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1235977 The profile introspection seq file has a locking bug when policy is viewed from a virtual root (task in a policy namespace), introspection from the real root is not affected. The test for root while (parent) { is correct for the real root, but incorrect for tasks in a policy namespace. This allows the task to walk backup the policy tree past its virtual root causing it to be unlocked before the virtual root should be in the p_stop fn. This results in the following lockdep back trace: [ 78.479744] [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] [ 78.479792] 3.11.0-11-generic #17 Not tainted [ 78.479838] ------------------------------------- [ 78.479885] grep/2223 is trying to release lock (&ns->lock) at: [ 78.479952] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10 [ 78.480002] but there are no more locks to release! [ 78.480037] [ 78.480037] other info that might help us debug this: [ 78.480037] 1 lock held by grep/2223: [ 78.480037] #0: (&p->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812111bd>] seq_read+0x3d/0x3d0 [ 78.480037] [ 78.480037] stack backtrace: [ 78.480037] CPU: 0 PID: 2223 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.11.0-11-generic #17 [ 78.480037] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 78.480037] ffffffff817bf3be ffff880007763d60 ffffffff817b97ef ffff8800189d2190 [ 78.480037] ffff880007763d88 ffffffff810e1c6e ffff88001f044730 ffff8800189d2190 [ 78.480037] ffffffff817bf3be ffff880007763e00 ffffffff810e5bd6 0000000724fe56b7 [ 78.480037] Call Trace: [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817b97ef>] dump_stack+0x54/0x74 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e1c6e>] print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0xee/0x100 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e5bd6>] lock_release_non_nested+0x226/0x300 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf2fe>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xce/0x180 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff810e5d5c>] lock_release+0xac/0x310 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf2b3>] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x83/0x180 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817bf3be>] mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff81376c91>] p_stop+0x51/0x90 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff81211408>] seq_read+0x288/0x3d0 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff811e9d9e>] vfs_read+0x9e/0x170 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff811ea8cc>] SyS_read+0x4c/0xa0 [ 78.480037] [<ffffffff817ccc9d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-10-16apparmor: fix memleak of the profile hashJohn Johansen
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1235523 This fixes the following kmemleak trace: unreferenced object 0xffff8801e8c35680 (size 32): comm "apparmor_parser", pid 691, jiffies 4294895667 (age 13230.876s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): e0 d3 4e b5 ac 6d f4 ed 3f cb ee 48 1c fd 40 cf ..N..m..?..H..@. 5b cc e9 93 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [............... backtrace: [<ffffffff817a97ee>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 [<ffffffff811ca9f3>] __kmalloc+0x103/0x290 [<ffffffff8138acbc>] aa_calc_profile_hash+0x6c/0x150 [<ffffffff8138074d>] aa_unpack+0x39d/0xd50 [<ffffffff8137eced>] aa_replace_profiles+0x3d/0xd80 [<ffffffff81376937>] profile_replace+0x37/0x50 [<ffffffff811e9f2d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0 [<ffffffff811ea96c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [<ffffffff817ccb1d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-10-04selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from avc_audit()Linus Torvalds
Now avc_audit() has no more users with that parameter. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-10-04selinux: avc_has_perm_flags has no more usersLinus Torvalds
.. so get rid of it. The only indirect users were all the avc_has_perm() callers which just expanded to have a zero flags argument. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-10-04selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from inode_has_permLinus Torvalds
Every single user passes in '0'. I think we had non-zero users back in some stone age when selinux_inode_permission() was implemented in terms of inode_has_perm(), but that complicated case got split up into a totally separate code-path so that we could optimize the much simpler special cases. See commit 2e33405785d3 ("SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permission") for example. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-09-29apparmor: fix suspicious RCU usage warning in policy.c/policy.hJohn Johansen
The recent 3.12 pull request for apparmor was missing a couple rcu _protected access modifiers. Resulting in the follow suspicious RCU usage [ 29.804534] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 29.804539] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted [ 29.804541] ------------------------------- [ 29.804545] security/apparmor/include/policy.h:363 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 29.804548] [ 29.804548] other info that might help us debug this: [ 29.804548] [ 29.804553] [ 29.804553] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 29.804558] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268: [ 29.804560] #0: (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>] file_start_write+0x27/0x29 [ 29.804576] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>] aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c [ 29.804589] [ 29.804589] stack backtrace: [ 29.804595] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5 [ 29.804599] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc. UL50VT /UL50VT , BIOS 217 03/01/2010 [ 29.804602] 0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d90 ffffffff8144eb9b ffff8800b94db540 [ 29.804611] ffff8800b95a1dc0 ffffffff81087439 ffff880138cc3a18 ffff880138cc3a18 [ 29.804619] ffff8800b9464a90 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1df0 ffffffff811f5084 [ 29.804628] Call Trace: [ 29.804636] [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82 [ 29.804642] [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105 [ 29.804649] [<ffffffff811f5084>] __aa_update_replacedby+0x53/0x7f [ 29.804655] [<ffffffff811f5408>] __replace_profile+0x11f/0x1ed [ 29.804661] [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c [ 29.804668] [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c [ 29.804674] [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113 [ 29.804680] [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a [ 29.804687] [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 29.804691] [ 29.804694] =============================== [ 29.804697] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 29.804700] 3.11.0+ #5 Not tainted [ 29.804703] ------------------------------- [ 29.804706] security/apparmor/policy.c:566 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 29.804709] [ 29.804709] other info that might help us debug this: [ 29.804709] [ 29.804714] [ 29.804714] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 29.804718] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1268: [ 29.804721] #0: (sb_writers#9){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81120a4c>] file_start_write+0x27/0x29 [ 29.804733] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811f5d88>] aa_replace_profiles+0x166/0x57c [ 29.804744] [ 29.804744] stack backtrace: [ 29.804750] CPU: 0 PID: 1268 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 3.11.0+ #5 [ 29.804753] Hardware name: ASUSTeK Computer Inc. UL50VT /UL50VT , BIOS 217 03/01/2010 [ 29.804756] 0000000000000000 ffff8800b95a1d80 ffffffff8144eb9b ffff8800b94db540 [ 29.804764] ffff8800b95a1db0 ffffffff81087439 ffff8800b95b02b0 0000000000000000 [ 29.804772] ffff8800b9efba08 ffff880138cc3a38 ffff8800b95a1dd0 ffffffff811f4f94 [ 29.804779] Call Trace: [ 29.804786] [<ffffffff8144eb9b>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x82 [ 29.804791] [<ffffffff81087439>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfc/0x105 [ 29.804798] [<ffffffff811f4f94>] aa_free_replacedby_kref+0x4d/0x62 [ 29.804804] [<ffffffff811f4f47>] ? aa_put_namespace+0x17/0x17 [ 29.804810] [<ffffffff811f4f0b>] kref_put+0x36/0x40 [ 29.804816] [<ffffffff811f5423>] __replace_profile+0x13a/0x1ed [ 29.804822] [<ffffffff811f6032>] aa_replace_profiles+0x410/0x57c [ 29.804829] [<ffffffff811f16d4>] profile_replace+0x35/0x4c [ 29.804835] [<ffffffff81120fa3>] vfs_write+0xad/0x113 [ 29.804840] [<ffffffff81121609>] SyS_write+0x44/0x7a [ 29.804847] [<ffffffff8145bfd2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: miles.lane@gmail.com CC: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-09-29apparmor: Use shash crypto API interface for profile hashesTyler Hicks
Use the shash interface, rather than the hash interface, when hashing AppArmor profiles. The shash interface does not use scatterlists and it is a better fit for what AppArmor needs. This fixes a kernel paging BUG when aa_calc_profile_hash() is passed a buffer from vmalloc(). The hash interface requires callers to handle vmalloc() buffers differently than what AppArmor was doing. Due to vmalloc() memory not being physically contiguous, each individual page behind the buffer must be assigned to a scatterlist with sg_set_page() and then the scatterlist passed to crypto_hash_update(). The shash interface does not have that limitation and allows vmalloc() and kmalloc() buffers to be handled in the same manner. BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1216294/ BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62261 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-09-07Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
2013-09-07Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Nothing major for this kernel, just maintenance updates" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits) apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policy apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module apparmor: add the profile introspection file to interface apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profiles apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c apparmor: rework namespace free path apparmor: update how unconfined is handled apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once apparmor: add a features/policy dir to interface apparmor: enable users to query whether apparmor is enabled apparmor: remove minimum size check for vmalloc() Smack: parse multiple rules per write to load2, up to PAGE_SIZE-1 bytes Smack: network label match fix security: smack: add a hash table to quicken smk_find_entry() security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list() xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr". ...
2013-09-05Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds
Pull networking changes from David Miller: "Noteworthy changes this time around: 1) Multicast rejoin support for team driver, from Jiri Pirko. 2) Centralize and simplify TCP RTT measurement handling in order to reduce the impact of bad RTO seeding from SYN/ACKs. Also, when both timestamps and local RTT measurements are available prefer the later because there are broken middleware devices which scramble the timestamp. From Yuchung Cheng. 3) Add TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option to limit the amount of kernel memory consumed to queue up unsend user data. From Eric Dumazet. 4) Add a "physical port ID" abstraction for network devices, from Jiri Pirko. 5) Add a "suppress" operation to influence fib_rules lookups, from Stefan Tomanek. 6) Add a networking development FAQ, from Paul Gortmaker. 7) Extend the information provided by tcp_probe and add ipv6 support, from Daniel Borkmann. 8) Use RCU locking more extensively in openvswitch data paths, from Pravin B Shelar. 9) Add SCTP support to openvswitch, from Joe Stringer. 10) Add EF10 chip support to SFC driver, from Ben Hutchings. 11) Add new SYNPROXY netfilter target, from Patrick McHardy. 12) Compute a rate approximation for sending in TCP sockets, and use this to more intelligently coalesce TSO frames. Furthermore, add a new packet scheduler which takes advantage of this estimate when available. From Eric Dumazet. 13) Allow AF_PACKET fanouts with random selection, from Daniel Borkmann. 14) Add ipv6 support to vxlan driver, from Cong Wang" Resolved conflicts as per discussion. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1218 commits) openvswitch: Fix alignment of struct sw_flow_key. netfilter: Fix build errors with xt_socket.c tcp: Add missing braces to do_tcp_setsockopt caif: Add missing braces to multiline if in cfctrl_linkup_request bnx2x: Add missing braces in bnx2x:bnx2x_link_initialize vxlan: Fix kernel panic on device delete. net: mvneta: implement ->ndo_do_ioctl() to support PHY ioctls net: mvneta: properly disable HW PHY polling and ensure adjust_link() works icplus: Use netif_running to determine device state ethernet/arc/arc_emac: Fix huge delays in large file copies tuntap: orphan frags before trying to set tx timestamp tuntap: purge socket error queue on detach qlcnic: use standard NAPI weights ipv6:introduce function to find route for redirect bnx2x: VF RSS support - VF side bnx2x: VF RSS support - PF side vxlan: Notify drivers for listening UDP port changes net: usbnet: update addr_assign_type if appropriate driver/net: enic: update enic maintainers and driver driver/net: enic: Exposing symbols for Cisco's low latency driver ...
2013-09-05Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux Pull module updates from Rusty Russell: "Minor fixes mainly, including a potential use-after-free on remove found by CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE which may be theoretical" * tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: module: Fix mod->mkobj.kobj potentially freed too early kernel/params.c: use scnprintf() instead of sprintf() kernel/module.c: use scnprintf() instead of sprintf() module/lsm: Have apparmor module parameters work with no args module: Add NOARG flag for ops with param_set_bool_enable_only() set function module: Add flag to allow mod params to have no arguments modules: add support for soft module dependencies scripts/mod/modpost.c: permit '.cranges' secton for sh64 architecture. module: fix sprintf format specifier in param_get_byte()
2013-09-04Merge branch 'for-3.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo: "A lot of activities on the cgroup front. Most changes aren't visible to userland at all at this point and are laying foundation for the planned unified hierarchy. - The biggest change is decoupling the lifetime management of css (cgroup_subsys_state) from that of cgroup's. Because controllers (cpu, memory, block and so on) will need to be dynamically enabled and disabled, css which is the association point between a cgroup and a controller may come and go dynamically across the lifetime of a cgroup. Till now, css's were created when the associated cgroup was created and stayed till the cgroup got destroyed. Assumptions around this tight coupling permeated through cgroup core and controllers. These assumptions are gradually removed, which consists bulk of patches, and css destruction path is completely decoupled from cgroup destruction path. Note that decoupling of creation path is relatively easy on top of these changes and the patchset is pending for the next window. - cgroup has its own event mechanism cgroup.event_control, which is only used by memcg. It is overly complex trying to achieve high flexibility whose benefits seem dubious at best. Going forward, new events will simply generate file modified event and the existing mechanism is being made specific to memcg. This pull request contains prepatory patches for such change. - Various fixes and cleanups" Fixed up conflict in kernel/cgroup.c as per Tejun. * 'for-3.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (69 commits) cgroup: fix cgroup_css() invocation in css_from_id() cgroup: make cgroup_write_event_control() use css_from_dir() instead of __d_cgrp() cgroup: make cgroup_event hold onto cgroup_subsys_state instead of cgroup cgroup: implement CFTYPE_NO_PREFIX cgroup: make cgroup_css() take cgroup_subsys * instead and allow NULL subsys cgroup: rename cgroup_css_from_dir() to css_from_dir() and update its syntax cgroup: fix cgroup_write_event_control() cgroup: fix subsystem file accesses on the root cgroup cgroup: change cgroup_from_id() to css_from_id() cgroup: use css_get() in cgroup_create() to check CSS_ROOT cpuset: remove an unncessary forward declaration cgroup: RCU protect each cgroup_subsys_state release cgroup: move subsys file removal to kill_css() cgroup: factor out kill_css() cgroup: decouple cgroup_subsys_state destruction from cgroup destruction cgroup: replace cgroup->css_kill_cnt with ->nr_css cgroup: bounce cgroup_subsys_state ref kill confirmation to a work item cgroup: move cgroup->subsys[] assignment to online_css() cgroup: reorganize css init / exit paths cgroup: add __rcu modifier to cgroup->subsys[] ...
2013-08-31capabilities: allow nice if we are privilegedSerge Hallyn
We allow task A to change B's nice level if it has a supserset of B's privileges, or of it has CAP_SYS_NICE. Also allow it if A has CAP_SYS_NICE with respect to B - meaning it is root in the same namespace, or it created B's namespace. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-08-31userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.Eric W. Biederman
As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP permission in the user namespace. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-08-22Merge branch 'smack-for-3.12' of git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel ↵James Morris
into ra-next
2013-08-20module/lsm: Have apparmor module parameters work with no argsSteven Rostedt
The apparmor module parameters for param_ops_aabool and param_ops_aalockpolicy are both based off of the param_ops_bool, and can handle a NULL value passed in as val. Have it enable the new KERNEL_PARAM_FL_NOARGS flag to allow the parameters to be set without having to state "=y" or "=1". Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2013-08-16Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
2013-08-14apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policyJohn Johansen
Provide userspace the ability to introspect a sha1 hash value for each profile currently loaded. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor moduleJohn Johansen
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: add the profile introspection file to interfaceJohn Johansen
Add the dynamic namespace relative profiles file to the interace, to allow introspection of loaded profiles and their modes. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profilesJohn Johansen
Add the ability to take in and report a human readable profile attachment string for profiles so that attachment specifications can be easily inspected. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespacesJohn Johansen
Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined stateJohn Johansen
Allow emulating the default profile behavior from boot, by allowing loading of a profile in the unconfined state into a new NS. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.cJohn Johansen
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: rework namespace free pathJohn Johansen
namespaces now completely use the unconfined profile to track the refcount and rcu freeing cycle. So rework the code to simplify (track everything through the profile path right up to the end), and move the rcu_head from policy base to profile as the namespace no longer needs it. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: update how unconfined is handledJohn Johansen
ns->unconfined is being used read side without locking, nor rcu but is being updated when a namespace is removed. This works for the root ns which is never removed but has a race window and can cause failures when children namespaces are removed. Also ns and ns->unconfined have a circular refcounting dependency that is problematic and must be broken. Currently this is done incorrectly when the namespace is destroyed. Fix this by forward referencing unconfined via the replacedby infrastructure instead of directly updating the ns->unconfined pointer. Remove the circular refcount dependency by making the ns and its unconfined profile share the same refcount. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: change how profile replacement update is doneJohn Johansen
remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation and lookup to handle task replacement. Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based lockingJohn Johansen
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at onceJohn Johansen
previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: add a features/policy dir to interfaceJohn Johansen
Add a policy directory to features to contain features that can affect policy compilation but do not affect mediation. Eg of such features would be types of dfa compression supported, etc. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: enable users to query whether apparmor is enabledJohn Johansen
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14apparmor: remove minimum size check for vmalloc()Tetsuo Handa
This is a follow-up to commit b5b3ee6c "apparmor: no need to delay vfree()". Since vmalloc() will do "size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);", we don't need to check for "size >= sizeof(struct work_struct)". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-12Smack: parse multiple rules per write to load2, up to PAGE_SIZE-1 bytesRafal Krypa
Smack interface for loading rules has always parsed only single rule from data written to it. This requires user program to call one write() per each rule it wants to load. This change makes it possible to write multiple rules, separated by new line character. Smack will load at most PAGE_SIZE-1 characters and properly return number of processed bytes. In case when user buffer is larger, it will be additionally truncated. All characters after last \n will not get parsed to avoid partial rule near input buffer boundary. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
2013-08-09cgroup: make css_for_each_descendant() and friends include the origin css in ↵Tejun Heo
the iteration Previously, all css descendant iterators didn't include the origin (root of subtree) css in the iteration. The reasons were maintaining consistency with css_for_each_child() and that at the time of introduction more use cases needed skipping the origin anyway; however, given that css_is_descendant() considers self to be a descendant, omitting the origin css has become more confusing and looking at the accumulated use cases rather clearly indicates that including origin would result in simpler code overall. While this is a change which can easily lead to subtle bugs, cgroup API including the iterators has recently gone through major restructuring and no out-of-tree changes will be applicable without adjustments making this a relatively acceptable opportunity for this type of change. The conversions are mostly straight-forward. If the iteration block had explicit origin handling before or after, it's moved inside the iteration. If not, if (pos == origin) continue; is added. Some conversions add extra reference get/put around origin handling by consolidating origin handling and the rest. While the extra ref operations aren't strictly necessary, this shouldn't cause any noticeable difference. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
2013-08-09cgroup: make hierarchy iterators deal with cgroup_subsys_state instead of cgroupTejun Heo
cgroup is currently in the process of transitioning to using css (cgroup_subsys_state) as the primary handle instead of cgroup in subsystem API. For hierarchy iterators, this is beneficial because * In most cases, css is the only thing subsystems care about anyway. * On the planned unified hierarchy, iterations for different subsystems will need to skip over different subtrees of the hierarchy depending on which subsystems are enabled on each cgroup. Passing around css makes it unnecessary to explicitly specify the subsystem in question as css is intersection between cgroup and subsystem * For the planned unified hierarchy, css's would need to be created and destroyed dynamically independent from cgroup hierarchy. Having cgroup core manage css iteration makes enforcing deref rules a lot easier. Most subsystem conversions are straight-forward. Noteworthy changes are * blkio: cgroup_to_blkcg() is no longer used. Removed. * freezer: cgroup_freezer() is no longer used. Removed. * devices: cgroup_to_devcgroup() is no longer used. Removed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2013-08-09cgroup: pass around cgroup_subsys_state instead of cgroup in file methodsTejun Heo
cgroup is currently in the process of transitioning to using struct cgroup_subsys_state * as the primary handle instead of struct cgroup. Please see the previous commit which converts the subsystem methods for rationale. This patch converts all cftype file operations to take @css instead of @cgroup. cftypes for the cgroup core files don't have their subsytem pointer set. These will automatically use the dummy_css added by the previous patch and can be converted the same way. Most subsystem conversions are straight forwards but there are some interesting ones. * freezer: update_if_frozen() is also converted to take @css instead of @cgroup for consistency. This will make the code look simpler too once iterators are converted to use css. * memory/vmpressure: mem_cgroup_from_css() needs to be exported to vmpressure while mem_cgroup_from_cont() can be made static. Updated accordingly. * cpu: cgroup_tg() doesn't have any user left. Removed. * cpuacct: cgroup_ca() doesn't have any user left. Removed. * hugetlb: hugetlb_cgroup_form_cgroup() doesn't have any user left. Removed. * net_cls: cgrp_cls_state() doesn't have any user left. Removed. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>