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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-10-25 07:45:31 (GMT) |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-10-25 07:45:31 (GMT) |
commit | 36b8d186e6cc8e32cb5227f5645a58e1bc0af190 (patch) | |
tree | 1000ad26e189e6ff2c53fb7eeff605f59c7ad94e /Documentation/ABI/testing | |
parent | cd85b557414fe4cd44ea6608825e96612a5fe2b2 (diff) | |
parent | c45ed235abf1b0b6666417e3c394f18717976acd (diff) | |
download | linux-fsl-qoriq-36b8d186e6cc8e32cb5227f5645a58e1bc0af190.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
Smack: compilation fix
Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
Smack: Clean up comments
Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
Smack: Rule list lookup performance
Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
target: check hex2bin result
encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 23 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8374d45 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +What: security/evm +Date: March 2011 +Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> +Description: + EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) + against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an + HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the + value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. + + EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it + with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. + The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until + EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully + loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM + can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but + returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM + should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done + in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part + of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and + loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to: + Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. (A sample dracut + patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables + EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.) |