crypto: add support for TLS 1.0 record encryption

This patch adds kernel support for encryption/decryption of TLS 1.0
records using block ciphers. Implementation is similar to authenc in the
sense that the base algorithms (AES, SHA1) are combined in a template to
produce TLS encapsulation frames. The composite algorithm will be called
"tls10(hmac(<digest>),cbc(<cipher>))". The cipher and hmac keys are
wrapped in the same format used by authenc.c

Change-Id: If2211062f1e8805ee1fe9e6684e7c0902bf44467
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Reviewed-on: http://git.am.freescale.net:8181/6211
Reviewed-by: Mircea Pop <mircea.pop@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Trefny <Tom.Trefny@freescale.com>
Tested-by: Review Code-CDREVIEW <CDREVIEW@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Jose Rivera <German.Rivera@freescale.com>
(cherry picked from commit e2fe61d3fe94949f9fc5766f7b27a1d19c9d4d6e)

Conflicts:
	crypto/tcrypt.c

Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com>
Change-Id: I6ecb63c7cb8c64aef984e71e439dab6000666b29
Reviewed-on: http://git.am.freescale.net:8181/10373
Reviewed-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Mircea Pop <mircea.pop@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Porosanu <alexandru.porosanu@freescale.com>
Tested-by: Review Code-CDREVIEW <CDREVIEW@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Jose Rivera <German.Rivera@freescale.com>

6 files changed, 927 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 7bcb70d..6c37bdb 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -211,6 +211,24 @@ config CRYPTO_SEQIV
 	  This IV generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by
 	  xoring it with a salt.  This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR
 
+config CRYPTO_TLS
+	tristate "TLS support"
+	select CRYPTO_AEAD
+	select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+	select CRYPTO_MANAGER
+	select CRYPTO_HASH
+	help
+	  Support for TLS 1.0 record encryption and decryption
+
+	  This module adds support for encryption/decryption of TLS 1.0 frames
+	  using blockcipher algorithms. The name of the resulting algorithm is
+	  "tls10(hmac(<digest>),cbc(<cipher>))". By default, the generic base
+	  algorithms are used (e.g. aes-generic, sha1-generic), but hardware
+	  accelerated versions will be used automatically if available.
+
+	  User-space applications (OpenSSL, GnuTLS) can offload TLS 1.0
+	  operations through AF_ALG or cryptodev interfaces
+
 comment "Block modes"
 
 config CRYPTO_CBC
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index ab6ce921..0d55bcc 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C) += crc32c.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32) += crc32.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF) += crct10dif_common.o crct10dif_generic.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC) += authenc.o authencesn.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TLS) += tls.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO) += lzo.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4) += lz4.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4HC) += lz4hc.o
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 001f07c..cbbfc7a 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -1246,6 +1246,10 @@ static int do_test(int m)
 		ret += tcrypt_test("authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))");
 		break;
 
+	case 180:
+		ret += tcrypt_test("tls10(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))");
+		break;
+
 	case 200:
 		test_cipher_speed("ecb(aes)", ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
 				speed_template_16_24_32);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 7795550..6221c54 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ struct cprng_test_suite {
 	unsigned int count;
 };
 
+struct tls_test_suite {
+	struct {
+		struct tls_testvec *vecs;
+		unsigned int count;
+	} enc, dec;
+};
+
 struct alg_test_desc {
 	const char *alg;
 	int (*test)(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
@@ -121,6 +128,7 @@ struct alg_test_desc {
 		struct pcomp_test_suite pcomp;
 		struct hash_test_suite hash;
 		struct cprng_test_suite cprng;
+		struct tls_test_suite tls;
 	} suite;
 };
 
@@ -803,6 +811,218 @@ static int test_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int __test_tls(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
+		       struct tls_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount,
+		       const bool diff_dst)
+{
+	const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm));
+	unsigned int i, rlen;
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+	char *q;
+	char *key;
+	struct aead_request *req;
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	struct scatterlist *asg;
+	struct scatterlist *sgout;
+	const char *e, *d;
+	struct tcrypt_result result;
+	void *input;
+	void *output;
+	void *assoc;
+	char iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+	char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+	char *xoutbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+	char *axbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+
+	if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
+		goto out_noxbuf;
+	if (testmgr_alloc_buf(axbuf))
+		goto out_noaxbuf;
+
+	if (diff_dst && testmgr_alloc_buf(xoutbuf))
+		goto out_nooutbuf;
+
+	sg = kmalloc(sizeof(*sg) * 8 * (diff_dst ? 3 : 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sg)
+		goto out_nosg;
+	asg = &sg[8];
+	sgout = &asg[8];
+
+	if (diff_dst)
+		d = "-ddst";
+	else
+		d = "";
+
+	if (enc == ENCRYPT)
+		e = "encryption";
+	else
+		e = "decryption";
+
+	init_completion(&result.completion);
+
+	req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		pr_err("alg: tls%s: Failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+		       d, algo);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				  tcrypt_complete, &result);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+		input = xbuf[0];
+		assoc = axbuf[0];
+
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		if (WARN_ON(template[i].ilen > PAGE_SIZE ||
+			    template[i].alen > PAGE_SIZE))
+			goto out;
+
+		memcpy(input, template[i].input, template[i].ilen);
+		memcpy(assoc, template[i].assoc, template[i].alen);
+		if (template[i].iv)
+			memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, MAX_IVLEN);
+		else
+			memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN);
+
+		crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
+		key = template[i].key;
+
+		ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].klen);
+		if (!ret == template[i].fail) {
+			pr_err("alg: tls%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: flags=%x\n",
+			       d, i, algo, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (ret)
+			continue;
+
+		output = diff_dst ? xoutbuf[0] : input;
+
+		/* Allocate enough space in the input and output scatterlists.
+		 * They must accomodate the result for in-place encryption and
+		 * different-place decryption
+		 */
+		rlen = max(template[i].ilen, template[i].rlen);
+		if (diff_dst) {
+			output = xoutbuf[0];
+			sg_init_one(&sg[0], input, template[i].ilen);
+			sg_init_one(&sgout[0], output, rlen);
+		} else {
+			output = input;
+			sg_init_one(&sg[0], input, rlen);
+		}
+
+		sg_init_one(&asg[0], assoc, template[i].alen);
+
+		aead_request_set_assoc(req, asg, template[i].alen);
+		aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, (diff_dst) ? sgout : sg,
+				       template[i].ilen, iv);
+
+		ret = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+
+		switch (ret) {
+		case 0:
+			if (template[i].novrfy) {
+				/* verification was supposed to fail */
+				pr_err("alg: tls%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret was 0, expected -EBADMSG\n",
+				       d, e, i, algo);
+				/* so really, we got a bad message */
+				ret = -EBADMSG;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		case -EINPROGRESS:
+		case -EBUSY:
+			/* The result is not ready yet. We wait for it and then
+			 * check if the request succeeded or not
+			 */
+			ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(
+						&result.completion);
+			if (!ret && !result.err) {
+				reinit_completion(&result.completion);
+				break;
+			} else {
+				ret = result.err;
+			}
+			/* fall through */
+		case -EBADMSG:
+			/* verification failure was expected */
+			if (template[i].novrfy)
+				continue;
+			/* fall through */
+		default:
+			pr_err("alg: tls%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+			       d, e, i, algo, -ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		q = output;
+		if (memcmp(q, template[i].result, template[i].rlen)) {
+			pr_err("alg: tls%s: Test %d failed on %s for %s\n",
+			       d, i, e, algo);
+			hexdump(q, template[i].rlen);
+			pr_err("should be:\n");
+			hexdump(template[i].result, template[i].rlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	aead_request_free(req);
+	kfree(sg);
+out_nosg:
+	if (diff_dst)
+		testmgr_free_buf(xoutbuf);
+out_nooutbuf:
+	testmgr_free_buf(axbuf);
+out_noaxbuf:
+	testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
+out_noxbuf:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_tls(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
+		struct tls_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount)
+{
+	int ret;
+	/* test 'dst == src' case */
+	ret = __test_tls(tfm, enc, template, tcount, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	/* test 'dst != src' case */
+	return __test_tls(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true);
+}
+
+static int alg_test_tls(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			 u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	if (desc->suite.tls.enc.vecs) {
+		err = test_tls(tfm, ENCRYPT, desc->suite.tls.enc.vecs,
+				desc->suite.tls.enc.count);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (!err && desc->suite.tls.dec.vecs)
+		err = test_tls(tfm, DECRYPT, desc->suite.tls.dec.vecs,
+				desc->suite.tls.dec.count);
+
+out:
+	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int test_cipher(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, int enc,
 		       struct cipher_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount)
 {
@@ -3000,6 +3220,21 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 			}
 		}
 	}, {
+		.alg = "tls10(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_tls,
+		.suite = {
+			.tls = {
+				.enc = {
+					.vecs = tls_enc_tv_template,
+					.count = TLS_ENC_TEST_VECTORS
+				},
+				.dec = {
+					.vecs = tls_dec_tv_template,
+					.count = TLS_DEC_TEST_VECTORS
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
 		.alg = "vmac(aes)",
 		.test = alg_test_hash,
 		.suite = {
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 7d44aa3..72b4e80 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -92,8 +92,110 @@ struct cprng_testvec {
 	unsigned short loops;
 };
 
+struct tls_testvec {
+	char *key;	/* wrapped keys for encryption and authentication */
+	char *iv;	/* initialization vector */
+	char *input;	/* input data */
+	char *assoc;	/* associated data: seq num, type, version, input len */
+	char *result;	/* result data */
+	unsigned char fail;	/* the test failure is expected */
+	unsigned char novrfy;	/* dec verification failure expected */
+	unsigned char klen;	/* key length */
+	unsigned short ilen;	/* input data length */
+	unsigned short alen;	/* associated data length */
+	unsigned short rlen;	/* result length */
+};
+
 static char zeroed_string[48];
 
+
+/*
+ * TLS1.0 synthetic test vectors
+ */
+#define TLS_ENC_TEST_VECTORS 2
+#define TLS_DEC_TEST_VECTORS 1
+
+static struct tls_testvec tls_enc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key	= "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			"\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key	= "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			"\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			"\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			"authenticationkey20b"
+			"enckeyis16_bytes",
+		.klen	= 8 + 20 + 16,
+		.iv	= "iv0123456789abcd",
+		.input	= "Single block msg",
+		.ilen	= 16,
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			"\x00\x03\x01\x00\x10",
+		.alen	= 13,
+		.result	= "\xd5\xac\xb\xd2\xac\xad\x3f\xb1"
+			"\x59\x79\x1e\x91\x5f\x52\x14\x9c"
+			"\xc0\x75\xd8\x4c\x97\x0f\x07\x73"
+			"\xdc\x89\x47\x49\x49\xcb\x30\x6b"
+			"\x1b\x45\x23\xa1\xd0\x51\xcf\x02"
+			"\x2e\xa8\x5d\xa0\xfe\xca\x82\x61",
+		.rlen	= 16 + 20 + 12,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key	= "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			"\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key	= "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			"\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			"\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			"authenticationkey20b"
+			"enckeyis16_bytes",
+		.klen	= 8 + 20 + 16,
+		.iv	= "iv0123456789abcd",
+		.input	= "",
+		.ilen	= 0,
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			"\x00\x03\x01\x00\x10",
+		.alen	= 13,
+		.result	= "\xa3\xdc\xf9\xac\x52\x70\x08\xcf"
+			"\x8d\x47\xbb\xe0\x64\xc0\x89\x2c"
+			"\xfb\x5d\x2d\x43\x35\x16\xeb\x4c"
+			"\x55\xb7\xcf\xaa\x9a\xe0\x02\x71",
+		.rlen	= 20 + 12,
+	}
+};
+
+static struct tls_testvec tls_dec_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key	= "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			"\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key	= "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			"\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			"\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			"authenticationkey20b"
+			"enckeyis16_bytes",
+		.klen	= 8 + 20 + 16,
+		.iv	= "iv0123456789abcd",
+		.input	= "\xd5\xac\xb\xd2\xac\xad\x3f\xb1"
+			"\x59\x79\x1e\x91\x5f\x52\x14\x9c"
+			"\xc0\x75\xd8\x4c\x97\x0f\x07\x73"
+			"\xdc\x89\x47\x49\x49\xcb\x30\x6b"
+			"\x1b\x45\x23\xa1\xd0\x51\xcf\x02"
+			"\x2e\xa8\x5d\xa0\xfe\xca\x82\x61",
+		.ilen	= 16 + 20 + 12,
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			"\x00\x03\x01\x00\x30",
+		.alen	= 13,
+		.result	= "Single block msg",
+		.rlen	= 16,
+	}
+};
+
 /*
  * MD4 test vectors from RFC1320
  */
diff --git a/crypto/tls.c b/crypto/tls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18cc536
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/tls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,567 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+
+struct tls_instance_ctx {
+	struct crypto_ahash_spawn auth;
+	struct crypto_skcipher_spawn enc;
+};
+
+struct crypto_tls_ctx {
+	unsigned int reqoff;
+	struct crypto_ahash *auth;
+	struct crypto_ablkcipher *enc;
+};
+
+struct tls_request_ctx {
+	/*
+	 * cryptlen holds the payload length in the case of encryption or
+	 * payload_len + icv_len + padding_len in case of decryption
+	 */
+	unsigned int cryptlen;
+	/* working space for partial results */
+	struct scatterlist icv[2];
+	struct scatterlist cipher[2];
+	char tail[];
+};
+
+struct async_op {
+	struct completion completion;
+	int err;
+};
+
+static void tls_async_op_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+	struct async_op *areq = req->data;
+
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+		return;
+
+	areq->err = err;
+	complete(&areq->completion);
+}
+
+static void tls_request_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+	/* Mark the completion of the TLS request */
+	struct aead_request *areq = req->data;
+
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+		return;
+
+	aead_request_complete(areq, err);
+}
+
+static int crypto_tls_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tls, const u8 *key,
+				 unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	unsigned int authkeylen;
+	unsigned int enckeylen;
+	struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
+	struct crypto_ahash *auth = ctx->auth;
+	struct crypto_ablkcipher *enc = ctx->enc;
+	struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key;
+	struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
+		goto badkey;
+	if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
+		goto badkey;
+	if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+		goto badkey;
+
+	param = RTA_DATA(rta);
+	enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
+
+	key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+	keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+
+	if (keylen < enckeylen)
+		goto badkey;
+
+	authkeylen = keylen - enckeylen;
+
+	crypto_ahash_clear_flags(auth, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_ahash_set_flags(auth, crypto_aead_get_flags(tls) &
+				    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(auth, key, authkeylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tls, crypto_ahash_get_flags(auth) &
+				       CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	crypto_ablkcipher_clear_flags(enc, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(enc, crypto_aead_get_flags(tls) &
+					 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(enc, key + authkeylen, enckeylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tls, crypto_ablkcipher_get_flags(enc) &
+				       CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+out:
+	return err;
+
+badkey:
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tls, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * crypto_tls_genicv - Calculate hmac digest for a TLS record
+ * @hash:	(output) buffer to save the digest into
+ * @src:	(input) scatterlist with the payload data
+ * @srclen:	(input) size of the payload data
+ * @req:	(input) aead request (with pointers to associated data)
+ **/
+static int crypto_tls_genicv(u8 *hash, struct scatterlist *src,
+			     unsigned int srclen, struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
+	struct tls_request_ctx *treq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct scatterlist *assoc = req->assoc;
+	struct scatterlist *icv = treq_ctx->icv;
+	struct async_op ahash_op;
+	struct ahash_request *ahreq = (void *)(treq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
+	unsigned int flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+	int err = -EBADMSG;
+
+	/*
+	 * Bail out as we have only two maneuvering scatterlists in icv. Check
+	 * also if the request assoc len matches the scatterlist len
+	 */
+	if (!req->assoclen || !sg_is_last(assoc) ||
+	    req->assoclen != assoc->length)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepend associated data to the source scatterlist. If the source is
+	 * empty, use directly the associated data scatterlist
+	 */
+	if (srclen) {
+		sg_init_table(icv, 2);
+		sg_set_page(icv, sg_page(assoc), assoc->length, assoc->offset);
+		scatterwalk_crypto_chain(icv, src, 0, 2);
+	} else {
+		icv = assoc;
+	}
+	srclen += assoc->length;
+
+	init_completion(&ahash_op.completion);
+
+	/* the hash transform to be executed comes from the original request */
+	ahash_request_set_tfm(ahreq, ctx->auth);
+	/* prepare the hash request with input data and result pointer */
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, icv, hash, srclen);
+	/* set the notifier for when the async hash function returns */
+	ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, aead_request_flags(req) & flags,
+				   tls_async_op_done, &ahash_op);
+
+	/* Calculate the digest on the given data. The result is put in hash */
+	err = crypto_ahash_digest(ahreq);
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+		err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&ahash_op.completion);
+		if (!err)
+			err = ahash_op.err;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * crypto_tls_gen_padicv - Calculate and pad hmac digest for a TLS record
+ * @hash:	(output) buffer to save the digest and padding into
+ * @phashlen:	(output) the size of digest + padding
+ * @cryptlen:	(output) the size of the total frame to be encrypted
+ * @req:	(input) aead request
+ **/
+static int crypto_tls_gen_padicv(u8 *hash, unsigned int *phashlen,
+			     unsigned int *cryptlen, struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	unsigned int hash_size = crypto_aead_authsize(tls);
+	unsigned int block_size = crypto_aead_blocksize(tls);
+	unsigned int srclen = req->cryptlen + hash_size;
+	unsigned int padlen;
+	int err;
+
+	err = crypto_tls_genicv(hash, req->src, req->cryptlen, req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* add padding after digest */
+	padlen = block_size - (srclen % block_size);
+	memset(hash + hash_size, padlen - 1, padlen);
+
+	/* save the frame length to be encrypted */
+	*cryptlen = srclen + padlen;
+	*phashlen = hash_size + padlen;
+out:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_tls_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
+	struct tls_request_ctx *treq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	unsigned int cryptlen, phashlen;
+	struct scatterlist *cipher = treq_ctx->cipher;
+	struct scatterlist *icv = treq_ctx->icv;
+	int err;
+	/*
+	 * The hash and the cipher are applied at different times and their
+	 * requests can use the same memory space without interference
+	 */
+	struct ablkcipher_request *abreq = (void *)(treq_ctx->tail +
+						    ctx->reqoff);
+	/*
+	 * The hash result is saved at the beginning of the tls request and is
+	 * aligned as required by the hash transform. Enough space was
+	 * allocated in crypto_tls_init_tfm to accomodate the difference. The
+	 * requests themselves start later at treq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff so
+	 * the result is not overwritten by the second (cipher) request
+	 */
+	u8 *hash = treq_ctx->tail;
+	hash = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)hash +
+			   crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth),
+			   crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth) + 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * STEP 1: create ICV and add necessary padding
+	 */
+	err = crypto_tls_gen_padicv(hash, &phashlen, &cryptlen, req);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/* we can reuse treq_cfr->icv because crypto_tls_gen_padicv finished */
+	sg_init_one(icv, hash, phashlen);
+
+	/*
+	 * STEP 2: encrypt the frame and return the result
+	 * Chain the payload with the hash. If the payload is empty, use
+	 * directly the hash scatterlist
+	 */
+	if (req->cryptlen) {
+		sg_init_table(cipher, 2);
+		sg_set_page(cipher, sg_page(req->src), req->cryptlen,
+			    req->src->offset);
+		scatterwalk_crypto_chain(cipher, icv, 0, 2);
+	} else {
+		cipher = icv;
+	}
+	/* prepare the cipher request */
+	ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, ctx->enc);
+	ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, cipher, req->dst, cryptlen,
+				     req->iv);
+	/* mark the completion of the whole encryption request */
+	ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+					tls_request_done, req);
+	/* Apply the cipher transform. The result will be in req->dst */
+	err = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(abreq);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_tls_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
+	struct tls_request_ctx *treq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct scatterlist *assoc = req->assoc;
+	unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
+	unsigned int hash_size = crypto_aead_authsize(tls);
+	unsigned int block_size = crypto_aead_blocksize(tls);
+	struct ablkcipher_request *abreq = (void *)(treq_ctx->tail +
+						    ctx->reqoff);
+	u8 padding[255]; /* padding can be 0-255 bytes */
+	u8 pad_size;
+	u16 *len_field;
+	u8 *ihash, *hash = treq_ctx->tail;
+
+	int paderr = 0;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
+	int i;
+	struct async_op ciph_op;
+
+	/*
+	 * Rule out bad packets. The input packet length must be at least one
+	 * byte more than the hash_size
+	 */
+	if (cryptlen <= hash_size || cryptlen % block_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Step 1 - Decrypt the source
+	 */
+	init_completion(&ciph_op.completion);
+
+	ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, ctx->enc);
+	ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+					tls_async_op_done, &ciph_op);
+	ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, req->src, req->dst, cryptlen,
+				     req->iv);
+	err = crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(abreq);
+	if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+		err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&ciph_op.completion);
+		if (!err)
+			err = ciph_op.err;
+	}
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Step 2 - Verify padding
+	 * Retrieve the last byte of the payload; this is the padding size
+	 */
+	cryptlen -= 1;
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&pad_size, req->dst, cryptlen, 1, 0);
+
+	/* RFC recommendation for invalid padding size */
+	if (cryptlen < pad_size + hash_size) {
+		pad_size = 0;
+		paderr = -EBADMSG;
+	}
+	cryptlen -= pad_size;
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(padding, req->dst, cryptlen, pad_size, 0);
+
+	/* Padding content must be equal with pad_size. We verify it all */
+	for (i = 0; i < pad_size; i++)
+		if (padding[i] != pad_size)
+			paderr = -EBADMSG;
+
+	/*
+	 * Step 3 - Verify hash
+	 * Align the digest result as required by the hash transform. Enough
+	 * space was allocated in crypto_tls_init_tfm
+	 */
+	hash = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)hash +
+			   crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth),
+			   crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth) + 1);
+	/*
+	 * Two bytes at the end of the associated data make the length field.
+	 * It must be updated with the length of the cleartext message before
+	 * the hash is calculated.
+	 */
+	len_field = sg_virt(assoc) + assoc->length - 2;
+	cryptlen -= hash_size;
+	*len_field = htons(cryptlen);
+
+	/* This is the hash from the decrypted packet. Save it for later */
+	ihash = hash + hash_size;
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, req->dst, cryptlen, hash_size, 0);
+
+	/* Now compute and compare our ICV with the one from the packet */
+	err = crypto_tls_genicv(hash, req->dst, cryptlen, req);
+	if (!err)
+		err = memcmp(hash, ihash, hash_size) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+
+	/* return the first found error */
+	if (paderr)
+		err = paderr;
+
+out:
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_tls_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct tls_instance_ctx *ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_ahash *auth;
+	struct crypto_ablkcipher *enc;
+	int err;
+
+	auth = crypto_spawn_ahash(&ictx->auth);
+	if (IS_ERR(auth))
+		return PTR_ERR(auth);
+
+	enc = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->enc);
+	err = PTR_ERR(enc);
+	if (IS_ERR(enc))
+		goto err_free_ahash;
+
+	ctx->auth = auth;
+	ctx->enc = enc;
+	/*
+	 * Allow enough space for two digests. The two digests will be compared
+	 * during the decryption phase. One will come from the decrypted packet
+	 * and the other will be calculated. For encryption, one digest is
+	 * padded (up to a cipher blocksize) and chained with the payload
+	 */
+	ctx->reqoff = ALIGN(crypto_ahash_digestsize(auth) +
+			    crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth),
+			    crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth) + 1) +
+		      max(crypto_ahash_digestsize(auth),
+			  crypto_ablkcipher_blocksize(enc));
+
+	tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct tls_request_ctx) + ctx->reqoff +
+		max_t(unsigned int,
+		      crypto_ahash_reqsize(auth) +
+		      sizeof(struct ahash_request),
+		      crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(enc) +
+		      sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request));
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_ahash:
+	crypto_free_ahash(auth);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void crypto_tls_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->auth);
+	crypto_free_ablkcipher(ctx->enc);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_instance *crypto_tls_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst;
+	struct hash_alg_common *auth;
+	struct crypto_alg *auth_base;
+	struct crypto_alg *enc;
+	struct tls_instance_ctx *ctx;
+	const char *enc_name;
+	int err;
+
+	algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+	err = PTR_ERR(algt);
+	if (IS_ERR(algt))
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	if ((algt->type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) & algt->mask)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	auth = ahash_attr_alg(tb[1], CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_HASH,
+			       CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(auth))
+		return ERR_CAST(auth);
+
+	auth_base = &auth->base;
+
+	enc_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	err = PTR_ERR(enc_name);
+	if (IS_ERR(enc_name))
+		goto out_put_auth;
+
+	inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!inst)
+		goto out_put_auth;
+
+	ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	err = crypto_init_ahash_spawn(&ctx->auth, auth, inst);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_free_inst;
+
+	crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ctx->enc, inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ctx->enc, enc_name, 0,
+				   crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							algt->mask));
+	if (err)
+		goto err_drop_auth;
+
+	enc = crypto_skcipher_spawn_alg(&ctx->enc);
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "tls10(%s,%s)", auth_base->cra_name, enc->cra_name) >=
+	    CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto err_drop_enc;
+
+	if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "tls10(%s,%s)", auth_base->cra_driver_name,
+		     enc->cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto err_drop_enc;
+
+	inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
+	inst->alg.cra_flags |= enc->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+	/* priority calculation is taken from authenc.c */
+	inst->alg.cra_priority = enc->cra_priority * 10 +
+				 auth_base->cra_priority;
+	inst->alg.cra_blocksize = enc->cra_blocksize;
+	inst->alg.cra_alignmask = auth_base->cra_alignmask | enc->cra_alignmask;
+	inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_aead_type;
+
+	inst->alg.cra_aead.ivsize = enc->cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
+	inst->alg.cra_aead.maxauthsize = auth->digestsize;
+
+	inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_tls_ctx);
+
+	inst->alg.cra_init = crypto_tls_init_tfm;
+	inst->alg.cra_exit = crypto_tls_exit_tfm;
+
+	inst->alg.cra_aead.setkey = crypto_tls_setkey;
+	inst->alg.cra_aead.encrypt = crypto_tls_encrypt;
+	inst->alg.cra_aead.decrypt = crypto_tls_decrypt;
+
+out:
+	crypto_mod_put(auth_base);
+	return inst;
+
+err_drop_enc:
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->enc);
+err_drop_auth:
+	crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->auth);
+err_free_inst:
+	kfree(inst);
+out_put_auth:
+	inst = ERR_PTR(err);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static void crypto_tls_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct tls_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->enc);
+	crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->auth);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template crypto_tls_tmpl = {
+	.name = "tls10",
+	.alloc = crypto_tls_alloc,
+	.free = crypto_tls_free,
+	.module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init crypto_tls_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_template(&crypto_tls_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit crypto_tls_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_tls_tmpl);
+}
+
+module_init(crypto_tls_module_init);
+module_exit(crypto_tls_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TLS 1.0 record encryption");