seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing

The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but
it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was
enabled.  Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter
to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter.

To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may
not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the
parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function.

For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally
supports seccomp filters.  Fixing that would probably only be a
couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit
maintainers.

This will be a slight slowdown on some arches.  The right fix is to
pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the
syscall nr part be fast.

This is a prerequisite for making two-phase seccomp work cleanly.

Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
(backported from commit a4412fc9486ec85686c6c7929e7e829f62ae377e)
Signed-off-by: Bogdan Purcareata <bogdan.purcareata@freescale.com>
Change-Id: I4109ed2560d19349927c3e3f7648022ae23db318
Reviewed-on: http://git.am.freescale.net:8181/33029
Reviewed-by: Scott Wood <scottwood@freescale.com>
Tested-by: Honghua Yin <Hong-Hua.Yin@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Honghua Yin <Hong-Hua.Yin@freescale.com>

1 files changed, 11 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 6f19cfd..10016bd 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -25,19 +25,17 @@ struct seccomp {
 	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
 };
 
-extern int __secure_computing(int);
-static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+extern int __secure_computing(void);
+static inline int secure_computing(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
-		return  __secure_computing(this_syscall);
+		return  __secure_computing();
 	return 0;
 }
-
-/* A wrapper for architectures supporting only SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. */
-static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
-{
-	BUG_ON(secure_computing(this_syscall) != 0);
-}
+#else
+extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
+#endif
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
 extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
@@ -54,8 +52,11 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 struct seccomp { };
 struct seccomp_filter { };
 
-static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall) { return 0; }
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
+#else
 static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
+#endif
 
 static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {