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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-05-01 21:08:52 (GMT) |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-05-01 21:08:52 (GMT) |
commit | 73287a43cc79ca06629a88d1a199cd283f42456a (patch) | |
tree | acf4456e260115bea77ee31a29f10ce17f0db45c /net/ipv4/tcp.c | |
parent | 251df49db3327c64bf917bfdba94491fde2b4ee0 (diff) | |
parent | 20074f357da4a637430aec2879c9d864c5d2c23c (diff) | |
download | linux-fsl-qoriq-73287a43cc79ca06629a88d1a199cd283f42456a.tar.xz |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights (1721 non-merge commits, this has to be a record of some
sort):
1) Add 'random' mode to team driver, from Jiri Pirko and Eric
Dumazet.
2) Make it so that any driver that supports configuration of multiple
MAC addresses can provide the forwarding database add and del
calls by providing a default implementation and hooking that up if
the driver doesn't have an explicit set of handlers. From Vlad
Yasevich.
3) Support GSO segmentation over tunnels and other encapsulating
devices such as VXLAN, from Pravin B Shelar.
4) Support L2 GRE tunnels in the flow dissector, from Michael Dalton.
5) Implement Tail Loss Probe (TLP) detection in TCP, from Nandita
Dukkipati.
6) In the PHY layer, allow supporting wake-on-lan in situations where
the PHY registers have to be written for it to be configured.
Use it to support wake-on-lan in mv643xx_eth.
From Michael Stapelberg.
7) Significantly improve firewire IPV6 support, from YOSHIFUJI
Hideaki.
8) Allow multiple packets to be sent in a single transmission using
network coding in batman-adv, from Martin Hundebøll.
9) Add support for T5 cxgb4 chips, from Santosh Rastapur.
10) Generalize the VXLAN forwarding tables so that there is more
flexibility in configurating various aspects of the endpoints.
From David Stevens.
11) Support RSS and TSO in hardware over GRE tunnels in bxn2x driver,
from Dmitry Kravkov.
12) Zero copy support in nfnelink_queue, from Eric Dumazet and Pablo
Neira Ayuso.
13) Start adding networking selftests.
14) In situations of overload on the same AF_PACKET fanout socket, or
per-cpu packet receive queue, minimize drop by distributing the
load to other cpus/fanouts. From Willem de Bruijn and Eric
Dumazet.
15) Add support for new payload offset BPF instruction, from Daniel
Borkmann.
16) Convert several drivers over to mdoule_platform_driver(), from
Sachin Kamat.
17) Provide a minimal BPF JIT image disassembler userspace tool, from
Daniel Borkmann.
18) Rewrite F-RTO implementation in TCP to match the final
specification of it in RFC4138 and RFC5682. From Yuchung Cheng.
19) Provide netlink socket diag of netlink sockets ("Yo dawg, I hear
you like netlink, so I implemented netlink dumping of netlink
sockets.") From Andrey Vagin.
20) Remove ugly passing of rtnetlink attributes into rtnl_doit
functions, from Thomas Graf.
21) Allow userspace to be able to see if a configuration change occurs
in the middle of an address or device list dump, from Nicolas
Dichtel.
22) Support RFC3168 ECN protection for ipv6 fragments, from Hannes
Frederic Sowa.
23) Increase accuracy of packet length used by packet scheduler, from
Jason Wang.
24) Beginning set of changes to make ipv4/ipv6 fragment handling more
scalable and less susceptible to overload and locking contention,
from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
25) Get rid of using non-type-safe NLMSG_* macros and use nlmsg_*()
instead. From Hong Zhiguo.
26) Optimize route usage in IPVS by avoiding reference counting where
possible, from Julian Anastasov.
27) Convert IPVS schedulers to RCU, also from Julian Anastasov.
28) Support cpu fanouts in xt_NFQUEUE netfilter target, from Holger
Eitzenberger.
29) Network namespace support for nf_log, ebt_log, xt_LOG, ipt_ULOG,
nfnetlink_log, and nfnetlink_queue. From Gao feng.
30) Implement RFC3168 ECN protection, from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
31) Support several new r8169 chips, from Hayes Wang.
32) Support tokenized interface identifiers in ipv6, from Daniel
Borkmann.
33) Use usbnet_link_change() helper in USB net driver, from Ming Lei.
34) Add 802.1ad vlan offload support, from Patrick McHardy.
35) Support mmap() based netlink communication, also from Patrick
McHardy.
36) Support HW timestamping in mlx4 driver, from Amir Vadai.
37) Rationalize AF_PACKET packet timestamping when transmitting, from
Willem de Bruijn and Daniel Borkmann.
38) Bring parity to what's provided by /proc/net/packet socket dumping
and the info provided by netlink socket dumping of AF_PACKET
sockets. From Nicolas Dichtel.
39) Fix peeking beyond zero sized SKBs in AF_UNIX, from Benjamin
Poirier"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1722 commits)
filter: fix va_list build error
af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields
bnx2x: Prevent memory leak when cnic is absent
bnx2x: correct reading of speed capabilities
net: sctp: attribute printl with __printf for gcc fmt checks
netlink: kconfig: move mmap i/o into netlink kconfig
netpoll: convert mutex into a semaphore
netlink: Fix skb ref counting.
net_sched: act_ipt forward compat with xtables
mlx4_en: fix a build error on 32bit arches
Revert "bnx2x: allow nvram test to run when device is down"
bridge: avoid OOPS if root port not found
drivers: net: cpsw: fix kernel warn on cpsw irq enable
sh_eth: use random MAC address if no valid one supplied
3c509.c: call SET_NETDEV_DEV for all device types (ISA/ISAPnP/EISA)
tg3: fix to append hardware time stamping flags
unix/stream: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
unix/dgram: fix peeking with an offset larger than data in queue
unix/dgram: peek beyond 0-sized skbs
openvswitch: Remove unneeded ovs_netdev_get_ifindex()
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp.c | 287 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 269 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index e220207..dcb116d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -409,15 +409,6 @@ void tcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) icsk->icsk_sync_mss = tcp_sync_mss; - /* TCP Cookie Transactions */ - if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0) { - /* Default, cookies without s_data_payload. */ - tp->cookie_values = - kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->cookie_values), - sk->sk_allocation); - if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) - kref_init(&tp->cookie_values->kref); - } /* Presumed zeroed, in order of appearance: * cookie_in_always, cookie_out_never, * s_data_constant, s_data_in, s_data_out @@ -2397,92 +2388,6 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, release_sock(sk); return err; } - case TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS: { - struct tcp_cookie_transactions ctd; - struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = NULL; - - if (sizeof(ctd) > optlen) - return -EINVAL; - if (copy_from_user(&ctd, optval, sizeof(ctd))) - return -EFAULT; - - if (ctd.tcpct_used > sizeof(ctd.tcpct_value) || - ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired > TCP_MSS_DESIRED) - return -EINVAL; - - if (ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired == 0) { - /* default to global value */ - } else if ((0x1 & ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired) || - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired > TCP_COOKIE_MAX || - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired < TCP_COOKIE_MIN) { - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER & ctd.tcpct_flags) { - /* Supercedes all other values */ - lock_sock(sk); - if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) { - kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref, - tcp_cookie_values_release); - tp->cookie_values = NULL; - } - tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always = 0; /* false */ - tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */ - release_sock(sk); - return err; - } - - /* Allocate ancillary memory before locking. - */ - if (ctd.tcpct_used > 0 || - (tp->cookie_values == NULL && - (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0 || - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired > 0 || - ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired > 0))) { - cvp = kzalloc(sizeof(*cvp) + ctd.tcpct_used, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (cvp == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - - kref_init(&cvp->kref); - } - lock_sock(sk); - tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always = - (TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS & ctd.tcpct_flags); - tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */ - - if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) { - if (cvp != NULL) { - /* Changed values are recorded by a changed - * pointer, ensuring the cookie will differ, - * without separately hashing each value later. - */ - kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref, - tcp_cookie_values_release); - } else { - cvp = tp->cookie_values; - } - } - - if (cvp != NULL) { - cvp->cookie_desired = ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired; - - if (ctd.tcpct_used > 0) { - memcpy(cvp->s_data_payload, ctd.tcpct_value, - ctd.tcpct_used); - cvp->s_data_desired = ctd.tcpct_used; - cvp->s_data_constant = 1; /* true */ - } else { - /* No constant payload data. */ - cvp->s_data_desired = ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired; - cvp->s_data_constant = 0; /* false */ - } - - tp->cookie_values = cvp; - } - release_sock(sk); - return err; - } default: /* fallthru */ break; @@ -2902,41 +2807,6 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, return -EFAULT; return 0; - case TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS: { - struct tcp_cookie_transactions ctd; - struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values; - - if (get_user(len, optlen)) - return -EFAULT; - if (len < sizeof(ctd)) - return -EINVAL; - - memset(&ctd, 0, sizeof(ctd)); - ctd.tcpct_flags = (tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always ? - TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS : 0) - | (tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never ? - TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER : 0); - - if (cvp != NULL) { - ctd.tcpct_flags |= (cvp->s_data_in ? - TCP_S_DATA_IN : 0) - | (cvp->s_data_out ? - TCP_S_DATA_OUT : 0); - - ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired = cvp->cookie_desired; - ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired = cvp->s_data_desired; - - memcpy(&ctd.tcpct_value[0], &cvp->cookie_pair[0], - cvp->cookie_pair_size); - ctd.tcpct_used = cvp->cookie_pair_size; - } - - if (put_user(sizeof(ctd), optlen)) - return -EFAULT; - if (copy_to_user(optval, &ctd, sizeof(ctd))) - return -EFAULT; - return 0; - } case TCP_THIN_LINEAR_TIMEOUTS: val = tp->thin_lto; break; @@ -3015,6 +2885,8 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 delta; unsigned int oldlen; unsigned int mss; + struct sk_buff *gso_skb = skb; + __sum16 newcheck; if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th))) goto out; @@ -3044,6 +2916,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN | SKB_GSO_TCPV6 | SKB_GSO_GRE | + SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL | 0) || !(type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6)))) goto out; @@ -3064,11 +2937,13 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, th = tcp_hdr(skb); seq = ntohl(th->seq); + newcheck = ~csum_fold((__force __wsum)((__force u32)th->check + + (__force u32)delta)); + do { th->fin = th->psh = 0; + th->check = newcheck; - th->check = ~csum_fold((__force __wsum)((__force u32)th->check + - (__force u32)delta)); if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) th->check = csum_fold(csum_partial(skb_transport_header(skb), @@ -3082,6 +2957,17 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_tso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, th->cwr = 0; } while (skb->next); + /* Following permits TCP Small Queues to work well with GSO : + * The callback to TCP stack will be called at the time last frag + * is freed at TX completion, and not right now when gso_skb + * is freed by GSO engine + */ + if (gso_skb->destructor == tcp_wfree) { + swap(gso_skb->sk, skb->sk); + swap(gso_skb->destructor, skb->destructor); + swap(gso_skb->truesize, skb->truesize); + } + delta = htonl(oldlen + (skb->tail - skb->transport_header) + skb->data_len); th->check = ~csum_fold((__force __wsum)((__force u32)th->check + @@ -3408,134 +3294,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); #endif -/* Each Responder maintains up to two secret values concurrently for - * efficient secret rollover. Each secret value has 4 states: - * - * Generating. (tcp_secret_generating != tcp_secret_primary) - * Generates new Responder-Cookies, but not yet used for primary - * verification. This is a short-term state, typically lasting only - * one round trip time (RTT). - * - * Primary. (tcp_secret_generating == tcp_secret_primary) - * Used both for generation and primary verification. - * - * Retiring. (tcp_secret_retiring != tcp_secret_secondary) - * Used for verification, until the first failure that can be - * verified by the newer Generating secret. At that time, this - * cookie's state is changed to Secondary, and the Generating - * cookie's state is changed to Primary. This is a short-term state, - * typically lasting only one round trip time (RTT). - * - * Secondary. (tcp_secret_retiring == tcp_secret_secondary) - * Used for secondary verification, after primary verification - * failures. This state lasts no more than twice the Maximum Segment - * Lifetime (2MSL). Then, the secret is discarded. - */ -struct tcp_cookie_secret { - /* The secret is divided into two parts. The digest part is the - * equivalent of previously hashing a secret and saving the state, - * and serves as an initialization vector (IV). The message part - * serves as the trailing secret. - */ - u32 secrets[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; - unsigned long expires; -}; - -#define TCP_SECRET_1MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL) -#define TCP_SECRET_2MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL * 2) -#define TCP_SECRET_LIFE (HZ * 600) - -static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_one; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_two; - -/* Essentially a circular list, without dynamic allocation. */ -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_generating; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_primary; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_retiring; -static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_secondary; - -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_secret_locker); - -/* Select a pseudo-random word in the cookie workspace. - */ -static inline u32 tcp_cookie_work(const u32 *ws, const int n) -{ - return ws[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS + ((COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS-1) & ws[n])]; -} - -/* Fill bakery[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS] with generator, updating as needed. - * Called in softirq context. - * Returns: 0 for success. - */ -int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery) -{ - unsigned long jiffy = jiffies; - - if (unlikely(time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires))) { - spin_lock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker); - if (!time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires)) { - /* refreshed by another */ - memcpy(bakery, - &tcp_secret_generating->secrets[0], - COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - } else { - /* still needs refreshing */ - get_random_bytes(bakery, COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - - /* The first time, paranoia assumes that the - * randomization function isn't as strong. But, - * this secret initialization is delayed until - * the last possible moment (packet arrival). - * Although that time is observable, it is - * unpredictably variable. Mash in the most - * volatile clock bits available, and expire the - * secret extra quickly. - */ - if (unlikely(tcp_secret_primary->expires == - tcp_secret_secondary->expires)) { - struct timespec tv; - - getnstimeofday(&tv); - bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS+0] ^= - (u32)tv.tv_nsec; - - tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy - + TCP_SECRET_1MSL - + (0x0f & tcp_cookie_work(bakery, 0)); - } else { - tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy - + TCP_SECRET_LIFE - + (0xff & tcp_cookie_work(bakery, 1)); - tcp_secret_primary->expires = jiffy - + TCP_SECRET_2MSL - + (0x1f & tcp_cookie_work(bakery, 2)); - } - memcpy(&tcp_secret_secondary->secrets[0], - bakery, COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - - rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_generating, - tcp_secret_secondary); - rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_retiring, - tcp_secret_primary); - /* - * Neither call_rcu() nor synchronize_rcu() needed. - * Retiring data is not freed. It is replaced after - * further (locked) pointer updates, and a quiet time - * (minimum 1MSL, maximum LIFE - 2MSL). - */ - } - spin_unlock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker); - } else { - rcu_read_lock_bh(); - memcpy(bakery, - &rcu_dereference(tcp_secret_generating)->secrets[0], - COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - } - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_cookie_generator); - void tcp_done(struct sock *sk) { struct request_sock *req = tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk; @@ -3590,7 +3348,6 @@ void __init tcp_init(void) unsigned long limit; int max_rshare, max_wshare, cnt; unsigned int i; - unsigned long jiffy = jiffies; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tcp_skb_cb) > sizeof(skb->cb)); @@ -3666,13 +3423,5 @@ void __init tcp_init(void) tcp_register_congestion_control(&tcp_reno); - memset(&tcp_secret_one.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_one.secrets)); - memset(&tcp_secret_two.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_two.secrets)); - tcp_secret_one.expires = jiffy; /* past due */ - tcp_secret_two.expires = jiffy; /* past due */ - tcp_secret_generating = &tcp_secret_one; - tcp_secret_primary = &tcp_secret_one; - tcp_secret_retiring = &tcp_secret_two; - tcp_secret_secondary = &tcp_secret_two; tcp_tasklet_init(); } |