diff options
author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-04-04 19:01:42 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-04-09 16:23:00 (GMT) |
commit | 602a8dd6ea6abd463bc26310c4a1b44919f88e68 (patch) | |
tree | 426df8399ff298942a7e30c3a360a666e51ba920 /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
parent | 2e33405785d3eaec303c54b4a10afdebf3729da7 (diff) | |
download | linux-fsl-qoriq-602a8dd6ea6abd463bc26310c4a1b44919f88e68.tar.xz |
SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadp
Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit
results.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index c99027d..8417a6a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1488,20 +1488,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags); } -static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred, - struct inode *inode, - u32 perms, - unsigned flags) -{ - struct common_audit_data ad; - struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; - - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); - ad.u.inode = inode; - ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); -} - /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ @@ -2128,21 +2114,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; - struct inode *inode; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. - Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather + Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; - if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, - FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) { + if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; - } } spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); @@ -3276,12 +3258,10 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; - struct inode *inode; struct inode_security_struct *isec; - inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; fsec = file->f_security; - isec = inode->i_security; + isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security; /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission @@ -3299,7 +3279,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0); + return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ |