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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2010-09-09 06:49:04 (GMT) |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2010-09-09 06:49:04 (GMT) |
commit | e199e6136ce6b151e6638ae93dca60748424d900 (patch) | |
tree | 0d66e0b5d227c36b005e4f5537f4bbcfc6ed4904 /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
parent | 972c40b5bee429c84ba727f8ac0a08292bc5dc3d (diff) | |
parent | d56557af19867edb8c0e96f8e26399698a08857f (diff) | |
download | linux-fsl-qoriq-e199e6136ce6b151e6638ae93dca60748424d900.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'master' of master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9b40f4c..4796ddd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2170,8 +2170,9 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { - file_list_lock(); + spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { + struct tty_file_private *file_priv; struct inode *inode; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. @@ -2179,14 +2180,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ - file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list); + file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, + struct tty_file_private, list); + file = file_priv->file; inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) { drop_tty = 1; } } - file_list_unlock(); + spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); } /* Reset controlling tty. */ @@ -2284,12 +2287,15 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { + /* protect against do_prlimit() */ + task_lock(current); for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } - update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur); + task_unlock(current); + update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); } } @@ -3333,16 +3339,17 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); } -static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) +static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim) { - struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; + struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) - return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); + return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); return 0; } |