summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs/proc
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/array.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c48
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/generic.c3
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/inode.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/meminfo.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/namespaces.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/proc_net.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c7
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/root.c13
9 files changed, 53 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 9b45ee8..3a1dafd 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent), ns) : 0;
tpid = 0;
if (pid_alive(p)) {
- struct task_struct *tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
+ struct task_struct *tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
if (tracer)
tpid = task_pid_nr_ns(tracer, ns);
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 14def99..5eb0206 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *__check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) {
int match;
rcu_read_lock();
- match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
+ match = (ptrace_parent(task) == current);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
return mm;
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
p->m.private = p;
p->ns = ns;
p->root = root;
- p->event = ns->event;
+ p->m.poll_event = ns->event;
return 0;
@@ -1118,10 +1118,9 @@ static ssize_t oom_adjust_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* Warn that /proc/pid/oom_adj is deprecated, see
* Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt.
*/
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): /proc/%d/oom_adj is deprecated, "
- "please use /proc/%d/oom_score_adj instead.\n",
- current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
- task_pid_nr(task), task_pid_nr(task));
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): /proc/%d/oom_adj is deprecated, please use /proc/%d/oom_score_adj instead.\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), task_pid_nr(task),
+ task_pid_nr(task));
task->signal->oom_adj = oom_adjust;
/*
* Scale /proc/pid/oom_score_adj appropriately ensuring that a maximum
@@ -1920,6 +1919,14 @@ static int proc_fd_info(struct inode *inode, struct path *path, char *info)
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
if (file) {
+ unsigned int f_flags;
+ struct fdtable *fdt;
+
+ fdt = files_fdtable(files);
+ f_flags = file->f_flags & ~O_CLOEXEC;
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, fdt->close_on_exec))
+ f_flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
+
if (path) {
*path = file->f_path;
path_get(&file->f_path);
@@ -1929,7 +1936,7 @@ static int proc_fd_info(struct inode *inode, struct path *path, char *info)
"pos:\t%lli\n"
"flags:\t0%o\n",
(long long) file->f_pos,
- file->f_flags);
+ f_flags);
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
put_files_struct(files);
return 0;
@@ -2167,13 +2174,9 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = {
* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
*/
-static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags)
+static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- int rv;
-
- if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
- return -ECHILD;
- rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, flags, NULL);
+ int rv = generic_permission(inode, mask);
if (rv == 0)
return 0;
if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
@@ -2711,6 +2714,16 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
unsigned long flags;
+ int result;
+
+ result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ if (result)
+ return result;
+
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+ result = -EACCES;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
@@ -2721,7 +2734,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
- return sprintf(buffer,
+ result = sprintf(buffer,
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
@@ -2736,6 +2749,9 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return result;
}
static int proc_tid_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
@@ -2843,7 +2859,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("coredump_filter", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_coredump_filter_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
- INF("io", S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
+ INF("io", S_IRUSR, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDWALL
INF("hardwall", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_hardwall),
@@ -3185,7 +3201,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
- INF("io", S_IRUGO, proc_tid_io_accounting),
+ INF("io", S_IRUSR, proc_tid_io_accounting),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDWALL
INF("hardwall", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_hardwall),
diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c
index f1637f1..9d99131 100644
--- a/fs/proc/generic.c
+++ b/fs/proc/generic.c
@@ -620,8 +620,7 @@ static struct proc_dir_entry *__proc_create(struct proc_dir_entry **parent,
if (!ent) goto out;
memset(ent, 0, sizeof(struct proc_dir_entry));
- memcpy(((char *) ent) + sizeof(struct proc_dir_entry), fn, len + 1);
- ent->name = ((char *) ent) + sizeof(*ent);
+ memcpy(ent->name, fn, len + 1);
ent->namelen = len;
ent->mode = mode;
ent->nlink = nlink;
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index 74b48cf..7ed72d6 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
if (!pde->proc_fops) {
spin_unlock(&pde->pde_unload_lock);
kfree(pdeo);
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -ENOENT;
}
pde->pde_users++;
open = pde->proc_fops->open;
diff --git a/fs/proc/meminfo.c b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
index ed257d1..5861741 100644
--- a/fs/proc/meminfo.c
+++ b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/vmstat.h>
-#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include "internal.h"
diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 781dec5..be177f7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -38,18 +38,21 @@ static struct dentry *proc_ns_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct inode *inode;
struct proc_inode *ei;
struct dentry *error = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ void *ns;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
if (!inode)
goto out;
+ ns = ns_ops->get(task);
+ if (!ns)
+ goto out_iput;
+
ei = PROC_I(inode);
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG|S_IRUSR;
inode->i_fop = &ns_file_operations;
ei->ns_ops = ns_ops;
- ei->ns = ns_ops->get(task);
- if (!ei->ns)
- goto out_iput;
+ ei->ns = ns;
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
d_add(dentry, inode);
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
index 9020ac1..f738024 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
@@ -197,15 +197,15 @@ static __net_init int proc_net_ns_init(struct net *net)
int err;
err = -ENOMEM;
- netd = kzalloc(sizeof(*netd), GFP_KERNEL);
+ netd = kzalloc(sizeof(*netd) + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!netd)
goto out;
netd->data = net;
netd->nlink = 2;
- netd->name = "net";
netd->namelen = 3;
netd->parent = &proc_root;
+ memcpy(netd->name, "net", 4);
err = -EEXIST;
net_statd = proc_net_mkdir(net, "stat", netd);
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index f50133c..1a77dbe 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,unsigned int flags)
+static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
/*
* sysctl entries that are not writeable,
@@ -304,9 +304,6 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,unsigned int flags)
struct ctl_table *table;
int error;
- if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
- return -ECHILD;
-
/* Executable files are not allowed under /proc/sys/ */
if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EACCES;
@@ -319,7 +316,7 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,unsigned int flags)
if (!table) /* global root - r-xr-xr-x */
error = mask & MAY_WRITE ? -EACCES : 0;
else /* Use the permissions on the sysctl table entry */
- error = sysctl_perm(head->root, table, mask);
+ error = sysctl_perm(head->root, table, mask & ~MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
sysctl_head_finish(head);
return error;
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index a9000e9..9a8a2b7 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -28,11 +28,12 @@ static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
- struct pid_namespace *ns;
-
- ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
- sb->s_fs_info = get_pid_ns(ns);
- return set_anon_super(sb, NULL);
+ int err = set_anon_super(sb, NULL);
+ if (!err) {
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
+ sb->s_fs_info = get_pid_ns(ns);
+ }
+ return err;
}
static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
@@ -185,13 +186,13 @@ static const struct inode_operations proc_root_inode_operations = {
struct proc_dir_entry proc_root = {
.low_ino = PROC_ROOT_INO,
.namelen = 5,
- .name = "/proc",
.mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
.nlink = 2,
.count = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
.proc_iops = &proc_root_inode_operations,
.proc_fops = &proc_root_operations,
.parent = &proc_root,
+ .name = "/proc",
};
int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
generated by cgit v0.10.2 at 2024-10-26 22:16:29 (GMT)