diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/process_keys.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 135 |
1 files changed, 80 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 504bdd2..930634e 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* Management of a process's keyrings +/* Manage a process's keyrings * * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) @@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include "internal.h" -/* session keyring create vs join semaphore */ +/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex); -/* user keyring creation semaphore */ +/* User keyring creation semaphore */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex); -/* the root user's tracking struct */ +/* The root user's tracking struct */ struct key_user root_key_user = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3), .cons_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock), @@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { .user_ns = &init_user_ns, }; -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * install user and user session keyrings for a particular UID + * Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID. */ int install_user_keyrings(void) { @@ -122,7 +121,8 @@ error: } /* - * install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials + * Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials. This keyring is + * allowed to overrun the quota. */ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) { @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) } /* - * install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one + * Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one. */ static int install_thread_keyring(void) { @@ -161,9 +161,10 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void) } /* - * install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct - * - returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed, - * and other -ve on any other error + * Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct. + * + * Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed, + * and other value on any other error */ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) { @@ -192,8 +193,11 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) } /* - * make sure a process keyring is installed - * - we + * Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process. The + * existing process keyring is not replaced. + * + * Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some + * error otherwise. */ static int install_process_keyring(void) { @@ -214,7 +218,7 @@ static int install_process_keyring(void) } /* - * install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct + * Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct. */ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) { @@ -254,8 +258,8 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) } /* - * install a session keyring, discarding the old one - * - if a keyring is not supplied, an empty one is invented + * Install a session keyring, discarding the old one. If a keyring is not + * supplied, an empty one is invented. */ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring) { @@ -275,9 +279,8 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring) return commit_creds(new); } -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * the filesystem user ID changed + * Handle the fsuid changing. */ void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) { @@ -288,12 +291,10 @@ void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid; up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); } +} -} /* end key_fsuid_changed() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * the filesystem group ID changed + * Handle the fsgid changing. */ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) { @@ -304,16 +305,28 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid; up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); } +} -} /* end key_fsgid_changed() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * search only my process keyrings for the first matching key - * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other - * feature of interest) matches - * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key - * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys + * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first + * matching key. + * + * The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is + * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence + * the search. Typically the match function will compare the description + * parameter to the key's description. + * + * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied + * credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if + * they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant + * Search permission to the credentials. + * + * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if + * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only + * matched negative keys. + * + * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the + * returned key reference. */ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, @@ -428,13 +441,13 @@ found: return key_ref; } -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * search the process keyrings for the first matching key - * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other - * feature of interest) matches - * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key - * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys + * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first + * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search + * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if + * one is available. + * + * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings(). */ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, @@ -489,24 +502,33 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, found: return key_ref; +} -} /* end search_process_keyrings() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * see if the key we're looking at is the target key + * See if the key we're looking at is the target key. */ int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target) { return key == target; +} -} /* end lookup_user_key_possessed() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * lookup a key given a key ID from userspace with a given permissions mask - * - don't create special keyrings unless so requested - * - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested + * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get + * the key it refers to. + * + * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred + * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip + * validity and permission checks on the found key. + * + * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful; + * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond + * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or + * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the + * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it; + * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created. + * + * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the + * returned key reference. */ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, key_perm_t perm) @@ -711,15 +733,18 @@ invalid_key: reget_creds: put_cred(cred); goto try_again; +} -} /* end lookup_user_key() */ - -/*****************************************************************************/ /* - * join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible, or attempt to - * create a new one of that name if not - * - if the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring is installed instead - * - named session keyring joining is done with a semaphore held + * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to + * create a new one of that name and join that. + * + * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the + * session keyring. + * + * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the + * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also + * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings. */ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) { @@ -791,8 +816,8 @@ error: } /* - * Replace a process's session keyring when that process resumes userspace on - * behalf of one of its children + * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when + * the target process is about to resume userspace execution. */ void key_replace_session_keyring(void) { |