summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/arch/x86/mm/setup_nx.c
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2013-07-14x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 filesPaul Gortmaker
The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2010-11-10x86, cpu: Only CPU features determine NX capabilitiesKees Cook
Fix the NX feature boot warning when NX is missing to correctly reflect that BIOSes cannot disable NX now. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> LKML-Reference: <1289414154-7829-5-git-send-email-kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2009-11-16x86, mm: Report state of NX protections during bootKees Cook
It is possible for x86_64 systems to lack the NX bit either due to the hardware lacking support or the BIOS having turned off the CPU capability, so NX status should be reported. Additionally, anyone booting NX-capable CPUs in 32bit mode without PAE will lack NX functionality, so this change provides feedback for that case as well. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> LKML-Reference: <1258154897-6770-6-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com>
2009-11-16x86, mm: Clean up and simplify NX enablementH. Peter Anvin
The 32- and 64-bit code used very different mechanisms for enabling NX, but even the 32-bit code was enabling NX in head_32.S if it is available. Furthermore, we had a bewildering collection of tests for the available of NX. This patch: a) merges the 32-bit set_nx() and the 64-bit check_efer() function into a single x86_configure_nx() function. EFER control is left to the head code. b) eliminates the nx_enabled variable entirely. Things that need to test for NX enablement can verify __supported_pte_mask directly, and cpu_has_nx gives the supported status of NX. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> LKML-Reference: <1258154897-6770-5-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
2009-09-21x86: split NX setup into separate file to limit unstack-protected codeJeremy Fitzhardinge
Move the NX setup into a separate file so that it can be compiled without stack-protection while leaving the rest of the mm/init code protected. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>