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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2012-03-19 23:12:53 (GMT)
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2012-03-29 09:37:17 (GMT)
commitbdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8 (patch)
tree854b6b5869857d40a02d21bb51b375812bdb2ed0 /Documentation/i2o
parentb5174fa3a7f4f8f150bfa3b917c92608953dfa0f (diff)
downloadlinux-bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8.tar.xz
futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process
It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar info that comes out of /proc. Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had: cred->euid != pcred->euid cred->euid == pcred->uid so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure. (This patch is based on changes from grsecurity.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: spender@grsecurity.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120319231253.GA20893@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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