diff options
author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2016-05-25 22:45:33 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2016-06-26 10:32:05 (GMT) |
commit | ed9f007ee68478f6a50ec9971ade25a0129a5c0e (patch) | |
tree | c5a1d1d15737ce5848d6c3bdef552004e0536774 /arch/x86/Kconfig | |
parent | 8391c73c96f28d4e8c40fd401fd0c9c04391b44a (diff) | |
download | linux-ed9f007ee68478f6a50ec9971ade25a0129a5c0e.tar.xz |
x86/KASLR: Extend kernel image physical address randomization to addresses larger than 4G
We want the physical address to be randomized anywhere between
16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB).
This patch exchanges the prior slots[] array for the new slot_areas[]
array, and lifts the limitation of KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on the physical
address offset for 64-bit. As before, process_e820_entry() walks
memory and populates slot_areas[], splitting on any detected mem_avoid
collisions.
Finally, since the slots[] array and its associated functions are not
needed any more, so they are removed.
Based on earlier patches by Baoquan He.
Originally-from: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Kconfig')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 27 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 0a7b885..770ae52 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1934,21 +1934,26 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel code internals. - The kernel physical and virtual address can be randomized - from 16MB up to 1GB on 64-bit and 512MB on 32-bit. (Note that - using RANDOMIZE_BASE reduces the memory space available to - kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB.) + On 64-bit, the kernel physical and virtual addresses are + randomized separately. The physical address will be anywhere + between 16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB). The + virtual address will be randomized from 16MB up to 1GB (9 bits + of entropy). Note that this also reduces the memory space + available to kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB. + + On 32-bit, the kernel physical and virtual addresses are + randomized together. They will be randomized from 16MB up to + 512MB (8 bits of entropy). Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is supported. If RDTSC is supported, its value is mixed into the entropy pool as well. If neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are - supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer. - - Since the kernel is built using 2GB addressing, and - PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a minimum of 2MB, only 10 bits of - entropy is theoretically possible. Currently, with the - default value for PHYSICAL_ALIGN and due to page table - layouts, 64-bit uses 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits. + supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer. The + usable entropy is limited by the kernel being built using + 2GB addressing, and that PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a + minimum of 2MB. As a result, only 10 bits of entropy are + theoretically possible, but the implementations are further + limited due to memory layouts. If CONFIG_HIBERNATE is also enabled, KASLR is disabled at boot time. To enable it, boot with "kaslr" on the kernel command |