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author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2016-06-07 18:05:33 (GMT) |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2016-07-26 21:41:47 (GMT) |
commit | f5509cc18daa7f82bcc553be70df2117c8eedc16 (patch) | |
tree | 648605cc96e4ac412a9f5201468795574997d9bb /arch/x86/pci/pcbios.c | |
parent | 0f60a8efe4005ab5e65ce000724b04d4ca04a199 (diff) | |
download | linux-f5509cc18daa7f82bcc553be70df2117c8eedc16.tar.xz |
mm: Hardened usercopy
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.
This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
- object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
- object must not extend before/after the current process stack
- object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/pci/pcbios.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions