Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index c50637d..e2fa89c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -310,10 +310,12 @@ unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 {
 	int duration_idx = TPM_UNDEFINED;
 	int duration = 0;
-	u8 category = (ordinal >> 24) & 0xFF;
 
-	if ((category == TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND && ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL) ||
-	    (category == TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND && ordinal < TSC_MAX_ORDINAL))
+	/*
+	 * We only have a duration table for protected commands, where the upper
+	 * 16 bits are 0. For the few other ordinals the fallback will be used.
+	 */
+	if (ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL)
 		duration_idx = tpm_ordinal_duration[ordinal];
 
 	if (duration_idx != TPM_UNDEFINED)
@@ -501,6 +503,21 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	struct duration_t *duration_cap;
 	ssize_t rc;
 
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+		/* Fixed timeouts for TPM2 */
+		chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
+		chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B);
+		chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C);
+		chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D);
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
+		    msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT);
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
+		    msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM);
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
+		    msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);