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authorYann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>2014-05-05 17:35:26 (GMT)
committerRoland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>2014-06-05 16:13:54 (GMT)
commitb7dfa8895f64ffa371d0ed09c1d1ba8c6e19b956 (patch)
tree24e7756b413c73d1bbecfcba0c4e163b19cc7d3c /drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h
parentb6f04d3d21458818073a2f5af5339f958864bf71 (diff)
downloadlinux-b7dfa8895f64ffa371d0ed09c1d1ba8c6e19b956.tar.xz
RDMA/cxgb4: add missing padding at end of struct c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp
The i386 ABI disagrees with most other ABIs regarding alignment of data types larger than 4 bytes: on most ABIs a padding must be added at end of the structures, while it is not required on i386. So for most ABI struct c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp gets implicitly padded to be aligned on a 8 bytes multiple, while for i386, such padding is not added. The tool pahole can be used to find such implicit padding: $ pahole --anon_include \ --nested_anon_include \ --recursive \ --class_name c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp \ drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.o Then, structure layout can be compared between i386 and x86_64: +++ obj-i386/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.o.pahole.txt 2014-03-28 11:43:05.547432195 +0100 --- obj-x86_64/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.o.pahole.txt 2014-03-28 10:55:10.990133017 +0100 @@ -2,9 +2,8 @@ struct c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp { __u64 status_page_key; /* 0 8 */ __u32 status_page_size; /* 8 4 */ - /* size: 12, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ - /* last cacheline: 12 bytes */ + /* size: 16, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */ + /* padding: 4 */ + /* last cacheline: 16 bytes */ }; This ABI disagreement will make an x86_64 kernel try to write past the buffer provided by an i386 binary. When boundary check will be implemented, the x86_64 kernel will refuse to write past the i386 userspace provided buffer and the uverbs will fail. If the structure is on a page boundary and the next page is not mapped, ib_copy_to_udata() will fail and the uverb will fail. Additionally, as reported by Dan Carpenter, without the implicit padding being properly cleared, an information leak would take place in most architectures. This patch adds an explicit padding to struct c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp, and, like 92b0ca7cb149 ("IB/mlx5: Fix stack info leak in mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext()"), makes function c4iw_alloc_ucontext() not writting this padding field to userspace. This way, x86_64 kernel will be able to write struct c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp as expected by unpatched and patched i386 libcxgb4. Link: http://marc.info/?i=cover.1399309513.git.ydroneaud@opteya.com Link: http://marc.info/?i=1395848977.3297.15.camel@localhost.localdomain Link: http://marc.info/?i=20140328082428.GH25192@mwanda Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 05eb23893c2c ("cxgb4/iw_cxgb4: Doorbell Drop Avoidance Bug Fixes") Reported-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Acked-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h')
-rw-r--r--drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h1
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h
index 9b7534b..cbd0ce1 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/user.h
@@ -75,5 +75,6 @@ struct c4iw_create_qp_resp {
struct c4iw_alloc_ucontext_resp {
__u64 status_page_key;
__u32 status_page_size;
+ __u32 reserved; /* explicit padding (optional for i386) */
};
#endif