diff options
author | Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> | 2016-01-20 23:00:04 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-21 01:09:18 (GMT) |
commit | caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 (patch) | |
tree | 6227530109dd91ab5447fbd2211f09bc636845a7 /fs/proc | |
parent | 3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 (diff) | |
download | linux-caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657.tar.xz |
ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 21 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/namespaces.c | 4 |
3 files changed, 14 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index d73291f..b6c00ce 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; - permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT); + permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT); mm = get_task_mm(task); if (mm) { vsize = task_vsize(mm); diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 2cf5d7e..e665097 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_cmdline_ops = { static int proc_pid_auxv(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { - struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) { unsigned int nwords = 0; do { @@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, wchan = get_wchan(task); - if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname)) + if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS) + && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname)) seq_printf(m, "%s", symname); else seq_putc(m, '0'); @@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); if (err) return err; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) { + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) { mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); return -EPERM; } @@ -697,7 +698,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) */ task = get_proc_task(inode); if (task) { - allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); put_task_struct(task); } return allowed; @@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid, return true; if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid)) return true; - return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); } @@ -809,7 +810,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode) struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); if (task) { - mm = mm_access(task, mode); + mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS); put_task_struct(task); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) { @@ -1860,7 +1861,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) if (!task) goto out_notask; - mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) goto out; @@ -2013,7 +2014,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, goto out; result = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) goto out_put_task; result = -ENOENT; @@ -2066,7 +2067,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) goto out; ret = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) goto out_put_task; ret = 0; @@ -2533,7 +2534,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh if (result) return result; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { result = -EACCES; goto out_unlock; } diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c index 1dece87..276f124 100644 --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, if (!task) return error; - if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { + if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops); if (!error) nd_jump_link(&ns_path); @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int bufl if (!task) return res; - if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) { + if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops); if (res >= 0) res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name); |