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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2008-11-13 23:39:23 (GMT)
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-11-13 23:39:23 (GMT)
commitd84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1 (patch)
treefc4a0349c42995715b93d0f7a3c78e9ea9b3f36e /kernel/cred.c
parent745ca2475a6ac596e3d8d37c2759c0fbe2586227 (diff)
downloadlinux-d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1.tar.xz
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/cred.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred.c321
1 files changed, 284 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ac73e36..cb6b5ed 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+#include "cred-internals.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
/*
* The common credentials for the initial task's thread group
@@ -64,7 +68,7 @@ static void release_tgcred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
/*
* Release a set of thread group credentials.
*/
-static void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
+void release_tgcred(struct cred *cred)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = cred->tgcred;
@@ -81,79 +85,322 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+ if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
+ panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
+ cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
+ security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
release_tgcred(cred);
put_group_info(cred->group_info);
free_uid(cred->user);
- security_cred_free(cred);
- kfree(cred);
+ kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
}
/**
* __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
- * @sec: The record to release
+ * @cred: The record to release
*
* Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
*/
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+
call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
+/**
+ * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
+ * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
+ * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
+ * calling commit_creds().
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
+ */
+struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task = current;
+ const struct cred *old;
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
+
+ new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new)
+ return NULL;
+
+ old = task->cred;
+ memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
+
+ atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ get_group_info(new->group_info);
+ get_uid(new->user);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ key_get(new->thread_keyring);
+ key_get(new->request_key_auth);
+ atomic_inc(&new->tgcred->usage);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ new->security = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ return new;
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
+
+/*
+ * prepare new credentials for the usermode helper dispatcher
+ */
+struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
+#endif
+ struct cred *new;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!tgcred)
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+
+ new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new)
+ return NULL;
+
+ memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
+
+ atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ get_group_info(new->group_info);
+ get_uid(new->user);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ new->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ new->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT;
+
+ atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
+ spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
+ new->tgcred = tgcred;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ new->security = NULL;
+#endif
+ if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
+ return new;
+
+error:
+ put_cred(new);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/*
* Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
+ *
+ * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
+ * set.
*/
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- struct cred *pcred;
- int ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
+#endif
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ mutex_init(&p->cred_exec_mutex);
- pcred = kmemdup(p->cred, sizeof(*p->cred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pcred)
+ if (
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
+#endif
+ clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
+ ) {
+ get_cred(p->cred);
+ atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
- atomic_inc(&pcred->tgcred->usage);
- } else {
- pcred->tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cred), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pcred->tgcred) {
- kfree(pcred);
+ /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
+ * had one */
+ if (new->thread_keyring) {
+ key_put(new->thread_keyring);
+ new->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
+ install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
+ }
+
+ /* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
+ * a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
+ * bit */
+ if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
+ tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tgcred) {
+ put_cred(new);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- atomic_set(&pcred->tgcred->usage, 1);
- spin_lock_init(&pcred->tgcred->lock);
- pcred->tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
- pcred->tgcred->session_keyring =
- key_get(p->cred->tgcred->session_keyring);
+ atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
+ spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
+ tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
+ tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
+
+ release_tgcred(new);
+ new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- pcred->security = NULL;
-#endif
+ atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
+ p->cred = new;
+ return 0;
+}
- ret = security_cred_alloc(pcred);
- if (ret < 0) {
- release_tgcred(pcred);
- kfree(pcred);
- return ret;
+/**
+ * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
+ * @new: The credentials to be assigned
+ *
+ * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
+ * the old set.
+ *
+ * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
+ *
+ * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
+ * of, say, sys_setgid().
+ */
+int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task = current;
+ const struct cred *old;
+
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
+
+ old = task->cred;
+ security_commit_creds(new, old);
+
+ /* dumpability changes */
+ if (old->euid != new->euid ||
+ old->egid != new->egid ||
+ old->fsuid != new->fsuid ||
+ old->fsgid != new->fsgid ||
+ !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
+ set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ task->pdeath_signal = 0;
+ smp_wmb();
}
- atomic_set(&pcred->usage, 1);
- get_group_info(pcred->group_info);
- get_uid(pcred->user);
- key_get(pcred->thread_keyring);
- key_get(pcred->request_key_auth);
+ /* alter the thread keyring */
+ if (new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
+ key_fsuid_changed(task);
+ if (new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
+ key_fsgid_changed(task);
+
+ /* do it
+ * - What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
+ * new uid over his NPROC rlimit? We can check this now
+ * cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
+ * we should be checking for it. -DaveM
+ */
+ if (new->user != old->user)
+ atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
+ if (new->user != old->user)
+ atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
+
+ sched_switch_user(task);
+
+ /* send notifications */
+ if (new->uid != old->uid ||
+ new->euid != old->euid ||
+ new->suid != old->suid ||
+ new->fsuid != old->fsuid)
+ proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
- atomic_inc(&pcred->user->processes);
+ if (new->gid != old->gid ||
+ new->egid != old->egid ||
+ new->sgid != old->sgid ||
+ new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
+ proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
- /* RCU assignment is unneeded here as no-one can have accessed this
- * pointer yet, barring us */
- p->cred = pcred;
+ put_cred(old);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
+
+/**
+ * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
+ * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
+ *
+ * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
+ * current task.
+ */
+void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
+{
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
+ put_cred(new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
+
+/**
+ * override_creds - Temporarily override the current process's credentials
+ * @new: The credentials to be assigned
+ *
+ * Install a set of temporary override credentials on the current process,
+ * returning the old set for later reversion.
+ */
+const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ const struct cred *old = current->cred;
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
+ return old;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
+
+/**
+ * revert_creds - Revert a temporary credentials override
+ * @old: The credentials to be restored
+ *
+ * Revert a temporary set of override credentials to an old set, discarding the
+ * override set.
+ */
+void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
+{
+ const struct cred *override = current->cred;
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
+ put_cred(override);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
+
+/*
+ * initialise the credentials stuff
+ */
+void __init cred_init(void)
+{
+ /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
+ cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
+ 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}