diff options
author | Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> | 2015-02-23 14:17:13 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2015-02-23 23:16:12 (GMT) |
commit | 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac (patch) | |
tree | aecd97232dd3fe3977adcef402ea3be1b60eeef9 /net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c | |
parent | 8d4ac39df09c6f8078af60cd0ddd7b2435728e72 (diff) | |
download | linux-77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac.tar.xz |
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions