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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-11-05 23:20:56 (GMT) |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-11-05 23:20:56 (GMT) |
| commit | 6de29ccb50f2caef07cdd888efc8cb933497b6a4 (patch) | |
| tree | c08336d487fb8f275e9ded66b4a648abbac7d39e /security | |
| parent | 69234acee54407962a20bedf90ef9c96326994b5 (diff) | |
| parent | f2ca379642d7a843be972ea4167abdd3c8c9e5d1 (diff) | |
| download | linux-6de29ccb50f2caef07cdd888efc8cb933497b6a4.tar.xz | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns hardlink capability check fix from Eric Biederman:
"This round just contains a single patch. There has been a lot of
other work this period but it is not quite ready yet, so I am pushing
it until 4.5.
The remaining change by Dirk Steinmetz wich fixes both Gentoo and
Ubuntu containers allows hardlinks if we have the appropriate
capabilities in the user namespace. Security wise it is really a
gimme as the user namespace root can already call setuid become that
user and create the hardlink"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
namei: permit linking with CAP_FOWNER in userns
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions