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[ Upstream commit c74fd80f2f41d05f350bb478151021f88551afe8 ]
Revert the main part of commit:
af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")
That commit introduced reading the pci device's msi message data to see
if a pirq was previously configured for the device's msi/msix, and re-use
that pirq. At the time, that was the correct behavior. However, a
later change to Qemu caused it to call into the Xen hypervisor to unmap
all pirqs for a pci device, when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX
vectors; specifically the Qemu commit:
c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad
("qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload")
Once Qemu added this pirq unmapping, it was no longer correct for the
kernel to re-use the pirq number cached in the pci device msi message
data. All Qemu releases since 2.1.0 contain the patch that unmaps the
pirqs when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors.
This bug is causing failures to initialize multiple NVMe controllers
under Xen, because the NVMe driver sets up a single MSIX vector for
each controller (concurrently), and then after using that to talk to
the controller for some configuration data, it disables the single MSIX
vector and re-configures all the MSIX vectors it needs. So the MSIX
setup code tries to re-use the cached pirq from the first vector
for each controller, but the hypervisor has already given away that
pirq to another controller, and its initialization fails.
This is discussed in more detail at:
https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-01/msg00447.html
Fixes: af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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allocations.
commit 21d25f6a4217e755906cb548b55ddab39d0e88b9 upstream.
On a kernel with DEBUG_LOCKS, ioat_free_chan_resources triggers an
in_interrupt() warning. With PROVE_LOCKING, it reports detecting a
SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock ordering in the same code path.
This is because dma_generic_alloc_coherent() checks if the GFP flags
permit blocking. It allocates from different subsystems if blocking is
permitted. The free path knows how to return the memory to the correct
allocator. If GFP_KERNEL is specified then the alloc and free end up
going through cma_alloc(), which uses mutexes.
Given that ioat_free_chan_resources() can be called in interrupt
context, ioat_alloc_chan_resources() must specify GFP_NOWAIT so that the
allocations do not block and instead use an allocator that uses
spinlocks.
Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6760bf2ddde8ad64f8205a651223a93de3a35494 ]
Martin reported a verifier issue that hit the BUG_ON() for his
test case in the mark_reg_unknown_value() function:
[ 202.861380] kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:467!
[...]
[ 203.291109] Call Trace:
[ 203.296501] [<ffffffff811364d5>] mark_map_reg+0x45/0x50
[ 203.308225] [<ffffffff81136558>] mark_map_regs+0x78/0x90
[ 203.320140] [<ffffffff8113938d>] do_check+0x226d/0x2c90
[ 203.331865] [<ffffffff8113a6ab>] bpf_check+0x48b/0x780
[ 203.343403] [<ffffffff81134c8e>] bpf_prog_load+0x27e/0x440
[ 203.355705] [<ffffffff8118a38f>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x11af/0x1230
[ 203.369158] [<ffffffff812d8188>] ? security_capable+0x48/0x60
[ 203.382035] [<ffffffff811351a4>] SyS_bpf+0x124/0x960
[ 203.393185] [<ffffffff810515f6>] ? __do_page_fault+0x276/0x490
[ 203.406258] [<ffffffff816db320>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
This issue got uncovered after the fix in a08dd0da5307 ("bpf: fix
regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups"). The reason why it
wasn't noticed before was, because as mentioned in a08dd0da5307,
mark_map_regs() was doing the id matching incorrectly based on the
uncached regs[regno].id. So, in the first loop, we walked all regs
and as soon as we found regno == i, then this reg's id was cleared
when calling mark_reg_unknown_value() thus that every subsequent
register was probed against id of 0 (which, in combination with the
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL type is an invalid condition that no other
register state can hold), and therefore wasn't type transitioned such
as in the spilled register case for the second loop.
Now since that got fixed, it turned out that 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf:
Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") used
mark_reg_unknown_value() incorrectly for the spilled regs, and thus
hitting the BUG_ON() in some cases due to regno >= MAX_BPF_REG.
Although spilled regs have the same type as the non-spilled regs
for the verifier state, that is, struct bpf_reg_state, they are
semantically different from the non-spilled regs. In other words,
there can be up to 64 (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) spilled regs
in the stack, for example, register R<x> could have been spilled by
the program to stack location X, Y, Z, and in mark_map_regs() we
need to scan these stack slots of type STACK_SPILL for potential
registers that we have to transition from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL.
Therefore, depending on the location, the spilled_regs regno can
be a lot higher than just MAX_BPF_REG's value since we operate on
stack instead. The reset in mark_reg_unknown_value() itself is
just fine, only that the BUG_ON() was inappropriate for this. Fix
it by making a __mark_reg_unknown_value() version that can be
called from mark_map_reg() generically; we know for the non-spilled
case that the regno is always < MAX_BPF_REG anyway.
Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a08dd0da5307ba01295c8383923e51e7997c3576 ]
Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped
loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit,
whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected
program has roughly 2k instructions.
What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively
anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular
in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per
se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the
same program with regards to involved map lookups.
Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers
until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to
either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the
id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types.
For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(),
but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even
transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among
others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call
return with RET_INTEGER return type.
states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state;
note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of
that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect
pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity
limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this
case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform
a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations
in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a
pruning decision.
We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of
complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also
runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is
through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus
a different scenario.
Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when
marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination
reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE,
it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id
and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE
anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that
was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of
mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other
time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states.
A test case for this is added here, too.
Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2a4dd37f6b41fbcad76efbf63124eb3126c66fe ]
Commmits 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
and 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") by themselves
are correct, but in combination they make state equivalence ignore 'id' field
of the register state which can lead to accepting invalid program.
Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers")
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0 ]
A BPF program is required to check the return register of a
map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps
track of this by converting the type of the result register from
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional
jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed
for the result register 0.
In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG
instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes
them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the
verifier objects when the register is accessed:
0: (b7) r1 = 10
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
2: (bf) r2 = r10
3: (07) r2 += -8
4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000
6: (85) call 1
7: (bf) r4 = r0
8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0
R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'
This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by
assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional
jump is observed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 72ef9c4125c7b257e3a714d62d778ab46583d6a3 ]
This patch fixes a memory leak, which happens if the connection request
is not fulfilled between parsing the DCCP options and handling the SYN
(because e.g. the backlog is full), because we forgot to free the
list of ack vectors.
Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b20e2d54789c6acbf6bd0efdbec2cf5fa4d90ef1 ]
aszlig observed failing ssh tunnels (-w) during initialization since
commit cc9da6cc4f56e0 ("ipv6: addrconf: use stable address generator for
ARPHRD_NONE"). We already had reports that the mentioned commit breaks
Juniper VPN connections. I can't clearly say that the Juniper VPN client
has the same problem, but it is worth a try to hint to this patch.
Because of the early generation of link local addresses, the kernel now
can start asking for routers on the local subnet much earlier than usual.
Those router solicitation packets arrive inside the ssh channels and
should be transmitted to the tun fd before the configuration scripts
might have upped the interface and made it ready for transmission.
ssh polls on the interface and receives back a POLL_OUT. It tries to send
the earily router solicitation packet to the tun interface. Unfortunately
it hasn't been up'ed yet by config scripts, thus failing with -EIO. ssh
doesn't retry again and considers the tun interface broken forever.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=121131
Fixes: cc9da6cc4f56 ("ipv6: addrconf: use stable address generator for ARPHRD_NONE")
Cc: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Reported-by: Jonas Lippuner <jonas@lippuner.ca>
Cc: Jonas Lippuner <jonas@lippuner.ca>
Reported-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
Cc: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 45caeaa5ac0b4b11784ac6f932c0ad4c6b67cda0 ]
As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.
We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:
#8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
[exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
#9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8
Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.
It's found the freed dst_entry here:
224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
225 {↩
226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
228 ↩
229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
231 }↩
But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.
All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:
- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.
- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:
LockDroppedIcmps 267
A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:
do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release().
Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.
To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.
The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.
As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().
Fixes: ceb3320610d6 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a13b2082ece95247779b9995c4e91b4246bed023 ]
Andreas reports kernel oops during rmmod of the br_netfilter module.
Hannes debugged the oops down to a NULL rt6info->rt6i_indev.
Problem is that br_netfilter has the nasty concept of adding a fake
rtable to skb->dst; this happens in a br_netfilter prerouting hook.
A second hook (in bridge LOCAL_IN) is supposed to remove these again
before the skb is handed up the stack.
However, on module unload hooks get unregistered which means an
skb could traverse the prerouting hook that attaches the fake_rtable,
while the 'fake rtable remove' hook gets removed from the hooklist
immediately after.
Fixes: 34666d467cbf1e2e3c7 ("netfilter: bridge: move br_netfilter out of the core")
Reported-by: Andreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
Debugged-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 79e49503efe53a8c51d8b695bedc8a346c5e4a87 ]
ip6_fragment, in case skb has a fraglist, checks if the
skb is cloned. If it is, it will move to the 'slow path' and allocates
new skbs for each fragment.
However, right before entering the slowpath loop, it updates the
nexthdr value of the last ipv6 extension header to NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT,
to account for the fragment header that will be inserted in the new
ipv6-fragment skbs.
In case original skb is cloned this munges nexthdr value of another
skb. Avoid this by doing the nexthdr update for each of the new fragment
skbs separately.
This was observed with tcpdump on a bridge device where netfilter ipv6
reassembly is active: tcpdump shows malformed fragment headers as
the l4 header (icmpv6, tcp, etc). is decoded as a fragment header.
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Andreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 67e194007be08d071294456274dd53e0a04fdf90 ]
Commit 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement") introduced a
loop that removes all siblings of an ECMP route that is being
replaced. However, this loop doesn't stop when it has replaced
siblings, and keeps removing other routes with a higher metric.
We also end up triggering the WARN_ON after the loop, because after
this nsiblings < 0.
Instead, stop the loop when we have taken care of all routes with the
same metric as the route being replaced.
Reproducer:
===========
#!/bin/sh
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -net ns1 link set lo up
for x in 0 1 2 ; do
ip link add veth$x netns ns2 type veth peer name eth$x netns ns1
ip -net ns1 link set eth$x up
ip -net ns2 link set veth$x up
done
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 nexthop via fe80::0 dev eth0 \
nexthop via fe80::1 dev eth1 nexthop via fe80::2 dev eth2
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 via fe80::42 dev eth0 metric 256
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 via fe80::43 dev eth0 metric 2048
echo "before replace, 3 routes"
ip -net ns1 -6 r | grep -v '^fe80\|^ff00'
echo
ip -net ns1 -6 r c 2000::/64 nexthop via fe80::4 dev eth0 \
nexthop via fe80::5 dev eth1 nexthop via fe80::6 dev eth2
echo "after replace, only 2 routes, metric 2048 is gone"
ip -net ns1 -6 r | grep -v '^fe80\|^ff00'
Fixes: 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 79099aab38c8f5c746748b066ae74ba984fe2cc8 ]
Multipath routes can be rendered usesless when a device in one of the
paths is deleted. For example:
$ ip -f mpls ro ls
100
nexthop as to 200 via inet 172.16.2.2 dev virt12
nexthop as to 300 via inet 172.16.3.2 dev br0
101
nexthop as to 201 via inet6 2000:2::2 dev virt12
nexthop as to 301 via inet6 2000:3::2 dev br0
$ ip li del br0
When br0 is deleted the other hop is not considered in
mpls_select_multipath because of the alive check -- rt_nhn_alive
is 0.
rt_nhn_alive is decremented once in mpls_ifdown when the device is taken
down (NETDEV_DOWN) and again when it is deleted (NETDEV_UNREGISTER). For
a 2 hop route, deleting one device drops the alive count to 0. Since
devices are taken down before unregistering, the decrement on
NETDEV_UNREGISTER is redundant.
Fixes: c89359a42e2a4 ("mpls: support for dead routes")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e37791ec1ad785b59022ae211f63a16189bacebf ]
When the mpls_router module is unloaded, mpls routes are deleted but
notifications are not sent to userspace leaving userspace caches
out of sync. Add the call to mpls_notify_route in mpls_net_exit as
routes are freed.
Fixes: 0189197f44160 ("mpls: Basic routing support")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 52491c7607c5527138095edf44c53169dc1ddb82 ]
tcf_connmark_init does not check in its configuration if TCA_CONNMARK_PARMS
is set, resulting in a null pointer dereference when trying to access it.
[501099.043007] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
[501099.043039] IP: [<ffffffffc10c60fb>] tcf_connmark_init+0x8b/0x180 [act_connmark]
...
[501099.044334] Call Trace:
[501099.044345] [<ffffffffa47270e8>] ? tcf_action_init_1+0x198/0x1b0
[501099.044363] [<ffffffffa47271b0>] ? tcf_action_init+0xb0/0x120
[501099.044380] [<ffffffffa47250a4>] ? tcf_exts_validate+0xc4/0x110
[501099.044398] [<ffffffffc0f5fa97>] ? u32_set_parms+0xa7/0x270 [cls_u32]
[501099.044417] [<ffffffffc0f60bf0>] ? u32_change+0x680/0x87b [cls_u32]
[501099.044436] [<ffffffffa4725d1d>] ? tc_ctl_tfilter+0x4dd/0x8a0
[501099.044454] [<ffffffffa44a23a1>] ? security_capable+0x41/0x60
[501099.044471] [<ffffffffa470ca01>] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xe1/0x220
[501099.044490] [<ffffffffa470c920>] ? rtnl_newlink+0x870/0x870
[501099.044507] [<ffffffffa472cc61>] ? netlink_rcv_skb+0xa1/0xc0
[501099.044524] [<ffffffffa47073f4>] ? rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x30
[501099.044541] [<ffffffffa472c634>] ? netlink_unicast+0x184/0x230
[501099.044558] [<ffffffffa472c9d8>] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x3b0
[501099.044576] [<ffffffffa46d8880>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40
[501099.044592] [<ffffffffa46d8e03>] ? SYSC_sendto+0xd3/0x150
[501099.044608] [<ffffffffa425fda1>] ? __do_page_fault+0x2d1/0x510
[501099.044626] [<ffffffffa47fbd7b>] ? system_call_fast_compare_end+0xc/0x9b
Fixes: 22a5dc0e5e3e ("net: sched: Introduce connmark action")
Signed-off-by: Étienne Noss <etienne.noss@wifirst.fr>
Signed-off-by: Victorien Molle <victorien.molle@wifirst.fr>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 745cb7f8a5de0805cade3de3991b7a95317c7c73 ]
Replace MAX_ADDR_LEN with its numeric value to fix the following
linux/packet_diag.h userspace compilation error:
/usr/include/linux/packet_diag.h:67:17: error: 'MAX_ADDR_LEN' undeclared here (not in a function)
__u8 pdmc_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
This is not the first case in the UAPI where the numeric value
of MAX_ADDR_LEN is used instead of symbolic one, uapi/linux/if_link.h
already does the same:
$ grep MAX_ADDR_LEN include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
__u8 mac[32]; /* MAX_ADDR_LEN */
There are no UAPI headers besides these two that use MAX_ADDR_LEN.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 294acf1c01bace5cea5d30b510504238bf5f7c25 ]
The gso code of several tunnels type (gre and udp tunnels)
takes for granted that the skb->inner_protocol is properly
initialized and drops the packet elsewhere.
On the forwarding path no one is initializing such field,
so gro encapsulated packets are dropped on forward.
Since commit 38720352412a ("gre: Use inner_proto to obtain
inner header protocol"), this can be reproduced when the
encapsulated packets use gre as the tunneling protocol.
The issue happens also with vxlan and geneve tunnels since
commit 8bce6d7d0d1e ("udp: Generalize skb_udp_segment"), if the
forwarding host's ingress nic has h/w offload for such tunnel
and a vxlan/geneve device is configured on top of it, regardless
of the configured peer address and vni.
To address the issue, this change initialize the inner_protocol
field for encapsulated packets in both ipv4 and ipv6 gro complete
callbacks.
Fixes: 38720352412a ("gre: Use inner_proto to obtain inner header protocol")
Fixes: 8bce6d7d0d1e ("udp: Generalize skb_udp_segment")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f7887d40e541f74402df0684a1463c0a0bb68c68 ]
KASAN detected a use-after-free:
[ 269.467067] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vrf_xmit+0x7f1/0x827 [vrf] at addr ffff8800350a21c0
[ 269.467067] Read of size 4 by task ssh/1879
[ 269.467067] CPU: 1 PID: 1879 Comm: ssh Not tainted 4.10.0+ #249
[ 269.467067] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 269.467067] Call Trace:
[ 269.467067] dump_stack+0x81/0xb6
[ 269.467067] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x78
[ 269.467067] kasan_report+0x2f7/0x450
[ 269.467067] ? vrf_xmit+0x7f1/0x827 [vrf]
[ 269.467067] ? ip_output+0xa4/0xdb
[ 269.467067] __asan_load4+0x6b/0x6d
[ 269.467067] vrf_xmit+0x7f1/0x827 [vrf]
...
Which corresponds to the skb access after xmit handling. Fix by saving
skb->len and using the saved value to update stats.
Fixes: 193125dbd8eb2 ("net: Introduce VRF device driver")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 62f8f4d9066c1c6f2474845d1ca7e2891f2ae3fd ]
Dmitry reported crashes in DCCP stack [1]
Problem here is that when I got rid of listener spinlock, I missed the
fact that DCCP stores a complex state in struct dccp_request_sock,
while TCP does not.
Since multiple cpus could access it at the same time, we need to add
protection.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0
net/dccp/feat.c:1541 at addr ffff88003713be68
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor2/8457
CPU: 2 PID: 8457 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7+ #127
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:162
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:200 [inline]
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:289 [inline]
kasan_report.part.1+0x20e/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:311
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:332 [inline]
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x29/0x30 mm/kasan/report.c:332
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1541
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457
dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186
dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902
</IRQ>
do_softirq.part.17+0x1e8/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:328
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:176 [inline]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1f2/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:181
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:31 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:971 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xbb0/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123
ip6_finish_output+0x302/0x960 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:148
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1cb/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:162
ip6_xmit+0xcdf/0x20d0 include/net/dst.h:501
inet6_csk_xmit+0x320/0x5f0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:179
dccp_transmit_skb+0xb09/0x1120 net/dccp/output.c:141
dccp_xmit_packet+0x215/0x760 net/dccp/output.c:280
dccp_write_xmit+0x168/0x1d0 net/dccp/output.c:362
dccp_sendmsg+0x79c/0xb10 net/dccp/proto.c:796
inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x4458b9
RSP: 002b:00007f8ceb77bb58 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000017 RCX: 00000000004458b9
RDX: 0000000000000023 RSI: 0000000020e60000 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 00000000006e1b90 R08: 00000000200f9fe1 R09: 0000000000000020
R10: 0000000000008010 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 00000000007080a8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f8ceb77c9c0 R15: 00007f8ceb77c700
Object at ffff88003713be50, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
Allocated:
PID = 8446
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270 mm/slub.c:2738
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:490 [inline]
dccp_feat_entry_new+0x214/0x410 net/dccp/feat.c:467
dccp_feat_push_change+0x38/0x220 net/dccp/feat.c:487
__feat_register_sp+0x223/0x2f0 net/dccp/feat.c:741
dccp_feat_propagate_ccid+0x22b/0x2b0 net/dccp/feat.c:949
dccp_feat_server_ccid_dependencies+0x1b3/0x250 net/dccp/feat.c:1012
dccp_make_response+0x1f1/0xc90 net/dccp/output.c:423
dccp_v6_send_response+0x4ec/0xc20 net/dccp/ipv6.c:217
dccp_v6_conn_request+0xaba/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:377
dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1650 net/dccp/input.c:606
dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:893 [inline]
__sk_receive_skb+0x36f/0xcc0 net/core/sock.c:479
dccp_v6_rcv+0xba5/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:742
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
Freed:
PID = 15
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1355 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1377 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2954 [inline]
kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3874
dccp_feat_entry_destructor.part.4+0x48/0x60 net/dccp/feat.c:418
dccp_feat_entry_destructor net/dccp/feat.c:416 [inline]
dccp_feat_list_pop net/dccp/feat.c:541 [inline]
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x57f/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1543
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457
dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186
dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88003713bd00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88003713bd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88003713be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
Fixes: 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6c4dc75c251721f517e9daeb5370ea606b5b35ce ]
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ac25fc063751379cb77434fef9f3b088cd3e2f7 ]
TX skbs do not necessarily hold a reference on skb->sk->sk_refcnt
By the time TX completion happens, sk_refcnt might be already 0.
sock_hold()/sock_put() would then corrupt critical state, like
sk_wmem_alloc and lead to leaks or use after free.
Fixes: 62bccb8cdb69 ("net-timestamp: Make the clone operation stand-alone from phy timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dd4f10722aeb10f4f582948839f066bebe44e5fb ]
TX skbs do not necessarily hold a reference on skb->sk->sk_refcnt
By the time TX completion happens, sk_refcnt might be already 0.
sock_hold()/sock_put() would then corrupt critical state, like
sk_wmem_alloc.
Fixes: bf7fa551e0ce ("mac80211: Resolve sk_refcnt/sk_wmem_alloc issue in wifi ack path")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 02b2faaf0af1d85585f6d6980e286d53612acfc2 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a divide by 0 triggered by syzkaller, exploiting
tcp_disconnect() path that was never really considered and/or used
before syzkaller ;)
I was not able to reproduce the bug, but it seems issues here are the
three possible actions that assumed they would never trigger on a
listener.
1) tcp_write_timer_handler
2) tcp_delack_timer_handler
3) MTU reduction
Only IPv6 MTU reduction was properly testing TCP_CLOSE and TCP_LISTEN
states from tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f78ef7cd9a0686b979679d0de061c6dbfd8d649e ]
Fixes: 43a0c6751a32 ("strparser: Stream parser for messages")
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d5afb6f9b6bb2c57bd0c05e76e12489dc0d037d9 ]
The code where sk_clone() came from created a new socket and locked it,
but then, on the error path didn't unlock it.
This problem stayed there for a long while, till b0691c8ee7c2 ("net:
Unlock sock before calling sk_free()") fixed it, but unfortunately the
callers of sk_clone() (now sk_clone_locked()) were not audited and the
one in dccp_create_openreq_child() remained.
Now in the age of the syskaller fuzzer, this was finally uncovered, as
reported by Dmitry:
---- 8< ----
I've got the following report while running syzkaller fuzzer on
86292b33d4b7 ("Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)")
[ BUG: held lock freed! ]
4.10.0+ #234 Not tainted
-------------------------
syz-executor6/6898 is freeing memory
ffff88006286cac0-ffff88006286d3b7, with a lock still held there!
(slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
(slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>]
sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504
5 locks held by syz-executor6/6898:
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] lock_sock
include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline]
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>]
inet_stream_connect+0x44/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:681
#1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83bc1c2a>]
inet6_csk_xmit+0x12a/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:126
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_unlink
include/linux/skbuff.h:1767 [inline]
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_dequeue
include/linux/skbuff.h:1783 [inline]
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>]
process_backlog+0x264/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4835
#3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83aeb5c0>]
ip6_input_finish+0x0/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:59
#4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
#4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>]
sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504
Fix it just like was done by b0691c8ee7c2 ("net: Unlock sock before calling
sk_free()").
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301153510.GE15145@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 48cac18ecf1de82f76259a54402c3adb7839ad01 ]
Andrey reported a use-after-free in IPv6 stack.
Issue here is that we free the socket while it still has skb
in TX path and in some queues.
It happens here because IPv6 reassembly unit messes skb->truesize,
breaking skb_set_owner_w() badly.
We fixed a similar issue for IPV4 in commit 8282f27449bf ("inet: frag:
Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()")
Acked-by: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x118/0x120
Read of size 8 at addr ffff880062da0060 by task a.out/4140
page:ffffea00018b6800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null)
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180130013
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88006741f140 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 4140 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3+ #59
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
describe_address mm/kasan/report.c:262
kasan_report_error+0x121/0x560 mm/kasan/report.c:370
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:392
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:413
sock_flag ./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:324
sock_wfree+0x118/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1631
skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:655
skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668
__kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684
kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4e0 net/core/skbuff.c:705
inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304
inet_frag_put ./include/net/inet_frag.h:133
nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1125/0x38b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617
ipv6_defrag+0x21b/0x350 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68
nf_hook_entry_hookfn ./include/linux/netfilter.h:102
nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310
nf_hook ./include/linux/netfilter.h:212
__ip6_local_out+0x52c/0xaf0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160
ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170
ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722
ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742
rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613
rawv6_sendmsg+0x2cff/0x4130 net/ipv6/raw.c:927
inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
sock_write_iter+0x326/0x620 net/socket.c:848
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:499
__vfs_write+0x483/0x760 fs/read_write.c:512
vfs_write+0x187/0x530 fs/read_write.c:560
SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607
SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203
RIP: 0033:0x7ff26e6f5b79
RSP: 002b:00007ff268e0ed98 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff268e0f9c0 RCX: 00007ff26e6f5b79
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020f50fe1 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ff26ebc1220 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ff268e0f9c0 R14: 00007ff26efec040 R15: 0000000000000003
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880062da0000
which belongs to the cache RAWv6 of size 1504
The buggy address ffff880062da0060 is located 96 bytes inside
of 1504-byte region [ffff880062da0000, ffff880062da05e0)
Freed by task 4113:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514
kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:2973
sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1377
__sk_destruct+0x49c/0x6e0 net/core/sock.c:1452
sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460
__sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468
sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1479
sock_put ./include/net/sock.h:1638
sk_common_release+0x31e/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2782
rawv6_close+0x54/0x80 net/ipv6/raw.c:1214
inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425
inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:431
sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:599
sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1063
__fput+0x332/0x7f0 fs/file_table.c:208
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
task_work_run+0x19b/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:116
exit_task_work ./include/linux/task_work.h:21
do_exit+0x186b/0x2800 kernel/exit.c:839
do_group_exit+0x149/0x420 kernel/exit.c:943
SYSC_exit_group kernel/exit.c:954
SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20 kernel/exit.c:952
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203
Allocated by task 4115:
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:544
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:432
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1af/0x250 mm/slub.c:2721
sk_prot_alloc+0x65/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:1334
sk_alloc+0x105/0x1010 net/core/sock.c:1396
inet6_create+0x44d/0x1150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:183
__sock_create+0x4f6/0x880 net/socket.c:1199
sock_create net/socket.c:1239
SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1269
SyS_socket+0xf9/0x230 net/socket.c:1249
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:203
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880062d9ff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff880062d9ff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff880062da0000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880062da0080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880062da0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 13baa00ad01bb3a9f893e3a08cbc2d072fc0c15d ]
It is now very clear that silly TCP listeners might play with
enabling/disabling timestamping while new children are added
to their accept queue.
Meaning net_enable_timestamp() can be called from BH context
while current state of the static key is not enabled.
Lets play safe and allow all contexts.
The work queue is scheduled only under the problematic cases,
which are the static key enable/disable transition, to not slow down
critical paths.
This extends and improves what we did in commit 5fa8bbda38c6 ("net: use
a work queue to defer net_disable_timestamp() work")
Fixes: b90e5794c5bd ("net: dont call jump_label_dec from irq context")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 540e2894f7905538740aaf122bd8e0548e1c34a4 ]
KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in packet_bind_spkt():
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
CPU: 0 PID: 1074 Comm: packet Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6+ #1891
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff88006b6dfc08 ffffffff82559ae8 ffff88006b6dfb48
ffffffff818a7c91 ffffffff85b9c870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85b9c550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000ec400911 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82559ae8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818a6626>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1003
[<ffffffff818a783b>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[< inline >] strlen lib/string.c:484
[<ffffffff8259b58d>] strlcpy+0x9d/0x200 lib/string.c:144
[<ffffffff84b2eca4>] packet_bind_spkt+0x144/0x230
net/packet/af_packet.c:3132
[<ffffffff84242e4d>] SYSC_bind+0x40d/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1370
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000eba00911
[<ffffffff810bb787>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:334
[<ffffffff818a59f8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0
mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
[<ffffffff818a7773>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84242b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000eb400911)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists
upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=====================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netpacket/packet.h>
#include <net/ethernet.h>
int main() {
struct sockaddr addr;
memset(&addr, 0xff, sizeof(addr));
addr.sa_family = AF_PACKET;
int fd = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, &addr, sizeof(addr));
return 0;
}
=====================================
This happens because addr.sa_data copied from the userspace is not
zero-terminated, and copying it with strlcpy() in packet_bind_spkt()
results in calling strlen() on the kernel copy of that non-terminated
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8953de2f02ad7b15e4964c82f9afd60f128e4e98 ]
Even with multicast flooding turned off, IPv6 ND should still work so
that IPv6 connectivity is provided. Allow this by continuing to flood
multicast traffic originated by us.
Fixes: b6cb5ac8331b ("net: bridge: add per-port multicast flood flag")
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Manning <mmanning@brocade.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 449809a66c1d0b1563dee84493e14bf3104d2d7e ]
SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH.
When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog
in commit 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket
backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN
from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket
backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call.
Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;)
=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted
---------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at:
[<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at:
[<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295
lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407
reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline]
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764
tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399
tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433
tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257
dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245
napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline]
napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636
e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline]
e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489
e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline]
irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline]
do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250
ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20
native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53
arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline]
default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271
arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262
default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243
cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345
start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272
verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc
irq event stamp: 1741
hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>]
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160
[inline]
hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191
hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>]
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>]
__do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310
softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>]
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090:
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock
include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline]
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>]
sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387
valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline]
mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline]
mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065
mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295
lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407
reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline]
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764
dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380
dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606
dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline]
__release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052
release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539
sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x4458b9
RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9
RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000
R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000
Fixes: 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f7df4923fa986247e93ec2cdff5ca168fff14dcf ]
When the structure of the LPM tree changes (f.e., due to the addition of
a new prefix), we unbind the old tree and then bind the new one. This
may result in temporary packet loss.
Instead, overwrite the old binding with the new one.
Fixes: 6b75c4807db3 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add virtual router management")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a717e3f740803cc88bd5c9a70c93504f6a368663 ]
There is no guarantees that callers of the TX path will hold
the RCU lock. Grab it explicitly.
Fixes: fceb9c3e3825 ("geneve: avoid using stale geneve socket.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 56de859e9967c070464a9a9f4f18d73f9447298e ]
There is no guarantees that callers of the TX path will hold
the RCU lock. Grab it explicitly.
Fixes: c6fcc4fc5f8b ("vxlan: avoid using stale vxlan socket.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit eab127717a6af54401ba534790c793ec143cd1fc ]
phy_error() is called in the PHY state machine workqueue context, and
calls phy_trigger_machine() which does a cancel_delayed_work_sync() of
the workqueue we execute from, causing a deadlock situation.
Augment phy_trigger_machine() machine with a sync boolean indicating
whether we should use cancel_*_sync() or just cancel_*_work().
Fixes: 3c293f4e08b5 ("net: phy: Trigger state machine on state change and not polling.")
Reported-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 51fb60eb162ab84c5edf2ae9c63cf0b878e5547e ]
l2tp_ip_backlog_recv may not return -1 if the packet gets dropped.
The return value is passed up to ip_local_deliver_finish, which treats
negative values as an IP protocol number for resubmission.
Signed-off-by: Paul Hüber <phueber@kernsp.in>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit edb9d1bff4bbe19b8ae0e71b1f38732591a9eeb2 ]
When tc actions are loaded as a module and no actions have been installed,
flushing them would result in actions removed from the memory, but modules
reference count not being decremented, so that the modules would not be
unloaded.
Following is example with GACT action:
% sudo modprobe act_gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions ls action gact
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 1
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 2
% sudo rmmod act_gact
rmmod: ERROR: Module act_gact is in use
....
After the fix:
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 1
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 2
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 3
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 3
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
% sudo rmmod act_gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
%
Fixes: f97017cdefef ("net-sched: Fix actions flushing")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e28099d38c0e50d62c1afc054e37e573adf3d21 ]
Restore the lost masking of TOS in input route code to
allow ip rules to match it properly.
Problem [1] noticed by Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
[1] http://marc.info/?t=137331755300040&r=1&w=2
Fixes: 89aef8921bfb ("ipv4: Delete routing cache.")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1158632b5a2dcce0786c1b1b99654e81cc867981 ]
When using IPv6 transport and a default dst, a pointer to the configured
source address is passed into the route lookup. If no source address is
configured, then the value is overwritten.
IPv6 route lookup ignores egress ifindex match if the source address is set,
so if egress ifindex match is desired, the source address must be passed
as any. The overwrite breaks this for subsequent lookups.
Avoid this by copying the configured address to an existing stack variable
and pass a pointer to that instead.
Fixes: 272d96a5ab10 ("net: vxlan: lwt: Use source ip address during route lookup.")
Signed-off-by: Brian Russell <brussell@brocade.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7dcdf941cdc96692ab99fd790c8cc68945514851 ]
Align vti6 with vti by returning GRE_KEY flag. This enables iproute2
to display tunnel keys on "ip -6 tunnel show"
Signed-off-by: David Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4e37d6911f36545b286d15073f6f2222f840e81c ]
The incorrect check caused an off-by-one error: the maximum VID 0xffffff
was unusable.
Fixes: d342894c5d2f ("vxlan: virtual extensible lan")
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 36154be40a28e4afaa0416da2681d80b7e2ca319 ]
In cqe compression with striding RQ, the decompression of the CQE field
wqe_counter was done with a wrong wraparound value.
This caused handling cqes with a wrong pointer to wqe (rx descriptor)
and creating SKBs with wrong data, pointing to wrong (and already consumed)
strides/pages.
The meaning of the CQE field wqe_counter in striding RQ holds the
stride index instead of the WQE index. Hence, when decompressing
a CQE, wqe_counter should have wrapped-around the number of strides
in a single multi-packet WQE.
We dropped this wrap-around mask at all in CQE decompression of striding
RQ. It is not needed as in such cases the CQE compression session would
break because of different value of wqe_id field, starting a new
compression session.
Tested:
ethtool -K ethxx lro off/on
ethtool --set-priv-flags ethxx rx_cqe_compress on
super_netperf 16 {ipv4,ipv6} -t TCP_STREAM -m 50 -D
verified no csum errors and no page refcount issues.
Fixes: 7219ab34f184 ("net/mlx5e: CQE compression")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4078e637c12f1e0a74293f1ec9563f42bff14a03 ]
When rq_type is Striding RQ, no room of SKB_RESERVE is needed
as SKB allocation is not done via build_skb.
Fixes: e4b85508072b ("net/mlx5e: Slightly reduce hardware LRO size")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6f08a22c5fb2b9aefb8ecd8496758e7a677c1fde ]
Currently vport representors are added only on driver load and removed on
driver unload. Apparently we forgot to handle them when we added the
seamless reset flow feature. This caused to leave the representors
netdevs alive and active with open HW resources on pci shutdown and on
error reset flows.
To overcome this we move their handling to interface attach/detach, so
they would be cleaned up on shutdown and recreated on reset flows.
Fixes: 26e59d8077a3 ("net/mlx5e: Implement mlx5e interface attach/detach callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Hadar Hen Zion <hadarh@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 45bded2c216da6010184ac5ebe88c27f73439009 upstream.
Make sure that the Q counters are supported by the FW before trying
to allocate/deallocte them, this will avoid driver load failure when
they aren't supported by the FW.
Fixes: 0837e86a7a34 ('IB/mlx5: Add per port counters')
Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kamalh@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d06863f903ac5f4f6efb0273079d27de3e53a28 upstream.
Fix a BUG when the kernel tries to mount a file system constructed as
follows:
echo foo > foo.txt
mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O encrypt foo.img 100
debugfs -w foo.img << EOF
write foo.txt a
set_inode_field a i_flags 0x80800
set_super_value s_last_orphan 12
quit
EOF
root@kvm-xfstests:~# mount -o loop foo.img /mnt
[ 160.238770] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 160.240106] kernel BUG at /usr/projects/linux/ext4/fs/ext4/inode.c:3874!
[ 160.240106] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 160.240106] Modules linked in:
[ 160.240106] CPU: 0 PID: 2547 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.10.0-rc3-00034-gcdd33b941b67 #227
[ 160.240106] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1 04/01/2014
[ 160.240106] task: f4518000 task.stack: f47b6000
[ 160.240106] EIP: ext4_block_zero_page_range+0x1a7/0x2b4
[ 160.240106] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 160.240106] EAX: 00000001 EBX: f7be4b50 ECX: f47b7dc0 EDX: 00000007
[ 160.240106] ESI: f43b05a8 EDI: f43babec EBP: f47b7dd0 ESP: f47b7dac
[ 160.240106] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 160.240106] CR0: 80050033 CR2: bfd85b08 CR3: 34a00680 CR4: 000006f0
[ 160.240106] Call Trace:
[ 160.240106] ext4_truncate+0x1e9/0x3e5
[ 160.240106] ext4_fill_super+0x286f/0x2b1e
[ 160.240106] ? set_blocksize+0x2e/0x7e
[ 160.240106] mount_bdev+0x114/0x15f
[ 160.240106] ext4_mount+0x15/0x17
[ 160.240106] ? ext4_calculate_overhead+0x39d/0x39d
[ 160.240106] mount_fs+0x58/0x115
[ 160.240106] vfs_kern_mount+0x4b/0xae
[ 160.240106] do_mount+0x671/0x8c3
[ 160.240106] ? _copy_from_user+0x70/0x83
[ 160.240106] ? strndup_user+0x31/0x46
[ 160.240106] SyS_mount+0x57/0x7b
[ 160.240106] do_int80_syscall_32+0x4f/0x61
[ 160.240106] entry_INT80_32+0x2f/0x2f
[ 160.240106] EIP: 0xb76b919e
[ 160.240106] EFLAGS: 00000246 CPU: 0
[ 160.240106] EAX: ffffffda EBX: 08053838 ECX: 08052188 EDX: 080537e8
[ 160.240106] ESI: c0ed0000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 080537e8 ESP: bfa13660
[ 160.240106] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b
[ 160.240106] Code: 59 8b 00 a8 01 0f 84 09 01 00 00 8b 07 66 25 00 f0 66 3d 00 80 75 61 89 f8 e8 3e e2 ff ff 84 c0 74 56 83 bf 48 02 00 00 00 75 02 <0f> 0b 81 7d e8 00 10 00 00 74 02 0f 0b 8b 43 04 8b 53 08 31 c9
[ 160.240106] EIP: ext4_block_zero_page_range+0x1a7/0x2b4 SS:ESP: 0068:f47b7dac
[ 160.317241] ---[ end trace d6a773a375c810a5 ]---
The problem is that when the kernel tries to truncate an inode in
ext4_truncate(), it tries to clear any on-disk data beyond i_size.
Without the encryption key, it can't do that, and so it triggers a
BUG.
E2fsck does *not* provide this service, and in practice most file
systems have their orphan list processed by e2fsck, so to avoid
crashing, this patch skips this step if we don't have access to the
encryption key (which is the case when processing the orphan list; in
all other cases, we will have the encryption key, or the kernel
wouldn't have allowed the file to be opened).
An open question is whether the fact that e2fsck isn't clearing the
bytes beyond i_size causing problems --- and if we've lived with it
not doing it for so long, can we drop this from the kernel replay of
the orphan list in all cases (not just when we don't have the key for
encrypted inodes).
Addresses-Google-Bug: #35209576
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 413808685dd7c9b54bbc5af79da2eaddd0fc3cb2 upstream.
When the protocol is set via the sysfs protocols attribute, the
decoder is loaded. However, when it is not when a device is first
plugged in or registered.
Fixes: acc1c3c ("[media] media: rc: load decoder modules on-demand")
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d67a5f4b5947aba4bfe9a80a2b86079c215ca755 upstream.
Commit df2cb6daa4 ("block: Avoid deadlocks with bio allocation by
stacking drivers") created a workqueue for every bio set and code
in bio_alloc_bioset() that tries to resolve some low-memory deadlocks
by redirecting bios queued on current->bio_list to the workqueue if the
system is low on memory. However other deadlocks (see below **) may
happen, without any low memory condition, because generic_make_request
is queuing bios to current->bio_list (rather than submitting them).
** the related dm-snapshot deadlock is detailed here:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/dm-devel/2016-July/msg00065.html
Fix this deadlock by redirecting any bios on current->bio_list to the
bio_set's rescue workqueue on every schedule() call. Consequently,
when the process blocks on a mutex, the bios queued on
current->bio_list are dispatched to independent workqueus and they can
complete without waiting for the mutex to be available.
The structure blk_plug contains an entry cb_list and this list can contain
arbitrary callback functions that are called when the process blocks.
To implement this fix DM (ab)uses the onstack plug's cb_list interface
to get its flush_current_bio_list() called at schedule() time.
This fixes the snapshot deadlock - if the map method blocks,
flush_current_bio_list() will be called and it redirects bios waiting
on current->bio_list to appropriate workqueues.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1267650
Depends-on: df2cb6daa4 ("block: Avoid deadlocks with bio allocation by stacking drivers")
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 370a0ec1819990f8e2a93df7cc9c0146980ed45f upstream.
Currently, if a vcpu thread tries to change the active state of an
interrupt which is already on the same vcpu's AP list, it will loop
forever. Since the VGIC mmio handler is called after a vcpu has
already synced back the LR state to the struct vgic_irq, we can just
let it proceed safely.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack@cs.columbia.edu>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2e4d88009f57057df7672fa69a32b5224af54d37 upstream.
While we can technically not run huge page guests right now, we can
setup a guest with huge pages. Trying to migrate it will trigger a
VM_BUG_ON and, if the kernel is not configured to panic on a BUG, it
will happily try to work on non-existing page table entries.
With this patch, we always return "dirty" if we encounter a large page
when migrating. This at least fixes the immediate problem until we
have proper handling for both kind of pages.
Fixes: 15f36eb ("KVM: s390: Add proper dirty bitmap support to S390 kvm.")
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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