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[ Upstream commit d8b54110ee944de522ccd3531191f39986ec20f9 ]
Shubham was recently asking on netdev why in arm64 JIT we don't multiply
the index for accessing the tail call map by 8. That led me into testing
out arm64 JIT wrt tail calls and it turned out I got a NULL pointer
dereference on the tail call.
The buggy access is at:
prog = array->ptrs[index];
if (prog == NULL)
goto out;
[...]
00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112
00000064: f86a682a ldr x10, [x1,x10]
00000068: f862694b ldr x11, [x10,x2]
0000006c: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000080
[...]
The code triggering the crash is f862694b. x1 at the time contains the
address of the bpf array, x10 offsetof(struct bpf_array, ptrs). Meaning,
above we load the pointer to the program at map slot 0 into x10. x10
can then be NULL if the slot is not occupied, which we later on try to
access with a user given offset in x2 that is the map index.
Fix this by emitting the following instead:
[...]
00000060: d2800e0a mov x10, #0x70 // #112
00000064: 8b0a002a add x10, x1, x10
00000068: d37df04b lsl x11, x2, #3
0000006c: f86b694b ldr x11, [x10,x11]
00000070: b40000ab cbz x11, 0x00000084
[...]
This basically adds the offset to ptrs to the base address of the bpf
array we got and we later on access the map with an index * 8 offset
relative to that. The tail call map itself is basically one large area
with meta data at the head followed by the array of prog pointers.
This makes tail calls working again, tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8.
Fixes: ddb55992b04d ("arm64: bpf: implement bpf_tail_call() helper")
Reported-by: Shubham Bansal <illusionist.neo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b4236e17cc1bd9fa14b2b0c7a4ae632d41f2e20 upstream.
Since read_initrd() invokes alloc_bootmem() for allocating
memory to load initrd image, it must be called after init_bootmem.
This makes read_initrd() called directly from setup_arch()
after init_bootmem() and mem_total_pages().
Fixes: b63236972e1 ("um: Setup physical memory in setup_arch()")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a8c39544a6eb2093c04afd5005b6192bd0e880c6 upstream.
failing sys_wait4() won't fill struct rusage...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 17c99d9421695a0e0de18bf1e7091d859e20ec1d upstream.
Some newer Loongson-3 have 64 bytes cache lines, so select
MIPS_L1_CACHE_SHIFT_6.
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Cc: Steven J . Hill <Steven.Hill@caviumnetworks.com>
Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com>
Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/15755/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3a158a62da0673db918b53ac1440845a5b64fd90 upstream.
The metag implementation of strncpy_from_user() doesn't validate the src
pointer, which could allow reading of arbitrary kernel memory. Add a
short access_ok() check to prevent that.
Its still possible for it to read across the user/kernel boundary, but
it will invariably reach a NUL character after only 9 bytes, leaking
only a static kernel address being loaded into D0Re0 at the beginning of
__start, which is acceptable for the immediate fix.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a8b56638bcac4e64cccc88bf95a0f9f4b19a2fb upstream.
The __user_bad() macro used by access_ok() has a few corner cases
noticed by Al Viro where it doesn't behave correctly:
- The kernel range check has off by 1 errors which permit access to the
first and last byte of the kernel mapped range.
- The kernel range check ends at LINCORE_BASE rather than
META_MEMORY_LIMIT, which is ineffective when the kernel is in global
space (an extremely uncommon configuration).
There are a couple of other shortcomings here too:
- Access to the whole of the other address space is permitted (i.e. the
global half of the address space when the kernel is in local space).
This isn't ideal as it could theoretically still contain privileged
mappings set up by the bootloader.
- The size argument is unused, permitting user copies which start on
valid pages at the end of the user address range and cross the
boundary into the kernel address space (e.g. addr = 0x3ffffff0, size
> 0x10).
It isn't very convenient to add size checks when disallowing certain
regions, and it seems far safer to be sure and explicit about what
userland is able to access, so invert the logic to allow certain regions
instead, and fix the off by 1 errors and missing size checks. This also
allows the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS check to be more easily optimised into
the user address range case.
We now have 3 such allowed regions:
- The user address range (incorporating the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS
check).
- NULL (some kernel code expects this to work, and we'll always catch
the fault anyway).
- The core code memory region.
Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a06040d7a791a9177581dcf7293941bd92400856 upstream.
Our access_ok() simply hands its arguments over to __range_ok(), which
implicitly assummes that the addr parameter is 64 bits wide. This isn't
necessarily true for compat code, which might pass down a 32-bit address
parameter.
In these cases, we don't have a guarantee that the address has been zero
extended to 64 bits, and the upper bits of the register may contain
unknown values, potentially resulting in a suprious failure.
Avoid this by explicitly casting the addr parameter to an unsigned long
(as is done on other architectures), ensuring that the parameter is
widened appropriately.
Fixes: 0aea86a2176c ("arm64: User access library functions")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 55de49f9aa17b0b2b144dd2af587177b9aadf429 upstream.
Our compat swp emulation holds the compat user address in an unsigned
int, which it passes to __user_swpX_asm(). When a 32-bit value is passed
in a register, the upper 32 bits of the register are unknown, and we
must extend the value to 64 bits before we can use it as a base address.
This patch casts the address to unsigned long to ensure it has been
suitably extended, avoiding the potential issue, and silencing a related
warning from clang.
Fixes: bd35a4adc413 ("arm64: Port SWP/SWPB emulation support from arm")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 994870bead4ab19087a79492400a5478e2906196 upstream.
When an inline assembly operand's type is narrower than the register it
is allocated to, the least significant bits of the register (up to the
operand type's width) are valid, and any other bits are permitted to
contain any arbitrary value. This aligns with the AAPCS64 parameter
passing rules.
Our __smp_store_release() implementation does not account for this, and
implicitly assumes that operands have been zero-extended to the width of
the type being stored to. Thus, we may store unknown values to memory
when the value type is narrower than the pointer type (e.g. when storing
a char to a long).
This patch fixes the issue by casting the value operand to the same
width as the pointer operand in all cases, which ensures that the value
is zero-extended as we expect. We use the same union trickery as
__smp_load_acquire and {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to avoid GCC complaining that
pointers are potentially cast to narrower width integers in unreachable
paths.
A whitespace issue at the top of __smp_store_release() is also
corrected.
No changes are necessary for __smp_load_acquire(). Load instructions
implicitly clear any upper bits of the register, and the compiler will
only consider the least significant bits of the register as valid
regardless.
Fixes: 47933ad41a86 ("arch: Introduce smp_load_acquire(), smp_store_release()")
Fixes: 878a84d5a8a1 ("arm64: add missing data types in smp_load_acquire/smp_store_release")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fee960bed5e857eb126c4e56dd9ff85938356579 upstream.
The inline assembly in __XCHG_CASE() uses a +Q constraint to hazard
against other accesses to the memory location being exchanged. However,
the pointer passed to the constraint is a u8 pointer, and thus the
hazard only applies to the first byte of the location.
GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the
location are unchanged, as demonstrated with the following test case:
union u {
unsigned long l;
unsigned int i[2];
};
unsigned long update_char_hazard(union u *u)
{
unsigned int a, b;
a = u->i[1];
asm ("str %1, %0" : "+Q" (*(char *)&u->l) : "r" (0UL));
b = u->i[1];
return a ^ b;
}
unsigned long update_long_hazard(union u *u)
{
unsigned int a, b;
a = u->i[1];
asm ("str %1, %0" : "+Q" (*(long *)&u->l) : "r" (0UL));
b = u->i[1];
return a ^ b;
}
The linaro 15.08 GCC 5.1.1 toolchain compiles the above as follows when
using -O2 or above:
0000000000000000 <update_char_hazard>:
0: d2800001 mov x1, #0x0 // #0
4: f9000001 str x1, [x0]
8: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0
c: d65f03c0 ret
0000000000000010 <update_long_hazard>:
10: b9400401 ldr w1, [x0,#4]
14: d2800002 mov x2, #0x0 // #0
18: f9000002 str x2, [x0]
1c: b9400400 ldr w0, [x0,#4]
20: 4a000020 eor w0, w1, w0
24: d65f03c0 ret
This patch fixes the issue by passing an unsigned long pointer into the
+Q constraint, as we do for our cmpxchg code. This may hazard against
more than is necessary, but this is better than missing a necessary
hazard.
Fixes: 305d454aaa29 ("arm64: atomics: implement native {relaxed, acquire, release} atomics")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0fbdf9953b41c28845fe8d05007ff09634ee3000 upstream.
The MMC hosts could be left in an unconsistent or uninitialized state from
the firmware. Instead of assuming, the firmware did the right things, let's
reset the host controllers.
This change fixes a bug when the mmc2/sdio is initialized leading to a hung
task:
[ 242.704294] INFO: task kworker/7:1:675 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 242.711129] Not tainted 4.9.0-rc8-00017-gcf0251f #3
[ 242.716571] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 242.724435] kworker/7:1 D 0 675 2 0x00000000
[ 242.729973] Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan
[ 242.734796] Call trace:
[ 242.737269] [<ffff00000808611c>] __switch_to+0xa8/0xb4
[ 242.742437] [<ffff000008d07c04>] __schedule+0x1c0/0x67c
[ 242.747689] [<ffff000008d08254>] schedule+0x40/0xa0
[ 242.752594] [<ffff000008d0b284>] schedule_timeout+0x1c4/0x35c
[ 242.758366] [<ffff000008d08e38>] wait_for_common+0xd0/0x15c
[ 242.763964] [<ffff000008d09008>] wait_for_completion+0x28/0x34
[ 242.769825] [<ffff000008a1a9f4>] mmc_wait_for_req_done+0x40/0x124
[ 242.775949] [<ffff000008a1ab98>] mmc_wait_for_req+0xc0/0xf8
[ 242.781549] [<ffff000008a1ac3c>] mmc_wait_for_cmd+0x6c/0x84
[ 242.787149] [<ffff000008a26610>] mmc_io_rw_direct_host+0x9c/0x114
[ 242.793270] [<ffff000008a26aa0>] sdio_reset+0x34/0x7c
[ 242.798347] [<ffff000008a1d46c>] mmc_rescan+0x2fc/0x360
[ ... ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8581c7c8be172dac156a19d261f988a72ce596f upstream.
The board file for imx6sx-sdb overrides cpufreq operating points to use
higher voltages. This is done because the board has a shared rail for
VDD_ARM_IN and VDD_SOC_IN and when using LDO bypass the shared voltage
needs to be a value suitable for both ARM and SOC.
This only applies to LDO bypass mode, a feature not present in upstream.
When LDOs are enabled the effect is to use higher voltages than necessary
for no good reason.
Setting these higher voltages can make some boards fail to boot with ugly
semi-random crashes reminiscent of memory corruption. These failures only
happen on board rev. C, rev. B is reported to still work.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Fixes: 54183bd7f766 ("ARM: imx6sx-sdb: add revb board and make it default")
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3df1ec06353e51fc44563d2e7e18d42811af290 upstream.
Remove ADC channels that are not available by default on the sama5d3_xplained
board (resistor not populated) in order to not create confusion.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9cdd31e5913c1f86dce7e201b086155b3f24896b upstream.
The voltage reference for the ADC is not 3V but 3.3V since it is connected to
VDDANA.
Signed-off-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6d80594936914e798b1b54b3bfe4bd68d8418966 upstream.
We save/restore registers around v7m_invalidate_l1 to address pointed
by r12, which is vector table, so the first eight entries are
overwritten with a garbage. We already have stack setup at that stage,
so use it to save/restore register.
Fixes: 6a8146f420be ("ARM: 8609/1: V7M: Add support for the Cortex-M7 processor")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b7ede5a1f5905ac394cc8e61712a13e3c5cb7b8f upstream.
Since commit 35fa91eed817 ("ARM: kernel: merge core and init PLTs"),
the ARM module PLT code allocates all PLT entries in a single core
section, since the overhead of having a separate init PLT section is
not justified by the small number of PLT entries usually required for
init code.
However, the core and init module regions are allocated independently,
and there is a corner case where the core region may be allocated from
the VMALLOC region if the dedicated module region is exhausted, but the
init region, being much smaller, can still be allocated from the module
region. This puts the PLT entries out of reach of the relocated branch
instructions, defeating the whole purpose of PLTs.
So split the core and init PLT regions, and name the latter ".init.plt"
so it gets allocated along with (and sufficiently close to) the .init
sections that it serves. Also, given that init PLT entries may need to
be emitted for branches that target the core module, modify the logic
that disregards defined symbols to only disregard symbols that are
defined in the same section.
Fixes: 35fa91eed817 ("ARM: kernel: merge core and init PLTs")
Reported-by: Angus Clark <angus@angusclark.org>
Tested-by: Angus Clark <angus@angusclark.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 661e6b02b5aa82db31897f36e96324b77450fd7a upstream.
Hardware debugging in guests is not intercepted currently, it means
that a malicious guest can bring down the entire machine by writing
to the debug registers.
This patch enable trapping of all debug registers, preventing the
guests to access the debug registers. This includes access to the
debug mode(DBGDSCR) in the guest world all the time which could
otherwise mess with the host state. Reads return 0 and writes are
ignored (RAZ_WI).
The result is the guest cannot detect any working hardware based debug
support. As debug exceptions are still routed to the guest normal
debug using software based breakpoints still works.
To support debugging using hardware registers we need to implement a
debug register aware world switch as well as special trapping for
registers that may affect the host state.
Signed-off-by: Zhichao Huang <zhichao.huang@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 501ad27c67ed0b90df465f23d33e9aed64058a47 upstream.
We like living dangerously. Nothing explicitely forbids stack-protector
to be used in the HYP code, while distributions routinely compile their
kernel with it. We're just lucky that no code actually triggers the
instrumentation.
Let's not try our luck for much longer, and disable stack-protector
for code living at HYP.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cde13b5dad60471886a3bccb4f4134c647c4a9dc upstream.
We like living dangerously. Nothing explicitely forbids stack-protector
to be used in the EL2 code, while distributions routinely compile their
kernel with it. We're just lucky that no code actually triggers the
instrumentation.
Let's not try our luck for much longer, and disable stack-protector
for code living at EL2.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f48e91e87e67b56bef63393d1a02c6e22c1d7078 upstream.
In commit dc3106690b20 ("powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state
to store live registers"), a section of code was removed that copied
the current state to checkpointed state. That code should not have been
removed.
When an FP (Floating Point) unavailable is taken inside a transaction,
we need to abort the transaction. This is because at the time of the
tbegin, the FP state is bogus so the state stored in the checkpointed
registers is incorrect. To fix this, we treclaim (to get the
checkpointed GPRs) and then copy the thread_struct FP live state into
the checkpointed state. We then trecheckpoint so that the FP state is
correctly restored into the CPU.
The copying of the FP registers from live to checkpointed is what was
missing.
This simplifies the logic slightly from the original patch.
tm_reclaim_thread() will now always write the checkpointed FP
state. Either the checkpointed FP state will be written as part of
the actual treclaim (in tm.S), or it'll be a copy of the live
state. Which one we use is based on MSR[FP] from userspace.
Similarly for VMX.
Fixes: dc3106690b20 ("powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers")
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: cyrilbur@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fd615f69a18a9d4aa5ef02a1dc83f319f75da8e7 upstream.
Debug interrupts can be taken during interrupt entry, since interrupt
entry does not automatically turn them off. The kernel will check
whether the faulting instruction is between [interrupt_base_book3e,
__end_interrupts], and if so clear MSR[DE] and return.
However, when the kernel is built with CONFIG_RELOCATABLE, it can't use
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r14,interrupt_base_book3e) and
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r15,__end_interrupts), as they ignore relocation.
Thus, if the kernel is actually running at a different address than it
was built at, the address comparison will fail, and the exception entry
code will hang at kernel_dbg_exc.
r2(toc) is also not usable here, as r2 still holds data from the
interrupted context, so LOAD_REG_ADDR() doesn't work either. So we use
the *name@got* to get the EV of two labels directly.
Test programs test.c shows as follows:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (access("/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid", F_OK) == -1)
printf("Kernel doesn't have perf_event support\n");
}
Steps to reproduce the bug, for example:
1) ./gdb ./test
2) (gdb) b access
3) (gdb) r
4) (gdb) s
Signed-off-by: Liu Hailong <liu.hailong6@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xuexin <jiang.xuexin@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Liu Song <liu.song11@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Huang Jian <huang.jian@zte.com.cn>
[scottwood: cleaned up commit message, and specified bad behavior
as a hang rather than an oops to correspond to mainline kernel behavior]
Fixes: 1cb6e0649248 ("powerpc/book3e: support CONFIG_RELOCATABLE")
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e889e96e98e8da97bd39e46b7253615eabe14397 upstream.
The CMA pages migration code does not support compound pages at
the moment so it performs few tests before proceeding to actual page
migration.
One of the tests - PageTransHuge() - has VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTail()) as
it is designed to be called on head pages only. Since we also test for
PageCompound(), and it contains PageTail() and PageHead(), we can
simplify the check by leaving just PageCompound() and therefore avoid
possible VM_BUG_ON_PAGE.
Fixes: 2e5bbb5461f1 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Migrate pinned pages out of CMA")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 68baf692c435339e6295cb470ea5545cbc28160e upstream.
Historically struct device_node references were tracked using a kref embedded as
a struct field. Commit 75b57ecf9d1d ("of: Make device nodes kobjects so they
show up in sysfs") (Mar 2014) refactored device_nodes to be kobjects such that
the device tree could by more simply exposed to userspace using sysfs.
Commit 0829f6d1f69e ("of: device_node kobject lifecycle fixes") (Mar 2014)
followed up these changes to better control the kobject lifecycle and in
particular the referecne counting via of_node_get(), of_node_put(), and
of_node_init().
A result of this second commit was that it introduced an of_node_put() call when
a dynamic node is detached, in of_node_remove(), that removes the initial kobj
reference created by of_node_init().
Traditionally as the original dynamic device node user the pseries code had
assumed responsibilty for releasing this final reference in its platform
specific DLPAR detach code.
This patch fixes a refcount underflow introduced by commit 0829f6d1f6, and
recently exposed by the upstreaming of the recount API.
Messages like the following are no longer seen in the kernel log with this
patch following DLPAR remove operations of cpus and pci devices.
rpadlpar_io: slot PHB 72 removed
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 3335 at lib/refcount.c:128 refcount_sub_and_test+0xf4/0x110
Fixes: 0829f6d1f69e ("of: device_node kobject lifecycle fixes")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[mpe: Make change log commit references more verbose]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d93b0ac01a9ce276ec39644be47001873d3d183c upstream.
machine_check_early() gets called in real mode. The very first time when
add_taint() is called, it prints a warning which ends up calling opal
call (that uses OPAL_CALL wrapper) for writing it to console. If we get a
very first machine check while we are in opal we are doomed. OPAL_CALL
overwrites the PACASAVEDMSR in r13 and in this case when we are done with
MCE handling the original opal call will use this new MSR on it's way
back to opal_return. This usually leads to unexpected behaviour or the
kernel to panic. Instead move the add_taint() call later in the virtual
mode where it is safe to call.
This is broken with current FW level. We got lucky so far for not getting
very first MCE hit while in OPAL. But easily reproducible on Mambo.
Fixes: 27ea2c420cad ("powerpc: Set the correct kernel taint on machine check errors.")
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit daeba2956f32f91f3493788ff6ee02fb1b2f02fa upstream.
eeh_handle_special_event() is called when an EEH event is detected but
can't be narrowed down to a specific PE. This function looks through
every PE to find one in an erroneous state, then calls the regular event
handler eeh_handle_normal_event() once it knows which PE has an error.
However, if eeh_handle_normal_event() found that the PE cannot possibly
be recovered, it will free it, rendering the passed PE stale.
This leads to a use after free in eeh_handle_special_event() as it attempts to
clear the "recovering" state on the PE after eeh_handle_normal_event() returns.
Thus, make sure the PE is valid when attempting to clear state in
eeh_handle_special_event().
Fixes: 8a6b1bc70dbb ("powerpc/eeh: EEH core to handle special event")
Reported-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9765ad134a00a01cbcc69c78ff6defbfad209bc5 upstream.
powerpc expects IRQs to already be (soft) disabled when switch_mm() is
called, as made clear in the commit message of 9c1e105238c4 ("powerpc: Allow
perf_counters to access user memory at interrupt time").
Aside from any race conditions that might exist between switch_mm() and an IRQ,
there is also an unconditional hard_irq_disable() in switch_slb(). If that isn't
followed at some point by an IRQ enable then interrupts will remain disabled
until we return to userspace.
It is true that when switch_mm() is called from the scheduler IRQs are off, but
not when it's called by use_mm(). Looking closer we see that last year in commit
f98db6013c55 ("sched/core: Add switch_mm_irqs_off() and use it in the scheduler")
this was made more explicit by the addition of switch_mm_irqs_off() which is now
called by the scheduler, vs switch_mm() which is used by use_mm().
Arguably it is a bug in use_mm() to call switch_mm() in a different context than
it expects, but fixing that will take time.
This was discovered recently when vhost started throwing warnings such as:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/mutex.c:578
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 10768, name: vhost-10760
no locks held by vhost-10760/10768.
irq event stamp: 10
hardirqs last enabled at (9): _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x40/0x80
hardirqs last disabled at (10): switch_slb+0x2e4/0x490
softirqs last enabled at (0): copy_process+0x5e8/0x1260
softirqs last disabled at (0): (null)
Call Trace:
show_stack+0x88/0x390 (unreliable)
dump_stack+0x30/0x44
__might_sleep+0x1c4/0x2d0
mutex_lock_nested+0x74/0x5c0
cgroup_attach_task_all+0x5c/0x180
vhost_attach_cgroups_work+0x58/0x80 [vhost]
vhost_worker+0x24c/0x3d0 [vhost]
kthread+0xec/0x100
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0xd4
Prior to commit 04b96e5528ca ("vhost: lockless enqueuing") (Aug 2016) the
vhost_worker() would do a spin_unlock_irq() not long after calling use_mm(),
which had the effect of reenabling IRQs. Since that commit removed the locking
in vhost_worker() the body of the vhost_worker() loop now runs with interrupts
off causing the warnings.
This patch addresses the problem by making the powerpc code mirror the x86 code,
ie. we disable interrupts in switch_mm(), and optimise the scheduler case by
defining switch_mm_irqs_off().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
[mpe: Flesh out/rewrite change log, add stable]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 07a63cbe8bcb6ba72fb989dcab1ec55ec6c36c7e upstream.
git commit c5328901aa1db134 "[S390] entry[64].S improvements" removed
the update of the exit_timer lowcore field from the critical section
cleanup of the .Lsysc_restore/.Lsysc_done and .Lio_restore/.Lio_done
blocks. If the PSW is updated by the critical section cleanup to point to
user space again, the interrupt entry code will do a vtime calculation
after the cleanup completed with an exit_timer value which has *not* been
updated. Due to this incorrect system time deltas are calculated.
If an interrupt occured with an old PSW between .Lsysc_restore/.Lsysc_done
or .Lio_restore/.Lio_done update __LC_EXIT_TIMER with the system entry
time of the interrupt.
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dcc00b79fc3d076832f7240de8870f492629b171 upstream.
Since linux v3.14 with commit 38dfac843cb6d7be1 ("vmcore: prevent PT_NOTE
p_memsz overflow during header update") on s390 we get the following
message in the kdump kernel:
Warning: Exceeded p_memsz, dropping PT_NOTE entry n_namesz=0x6b6b6b6b,
n_descsz=0x6b6b6b6b
The reason for this is that we don't create a final zero note in
the ELF header which the proc/vmcore code uses to find out the end
of the notes section (see also kernel/kexec_core.c:final_note()).
It still worked on s390 by chance because we (most of the time?) have the
byte pattern 0x6b6b6b6b after the notes section which also makes the notes
parsing code stop in update_note_header_size_elf64() because 0x6b6b6b6b is
interpreded as note size:
if ((real_sz + sz) > max_sz) {
pr_warn("Warning: Exceeded p_memsz, dropping P ...);
break;
}
So fix this and add the missing final note to the ELF header.
We don't have to adjust the memory size for ELF header ("alloc_size")
because the new ELF note still fits into the 0x1000 base memory.
Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 33c9e9729033387ef0521324c62e7eba529294af upstream.
The code to fetch a 64-bit value from user space was entirely buggered,
and has been since the code was merged in early 2016 in commit
b2f680380ddf ("x86/mm/32: Add support for 64-bit __get_user() on 32-bit
kernels").
Happily the buggered routine is almost certainly entirely unused, since
the normal way to access user space memory is just with the non-inlined
"get_user()", and the inlined version didn't even historically exist.
The normal "get_user()" case is handled by external hand-written asm in
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S that doesn't have either of these issues.
There were two independent bugs in __get_user_asm_u64():
- it still did the STAC/CLAC user space access marking, even though
that is now done by the wrapper macros, see commit 11f1a4b9755f
("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses").
This didn't result in a semantic error, it just means that the
inlined optimized version was hugely less efficient than the
allegedly slower standard version, since the CLAC/STAC overhead is
quite high on modern Intel CPU's.
- the double register %eax/%edx was marked as an output, but the %eax
part of it was touched early in the asm, and could thus clobber other
inputs to the asm that gcc didn't expect it to touch.
In particular, that meant that the generated code could look like
this:
mov (%eax),%eax
mov 0x4(%eax),%edx
where the load of %edx obviously was _supposed_ to be from the 32-bit
word that followed the source of %eax, but because %eax was
overwritten by the first instruction, the source of %edx was
basically random garbage.
The fixes are trivial: remove the extraneous STAC/CLAC entries, and mark
the 64-bit output as early-clobber to let gcc know that no inputs should
alias with the output register.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cbfc6c9184ce71b52df4b1d82af5afc81a709178 upstream.
Huawei folks reported a read out-of-bounds vulnerability in kvm pio emulation.
- "inb" instruction to access PIT Mod/Command register (ioport 0x43, write only,
a read should be ignored) in guest can get a random number.
- "rep insb" instruction to access PIT register port 0x43 can control memcpy()
in emulator_pio_in_emulated() to copy max 0x400 bytes but only read 1 bytes,
which will disclose the unimportant kernel memory in host but no crash.
The similar test program below can reproduce the read out-of-bounds vulnerability:
void hexdump(void *mem, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int i, j;
for(i = 0; i < len + ((len % HEXDUMP_COLS) ? (HEXDUMP_COLS - len % HEXDUMP_COLS) : 0); i++)
{
/* print offset */
if(i % HEXDUMP_COLS == 0)
{
printf("0x%06x: ", i);
}
/* print hex data */
if(i < len)
{
printf("%02x ", 0xFF & ((char*)mem)[i]);
}
else /* end of block, just aligning for ASCII dump */
{
printf(" ");
}
/* print ASCII dump */
if(i % HEXDUMP_COLS == (HEXDUMP_COLS - 1))
{
for(j = i - (HEXDUMP_COLS - 1); j <= i; j++)
{
if(j >= len) /* end of block, not really printing */
{
putchar(' ');
}
else if(isprint(((char*)mem)[j])) /* printable char */
{
putchar(0xFF & ((char*)mem)[j]);
}
else /* other char */
{
putchar('.');
}
}
putchar('\n');
}
}
}
int main(void)
{
int i;
if (iopl(3))
{
err(1, "set iopl unsuccessfully\n");
return -1;
}
static char buf[0x40];
/* test ioport 0x40,0x41,0x42,0x43,0x44,0x45 */
memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));
asm volatile("push %rdi;");
asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));
asm volatile ("mov $0x40, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x41, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x42, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x43, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x44, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x45, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
asm volatile ("stosb;");
asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
hexdump(buf, 0x40);
printf("\n");
/* ins port 0x40 */
memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));
asm volatile("push %rdi;");
asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));
asm volatile ("mov $0x20, %rcx;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x40, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("rep insb;");
asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
hexdump(buf, 0x40);
printf("\n");
/* ins port 0x43 */
memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));
asm volatile("push %rdi;");
asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));
asm volatile ("mov $0x20, %rcx;");
asm volatile ("mov $0x43, %rdx;");
asm volatile ("rep insb;");
asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
hexdump(buf, 0x40);
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
The vcpu->arch.pio_data buffer is used by both in/out instrutions emulation
w/o clear after using which results in some random datas are left over in
the buffer. Guest reads port 0x43 will be ignored since it is write only,
however, the function kernel_pio() can't distigush this ignore from successfully
reads data from device's ioport. There is no new data fill the buffer from
port 0x43, however, emulator_pio_in_emulated() will copy the stale data in
the buffer to the guest unconditionally. This patch fixes it by clearing the
buffer before in instruction emulation to avoid to grant guest the stale data
in the buffer.
In addition, string I/O is not supported for in kernel device. So there is no
iteration to read ioport %RCX times for string I/O. The function kernel_pio()
just reads one round, and then copy the io size * %RCX to the guest unconditionally,
actually it copies the one round ioport data w/ other random datas which are left
over in the vcpu->arch.pio_data buffer to the guest. This patch fixes it by
introducing the string I/O support for in kernel device in order to grant the right
ioport datas to the guest.
Before the patch:
0x000000: fe 38 93 93 ff ff ab ab .8......
0x000008: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000010: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000018: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: f6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 4d 51 30 30 ....MQ00
0x000018: 30 30 20 33 20 20 20 20 00 3
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: f6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 4d 51 30 30 ....MQ00
0x000018: 30 30 20 33 20 20 20 20 00 3
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
After the patch:
0x000000: 1e 02 f8 00 ff ff ab ab ........
0x000008: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000010: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000018: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: d2 e2 d2 df d2 db d2 d7 ........
0x000008: d2 d3 d2 cf d2 cb d2 c7 ........
0x000010: d2 c4 d2 c0 d2 bc d2 b8 ........
0x000018: d2 b4 d2 b0 d2 ac d2 a8 ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000018: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit e2c2206a18993bc9f62393d49c7b2066c3845b25 upstream.
BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: qemu-system-x86/2809
caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
CPU: 2 PID: 2809 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.0+ #13
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x99/0xce
check_preemption_disabled+0xf5/0x100
__this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
get_kvmclock_ns+0x6f/0x110 [kvm]
get_time_ref_counter+0x5d/0x80 [kvm]
kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm]
? kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xac9/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5bf/0x1ce0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
? __fget+0xf3/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? __fget+0x114/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x7f9d164ed357
? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
This can be reproduced by run kvm-unit-tests/hyperv_stimer.flat w/
CONFIG_PREEMPT and CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT enabled.
Safe access to per-CPU data requires a couple of constraints, though: the
thread working with the data cannot be preempted and it cannot be migrated
while it manipulates per-CPU variables. If the thread is preempted, the
thread that replaces it could try to work with the same variables; migration
to another CPU could also cause confusion. However there is no preemption
disable when reads host per-CPU tsc rate to calculate the current kvmclock
timestamp.
This patch fixes it by utilizing get_cpu/put_cpu pair to guarantee both
__this_cpu_read() and rdtsc() are not preempted.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a575813bfe4bc15aba511a5e91e61d242bff8b9d upstream.
Reported by syzkaller:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc07f6a2e
IP: report_bug+0x94/0x120
PGD 348e12067
P4D 348e12067
PUD 348e14067
PMD 3cbd84067
PTE 80000003f7e87161
Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 7091 Comm: kvm_load_guest_ Tainted: G OE 4.11.0+ #8
task: ffff92fdfb525400 task.stack: ffffbda6c3d04000
RIP: 0010:report_bug+0x94/0x120
RSP: 0018:ffffbda6c3d07b20 EFLAGS: 00010202
do_trap+0x156/0x170
do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
? mark_held_locks+0x79/0xa0
? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
do_invalid_op+0x20/0x30
invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
RIP: 0010:kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x1c/0x170 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xed6/0x1b70 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
? sched_clock+0x13/0x20
? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
? up_read+0x1f/0x40
? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
SDM mentioned that "The MXCSR has several reserved bits, and attempting to write
a 1 to any of these bits will cause a general-protection exception(#GP) to be
generated". The syzkaller forks' testcase overrides xsave area w/ random values
and steps on the reserved bits of MXCSR register. The damaged MXCSR register
values of guest will be restored to SSEx MXCSR register before vmentry. This
patch fixes it by catching userspace override MXCSR register reserved bits w/
random values and bails out immediately.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 0c18927f51f4d390abdcf385bff5f995407ee732 upstream.
Current U-Boot enables the display already. Marking the regulator as
enabled on boot fixes sporadic panel initialization failures.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dietrich <marvin24@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Misha Komarovskiy <zombah@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 041939c1ec54208b42f5cd819209173d52a29d34 upstream.
After commit c950fd6f201a kernel registers pstore write based on flag set.
Pstore write for powerpc is broken as flags(PSTORE_FLAGS_DMESG) is not set for
powerpc architecture. On panic, kernel doesn't write message to
/fs/pstore/dmesg*(Entry doesn't gets created at all).
This patch enables pstore write for powerpc architecture by setting
PSTORE_FLAGS_DMESG flag.
Fixes: c950fd6f201a ("pstore: Split pstore fragile flags")
Signed-off-by: Ankit Kumar <ankit@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit c667186f1c01ca8970c785888868b7ffd74e51ee upstream.
Our 32bit CP14/15 handling inherited some of the ARMv7 code for handling
the trapped system registers, completely missing the fact that the
fields for Rt and Rt2 are now 5 bit wide, and not 4...
Let's fix it, and provide an accessor for the most common Rt case.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c7a5dce22b3f3cc44be098e2837fa6797edb8b8 upstream.
Fix potential races in kvm_psci_vcpu_on() by taking the kvm->lock
mutex. In general, it's a bad idea to allow more than one PSCI_CPU_ON
to process the same target VCPU at the same time. One such problem
that may arise is that one PSCI_CPU_ON could be resetting the target
vcpu, which fills the entire sys_regs array with a temporary value
including the MPIDR register, while another looks up the VCPU based
on the MPIDR value, resulting in no target VCPU found. Resolves both
races found with the kvm-unit-tests/arm/psci unit test.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Levente Kurusa <lkurusa@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 28bf28887976d8881a3a59491896c718fade7355 upstream.
If we already entered/are about to enter SMM, don't allow switching to
INIT/SIPI_RECEIVED, otherwise the next call to kvm_apic_accept_events()
will report a warning.
Same applies if we are already in MP state INIT_RECEIVED and SMM is
requested to be turned on. Refuse to set the VCPU events in this case.
Fixes: cd7764fe9f73 ("KVM: x86: latch INITs while in system management mode")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 33b88e708e7dfa58dc896da2a98f5719d2eb315c upstream.
It appears as though the Broadwell-EP DRAM units share the special
units quirk with Haswell-EP/KNL.
Without this patch, you get really high results (a single DRAM using 20W
of power).
The powercap driver in drivers/powercap/intel_rapl.c already has this
change.
Signed-off-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9abc74a22d85ab29cef9896a2582a530da7e79bf upstream.
This is broken since ever but sadly nobody noticed.
Recent versions of GDB set DR_CONTROL unconditionally and
UML dies due to a heap corruption. It turns out that
the PTRACE_POKEUSER was copy&pasted from i386 and assumes
that addresses are 4 bytes long.
Fix that by using 8 as address size in the calculation.
Reported-by: jie cao <cj3054@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8376efd31d3d7c44bd05be337adde023cc531fa1 upstream.
Commit 11e63f6d920d added cache flushing for unaligned writes from an
iovec, covering the first and last cache line of a >= 8 byte write and
the first cache line of a < 8 byte write. But an unaligned write of
2-7 bytes can still cover two cache lines, so make sure we flush both
in that case.
Fixes: 11e63f6d920d ("x86, pmem: fix broken __copy_user_nocache ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d594aa0277e541bb997aef0bc0a55172d8138340 upstream.
The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".
The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().
Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish@bluestacks.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 69861e0a52f8733355ce246f0db15e1b240ad667 upstream.
When booted as pv-guest the p2m list presented by the Xen is already
mapped to virtual addresses. In dom0 case the hypervisor might make use
of 2M- or 1G-pages for this mapping. Unfortunately while being properly
aligned in virtual and machine address space, those pages might not be
aligned properly in guest physical address space.
So when trying to obtain the guest physical address of such a page
pud_pfn() and pmd_pfn() must be avoided as those will mask away guest
physical address bits not being zero in this special case.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 84d582d236dc1f9085e741affc72e9ba061a67c2 upstream.
Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741)
established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit
da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and,
in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0
Therefore we revert both of those commits.
The summary of that discussion is below:
Here is the brief summary of the current situation:
Before the offending commit (72a9b186292):
1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path.
2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0
3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor
support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with
Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature
either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by
modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it).
After the offending commit (+ partial revert):
1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests).
2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does
not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode
supported is INTx which.
So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were
in much better position from a user point of view.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ddc665a4bb4b728b4e6ecec8db1b64efa9184b9c ]
When the instruction right before the branch destination is
a 64 bit load immediate, we currently calculate the wrong
jump offset in the ctx->offset[] array as we only account
one instruction slot for the 64 bit load immediate although
it uses two BPF instructions. Fix it up by setting the offset
into the right slot after we incremented the index.
Before (ldimm64 test 1):
[...]
00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0
00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3
00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2
0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1
00000030: 54ffff82 b.cs 0x00000020
00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535
00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16
0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32
00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48
00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166
00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16
0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32
00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48
[...]
After (ldimm64 test 1):
[...]
00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0
00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3
00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2
0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1
00000030: 540000a2 b.cs 0x00000044
00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535
00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16
0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32
00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48
00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166
00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16
0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32
00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48
[...]
Also, add a couple of test cases to make sure JITs pass
this test. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. The added
test cases all pass after the fix.
Fixes: 8eee539ddea0 ("arm64: bpf: fix out-of-bounds read in bpf2a64_offset()")
Reported-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3c7f62212018b904ae17f5636ead18a4dca3a88f upstream.
When any of the functions contained in NGbzero.S and GENbzero.S
vector through *bzero_from_clear_user, we may end up taking a
fault when executing one of the store alternate address space
instructions. If this happens, the exception handler does not
restore the %asi register.
This commit fixes the issue by introducing a new exception
handler that ensures the %asi register is restored when
a fault is handled.
Orabug: 25577560
Signed-off-by: Dave Aldridge <david.j.aldridge@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Gardner <rob.gardner@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d65e5677ad5b3a49c43f60ec07644dc1f87bbd2e upstream.
MIPS instructions MULTU, MADDU and MSUBU emulation requires registers HI/LO
to be converted to signed 32bits before 64bit sign extension on MIPS64.
Bug was found on running MIPS32 R2 test application on MIPS64 R6 kernel.
Fixes: b0a668fb2038 ("MIPS: kernel: mips-r2-to-r6-emul: Add R2 emulator for MIPS R6")
Signed-off-by: Leonid Yegoshin <Leonid.Yegoshin@imgtec.com>
Reported-by: Nikola.Veljkovic@imgtec.com
Cc: paul.burton@imgtec.com
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: andrea.gelmini@gelma.net
Cc: macro@imgtec.com
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14043/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ab007cc94ff9d82f5a8db8363b3becbd946e58cf upstream.
The PML feature is not exposed to guests so we should not be forwarding
the vmexit either.
This commit fixes BSOD 0x20001 (HYPERVISOR_ERROR) when running Hyper-V
enabled Windows Server 2016 in L1 on hardware that supports PML.
Fixes: 843e4330573c ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1fb883bb827ee8efc1cc9ea0154f953f8a219d38 upstream.
L2 was running with uninitialized PML fields which led to incomplete
dirty bitmap logging. This manifested as all kinds of subtle erratic
behavior of the nested guest.
Fixes: 843e4330573c ("KVM: VMX: Add PML support in VMX")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0b4c208d443ba2af82b4c70f99ca8df31e9a0020 upstream.
This reverts commit bc6134942dbbf31c25e9bd7c876be5da81c9e1ce.
A CPUID instruction executed in VMX non-root mode always causes a
VM-exit, regardless of the leaf being queried.
Fixes: bc6134942dbb ("KVM: nested VMX: disable perf cpuid reporting")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
[The issue solved by bc6134942dbb has been resolved with ff651cb613b4
("KVM: nVMX: Add nested msr load/restore algorithm").]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 80354c29025833acd72ddac1ffa21c6cb50128cd upstream.
The interrupt line used for the watchdog is 12, according to the official
Intel Edison BSP code.
And indeed after fixing it we start getting an interrupt and thus the
watchdog starts working again:
[ 191.699951] Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel Watchdog
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Cohen <david.a.cohen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 78a3bb9e408b ("x86: intel-mid: add watchdog platform code for Merrifield")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170312150744.45493-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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