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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into for-linus
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
cryptographically via dm-verity).
This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).
- Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
Lots of general fixes and updates.
- SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
seccomp: Fix comment typo
ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
Yama: consolidate error reporting
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Crypto self tests can now be disabled at boot/run time.
- Add async support to algif_aead.
Algorithms:
- A large number of fixes to MPI from Nicolai Stange.
- Performance improvement for HMAC DRBG.
Drivers:
- Use generic crypto engine in omap-des.
- Merge ppc4xx-rng and crypto4xx drivers.
- Fix lockups in sun4i-ss driver by disabling IRQs.
- Add DMA engine support to ccp.
- Reenable talitos hash algorithms.
- Add support for Hisilicon SoC RNG.
- Add basic crypto driver for the MXC SCC.
Others:
- Do not allocate crypto hash tfm in NORECLAIM context in ecryptfs"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (77 commits)
crypto: qat - change the adf_ctl_stop_devices to void
crypto: caam - fix caam_jr_alloc() ret code
crypto: vmx - comply with ABIs that specify vrsave as reserved.
crypto: testmgr - Add a flag allowing the self-tests to be disabled at runtime.
crypto: ccp - constify ccp_actions structure
crypto: marvell/cesa - Use dma_pool_zalloc
crypto: qat - make adf_vf_isr.c dependant on IOV config
crypto: qat - Fix typo in comments
lib: asn1_decoder - add MODULE_LICENSE("GPL")
crypto: omap-sham - Use dma_request_chan() for requesting DMA channel
crypto: omap-des - Use dma_request_chan() for requesting DMA channel
crypto: omap-aes - Use dma_request_chan() for requesting DMA channel
crypto: omap-des - Integrate with the crypto engine framework
crypto: s5p-sss - fix incorrect usage of scatterlists api
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix missed interrupts when working with 8 kB blocks
crypto: s5p-sss - Use common BIT macro
crypto: mxc-scc - fix unwinding in mxc_scc_crypto_register()
crypto: mxc-scc - signedness bugs in mxc_scc_ablkcipher_req_init()
crypto: talitos - fix ahash algorithms registration
crypto: ccp - Ensure all dependencies are specified
...
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The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyring instead of the
built-in keyring if available as the source of trustworthy keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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As akcipher uses an SG interface, you must not use vmalloc memory
as input for it. This patch fixes testmgr to copy the vmalloc
test vectors to kmalloc memory before running the test.
This patch also removes a superfluous sg_virt call in do_test_rsa.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Anatoly Pugachev <matorola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Running self-tests for a short-lived KVM VM takes 28ms on my laptop.
This commit adds a flag 'cryptomgr.notests' which allows them to be
disabled.
However if fips=1 as well, we ignore this flag as FIPS mode mandates
that the self-tests are run.
Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The pkcs1pad template needs CRYPTO_MANAGER so it needs
to be explicitly selected by CRYPTO_RSA.
Reported-by: Jamie Heilman <jamie@audible.transient.net>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The crypto hash walk code is broken when supplied with an offset
greater than or equal to PAGE_SIZE. This patch fixes it by adjusting
walk->pg and walk->offset when this happens.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge the crypto tree to pull in the qat adf_init_pf_wq change.
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__GFP_REPEAT has a rather weak semantic but since it has been introduced
around 2.6.12 it has been ignored for low order allocations.
lzo_init uses __GFP_REPEAT to allocate LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS 16K. This is
order 3 allocation request and __GFP_REPEAT is ignored for this size
as well as all <= PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY requests.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The output buffer length has to be at least as big as the key_size.
It is then updated to the actual output size by the implementation.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.
This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.
Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Move the X.509 trust validation code out to its own file so that it can be
generalised.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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We should call verify_signature() rather than directly calling
public_key_verify_signature() if we have a struct key to use as we
shouldn't be poking around in the private data of the key struct as that's
subtype dependent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any
dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the
public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be
generalised.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.
verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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There's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is self-signed
or not: if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume that the
cert is self-signed, which may not be true.
Fix this by checking that the raw subject name matches the raw issuer name
and that the public key algorithm for the key and signature are both the
same in addition to requiring that the AKID bits match.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Extract the signature digest for an X.509 certificate earlier, at the end
of x509_cert_parse() rather than leaving it to the callers thereof since it
has to be called anyway.
Further, immediately after that, check the signature on self-signed
certificates, also rather in the callers of x509_cert_parse().
We note in the x509_certificate struct the following bits of information:
(1) Whether the signature is self-signed (even if we can't check the
signature due to missing crypto).
(2) Whether the key held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be
used. We may get a PKCS#7 message with X.509 certs that we can't make
use of - we just ignore them and give ENOPKG at the end it we couldn't
verify anything if at least one of these unusable certs are in the
chain of trust.
(3) Whether the signature held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto
to be checked. We can still use the key held in this certificate,
even if we can't check the signature on it - if it is held in the
system trusted keyring, for instance. We just can't add it to a ring
of trusted keys or follow it further up the chain of trust.
Making these checks earlier allows x509_check_signature() to be removed and
replaced with direct calls to public_key_verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Point to the public_key_signature struct from the pkcs7_signed_info struct
rather than embedding it. This makes the code consistent with the X.509
signature handling and makes it possible to have a common cleanup function.
We also save a copy of the digest in the signature without sharing the
memory with the crypto layer metadata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Retain the key verification data (ie. the struct public_key_signature)
including the digest and the key identifiers.
Note that this means that we need to take a separate copy of the digest in
x509_get_sig_params() rather than lumping it in with the crypto layer data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can
be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the
signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.
For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Clean up some whitespace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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The HMAC implementation allows setting the HMAC key independently from
the hashing operation. Therefore, the key only needs to be set when a
new key is generated.
This patch increases the speed of the HMAC DRBG by at least 35% depending
on the use case.
The patch is fully CAVS tested.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The OID_sha224 case is missing a break and it falls through
to the -ENOPKG error default. Since HASH_ALGO_SHA224 seems
to be supported, this looks like an unintentional missing break.
Fixes: 07f081fb5057 ("PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Following the async change for algif_skcipher
this patch adds similar async read to algif_aead.
changes in v3:
- add call to aead_reset_ctx directly from aead_put_sgl instead of calling
them separatelly one after the other
- remove wait from aead_sock_destruct function as it is not needed
when sock_hold is used
changes in v2:
- change internal data structures from fixed size arrays, limited to
RSGL_MAX_ENTRIES, to linked list model with no artificial limitation.
- use sock_kmalloc instead of kmalloc for memory allocation
- use sock_hold instead of separate atomic ctr to wait for outstanding
request
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes a bug in pkcs7_validate_trust and its users where the
output value may in fact be taken from uninitialised memory"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argument
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Despite what the DocBook comment to pkcs7_validate_trust() says, the
*_trusted argument is never set to false.
pkcs7_validate_trust() only positively sets *_trusted upon encountering
a trusted PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
This is quite unfortunate since its callers, system_verify_data() for
example, depend on pkcs7_validate_trust() clearing *_trusted on non-trust.
Indeed, UBSAN splats when attempting to load the uninitialized local
variable 'trusted' from system_verify_data() in pkcs7_validate_trust():
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:194:14
load of value 82 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
[<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
[<ffffffff8194113b>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
[<ffffffff819419fa>] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x111/0x158
[<ffffffff819418e9>] ? val_to_string.constprop.12+0xcf/0xcf
[<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370
[<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370
[<ffffffff818312c2>] ? public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50
[<ffffffff81835e04>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x524/0x5f0
[<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170
[<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b
[<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290
[...]
The implication is that pkcs7_validate_trust() effectively grants trust
when it really shouldn't have.
Fix this by explicitly setting *_trusted to false at the very beginning
of pkcs7_validate_trust().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge second patch-bomb from Andrew Morton:
- a couple of hotfixes
- the rest of MM
- a new timer slack control in procfs
- a couple of procfs fixes
- a few misc things
- some printk tweaks
- lib/ updates, notably to radix-tree.
- add my and Nick Piggin's old userspace radix-tree test harness to
tools/testing/radix-tree/. Matthew said it was a godsend during the
radix-tree work he did.
- a few code-size improvements, switching to __always_inline where gcc
screwed up.
- partially implement character sets in sscanf
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (118 commits)
sscanf: implement basic character sets
lib/bug.c: use common WARN helper
param: convert some "on"/"off" users to strtobool
lib: add "on"/"off" support to kstrtobool
lib: update single-char callers of strtobool()
lib: move strtobool() to kstrtobool()
include/linux/unaligned: force inlining of byteswap operations
include/uapi/linux/byteorder, swab: force inlining of some byteswap operations
include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h: force inlining of some atomic_long operations
usb: common: convert to use match_string() helper
ide: hpt366: convert to use match_string() helper
ata: hpt366: convert to use match_string() helper
power: ab8500: convert to use match_string() helper
power: charger_manager: convert to use match_string() helper
drm/edid: convert to use match_string() helper
pinctrl: convert to use match_string() helper
device property: convert to use match_string() helper
lib/string: introduce match_string() helper
radix-tree tests: add test for radix_tree_iter_next
radix-tree tests: add regression3 test
...
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CMA allocation should be guaranteed to succeed by definition, but,
unfortunately, it would be failed sometimes. It is hard to track down
the problem, because it is related to page reference manipulation and we
don't have any facility to analyze it.
This patch adds tracepoints to track down page reference manipulation.
With it, we can find exact reason of failure and can fix the problem.
Following is an example of tracepoint output. (note: this example is
stale version that printing flags as the number. Recent version will
print it as human readable string.)
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678375: page_ref_set: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x0 count=1 mapcount=0 mapping=(nil) mt=4 val=1
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678378: kernel_stack:
=> get_page_from_freelist (ffffffff81176659)
=> __alloc_pages_nodemask (ffffffff81176d22)
=> alloc_pages_vma (ffffffff811bf675)
=> handle_mm_fault (ffffffff8119e693)
=> __do_page_fault (ffffffff810631ea)
=> trace_do_page_fault (ffffffff81063543)
=> do_async_page_fault (ffffffff8105c40a)
=> async_page_fault (ffffffff817581d8)
[snip]
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678379: page_ref_mod: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x40048 count=2 mapcount=1 mapping=0xffff880015a78dc1 mt=4 val=1
[snip]
...
...
<...>-9131 [001] 93.174468: test_pages_isolated: start_pfn=0x17800 end_pfn=0x17c00 fin_pfn=0x17ac9 ret=fail
[snip]
<...>-9018 [004] 93.174843: page_ref_mod_and_test: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x40068 count=0 mapcount=0 mapping=0xffff880015a78dc1 mt=4 val=-1 ret=1
=> release_pages (ffffffff8117c9e4)
=> free_pages_and_swap_cache (ffffffff811b0697)
=> tlb_flush_mmu_free (ffffffff81199616)
=> tlb_finish_mmu (ffffffff8119a62c)
=> exit_mmap (ffffffff811a53f7)
=> mmput (ffffffff81073f47)
=> do_exit (ffffffff810794e9)
=> do_group_exit (ffffffff81079def)
=> SyS_exit_group (ffffffff81079e74)
=> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (ffffffff817560b6)
This output shows that problem comes from exit path. In exit path, to
improve performance, pages are not freed immediately. They are gathered
and processed by batch. During this process, migration cannot be
possible and CMA allocation is failed. This problem is hard to find
without this page reference tracepoint facility.
Enabling this feature bloat kernel text 30 KB in my configuration.
text data bss dec hex filename
12127327 2243616 1507328 15878271 f2487f vmlinux_disabled
12157208 2258880 1507328 15923416 f2f8d8 vmlinux_enabled
Note that, due to header file dependency problem between mm.h and
tracepoint.h, this feature has to open code the static key functions for
tracepoints. Proposed by Steven Rostedt in following link.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/9/699
[arnd@arndb.de: crypto/async_pq: use __free_page() instead of put_page()]
[iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com: fix build failure for xtensa]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak Kconfig text, per Vlastimil]
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor
fixes scattered across the subsystem.
IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured
and appraised"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits)
X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum
akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer
crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled
MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls
MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy()
certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime
X.509: Support leap seconds
Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64()
X.509: Fix leap year handling again
PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'
firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg()
KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert
KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume
ima: require signed IMA policy
ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself
ima: load policy using path
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.6:
API:
- Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
- Remove crypto_hash interface.
- Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
- Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
- Add akcipher documentation.
- Add skcipher documentation.
Algorithms:
- Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
- Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.
Drivers:
- Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
- Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
- Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
- Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
- Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
- Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
- Make atmel-sha available again.
- Make sahara hashing available again.
- Make ccp hashing available again.
- Make sha1-mb available again.
- Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
- Improve DMA performance in caam.
- Add hashing support to rockchip"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
lib/mpi: Endianness fix
crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
crypto: xts - fix compile errors
crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
...
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Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.
To make this work, the following changes have been made:
(1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the
padding and returns just the message hash.
(2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this,
and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.
(3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
and and has been merged into public_key.c.
(4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.
Thoughts:
(*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates
registered that share most of the code?
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This adds hash param to pkcs1pad.
The pkcs1pad template can work with or without the hash.
When hash param is provided then the verify operation will
also verify the output against the known digest.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The ASN.1 GeneralizedTime object carries an ISO 8601 format date and time.
The time is permitted to show midnight as 00:00 or 24:00 (the latter being
equivalent of 00:00 of the following day).
The permitted value is checked in x509_decode_time() but the actual
handling is left to mktime64().
Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected and could
lead to an unbootable kernel.
Note that with this patch we also permit any 24:mm:ss time and extend this
to UTCTime, which whilst not strictly correct don't permit much leeway in
fiddling date strings.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
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The format of ASN.1 GeneralizedTime seems to be specified by ISO 8601
[X.680 46.3] and this apparently supports leap seconds (ie. the seconds
field is 60). It's not entirely clear that ASN.1 expects it, but we can
relax the seconds check slightly for GeneralizedTime.
This results in us passing a time with sec as 60 to mktime64(), which
handles it as being a duplicate of the 0th second of the next minute.
We can't really do otherwise without giving the kernel much greater
knowledge of where all the leap seconds are. Unfortunately, this would
require change the mapping of the kernel's current-time-in-seconds.
UTCTime, however, only supports a seconds value in the range 00-59, but for
the sake of simplicity allow this with UTCTime also.
Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected,
potentially making a kernel unbootable.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
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There are still a couple of minor issues in the X.509 leap year handling:
(1) To avoid doing a modulus-by-400 in addition to a modulus-by-100 when
determining whether the year is a leap year or not, I divided the year
by 100 after doing the modulus-by-100, thereby letting the compiler do
one instruction for both, and then did a modulus-by-4.
Unfortunately, I then passed the now-modified year value to mktime64()
to construct a time value.
Since this isn't a fast path and since mktime64() does a bunch of
divisions, just condense down to "% 400". It's also easier to read.
(2) The default month length for any February where the year doesn't
divide by four exactly is obtained from the month_length[] array where
the value is 29, not 28.
This is fixed by altering the table.
Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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The boolean want is not initialized and hence garbage. The default should
be false (later it is only set to true on tne sinfo->authattrs check).
Found with static analysis using CoverityScan
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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RFC 3686 CTR in various authenc methods.
rfc3686(ctr(aes)) is already marked fips compliant,
so these should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The patch centralizes the XTS key check logic into the service function
xts_check_key which is invoked from the different XTS implementations.
With this, the XTS implementations in ARM, ARM64, PPC and S390 have now
a sanity check for the XTS keys similar to the other arches.
In addition, this service function received a check to ensure that the
key != the tweak key which is mandated by FIPS 140-2 IG A.9. As the
check is not present in the standards defining XTS, it is only enforced
in FIPS mode of the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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(2nd try that adds missing , to build.)
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API.
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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This needs to go through the security tree so I'm reverting the
patches for now.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Some more authenc() wrapped algorithms are FIPS compliant, tag
them as such.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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__test_aead() reads MAX_IVLEN bytes from template[i].iv, but the
actual length of the initialisation vector can be shorter.
The length of the IV is already calculated earlier in the
function. Let's just reuses that. Also the IV length is currently
calculated several time for no reason. Let's fix that too.
This fix an out-of-bound error detected by KASan.
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Modify __test_hash() so that hash import/export can be tested
from within the kernel. The test is unconditionally done when
a struct hash_testvec has its .np > 1.
v3: make the test unconditional
v2: Leverage template[i].np as suggested by Tim Chen
Signed-off-by: Rui Wang <rui.y.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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