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2010-03-05Merge branch 'for_linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs-2.6 * 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs-2.6: (33 commits) quota: stop using QUOTA_OK / NO_QUOTA dquot: cleanup dquot initialize routine dquot: move dquot initialization responsibility into the filesystem dquot: cleanup dquot drop routine dquot: move dquot drop responsibility into the filesystem dquot: cleanup dquot transfer routine dquot: move dquot transfer responsibility into the filesystem dquot: cleanup inode allocation / freeing routines dquot: cleanup space allocation / freeing routines ext3: add writepage sanity checks ext3: Truncate allocated blocks if direct IO write fails to update i_size quota: Properly invalidate caches even for filesystems with blocksize < pagesize quota: generalize quota transfer interface quota: sb_quota state flags cleanup jbd: Delay discarding buffers in journal_unmap_buffer ext3: quota_write cross block boundary behaviour quota: drop permission checks from xfs_fs_set_xstate/xfs_fs_set_xquota quota: split out compat_sys_quotactl support from quota.c quota: split out netlink notification support from quota.c quota: remove invalid optimization from quota_sync_all ... Fixed trivial conflicts in fs/namei.c and fs/ufs/inode.c
2010-03-04dquot: move dquot initialization responsibility into the filesystemChristoph Hellwig
Currently various places in the VFS call vfs_dq_init directly. This means we tie the quota code into the VFS. Get rid of that and make the filesystem responsible for the initialization. For most metadata operations this is a straight forward move into the methods, but for truncate and open it's a bit more complicated. For truncate we currently only call vfs_dq_init for the sys_truncate case because open already takes care of it for ftruncate and open(O_TRUNC) - the new code causes an additional vfs_dq_init for those which is harmless. For open the initialization is moved from do_filp_open into the open method, which means it happens slightly earlier now, and only for regular files. The latter is fine because we don't need to initialize it for operations on special files, and we already do it as part of the namespace operations for directories. Add a dquot_file_open helper that filesystems that support generic quotas can use to fill in ->open. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2010-03-03Switch may_open() and break_lease() to passing O_...Al Viro
... instead of mixing FMODE_ and O_ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-22Sanitize f_flags helpersAl Viro
* pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place * nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper too (OPEN_FMODE(flags)) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-22Fix f_flags/f_mode in case of lookup_instantiate_filp() from open(pathname, 3)Al Viro
Just set f_flags when shoving struct file into nameidata; don't postpone that until __dentry_open(). do_filp_open() has correct value; lookup_instantiate_filp() doesn't - we lose the difference between O_RDWR and 3 by that point. We still set .intent.open.flags, so no fs code needs to be changed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with countersAl Viro
* do ima_get_count() in __dentry_open() * stop doing that in followups * move ima_path_check() to right after nameidata_to_filp() * don't bump counters on it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-16fs: move get_empty_filp() deffinition to internal.hEric Paris
All users outside of fs/ of get_empty_filp() have been removed. This patch moves the definition from the include/ directory to internal.h so no new users crop up and removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL. I'd love to see open intents stop using it too, but that's a problem for another day and a smarter developer! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-11-23LSM: Move security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() to after mutex_lock().Tetsuo Handa
We should call security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() after mutex_lock() in order to avoid races. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-11LSM: Add security_path_chroot().Tetsuo Handa
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-11LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown().Tetsuo Handa
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23fs: change sys_truncate length parameter typeHeiko Carstens
For this system call user space passes a signed long length parameter, while the kernel side takes an unsigned long parameter and converts it later to signed long again. This has led to bugs in compat wrappers see e.g. dd90bbd5 "powerpc: Add compat_sys_truncate". The s390 compat wrapper for this functions is broken as well since it also performs zero extension instead of sign extension for the length parameter. In addition if hpa comes up with an automated way of generating compat wrappers it would generate a wrong one here. So change the length parameter from unsigned long to long. Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-02CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]David Howells
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes all references, not just those from task_structs). Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid. This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the credential struct has been previously released): http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-21vfs: allow file truncations when both suid and write permissions setAmerigo Wang
When suid is set and the non-owner user has write permission, any writing into this file should be allowed and suid should be removed after that. However, current kernel only allows writing without truncations, when we do truncations on that file, we get EPERM. This is a bug. Steps to reproduce this bug: % ls -l rootdir/file1 -rwsrwsrwx 1 root root 3 Jun 25 15:42 rootdir/file1 % echo h > rootdir/file1 zsh: operation not permitted: rootdir/file1 % ls -l rootdir/file1 -rwsrwsrwx 1 root root 3 Jun 25 15:42 rootdir/file1 % echo h >> rootdir/file1 % ls -l rootdir/file1 -rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 5 Jun 25 16:34 rootdir/file1 Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-06-24fs: Add new pre-allocation ioctls to vfs for compatibility with legacy xfs ↵Ankit Jain
ioctls This patch adds ioctls to vfs for compatibility with legacy XFS pre-allocation ioctls (XFS_IOC_*RESVP*). The implementation effectively invokes sys_fallocate for the new ioctls. Also handles the compat_ioctl case. Note: These legacy ioctls are also implemented by OCFS2. [AV: folded fixes from hch] Signed-off-by: Ankit Jain <me@ankitjain.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-12fs: introduce mnt_clone_writenpiggin@suse.de
This patch speeds up lmbench lat_mmap test by about another 2% after the first patch. Before: avg = 462.286 std = 5.46106 After: avg = 453.12 std = 9.58257 (50 runs of each, stddev gives a reasonable confidence) It does this by introducing mnt_clone_write, which avoids some heavyweight operations of mnt_want_write if called on a vfsmount which we know already has a write count; and mnt_want_write_file, which can call mnt_clone_write if the file is open for write. After these two patches, mnt_want_write and mnt_drop_write go from 7% on the profile down to 1.3% (including mnt_clone_write). [AV: mnt_want_write_file() should take file alone and derive mnt from it; not only all callers have that form, but that's the only mnt about which we know that it's already held for write if file is opened for write] Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-05-09Switch open_exec() and sys_uselib() to do_open_filp()Al Viro
... and make path_lookup_open() static Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-01Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.hAl Viro
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration of struct fs_struct; Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-26vfs: Use lowercase names of quota functionsJan Kara
Use lowercase names of quota functions instead of old uppercase ones. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> CC: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 30Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 20Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 17Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 16Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 15Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 14Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 11Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 10Heiko Carstens
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14[CVE-2009-0029] System call wrapper special casesHeiko Carstens
System calls with an unsigned long long argument can't be converted with the standard wrappers since that would include a cast to long, which in turn means that we would lose the upper 32 bit on 32 bit architectures. Also semctl can't use the standard wrapper since it has a 'union' parameter. So we handle them as special case and add some extra wrappers instead. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-05inode->i_op is never NULLAl Viro
We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even though it had been eliminated years ago. You'd need to go out of your way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on such inodes anyway. After killing two remaining places that still did that bogosity, all that crap can go away. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-31introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.Kentaro Takeda
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-11-13CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()David Howells
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13CRED: Separate task security context from task_structDavid Howells
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13CRED: Neuter sys_capset()David Howells
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current. This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading them against interference by other processes. This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since: (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed. (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-10-21[PATCH] introduce fmode_t, do annotationsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-10-13tty: the vhangup syscall is racyAlan Cox
We now have the infrastructure to sort this out but rather than teaching the syscall tty lock rules we move the hard work into a tty helper Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-08-01[PATCH] merge locate_fd() and get_unused_fd()Al Viro
New primitive: alloc_fd(start, flags). get_unused_fd() and get_unused_fd_flags() become wrappers on top of it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handlingAl Viro
* dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open * dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0; it should get -EMFILE instead. Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl(). Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF. Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.Al Viro
* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want. * switch to new helpers: user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path) user_path(pathname, &path) user_lpath(pathname, &path) user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory) The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one. * remove nameidata in callers. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanupAl Viro
Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path. Get rid of the few that do not. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that careAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanupMiklos Szeredi
Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes into notify_change(). Checks for immutable and append-only files are always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok(). This should be completely equivalent. CC: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] fix MAY_CHDIR/MAY_ACCESS/LOOKUP_ACCESS messAl Viro
* MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS * MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution * fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why chdir() needs that. * now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be removed; it has no business being in nameidata. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] kill altrootAl Viro
long overdue... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[PATCH] permission checks for chdir need special treatment only on the last stepAl Viro
... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution. LOOKUP_CHDIR is killed by that. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-27[patch 1/5] vfs: truncate: dont check immutable twiceMiklos Szeredi
vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being immutable, so no need to repeat it. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2008-07-24fs: check for statfs overflowJon Tollefson
Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0. Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-04security: filesystem capabilities: fix fragile setuid fixup codeAndrew G. Morgan
This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()). The effect of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is configured.) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-05-01[PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28xip: support non-struct page backed memoryNick Piggin
Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for the user mappings. This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one. Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here. This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too). Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Acked-by: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-19[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: debugging for missed callsDave Hansen
There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts. There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from dentry_open() calls. This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of bugs. It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or mnt_writer count imbalances. I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it. [hch: made it conditional on a debug option. But it's still a little bit too ugly] [hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>