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commit 2fcc319d2467a5f5b78f35f79fd6e22741a31b1e upstream.
When a reflink operation causes the bmap code to allocate a btree block
we're currently doing single-AG allocations due to having ->firstblock
set and then try any higher AG due a little reflink quirk we've put in
when adding the reflink code. But given that we do not have a minleft
reservation of any kind in this AG we can still not have any space in
the same or higher AG even if the file system has enough free space.
To fix this use a XFS_ALLOCTYPE_FIRST_AG allocation in this fall back
path instead.
[And yes, we need to redo this properly instead of piling hacks over
hacks. I'm working on that, but it's not going to be a small series.
In the meantime this fixes the customer reported issue]
Also add a warning for failing allocations to make it easier to debug.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f65e6fad293b3a5793b7fa2044800506490e7a2e upstream.
Commit fa7f138 ("xfs: clear delalloc and cache on buffered write
failure") fixed one regression in the iomap error handling code and
exposed another. The fundamental problem is that if a buffered write
is a rewrite of preexisting delalloc blocks and the write fails, the
failure handling code can punch out preexisting blocks with valid
file data.
This was reproduced directly by sub-block writes in the LTP
kernel/syscalls/write/write03 test. A first 100 byte write allocates
a single block in a file. A subsequent 100 byte write fails and
punches out the block, including the data successfully written by
the previous write.
To address this problem, update the ->iomap_begin() handler to
distinguish newly allocated delalloc blocks from preexisting
delalloc blocks via the IOMAP_F_NEW flag. Use this flag in the
->iomap_end() handler to decide when a failed or short write should
punch out delalloc blocks.
This introduces the subtle requirement that ->iomap_begin() should
never combine newly allocated delalloc blocks with existing blocks
in the resulting iomap descriptor. This can occur when a new
delalloc reservation merges with a neighboring extent that is part
of the current write, for example. Therefore, drop the
post-allocation extent lookup from xfs_bmapi_reserve_delalloc() and
just return the record inserted into the fork. This ensures only new
blocks are returned and thus that preexisting delalloc blocks are
always handled as "found" blocks and not punched out on a failed
rewrite.
Reported-by: Xiong Zhou <xzhou@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5825712ee98d68a2c17bc89dad2c30276894cba upstream.
When block size is larger than inode cluster size, the call to
XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, mp->m_inode_cluster_size) returns 0. Also, mkfs.xfs
would have set xfs_sb->sb_inoalignmt to 0. Hence in
xfs_set_inoalignment(), xfs_mount->m_inoalign_mask gets initialized to
-1 instead of 0. However, xfs_mount->m_sinoalign would get correctly
intialized to 0 because for every positive value of xfs_mount->m_dalign,
the condition "!(mp->m_dalign & mp->m_inoalign_mask)" would evaluate to
false.
Also, xfs_imap() worked fine even with xfs_mount->m_inoalign_mask having
-1 as the value because blks_per_cluster variable would have the value 1
and hence we would never have a need to use xfs_mount->m_inoalign_mask
to compute the inode chunk's agbno and offset within the chunk.
Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 787eb485509f9d58962bd8b4dbc6a5ac6e2034fe upstream.
There are two different cases of buffered I/O errors:
- first we can have an already shutdown fs. In that case we should skip
any on-disk operations and just clean up the appen transaction if
present and destroy the ioend
- a real I/O error. In that case we should cleanup any lingering COW
blocks. This gets skipped in the current code and is fixed by this
patch.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3802a345321a08093ba2ddb1849e736f84e8d450 upstream.
We only want to reclaim preallocations from our periodic work item.
Currently this is archived by looking for a dirty inode, but that check
is rather fragile. Instead add a flag to xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_* so
that the caller can ask for just cancelling unwritten extents in the COW
fork.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in commit message]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 410d17f67e583559be3a922f8b6cc336331893f3 upstream.
In various places we currently assert that xfs_bmap_btalloc allocates
from the same as the firstblock value passed in, unless it's either
NULLAGNO or the dop_low flag is set. But the reflink code does not
fully follow this convention as it passes in firstblock purely as
a hint for the allocator without actually having previous allocations
in the transaction, and without having a minleft check on the current
AG, leading to the assert firing on a very full and heavily used
file system. As even the reflink code only allocates from equal or
higher AGs for now we can simply the check to always allow for equal
or higher AGs.
Note that we need to eventually split the two meanings of the firstblock
value. At that point we can also allow the reflink code to allocate
from any AG instead of limiting it in any way.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8ee9fdbebc84b39f1d1c201c5e32277c61d034aa upstream.
On a ppc64 system, executing generic/256 test with 32k block size gives the following call trace,
XFS: Assertion failed: args->maxlen > 0, file: /root/repos/linux/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c, line: 2026
kernel BUG at /root/repos/linux/fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:113!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=2048
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
NUMA
pSeries
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 19361 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 4.10.0-rc5 #58
task: c000000102606d80 task.stack: c0000001026b8000
NIP: c0000000004ef798 LR: c0000000004ef798 CTR: c00000000082b290
REGS: c0000001026bb090 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (4.10.0-rc5)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI>
CR: 28004428 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c0000000004ef180 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c0000000004ef798 c0000001026bb310 c000000001157300 ffffffffffffffea
GPR04: 000000000000000a c0000001026bb130 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffc0
GPR08: 00000000000000d1 0000000000000021 00000000ffffffd1 c000000000dd4990
GPR12: 0000000022004444 c00000000fe00800 0000000020000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000043a606fc 0000000043a76c08 0000000043a1b3d0
GPR20: 000001002a35cd60 c0000001026bbb80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
GPR24: 0000000000000240 0000000000000004 c00000062dc55000 0000000000000000
GPR28: 0000000000000004 c00000062ecd9200 0000000000000000 c0000001026bb6c0
NIP [c0000000004ef798] .assfail+0x28/0x30
LR [c0000000004ef798] .assfail+0x28/0x30
Call Trace:
[c0000001026bb310] [c0000000004ef798] .assfail+0x28/0x30 (unreliable)
[c0000001026bb380] [c000000000455d74] .xfs_alloc_space_available+0x194/0x1b0
[c0000001026bb410] [c00000000045b914] .xfs_alloc_fix_freelist+0x144/0x480
[c0000001026bb580] [c00000000045c368] .xfs_alloc_vextent+0x698/0xa90
[c0000001026bb650] [c0000000004a6200] .xfs_ialloc_ag_alloc+0x170/0x820
[c0000001026bb7c0] [c0000000004a9098] .xfs_dialloc+0x158/0x320
[c0000001026bb8a0] [c0000000004e628c] .xfs_ialloc+0x7c/0x610
[c0000001026bb990] [c0000000004e8138] .xfs_dir_ialloc+0xa8/0x2f0
[c0000001026bbaa0] [c0000000004e8814] .xfs_create+0x494/0x790
[c0000001026bbbf0] [c0000000004e5ebc] .xfs_generic_create+0x2bc/0x410
[c0000001026bbce0] [c0000000002b4a34] .vfs_mkdir+0x154/0x230
[c0000001026bbd70] [c0000000002bc444] .SyS_mkdirat+0x94/0x120
[c0000001026bbe30] [c00000000000b760] system_call+0x38/0xfc
Instruction dump:
4e800020 60000000 7c0802a6 7c862378 3c82ffca 7ca72b78 38841c18 7c651b78
38600000 f8010010 f821ff91 4bfff94d <0fe00000> 60000000 7c0802a6 7c892378
When block size is larger than inode cluster size, the call to
XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, mp->m_inode_cluster_size) returns 0. Also, mkfs.xfs
would have set xfs_sb->sb_inoalignmt to 0. This causes
xfs_ialloc_cluster_alignment() to return 0. Due to this
args.minalignslop (in xfs_ialloc_ag_alloc()) gets the unsigned
equivalent of -1 assigned to it. This later causes alloc_len in
xfs_alloc_space_available() to have a value of 0. In such a scenario
when args.total is also 0, the assert statement "ASSERT(args->maxlen >
0);" fails.
This commit fixes the bug by replacing the call to XFS_B_TO_FSBT() in
xfs_ialloc_cluster_alignment() with a call to xfs_icluster_size_fsb().
Suggested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 48af96ab92bc68fb645068b978ce36df2379e076 upstream.
The block reservation for the transaction allocated in
xfs_shift_file_space() is an artifact of the original collapse range
support. It exists to handle the case where a collapse range occurs,
the initial extent is left shifted into a location that forms a
contiguous boundary with the previous extent and thus the extents
are merged. This code was subsequently refactored and reused for
insert range (right shift) support.
If an insert range occurs under low free space conditions, the
extent at the starting offset is split before the first shift
transaction is allocated. If the block reservation fails, this
leaves separate, but contiguous extents around in the inode. While
not a fatal problem, this is unexpected and will flag a warning on
subsequent insert range operations on the inode. This problem has
been reproduce intermittently by generic/270 running against a
ramdisk device.
Since right shift does not create new extent boundaries in the
inode, a block reservation for extent merge is unnecessary. Update
xfs_shift_file_space() to conditionally reserve fs blocks for left
shift transactions only. This avoids the warning reproduced by
generic/270.
Reported-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 93aaead52a9eebdc20dc8fa673c350e592a06949 upstream.
Fix an uninitialize variable.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 75d65361cf3c0dae2af970c305e19c727b28a510 upstream.
Certain workoads that punch holes into speculative preallocation can
cause delalloc indirect reservation splits when the delalloc extent is
split in two. If further splits occur, an already short-handed extent
can be split into two in a manner that leaves zero indirect blocks for
one of the two new extents. This occurs because the shortage is large
enough that the xfs_bmap_split_indlen() algorithm completely drains the
requested indlen of one of the extents before it honors the existing
reservation.
This ultimately results in a warning from xfs_bmap_del_extent(). This
has been observed during file copies of large, sparse files using 'cp
--sparse=always.'
To avoid this problem, update xfs_bmap_split_indlen() to explicitly
apply the reservation shortage fairly between both extents. This smooths
out the overall indlen shortage and defers the situation where we end up
with a delalloc extent with zero indlen reservation to extreme
circumstances.
Reported-by: Patrick Dung <mpatdung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0e339ef8556d9e567aa7925f8892c263d79430d9 upstream.
When a delalloc extent is created, it can be merged with pre-existing,
contiguous, delalloc extents. When this occurs,
xfs_bmap_add_extent_hole_delay() merges the extents along with the
associated indirect block reservations. The expectation here is that the
combined worst case indlen reservation is always less than or equal to
the indlen reservation for the individual extents.
This is not always the case, however, as existing extents can less than
the expected indlen reservation if the extent was previously split due
to a hole punch. If a new extent merges with such an extent, the total
indlen requirement may be larger than the sum of the indlen reservations
held by both extents.
xfs_bmap_add_extent_hole_delay() assumes that the worst case indlen
reservation is always available and assigns it to the merged extent
without consideration for the indlen held by the pre-existing extent. As
a result, the subsequent xfs_mod_fdblocks() call can attempt an
unintentional allocation rather than a free (indicated by an ASSERT()
failure). Further, if the allocation happens to fail in this context,
the failure goes unhandled and creates a filesystem wide block
accounting inconsistency.
Fix xfs_bmap_add_extent_hole_delay() to function as designed. Cap the
indlen reservation assigned to the merged extent to the sum of the
indlen reservations held by each of the individual extents.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5e30c23d13919a718b22d4921dc5c0accc59da27 upstream.
We don't just need the structure to track busy extents which can be
avoided with a synchronous transaction, but also to keep track of
pending discard.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54a4ef8af4e0dc5c983d17fcb9cf5fd25666d94e upstream.
We currently fall back from direct to buffered writes if we detect a
remaining shared extent in the iomap_begin callback. But by the time
iomap_begin is called for the potentially unaligned end block we might
have already written most of the data to disk, which we'd now write
again using buffered I/O. To avoid this reject all writes to reflinked
files before starting I/O so that we are guaranteed to only write the
data once.
The alternative would be to unshare the unaligned start and/or end block
before doing the I/O. I think that's doable, and will actually be
required to support reflinks on DAX file system. But it will take a
little more time and I'd rather get rid of the double write ASAP.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[slight changes in context due to the new direct I/O code in 4.10+]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5ecb42342852892f978572ddc6dca703460f25a upstream.
We're changing both metadata and data, so we need to update the
timestamps for clone operations. Dedupe on the other hand does
not change file data, and only changes invisible metadata so the
timestamps should not be updated.
This follows existing btrfs behavior.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: remove redundant is_dedupe test]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4dd2eb633598cb6a5a0be2fd9a2be0819f5eeb5f upstream.
After successful IO or permanent error, b_first_retry_time also
needs to be cleared, else the invalid first retry time will be
used by the next retry check.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5eda43000064a69a39fb7869cc63c9571535ad29 upstream.
Christoph Hellwig pointed out that there's a potentially nasty race when
performing simultaneous nearby directio cow writes:
"Thread 1 writes a range from B to c
" B --------- C
p
"a little later thread 2 writes from A to B
" A --------- B
p
[editor's note: the 'p' denote cowextsize boundaries, which I added to
make this more clear]
"but the code preallocates beyond B into the range where thread
"1 has just written, but ->end_io hasn't been called yet.
"But once ->end_io is called thread 2 has already allocated
"up to the extent size hint into the write range of thread 1,
"so the end_io handler will splice the unintialized blocks from
"that preallocation back into the file right after B."
We can avoid this race by ensuring that thread 1 cannot accidentally
remap the blocks that thread 2 allocated (as part of speculative
preallocation) as part of t2's write preparation in t1's end_io handler.
The way we make this happen is by taking advantage of the unwritten
extent flag as an intermediate step.
Recall that when we begin the process of writing data to shared blocks,
we create a delayed allocation extent in the CoW fork:
D: --RRRRRRSSSRRRRRRRR---
C: ------DDDDDDD---------
When a thread prepares to CoW some dirty data out to disk, it will now
convert the delalloc reservation into an /unwritten/ allocated extent in
the cow fork. The da conversion code tries to opportunistically
allocate as much of a (speculatively prealloc'd) extent as possible, so
we may end up allocating a larger extent than we're actually writing
out:
D: --RRRRRRSSSRRRRRRRR---
U: ------UUUUUUU---------
Next, we convert only the part of the extent that we're actively
planning to write to normal (i.e. not unwritten) status:
D: --RRRRRRSSSRRRRRRRR---
U: ------UURRUUU---------
If the write succeeds, the end_cow function will now scan the relevant
range of the CoW fork for real extents and remap only the real extents
into the data fork:
D: --RRRRRRRRSRRRRRRRR---
U: ------UU--UUU---------
This ensures that we never obliterate valid data fork extents with
unwritten blocks from the CoW fork.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 05a630d76bd3f39baf0eecfa305bed2820796dee upstream.
In the data fork, we only allow extents to perform the following state
transitions:
delay -> real <-> unwritten
There's no way to move directly from a delalloc reservation to an
/unwritten/ allocated extent. However, for the CoW fork we want to be
able to do the following to each extent:
delalloc -> unwritten -> written -> remapped to data fork
This will help us to avoid a race in the speculative CoW preallocation
code between a first thread that is allocating a CoW extent and a second
thread that is remapping part of a file after a write. In order to do
this, however, we need two things: first, we have to be able to
transition from da to unwritten, and second the function that converts
between real and unwritten has to be made aware of the cow fork. Do
both of those things.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit de14c5f541e78c59006bee56f6c5c2ef1ca07272 upstream.
Perform basic sanity checking of the directory free block header
fields so that we avoid hanging the system on invalid data.
(Granted that just means that now we shutdown on directory write,
but that seems better than hanging...)
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b3bf607d58520ea8c0666aeb4be60dbb724cd3a2 upstream.
We can't handle a bmbt that's taller than BTREE_MAXLEVELS, and there's
no such thing as a zero-level bmbt (for that we have extents format),
so if we see this, send back an error code.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5a91baeb6033c3392121e4d5c011cdc08dfa9f7 upstream.
Don't let anybody load an obviously bad btree pointer. Since the values
come from disk, we must return an error, not just ASSERT.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7a652bbe366464267190c2792a32ce4fff5595ef upstream.
When we open a directory, we try to readahead block 0 of the directory
on the assumption that we're going to need it soon. If the bmbt is
corrupt, the directory will never be usable and the readahead fails
immediately, so we might as well prevent the directory from being opened
at all. This prevents a subsequent read or modify operation from
hitting it and taking the fs offline.
NOTE: We're only checking for early failures in the block mapping, not
the readahead directory block itself.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4b5bd5bf3fb182dc504b1b64e0331300f156e756 upstream.
We use di_format and if_flags to decide whether we're grabbing the ilock
in btree mode (btree extents not loaded) or shared mode (anything else),
but the state of those fields can be changed by other threads that are
also trying to load the btree extents -- IFEXTENTS gets set before the
_bmap_read_extents call and cleared if it fails.
We don't actually need to have IFEXTENTS set until after the bmbt
records are successfully loaded and validated, which will fix the race
between multiple threads trying to read the same directory. The next
patch strengthens directory bmbt validation by refusing to open the
directory if reading the bmbt to start directory readahead fails.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e4229d6b0bc9280f29624faf170cf76a9f1ca60e upstream.
It's possible for post-eof blocks to end up being used for direct I/O
writes. dio write performs an upfront unwritten extent allocation, sends
the dio and then updates the inode size (if necessary) on write
completion. If a file release occurs while a file extending dio write is
in flight, it is possible to mistake the post-eof blocks for speculative
preallocation and incorrectly truncate them from the inode. This means
that the resulting dio write completion can discover a hole and allocate
new blocks rather than perform unwritten extent conversion.
This requires a strange mix of I/O and is thus not likely to reproduce
in real world workloads. It is intermittently reproduced by generic/299.
The error manifests as an assert failure due to transaction overrun
because the aforementioned write completion transaction has only
reserved enough blocks for btree operations:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, \
file: fs/xfs//xfs_trans.c, line: 309
The root cause is that xfs_free_eofblocks() uses i_size to truncate
post-eof blocks from the inode, but async, file extending direct writes
do not update i_size until write completion, long after inode locks are
dropped. Therefore, xfs_free_eofblocks() effectively truncates the inode
to the incorrect size.
Update xfs_free_eofblocks() to serialize against dio similar to how
extending writes are serialized against i_size updates before post-eof
block zeroing. Specifically, wait on dio while under the iolock. This
ensures that dio write completions have updated i_size before post-eof
blocks are processed.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c3155097ad89a956579bc305856a1f2878494e52 upstream.
The xfs_eofblocks.eof_scan_owner field is an internal field to
facilitate invoking eofb scans from the kernel while under the iolock.
This is necessary because the eofb scan acquires the iolock of each
inode. Synchronous scans are invoked on certain buffered write failures
while under iolock. In such cases, the scan owner indicates that the
context for the scan already owns the particular iolock and prevents a
double lock deadlock.
eofblocks scans while under iolock are still livelock prone in the event
of multiple parallel scans, however. If multiple buffered writes to
different inodes fail and invoke eofblocks scans at the same time, each
scan avoids a deadlock with its own inode by virtue of the
eof_scan_owner field, but will never be able to acquire the iolock of
the inode from the parallel scan. Because the low free space scans are
invoked with SYNC_WAIT, the scan will not return until it has processed
every tagged inode and thus both scans will spin indefinitely on the
iolock being held across the opposite scan. This problem can be
reproduced reliably by generic/224 on systems with higher cpu counts
(x16).
To avoid this problem, simplify the semantics of eofblocks scans to
never invoke a scan while under iolock. This means that the buffered
write context must drop the iolock before the scan. It must reacquire
the lock before the write retry and also repeat the initial write
checks, as the original state might no longer be valid once the iolock
was dropped.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a36b926180cda375ac2ec89e1748b47137cfc51c upstream.
xfs_free_eofblocks() requires the IOLOCK_EXCL lock, but is called from
different contexts where the lock may or may not be held. The
need_iolock parameter exists for this reason, to indicate whether
xfs_free_eofblocks() must acquire the iolock itself before it can
proceed.
This is ugly and confusing. Simplify the semantics of
xfs_free_eofblocks() to require the caller to acquire the iolock
appropriately and kill the need_iolock parameter. While here, the mp
param can be removed as well as the xfs_mount is accessible from the
xfs_inode structure. This patch does not change behavior.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 76d771b4cbe33c581bd6ca2710c120be51172440 upstream.
Currently we try to rely on the global reserved block pool for block
allocations for the free inode btree, but I have customer reports
(fairly complex workload, need to find an easier reproducer) where that
is not enough as the AG where we free an inode that requires a new
finobt block is entirely full. This causes us to cancel a dirty
transaction and thus a file system shutdown.
I think the right way to guard against this is to treat the finot the same
way as the refcount btree and have a per-AG reservations for the possible
worst case size of it, and the patch below implements that.
Note that this could increase mount times with large finobt trees. In
an ideal world we would have added a field for the number of finobt
fields to the AGI, similar to what we did for the refcount blocks.
We should do add it next time we rev the AGI or AGF format by adding
new fields.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4dfa2b84118fd6c95202ae87e62adf5000ccd4d0 upstream.
Try to reserve the blocks first and only then update the fields in
or hanging off the mount structure. This way we can call __xfs_ag_resv_init
again after a previous failure.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cd9cb405e0b948363811dc74dbb2890f56f2cb87 upstream.
In journal_init_common(), if we failed to allocate the j_wbuf array, or
if we failed to create the buffer_head for the journal superblock, we
leaked the memory allocated for the revocation tables. Fix this.
Fixes: f0c9fd5458bacf7b12a9a579a727dc740cbe047e
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dac7a4b4b1f664934e8b713f529b629f67db313c upstream.
We must lock the xattr block before calculating or verifying the
checksum in order to avoid spurious checksum failures.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=193661
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b9cf625d6ecde0d372e23ae022feead72b4228a6 upstream.
If ext4_convert_inline_data() was called on a directory with inline
data, the filesystem was left in an inconsistent state (as considered by
e2fsck) because the file size was not increased to cover the new block.
This happened because the inode was not marked dirty after i_disksize
was updated. Fix this by marking the inode dirty at the end of
ext4_finish_convert_inline_dir().
This bug was probably not noticed before because most users mark the
inode dirty afterwards for other reasons. But if userspace executed
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY with invalid parameters, as exercised by
'kvm-xfstests -c adv generic/396', then the inode was never marked dirty
after updating i_disksize.
Fixes: 3c47d54170b6a678875566b1b8d6dcf57904e49b
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2ba3e6e8afc9b6188b471f27cf2b5e3cf34e7af2 upstream.
It is OK for s_first_meta_bg to be equal to the number of block group
descriptor blocks. (It rarely happens, but it shouldn't cause any
problems.)
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=194567
Fixes: 3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 28ea06c46fbcab63fd9a55531387b7928a18a590 upstream.
Commit 88ffbf3e03 switches to using rhashtables for glocks, hashing over
the entire struct lm_lockname instead of its individual fields. On some
architectures, struct lm_lockname contains a hole of uninitialized
memory due to alignment rules, which now leads to incorrect hash values.
Get rid of that hole.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 63513232f8cd219dcaa5eafae028740ed3067d83 upstream.
Since rpc_task is async, the release function should be called which
will free the impl_id, scope, and owner.
Trond pointed at 2 more problems:
-- use of client pointer after free in the nfs4_exchangeid_release() function
-- cl_count mismatch if rpc_run_task() isn't run
Fixes: 8d89bd70bc9 ("NFS setup async exchange_id")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0d06863f903ac5f4f6efb0273079d27de3e53a28 upstream.
Fix a BUG when the kernel tries to mount a file system constructed as
follows:
echo foo > foo.txt
mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O encrypt foo.img 100
debugfs -w foo.img << EOF
write foo.txt a
set_inode_field a i_flags 0x80800
set_super_value s_last_orphan 12
quit
EOF
root@kvm-xfstests:~# mount -o loop foo.img /mnt
[ 160.238770] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 160.240106] kernel BUG at /usr/projects/linux/ext4/fs/ext4/inode.c:3874!
[ 160.240106] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 160.240106] Modules linked in:
[ 160.240106] CPU: 0 PID: 2547 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.10.0-rc3-00034-gcdd33b941b67 #227
[ 160.240106] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1 04/01/2014
[ 160.240106] task: f4518000 task.stack: f47b6000
[ 160.240106] EIP: ext4_block_zero_page_range+0x1a7/0x2b4
[ 160.240106] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 160.240106] EAX: 00000001 EBX: f7be4b50 ECX: f47b7dc0 EDX: 00000007
[ 160.240106] ESI: f43b05a8 EDI: f43babec EBP: f47b7dd0 ESP: f47b7dac
[ 160.240106] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 160.240106] CR0: 80050033 CR2: bfd85b08 CR3: 34a00680 CR4: 000006f0
[ 160.240106] Call Trace:
[ 160.240106] ext4_truncate+0x1e9/0x3e5
[ 160.240106] ext4_fill_super+0x286f/0x2b1e
[ 160.240106] ? set_blocksize+0x2e/0x7e
[ 160.240106] mount_bdev+0x114/0x15f
[ 160.240106] ext4_mount+0x15/0x17
[ 160.240106] ? ext4_calculate_overhead+0x39d/0x39d
[ 160.240106] mount_fs+0x58/0x115
[ 160.240106] vfs_kern_mount+0x4b/0xae
[ 160.240106] do_mount+0x671/0x8c3
[ 160.240106] ? _copy_from_user+0x70/0x83
[ 160.240106] ? strndup_user+0x31/0x46
[ 160.240106] SyS_mount+0x57/0x7b
[ 160.240106] do_int80_syscall_32+0x4f/0x61
[ 160.240106] entry_INT80_32+0x2f/0x2f
[ 160.240106] EIP: 0xb76b919e
[ 160.240106] EFLAGS: 00000246 CPU: 0
[ 160.240106] EAX: ffffffda EBX: 08053838 ECX: 08052188 EDX: 080537e8
[ 160.240106] ESI: c0ed0000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 080537e8 ESP: bfa13660
[ 160.240106] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b
[ 160.240106] Code: 59 8b 00 a8 01 0f 84 09 01 00 00 8b 07 66 25 00 f0 66 3d 00 80 75 61 89 f8 e8 3e e2 ff ff 84 c0 74 56 83 bf 48 02 00 00 00 75 02 <0f> 0b 81 7d e8 00 10 00 00 74 02 0f 0b 8b 43 04 8b 53 08 31 c9
[ 160.240106] EIP: ext4_block_zero_page_range+0x1a7/0x2b4 SS:ESP: 0068:f47b7dac
[ 160.317241] ---[ end trace d6a773a375c810a5 ]---
The problem is that when the kernel tries to truncate an inode in
ext4_truncate(), it tries to clear any on-disk data beyond i_size.
Without the encryption key, it can't do that, and so it triggers a
BUG.
E2fsck does *not* provide this service, and in practice most file
systems have their orphan list processed by e2fsck, so to avoid
crashing, this patch skips this step if we don't have access to the
encryption key (which is the case when processing the orphan list; in
all other cases, we will have the encryption key, or the kernel
wouldn't have allowed the file to be opened).
An open question is whether the fact that e2fsck isn't clearing the
bytes beyond i_size causing problems --- and if we've lived with it
not doing it for so long, can we drop this from the kernel replay of
the orphan list in all cases (not just when we don't have the key for
encrypted inodes).
Addresses-Google-Bug: #35209576
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c0d0e351285161a515396b7b1ee53ec9ffd97e3c upstream.
Recently fallocate patch was merged and it uses
MSDOS_I(inode)->mmu_private at fat_evict_inode(). However,
fat_inode/fsinfo_inode that was introduced in past didn't initialize
MSDOS_I(inode) properly.
With those combinations, it became the cause of accessing random entry
in FAT area.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pohrj4i8.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Reported-by: Moreno Bartalucci <moreno.bartalucci@tecnorama.it>
Tested-by: Moreno Bartalucci <moreno.bartalucci@tecnorama.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit df963ea8a082d31521a120e8e31a29ad8a1dc215 upstream.
There's no reason a request should ever be on a s_unsafe list but not
in the request tree.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/18474
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0695d7dc1d9f19b82ec2cae24856bddce278cfe6 upstream.
freeing of inodes must be RCU-delayed on all filesystems
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 93faccbbfa958a9668d3ab4e30f38dd205cee8d8 upstream.
To support unprivileged users mounting filesystems two permission
checks have to be performed: a test to see if the user allowed to
create a mount in the mount namespace, and a test to see if
the user is allowed to access the specified filesystem.
The automount case is special in that mounting the original filesystem
grants permission to mount the sub-filesystems, to any user who
happens to stumble across the their mountpoint and satisfies the
ordinary filesystem permission checks.
Attempting to handle the automount case by using override_creds
almost works. It preserves the idea that permission to mount
the original filesystem is permission to mount the sub-filesystem.
Unfortunately using override_creds messes up the filesystems
ordinary permission checks.
Solve this by being explicit that a mount is a submount by introducing
vfs_submount, and using it where appropriate.
vfs_submount uses a new mount internal mount flags MS_SUBMOUNT, to let
sget and friends know that a mount is a submount so they can take appropriate
action.
sget and sget_userns are modified to not perform any permission checks
on submounts.
follow_automount is modified to stop using override_creds as that
has proven problemantic.
do_mount is modified to always remove the new MS_SUBMOUNT flag so
that we know userspace will never by able to specify it.
autofs4 is modified to stop using current_real_cred that was put in
there to handle the previous version of submount permission checking.
cifs is modified to pass the mountpoint all of the way down to vfs_submount.
debugfs is modified to pass the mountpoint all of the way down to
trace_automount by adding a new parameter. To make this change easier
a new typedef debugfs_automount_t is introduced to capture the type of
the debugfs automount function.
Fixes: 069d5ac9ae0d ("autofs: Fix automounts by using current_real_cred()->uid")
Fixes: aeaa4a79ff6a ("fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds")
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1064f874abc0d05eeed8993815f584d847b72486 upstream.
Ever since mount propagation was introduced in cases where a mount in
propagated to parent mount mountpoint pair that is already in use the
code has placed the new mount behind the old mount in the mount hash
table.
This implementation detail is problematic as it allows creating
arbitrary length mount hash chains.
Furthermore it invalidates the constraint maintained elsewhere in the
mount code that a parent mount and a mountpoint pair will have exactly
one mount upon them. Making it hard to deal with and to talk about
this special case in the mount code.
Modify mount propagation to notice when there is already a mount at
the parent mount and mountpoint where a new mount is propagating to
and place that preexisting mount on top of the new mount.
Modify unmount propagation to notice when a mount that is being
unmounted has another mount on top of it (and no other children), and
to replace the unmounted mount with the mount on top of it.
Move the MNT_UMUONT test from __lookup_mnt_last into
__propagate_umount as that is the only call of __lookup_mnt_last where
MNT_UMOUNT may be set on any mount visible in the mount hash table.
These modifications allow:
- __lookup_mnt_last to be removed.
- attach_shadows to be renamed __attach_mnt and its shadow
handling to be removed.
- commit_tree to be simplified
- copy_tree to be simplified
The result is an easier to understand tree of mounts that does not
allow creation of arbitrary length hash chains in the mount hash table.
The result is also a very slight userspace visible difference in semantics.
The following two cases now behave identically, where before order
mattered:
case 1: (explicit user action)
B is a slave of A
mount something on A/a , it will propagate to B/a
and than mount something on B/a
case 2: (tucked mount)
B is a slave of A
mount something on B/a
and than mount something on A/a
Histroically umount A/a would fail in case 1 and succeed in case 2.
Now umount A/a succeeds in both configurations.
This very small change in semantics appears if anything to be a bug
fix to me and my survey of userspace leads me to believe that no programs
will notice or care of this subtle semantic change.
v2: Updated to mnt_change_mountpoint to not call dput or mntput
and instead to decrement the counts directly. It is guaranteed
that there will be other references when mnt_change_mountpoint is
called so this is safe.
v3: Moved put_mountpoint under mount_lock in attach_recursive_mnt
As the locking in fs/namespace.c changed between v2 and v3.
v4: Reworked the logic in propagate_mount_busy and __propagate_umount
that detects when a mount completely covers another mount.
v5: Removed unnecessary tests whose result is alwasy true in
find_topper and attach_recursive_mnt.
v6: Document the user space visible semantic difference.
Fixes: b90fa9ae8f51 ("[PATCH] shared mount handling: bind and rbind")
Tested-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d641df819db8b80198fd85d9de91137e8a823b07 upstream.
add_to_page_cache_lru() can fails, so the actual pages to read
can be smaller than the initial size of osd request. We need to
update osd request size in that case.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8b107f5b97772c7c0c218302e9a4d15b4edf50b4 upstream.
If segs_per_sec is over 1 like under SMR, previously f2fs issues discard
commands redundantly on the same section, since we didn't move end position
for the previous discard command.
E.g.,
start end
| |
prefree_bitmap = [01111100111100]
And, after issue discard for this section,
end start
| |
prefree_bitmap = [01111100111100]
Select this section again by searching from (end + 1),
start end
| |
prefree_bitmap = [01111100111100]
Fixes: 36abef4e796d38 ("f2fs: introduce mode=lfs mount option")
Cc: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e93b9865251a0503d83fd570e7d5a7c8bc351715 upstream.
For foreground gc, greedy algorithm should be adapted, which makes
this formula work well:
(2 * (100 / config.overprovision + 1) + 6)
But currently, we fg_gc have a prior to select bg_gc victim segments to gc
first, these victims are selected by cost-benefit algorithm, we can't guarantee
such segments have the small valid blocks, which may destroy the f2fs rule, on
the worstest case, would consume all the free segments.
This patch fix this by add a filter in check_bg_victims, if segment's has # of
valid blocks over overprovision ratio, skip such segments.
Signed-off-by: Hou Pengyang <houpengyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88c5c13a5027b36d914536fdba23f069d7067204 upstream.
It turns out a stakable filesystem like sdcardfs in AOSP can trigger multiple
vfs_create() to lower filesystem. In that case, f2fs will add multiple dentries
having same name which breaks filesystem consistency.
Until upper layer fixes, let's work around by f2fs, which shows actually not
much performance regression.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7855eba4d6102f811b6dd142d6c749f53b591fa3 upstream.
This patch fix a problem of using memory after free
in function __try_merge_extent_node.
Fixes: 0f825ee6e873 ("f2fs: add new interfaces for extent tree")
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ed92d8c137b7794c2c2aa14479298b9885967607 upstream.
We're not taking into account that the space needed for the (variable
length) attr bitmap, with the result that we'd sometimes get a spurious
ERANGE when the ACL data got close to the end of a page.
Just add in an extra page to make sure.
Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6682c14bbe505a8b912c57faf544f866777ee48d upstream.
Bitmap and attrlen follow immediately after the op reply header. This
was an oversight from commit bf118a342f.
Consequences of this are just minor efficiency (extra calls to
xdr_shrink_bufhead).
Fixes: bf118a342f10 "NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data"
Reviewed-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit df3ab232e462bce20710596d697ade6b72497694 upstream.
If we see that our pNFS READ/WRITE/COMMIT operation failed, but we
also see that our layout segment is no longer valid, then we need to
get a new layout segment before retrying.
Fixes: 90816d1ddacf ("NFSv4.1/flexfiles: Don't mark the entire deviceid...")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9d8cacbf5636657d2cd0dda17438a56d806d3224 upstream.
Copy offload code needs to be hooked into the code for handling
NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID by ensuring that we set the "stateid" field
in struct nfs4_exception.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: 2e72448b07dc3 ("NFS: Add COPY nfs operation")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a974deee477af89411e0f80456bfb344ac433c98 upstream.
If we exit because the file access check failed, we currently
leak the struct nfs4_state. We need to attach it to the
open context before returning.
Fixes: 3efb9722475e ("NFSv4: Refactor _nfs4_open_and_get_state..")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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