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* allow kernel_execve() leave the actual return to userland to
caller (selected by CONFIG_GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE). Callers
updated accordingly.
* architecture that does select GENERIC_KERNEL_EXECVE in its
Kconfig should have its ret_from_kernel_thread() do this:
call schedule_tail
call the callback left for it by copy_thread(); if it ever
returns, that's because it has just done successful kernel_execve()
jump to return from syscall
IOW, its only difference from ret_from_fork() is that it does call the
callback.
* such an architecture should also get rid of ret_from_kernel_execve()
and __ARCH_WANT_KERNEL_EXECVE
This is the last part of infrastructure patches in that area - from
that point on work on different architectures can live independently.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Most of them never returned anyway - only two functions had to be
changed. That allows to simplify their callers a whole lot.
Note that this does *not* apply to kthread_run() callbacks - all of
those had been called from the same kernel_thread() callback, which
did do_exit() already. This is strictly about very few low-level
kernel_thread() callbacks (there are only 6 of those, mostly as part
of kthread.h and kmod.h exported mechanisms, plus kernel_init()
itself).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The system deadlocks (at least since 2.6.10) when
call_usermodehelper(UMH_WAIT_EXEC) request triggers
call_usermodehelper(UMH_WAIT_PROC) request.
This is because "khelper thread is waiting for the worker thread at
wait_for_completion() in do_fork() since the worker thread was created
with CLONE_VFORK flag" and "the worker thread cannot call complete()
because do_execve() is blocked at UMH_WAIT_PROC request" and "the khelper
thread cannot start processing UMH_WAIT_PROC request because the khelper
thread is waiting for the worker thread at wait_for_completion() in
do_fork()".
The easiest example to observe this deadlock is to use a corrupted
/sbin/hotplug binary (like shown below).
# : > /tmp/dummy
# chmod 755 /tmp/dummy
# echo /tmp/dummy > /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug
# modprobe whatever
call_usermodehelper("/tmp/dummy", UMH_WAIT_EXEC) is called from
kobject_uevent_env() in lib/kobject_uevent.c upon loading/unloading a
module. do_execve("/tmp/dummy") triggers a call to
request_module("binfmt-0000") from search_binary_handler() which in turn
calls call_usermodehelper(UMH_WAIT_PROC).
In order to avoid deadlock, as a for-now and easy-to-backport solution, do
not try to call wait_for_completion() in call_usermodehelper_exec() if the
worker thread was created by khelper thread with CLONE_VFORK flag. Future
and fundamental solution might be replacing singleton khelper thread with
some workqueue so that recursive calls up to max_active dependency loop
can be handled without deadlock.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment to kmod_thread_locker]
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This function's interface is, uh, subtle. Attempt to apologise for it.
Cc: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Warning(kernel/kmod.c:419): No description found for parameter 'depth'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If we move call_usermodehelper_fns() to kmod.c file and EXPORT_SYMBOL it
we can avoid exporting all it's helper functions:
call_usermodehelper_setup
call_usermodehelper_setfns
call_usermodehelper_exec
And make all of them static to kmod.c
Since the optimizer will see all these as a single call site it will
inline them inside call_usermodehelper_fns(). So we loose the call to
_fns but gain 3 calls to the helpers. (Not that it matters)
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() is not used outside of kmod.c. So unexport
it, and make it static to kmod.c
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There is a race condition between the freezer and request_firmware()
such that if request_firmware() is run on one CPU and
freeze_processes() is run on another CPU and usermodehelper_disable()
called by it succeeds to grab umhelper_sem for writing before
usermodehelper_read_trylock() called from request_firmware()
acquires it for reading, the request_firmware() will fail and
trigger a WARN_ON() complaining that it was called at a wrong time.
However, in fact, it wasn't called at a wrong time and
freeze_processes() simply happened to be executed simultaneously.
To avoid this race, at least in some cases, modify
usermodehelper_read_trylock() so that it doesn't fail if the
freezing of tasks has just started and hasn't been completed yet.
Instead, during the freezing of tasks, it will try to freeze the
task that has called it so that it can wait until user space is
thawed without triggering the scary warning.
For this purpose, change usermodehelper_disabled so that it can
take three different values, UMH_ENABLED (0), UMH_FREEZING and
UMH_DISABLED. The first one means that usermode helpers are
enabled, the last one means "hard disable" (i.e. the system is not
ready for usermode helpers to be used) and the second one
is reserved for the freezer. Namely, when freeze_processes() is
started, it sets usermodehelper_disabled to UMH_FREEZING which
tells usermodehelper_read_trylock() that it shouldn't fail just
yet and should call try_to_freeze() if woken up and cannot
return immediately. This way all freezable tasks that happen
to call request_firmware() right before freeze_processes() is
started and lose the race for umhelper_sem with it will be
frozen and will sleep until thaw_processes() unsets
usermodehelper_disabled. [For the non-freezable callers of
request_firmware() the race for umhelper_sem against
freeze_processes() is unfortunately unavoidable.]
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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If firmware is requested asynchronously, by calling
request_firmware_nowait(), there is no reason to fail the request
(and warn the user) when the system is (presumably temporarily)
unready to handle it (because user space is not available yet or
frozen). For this reason, introduce an alternative routine for
read-locking umhelper_sem, usermodehelper_read_lock_wait(), that
will wait for usermodehelper_disabled to be unset (possibly with
a timeout) and make request_firmware_work_func() use it instead of
usermodehelper_read_trylock().
Accordingly, modify request_firmware() so that it uses
usermodehelper_read_trylock() to acquire umhelper_sem and remove
the code related to that lock from _request_firmware().
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Instead of two functions, read_lock_usermodehelper() and
usermodehelper_is_disabled(), used in combination, introduce
usermodehelper_read_trylock() that will only return with umhelper_sem
held if usermodehelper_disabled is unset (and will return -EAGAIN
otherwise) and make _request_firmware() use it.
Rename read_unlock_usermodehelper() to
usermodehelper_read_unlock() to follow the naming convention of the
new function.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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As Tetsuo Handa pointed out, request_module() can stress the system
while the oom-killed caller sleeps in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE.
The task T uses "almost all" memory, then it does something which
triggers request_module(). Say, it can simply call sys_socket(). This
in turn needs more memory and leads to OOM. oom-killer correctly
chooses T and kills it, but this can't help because it sleeps in
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE and after that oom-killer becomes "disabled" by the
TIF_MEMDIE task T.
Make __request_module() killable. The only necessary change is that
call_modprobe() should kmalloc argv and module_name, they can't live in
the stack if we use UMH_KILLABLE. This memory is freed via
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo()->cleanup.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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No functional changes. Move the call_usermodehelper code from
__request_module() into the new simple helper, call_modprobe().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Minor cleanup. ____call_usermodehelper() can simply return, no need to
call do_exit() explicitely.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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No functional changes. It is not sane to use UMH_KILLABLE with enum
umh_wait, but obviously we do not want another argument in
call_usermodehelper_* helpers. Kill this enum, use the plain int.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Implement UMH_KILLABLE, should be used along with UMH_WAIT_EXEC/PROC.
The caller must ensure that subprocess_info->path/etc can not go away
until call_usermodehelper_freeinfo().
call_usermodehelper_exec(UMH_KILLABLE) does
wait_for_completion_killable. If it fails, it uses
xchg(&sub_info->complete, NULL) to serialize with umh_complete() which
does the same xhcg() to access sub_info->complete.
If call_usermodehelper_exec wins, it can safely return. umh_complete()
should get NULL and call call_usermodehelper_freeinfo().
Otherwise we know that umh_complete() was already called, in this case
call_usermodehelper_exec() falls back to wait_for_completion() which
should succeed "very soon".
Note: UMH_NO_WAIT == -1 but it obviously should not be used with
UMH_KILLABLE. We delay the neccessary cleanup to simplify the back
porting.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Preparation. Add the new trivial helper, umh_complete(). Currently it
simply does complete(sub_info->complete).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* pm-sleep: (51 commits)
PM: Drop generic_subsys_pm_ops
PM / Sleep: Remove forward-only callbacks from AMBA bus type
PM / Sleep: Remove forward-only callbacks from platform bus type
PM: Run the driver callback directly if the subsystem one is not there
PM / Sleep: Make pm_op() and pm_noirq_op() return callback pointers
PM / Sleep: Merge internal functions in generic_ops.c
PM / Sleep: Simplify generic system suspend callbacks
PM / Hibernate: Remove deprecated hibernation snapshot ioctls
PM / Sleep: Fix freezer failures due to racy usermodehelper_is_disabled()
PM / Sleep: Recommend [un]lock_system_sleep() over using pm_mutex directly
PM / Sleep: Replace mutex_[un]lock(&pm_mutex) with [un]lock_system_sleep()
PM / Sleep: Make [un]lock_system_sleep() generic
PM / Sleep: Use the freezer_count() functions in [un]lock_system_sleep() APIs
PM / Freezer: Remove the "userspace only" constraint from freezer[_do_not]_count()
PM / Hibernate: Replace unintuitive 'if' condition in kernel/power/user.c with 'else'
Freezer / sunrpc / NFS: don't allow TASK_KILLABLE sleeps to block the freezer
PM / Sleep: Unify diagnostic messages from device suspend/resume
ACPI / PM: Do not save/restore NVS on Asus K54C/K54HR
PM / Hibernate: Remove deprecated hibernation test modes
PM / Hibernate: Thaw processes in SNAPSHOT_CREATE_IMAGE ioctl test path
...
Conflicts:
kernel/kmod.c
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Commit a144c6a (PM: Print a warning if firmware is requested when tasks
are frozen) introduced usermodehelper_is_disabled() to warn and exit
immediately if firmware is requested when usermodehelpers are disabled.
However, it is racy. Consider the following scenario, currently used in
drivers/base/firmware_class.c:
...
if (usermodehelper_is_disabled())
goto out;
/* Do actual work */
...
out:
return err;
Nothing prevents someone from disabling usermodehelpers just after the check
in the 'if' condition, which means that it is quite possible to try doing the
"actual work" with usermodehelpers disabled, leading to undesirable
consequences.
In particular, this race condition in _request_firmware() causes task freezing
failures whenever suspend/hibernation is in progress because, it wrongly waits
to get the firmware/microcode image from userspace when actually the
usermodehelpers are disabled or userspace has been frozen.
Some of the example scenarios that cause freezing failures due to this race
are those that depend on userspace via request_firmware(), such as x86
microcode module initialization and microcode image reload.
Previous discussions about this issue can be found at:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1198291/focus=1200591
This patch adds proper synchronization to fix this issue.
It is to be noted that this patchset fixes the freezing failures but doesn't
remove the warnings. IOW, it does not attempt to add explicit synchronization
to x86 microcode driver to avoid requesting microcode image at inopportune
moments. Because, the warnings were introduced to highlight such cases, in the
first place. And we need not silence the warnings, since we take care of the
*real* problem (freezing failure) and hence, after that, the warnings are
pretty harmless anyway.
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
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usermodehelper_pm_callback() no longer exists in the kernel. There are 2
comments in kernel/kmod.c that still refer to it.
Also, the patch that introduced usermodehelper_pm_callback(), #included
two header files: <linux/notifier.h> and <linux/suspend.h>. But these are
no longer necessary.
This patch updates the comments as appropriate and removes the unnecessary
header file inclusions.
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
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Due to post-increment in condition of kmod_loop_msg in __request_module(),
the system log can be spammed by much more than 5 instances of the 'runaway
loop' message if the number of events triggering it makes the kmod_loop_msg
to overflow.
Fix that by making sure we never increment it past the threshold.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
CC: stable@kernel.org
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The core device layer sends tons of uevent notifications for each device
it finds, and if the kernel has been built with a non-empty
CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER_PATH that will make us try to execute the usermode
helper binary for all these events very early in the boot.
Not only won't the root filesystem even be mounted at that point, we
literally won't have necessarily even initialized all the process
handling data structures at that point, which causes no end of silly
problems even when the usermode helper doesn't actually succeed in
executing.
So just use our existing infrastructure to disable the usermodehelpers
to make the kernel start out with them disabled. We enable them when
we've at least initialized stuff a bit.
Problems related to an uninitialized
init_ipc_ns.ids[IPC_SHM_IDS].rw_mutex
reported by various people.
Reported-by: Manuel Lauss <manuel.lauss@googlemail.com>
Reported-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@misterjones.org>
Acked-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function. The problem is that commit
17f60a7da150 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function. This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.
The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init(). That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.
This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key. This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We need to prevent kernel-forked processes during system poweroff.
Such processes try to access the filesystem whose disks we are
trying to shutdown at the same time. This causes delays and exceptions
in the storage drivers.
A follow-up patch will add these calls and need usermodehelper_disable()
also on systems without suspend support.
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
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Some drivers erroneously use request_firmware() from their ->resume()
(or ->thaw(), or ->restore()) callbacks, which is not going to work
unless the firmware has been built in. This causes system resume to
stall until the firmware-loading timeout expires, which makes users
think that the resume has failed and reboot their machines
unnecessarily. For this reason, make _request_firmware() print a
warning and return immediately with error code if it has been called
when tasks are frozen and it's impossible to start any new usermode
helpers.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
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There is no way to limit the capabilities of usermodehelpers. This problem
reared its head recently when someone complained that any user with
cap_net_admin was able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user
didn't have cap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by
a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set. This patch addes new
sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers.
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritable
You must have CAP_SYS_MODULE and CAP_SETPCAP to change these (changes are
&= ONLY). When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these
as the bset and pI.
-v2: make globals static
create spinlock to protect globals
-v3: require both CAP_SETPCAP and CAP_SYS_MODULE
-v4: fix the typo s/CAP_SET_PCAP/CAP_SETPCAP/ because I didn't commit
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
No-objection-from: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer so that kernel_execve() compiles
correctly on ARM:
arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c:88: warning: passing argument 1 of 'do_execve' discards qualifiers from pointer target type
This also requires the argv and envp arguments to be consted twice, once for
the pointer array and once for the strings the array points to. This is
because do_execve() passes a pointer to the filename (now const) to
copy_strings_kernel(). A simpler alternative would be to cast the filename
pointer in do_execve() when it's passed to copy_strings_kernel().
do_execve() may not change any of the strings it is passed as part of the argv
or envp lists as they are some of them in .rodata, so marking these strings as
const should be fine.
Further kernel_execve() and sys_execve() need to be changed to match.
This has been test built on x86_64, frv, arm and mips.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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UMH_WAIT_EXEC should report the error if kernel_thread() fails, like
UMH_WAIT_PROC does.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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__call_usermodehelper(UMH_NO_WAIT) has 2 problems:
- if kernel_thread() fails, call_usermodehelper_freeinfo()
is not called.
- for unknown reason UMH_NO_WAIT has UMH_WAIT_PROC logic,
we spawn yet another thread which waits until the user
mode application exits.
Change the UMH_NO_WAIT code to use ____call_usermodehelper() instead of
wait_for_helper(), and do call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() unconditionally.
We can rely on CLONE_VFORK, do_fork(CLONE_VFORK) until the child exits or
execs.
With or without this patch UMH_NO_WAIT does not report the error if
kernel_thread() fails, this is correct since the caller doesn't wait for
result.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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1. wait_for_helper() calls allow_signal(SIGCHLD) to ensure the child
can't autoreap itself.
However, this means that a spurious SIGCHILD from user-space can
set TIF_SIGPENDING and:
- kernel_thread() or sys_wait4() can fail due to signal_pending()
- worse, wait4() can fail before ____call_usermodehelper() execs
or exits. In this case the caller may kfree(subprocess_info)
while the child still uses this memory.
Change the code to use SIG_DFL instead of magic "(void __user *)2"
set by allow_signal(). This means that SIGCHLD won't be delivered,
yet the child won't autoreap itsefl.
The problem is minor, only root can send a signal to this kthread.
2. If sys_wait4(&ret) fails it doesn't populate "ret", in this case
wait_for_helper() reports a random value from uninitialized var.
With this patch sys_wait4() should never fail, but still it makes
sense to initialize ret = -ECHILD so that the caller can notice
the problem.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
____call_usermodehelper() correctly calls flush_signal_handlers() to set
SIG_DFL, but sigemptyset(->blocked) and recalc_sigpending() are not
needed.
This kthread was forked by workqueue thread, all signals must be unblocked
and ignored, no pending signal is possible.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Now that nobody ever changes subprocess_info->cred we can kill this member
and related code. ____call_usermodehelper() always runs in the context of
freshly forked kernel thread, it has the proper ->cred copied from its
parent kthread, keventd.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
call_usermodehelper_keys() uses call_usermodehelper_setkeys() to change
subprocess_info->cred in advance. Now that we have info->init() we can
change this code to set tgcred->session_keyring in context of execing
kernel thread.
Note: since currently call_usermodehelper_keys() is never called with
UMH_NO_WAIT, call_usermodehelper_keys()->key_get() and umh_keys_cleanup()
are not really needed, we could rely on install_session_keyring_to_cred()
which does key_get() on success.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
resolve limit
The first patch in this series introduced an init function to the
call_usermodehelper api so that processes could be customized by caller.
This patch takes advantage of that fact, by customizing the helper in
do_coredump to create the pipe and set its core limit to one (for our
recusrsion check). This lets us clean up the previous uglyness in the
usermodehelper internals and factor call_usermodehelper out entirely.
While I'm at it, we can also modify the helper setup to look for a core
limit value of 1 rather than zero for our recursion check
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
About 6 months ago, I made a set of changes to how the core-dump-to-a-pipe
feature in the kernel works. We had reports of several races, including
some reports of apps bypassing our recursion check so that a process that
was forked as part of a core_pattern setup could infinitely crash and
refork until the system crashed.
We fixed those by improving our recursion checks. The new check basically
refuses to fork a process if its core limit is zero, which works well.
Unfortunately, I've been getting grief from maintainer of user space
programs that are inserted as the forked process of core_pattern. They
contend that in order for their programs (such as abrt and apport) to
work, all the running processes in a system must have their core limits
set to a non-zero value, to which I say 'yes'. I did this by design, and
think thats the right way to do things.
But I've been asked to ease this burden on user space enough times that I
thought I would take a look at it. The first suggestion was to make the
recursion check fail on a non-zero 'special' number, like one. That way
the core collector process could set its core size ulimit to 1, and enable
the kernel's recursion detection. This isn't a bad idea on the surface,
but I don't like it since its opt-in, in that if a program like abrt or
apport has a bug and fails to set such a core limit, we're left with a
recursively crashing system again.
So I've come up with this. What I've done is modify the
call_usermodehelper api such that an extra parameter is added, a function
pointer which will be called by the user helper task, after it forks, but
before it exec's the required process. This will give the caller the
opportunity to get a call back in the processes context, allowing it to do
whatever it needs to to the process in the kernel prior to exec-ing the
user space code. In the case of do_coredump, this callback is ues to set
the core ulimit of the helper process to 1. This elimnates the opt-in
problem that I had above, as it allows the ulimit for core sizes to be set
to the value of 1, which is what the recursion check looks for in
do_coredump.
This patch:
Create new function call_usermodehelper_fns() and allow it to assign both
an init and cleanup function, as we'll as arbitrary data.
The init function is called from the context of the forked process and
allows for customization of the helper process prior to calling exec. Its
return code gates the continuation of the process, or causes its exit.
Also add an arbitrary data pointer to the subprocess_info struct allowing
for data to be passed from the caller to the new process, and the
subsequent cleanup process
Also, use this patch to cleanup the cleanup function. It currently takes
an argp and envp pointer for freeing, which is ugly. Lets instead just
make the subprocess_info structure public, and pass that to the cleanup
and init routines
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fix resource (write-pipe file) leak in call_usermodehelper_pipe().
When call_usermodehelper_exec() fails, write-pipe file is opened and
call_usermodehelper_pipe() just returns an error. Since it is hard for
caller to determine whether the error occured when opening the pipe or
executing the helper, the caller cannot close the pipe by themselves.
I've found this resoruce leak when testing coredump. You can check how
the resource leaks as below;
$ echo "|nocommand" > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
$ ulimit -c unlimited
$ while [ 1 ]; do ./segv; done &> /dev/null &
$ cat /proc/meminfo (<- repeat it)
where segv.c is;
//-----
int main () {
char *p = 0;
*p = 1;
}
//-----
This patch closes write-pipe file if call_usermodehelper_exec() failed.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.
Example output:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'tracing-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (105 commits)
ring-buffer: only enable ring_buffer_swap_cpu when needed
ring-buffer: check for swapped buffers in start of committing
tracing: report error in trace if we fail to swap latency buffer
tracing: add trace_array_printk for internal tracers to use
tracing: pass around ring buffer instead of tracer
tracing: make tracing_reset safe for external use
tracing: use timestamp to determine start of latency traces
tracing: Remove mentioning of legacy latency_trace file from documentation
tracing/filters: Defer pred allocation, fix memory leak
tracing: remove users of tracing_reset
tracing: disable buffers and synchronize_sched before resetting
tracing: disable update max tracer while reading trace
tracing: print out start and stop in latency traces
ring-buffer: disable all cpu buffers when one finds a problem
ring-buffer: do not count discarded events
ring-buffer: remove ring_buffer_event_discard
ring-buffer: fix ring_buffer_read crossing pages
ring-buffer: remove unnecessary cpu_relax
ring-buffer: do not swap buffers during a commit
ring-buffer: do not reset while in a commit
...
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Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).
Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):
http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Add trace points to trace module_load, module_free, module_get,
module_put and module_request, and use trace_event facility to
get the trace output.
Here's the sample output:
TASK-PID CPU# TIMESTAMP FUNCTION
| | | | |
<...>-42 [000] 1.758380: module_request: fb0 wait=1 call_site=fb_open
...
<...>-60 [000] 3.269403: module_load: scsi_wait_scan
<...>-60 [000] 3.269432: module_put: scsi_wait_scan call_site=sys_init_module refcnt=0
<...>-61 [001] 3.273168: module_free: scsi_wait_scan
...
<...>-1021 [000] 13.836081: module_load: sunrpc
<...>-1021 [000] 13.840589: module_put: sunrpc call_site=sys_init_module refcnt=-1
<...>-1027 [000] 13.848098: module_get: sunrpc call_site=try_module_get refcnt=0
<...>-1027 [000] 13.848308: module_get: sunrpc call_site=get_filesystem refcnt=1
<...>-1027 [000] 13.848692: module_put: sunrpc call_site=put_filesystem refcnt=0
...
modprobe-2587 [001] 1088.437213: module_load: trace_events_sample F
modprobe-2587 [001] 1088.437786: module_put: trace_events_sample call_site=sys_init_module refcnt=0
Note:
- the taints flag can be 'F', 'C' and/or 'P' if mod->taints != 0
- the module refcnt is percpu, so it can be negative in a
specific cpu
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4A891B3C.5030608@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
|
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Fix various silly problems wrt mnt_namespace.h:
- exit_mnt_ns() isn't used, remove it
- done that, sched.h and nsproxy.h inclusions aren't needed
- mount.h inclusion was need for vfsmount_lock, but no longer
- remove mnt_namespace.h inclusion from files which don't use anything
from mnt_namespace.h
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
call_usermodehelper_setup() forgot to kfree(sub_info)
when prepare_usermodehelper_creds() failed.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There seems to be a common pattern in the kernel where drivers want to
call request_module() from inside a module_init() function. Currently
this would deadlock.
As a result, several drivers go through hoops like scheduling things via
kevent, or creating custom work queues (because kevent can deadlock on them).
This patch changes this to use a request_module_nowait() function macro instead,
which just fires the modprobe off but doesn't wait for it, and thus avoids the
original deadlock entirely.
On my laptop this already results in one less kernel thread running..
(Includes Jiri's patch to use enum umh_wait)
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> (bool-ified)
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
|
|
Impact: cleanup
(Thanks to Al Viro for reminding me of this, via Ingo)
CPU_MASK_ALL is the (deprecated) "all bits set" cpumask, defined as so:
#define CPU_MASK_ALL (cpumask_t) { { ... } }
Taking the address of such a temporary is questionable at best,
unfortunately 321a8e9d (cpumask: add CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR macro) added
CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR:
#define CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR (&CPU_MASK_ALL)
Which formalizes this practice. One day gcc could bite us over this
usage (though we seem to have gotten away with it so far).
So replace everywhere which used &CPU_MASK_ALL or CPU_MASK_ALL_PTR
with the modern "cpu_all_mask" (a real const struct cpumask *).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
|
|
Fix varargs kernel-doc format in kmod.c:
Use @... instead of @varargs.
Warning(kernel/kmod.c:67): Excess function parameter or struct member 'varargs' description in 'request_module'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.
This patch alters the behaviour such that:
(1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.
(2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
(KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then:
(a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
key will be attached to that keyring.
(b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().
(3) No extra link will be made.
Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.
Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained. This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:
+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | | | | |
| Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
request_key() request_key()
This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus:
module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endif
remove CONFIG_KMOD from fs
remove CONFIG_KMOD from drivers
Manually fix conflict due to include cleanups in drivers/md/md.c
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We currently use a PM notifier to disable user mode helpers before suspend
and hibernation and to re-enable them during resume. However, this is not
an ideal solution, because if any drivers want to upload firmware into
memory before suspend, they have to use a PM notifier for this purpose and
there is no guarantee that the ordering of PM notifiers will be as
expected (ie. the notifier that disables user mode helpers has to be run
after the driver's notifier used for uploading the firmware).
For this reason, it seems better to move the disabling and enabling of
user mode helpers to separate functions that will be called by the PM core
as necessary.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded ifdefs]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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