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2016-01-21UBSAN: run-time undefined behavior sanity checkerAndrey Ryabinin
UBSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to catch undefined behavior (UB). Compiler inserts code that perform certain kinds of checks before operations that could cause UB. If check fails (i.e. UB detected) __ubsan_handle_* function called to print error message. So the most of the work is done by compiler. This patch just implements ubsan handlers printing errors. GCC has this capability since 4.9.x [1] (see -fsanitize=undefined option and its suboptions). However GCC 5.x has more checkers implemented [2]. Article [3] has a bit more details about UBSAN in the GCC. [1] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.0/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [2] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [3] - http://developerblog.redhat.com/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan/ Issues which UBSAN has found thus far are: Found bugs: * out-of-bounds access - 97840cb67ff5 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: fix insufficient validation in nfnetlink_bind") undefined shifts: * d48458d4a768 ("jbd2: use a better hash function for the revoke table") * 10632008b9e1 ("clockevents: Prevent shift out of bounds") * 'x << -1' shift in ext4 - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<5444EF21.8020501@samsung.com> * undefined rol32(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449198241-20654-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * undefined dirty_ratelimit calculation - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<566594E2.3050306@odin.com> * undefined roundown_pow_of_two(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449156616-11474-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * [WONTFIX] undefined shift in __bpf_prog_run - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+ZxoR3UjLgcNdUm4fECLMx2VdtfrENMtRRCdgHB2n0bJA@mail.gmail.com> WONTFIX here because it should be fixed in bpf program, not in kernel. signed overflows: * 32a8df4e0b33f ("sched: Fix odd values in effective_load() calculations") * mul overflow in ntp - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449175608-1146-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * incorrect conversion into rtc_time in rtc_time64_to_tm() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449187944-11730-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * unvalidated timespec in io_getevents() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+bBxVYLQ6LtOKrKtnLthqLHcw-BMp3aqP3mjdAvr9FULQ@mail.gmail.com> * [NOTABUG] signed overflow in ktime_add_safe() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+aJ4muRnWxsUe1CMnA6P8nooO33kwG-c8YZg=0Xc8rJqw@mail.gmail.com> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused local warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix __int128 build woes] Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Yury Gribov <y.gribov@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-21kasan: fix kmemleak false-positive in kasan_module_alloc()Andrey Ryabinin
Kmemleak reports the following leak: unreferenced object 0xfffffbfff41ea000 (size 20480): comm "modprobe", pid 65199, jiffies 4298875551 (age 542.568s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff82354f5e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xc0 [<ffffffff8152e718>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x4b8/0x740 [<ffffffff81574072>] kasan_module_alloc+0x72/0xc0 [<ffffffff810efe68>] module_alloc+0x78/0xb0 [<ffffffff812f6a24>] module_alloc_update_bounds+0x14/0x70 [<ffffffff812f8184>] layout_and_allocate+0x16f4/0x3c90 [<ffffffff812faa1f>] load_module+0x2ff/0x6690 [<ffffffff813010b6>] SyS_finit_module+0x136/0x170 [<ffffffff8239bbc9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff kasan_module_alloc() allocates shadow memory for module and frees it on module unloading. It doesn't store the pointer to allocated shadow memory because it could be calculated from the shadowed address, i.e. kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr). Since kmemleak cannot find pointer to allocated shadow, it thinks that memory leaked. Use kmemleak_ignore() to tell kmemleak that this is not a leak and shadow memory doesn't contain any pointers. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: always taint kernel on reportAndrey Ryabinin
Currently we already taint the kernel in some cases. E.g. if we hit some bug in slub memory we call object_err() which will taint the kernel with TAINT_BAD_PAGE flag. But for other kind of bugs kernel left untainted. Always taint with TAINT_BAD_PAGE if kasan found some bug. This is useful for automated testing. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: use IS_ALIGNED in memory_is_poisoned_8()Xishi Qiu
Use IS_ALIGNED() to determine whether the shadow span two bytes. It generates less code and more readable. Also add some comments in shadow check functions. Signed-off-by: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: Fix a type conversion errorWang Long
The current KASAN code can not find the following out-of-bounds bugs: char *ptr; ptr = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL); memset(ptr+7, 0, 2); the cause of the problem is the type conversion error in *memory_is_poisoned_n* function. So this patch fix that. Signed-off-by: Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: update reference to kasan prototype repoAndrey Konovalov
Update the reference to the kasan prototype repository on github, since it was renamed. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: update log messagesAndrey Konovalov
We decided to use KASAN as the short name of the tool and KernelAddressSanitizer as the full one. Update log messages according to that. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: accurately determine the type of the bad accessAndrey Konovalov
Makes KASAN accurately determine the type of the bad access. If the shadow byte value is in the [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) range we can look at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the access. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: update reported bug types for kernel memory accessesAndrey Konovalov
Update the names of the bad access types to better reflect the type of the access that happended and make these error types "literals" that can be used for classification and deduplication in scripts. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kasan: update reported bug types for not user nor kernel memory accessesAndrey Konovalov
Each access with address lower than kasan_shadow_to_mem(KASAN_SHADOW_START) is reported as user-memory-access. This is not always true, the accessed address might not be in user space. Fix this by reporting such accesses as null-ptr-derefs or wild-memory-accesses. There's another reason for this change. For userspace ASan we have a bunch of systems that analyze error types for the purpose of classification and deduplication. Sooner of later we will write them to KASAN as well. Then clearly and explicitly stated error types will bring value. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06mm/kasan: prevent deadlock in kasan reportingAneesh Kumar K.V
When we end up calling kasan_report in real mode, our shadow mapping for the spinlock variable will show poisoned. This will result in us calling kasan_report_error with lock_report spin lock held. To prevent this disable kasan reporting when we are priting error w.r.t kasan. Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06mm/kasan: don't use kasan shadow pointer in generic functionsAneesh Kumar K.V
We can't use generic functions like print_hex_dump to access kasan shadow region. This require us to setup another kasan shadow region for the address passed (kasan shadow address). Some architectures won't be able to do that. Hence make a copy of the shadow region row and pass that to generic functions. Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06mm/kasan: MODULE_VADDR is not available on all archsAneesh Kumar K.V
Use is_module_address instead Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06mm/kasan: rename kasan_enabled() to kasan_report_enabled()Aneesh Kumar K.V
The function only disable/enable reporting. In the later patch we will be adding a kasan early enable/disable. Rename kasan_enabled to properly reflect its function. Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-18kasan: fix last shadow judgement in memory_is_poisoned_16()Xishi Qiu
The shadow which correspond 16 bytes memory may span 2 or 3 bytes. If the memory is aligned on 8, then the shadow takes only 2 bytes. So we check "shadow_first_bytes" is enough, and need not to call "memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);". But the code "if (likely(!last_byte))" is wrong judgement. e.g. addr=0, so last_byte = 15 & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK = 7, then the code will continue to call "memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);" Signed-off-by: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-08-22x86/kasan, mm: Introduce generic kasan_populate_zero_shadow()Andrey Ryabinin
Introduce generic kasan_populate_zero_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end). This function maps kasan_zero_page to the [shadow_start, shadow_end] addresses. This replaces x86_64 specific populate_zero_shadow() and will be used for ARM64 in follow on patches. The main changes from original version are: * Use p?d_populate*() instead of set_p?d() * Use memblock allocator directly instead of vmemmap_alloc_block() * __pa() instead of __pa_nodebug(). __pa() causes troubles iff we use it before kasan_early_init(). kasan_populate_zero_shadow() will be used later, so we ok with __pa() here. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexey Klimov <klimov.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: David Keitel <dkeitel@codeaurora.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Yury <yury.norov@gmail.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1439444244-26057-3-git-send-email-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-08-14.mailmap: Andrey Ryabinin has movedAndrey Ryabinin
Update my email address. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-26kasan: remove duplicate definition of the macro KASAN_FREE_PAGEWang Long
Remove duplicate definition of the macro KASAN_FREE_PAGE in mm/kasan/kasan.h Signed-off-by: Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15mm/mempool.c: kasan: poison mempool elementsAndrey Ryabinin
Mempools keep allocated objects in reserved for situations when ordinary allocation may not be possible to satisfy. These objects shouldn't be accessed before they leave the pool. This patch poison elements when get into the pool and unpoison when they leave it. This will let KASan to detect use-after-free of mempool's elements. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <drcheren@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-03-13kasan, module, vmalloc: rework shadow allocation for modulesAndrey Ryabinin
Current approach in handling shadow memory for modules is broken. Shadow memory could be freed only after memory shadow corresponds it is no longer used. vfree() called from interrupt context could use memory its freeing to store 'struct llist_node' in it: void vfree(const void *addr) { ... if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) { struct vfree_deferred *p = this_cpu_ptr(&vfree_deferred); if (llist_add((struct llist_node *)addr, &p->list)) schedule_work(&p->wq); Later this list node used in free_work() which actually frees memory. Currently module_memfree() called in interrupt context will free shadow before freeing module's memory which could provoke kernel crash. So shadow memory should be freed after module's memory. However, such deallocation order could race with kasan_module_alloc() in module_alloc(). Free shadow right before releasing vm area. At this point vfree()'d memory is not used anymore and yet not available for other allocations. New VM_KASAN flag used to indicate that vm area has dynamically allocated shadow memory so kasan frees shadow only if it was previously allocated. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14kasan: enable instrumentation of global variablesAndrey Ryabinin
This feature let us to detect accesses out of bounds of global variables. This will work as for globals in kernel image, so for globals in modules. Currently this won't work for symbols in user-specified sections (e.g. __init, __read_mostly, ...) The idea of this is simple. Compiler increases each global variable by redzone size and add constructors invoking __asan_register_globals() function. Information about global variable (address, size, size with redzone ...) passed to __asan_register_globals() so we could poison variable's redzone. This patch also forces module_alloc() to return 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address making shadow memory handling ( kasan_module_alloc()/kasan_module_free() ) more simple. Such alignment guarantees that each shadow page backing modules address space correspond to only one module_alloc() allocation. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14kasan: enable stack instrumentationAndrey Ryabinin
Stack instrumentation allows to detect out of bounds memory accesses for variables allocated on stack. Compiler adds redzones around every variable on stack and poisons redzones in function's prologue. Such approach significantly increases stack usage, so all in-kernel stacks size were doubled. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14x86_64: kasan: add interceptors for memset/memmove/memcpy functionsAndrey Ryabinin
Recently instrumentation of builtin functions calls was removed from GCC 5.0. To check the memory accessed by such functions, userspace asan always uses interceptors for them. So now we should do this as well. This patch declares memset/memmove/memcpy as weak symbols. In mm/kasan/kasan.c we have our own implementation of those functions which checks memory before accessing it. Default memset/memmove/memcpy now now always have aliases with '__' prefix. For files that built without kasan instrumentation (e.g. mm/slub.c) original mem* replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants, cause we don't want to check memory accesses there. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14mm: slub: add kernel address sanitizer support for slub allocatorAndrey Ryabinin
With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated by slub. Initially all objects in newly allocated slab page, marked as redzone. Later, when allocation of slub object happens, requested by caller number of bytes marked as accessible, and the rest of the object (including slub's metadata) marked as redzone (inaccessible). We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object. There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible. Code in slub.c and slab_common.c files could validly access to object's metadata, so instrumentation for this files are disabled. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14mm: page_alloc: add kasan hooks on alloc and free pathsAndrey Ryabinin
Add kernel address sanitizer hooks to mark allocated page's addresses as accessible in corresponding shadow region. Mark freed pages as inaccessible. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14kasan: disable memory hotplugAndrey Ryabinin
Currently memory hotplug won't work with KASan. As we don't have shadow for hotplugged memory, kernel will crash on the first access to it. To make this work we will need to allocate shadow for new memory. At some future point proper memory hotplug support will be implemented. Until then, print a warning at startup and disable memory hot-add. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-14kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructureAndrey Ryabinin
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds bugs. KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access, therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan instrumentation of globals. This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1]. Basic idea: The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory on each memory access. Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address. Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address: unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr) { return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET; } where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3. So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory. The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler. Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed. Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov: "We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan), ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing, running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000 scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and lots of others): [2] [3] [4]. The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers. We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer (it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs. Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5]. We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also people from Samsung and Oracle have found some. [...] As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we finish all tuning). I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads. Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are relatively easy to port." Comparison with other debugging features: ======================================== KMEMCHECK: - KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of uninitialized memory reads. Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck: $ netperf -l 30 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72 kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54 kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39 kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23 - Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation. DEBUG_PAGEALLOC: - KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page granularity level, so it able to find more bugs. SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones): - SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan. - SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads, KASan able to detect both reads and writes. - In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact place of first bad read/write. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel [2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs [5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies Based on work by Andrey Konovalov. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>