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commit 7af3ea189a9a13f090de51c97f676215dabc1205 upstream.
This is useless and more importantly not allowed on the writeback path,
because crypto_alloc_skcipher() allocates memory with GFP_KERNEL, which
can recurse back into the filesystem:
kworker/9:3 D ffff92303f318180 0 20732 2 0x00000080
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
ffff923035dd4480 ffff923038f8a0c0 0000000000000001 000000009eb27318
ffff92269eb28000 ffff92269eb27338 ffff923036b145ac ffff923035dd4480
00000000ffffffff ffff923036b145b0 ffffffff951eb4e1 ffff923036b145a8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff951eb4e1>] ? schedule+0x31/0x80
[<ffffffff951eb77a>] ? schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
[<ffffffff951ed1f4>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xb4/0x130
[<ffffffff951ed28b>] ? mutex_lock+0x1b/0x30
[<ffffffffc0a974b3>] ? xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x233/0x2d0 [xfs]
[<ffffffff94d92ba5>] ? move_active_pages_to_lru+0x125/0x270
[<ffffffff94f2b985>] ? radix_tree_gang_lookup_tag+0xc5/0x1c0
[<ffffffff94dad0f3>] ? __list_lru_walk_one.isra.3+0x33/0x120
[<ffffffffc0a98331>] ? xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40 [xfs]
[<ffffffff94e05bfe>] ? super_cache_scan+0x17e/0x190
[<ffffffff94d919f3>] ? shrink_slab.part.38+0x1e3/0x3d0
[<ffffffff94d9616a>] ? shrink_node+0x10a/0x320
[<ffffffff94d96474>] ? do_try_to_free_pages+0xf4/0x350
[<ffffffff94d967ba>] ? try_to_free_pages+0xea/0x1b0
[<ffffffff94d863bd>] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x61d/0xe60
[<ffffffff94ddf42d>] ? cache_grow_begin+0x9d/0x560
[<ffffffff94ddfb88>] ? fallback_alloc+0x148/0x1c0
[<ffffffff94ed84e7>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x37/0x130
[<ffffffff94de09db>] ? __kmalloc+0x1eb/0x580
[<ffffffffc09fe2db>] ? crush_choose_firstn+0x3eb/0x470 [libceph]
[<ffffffff94ed84e7>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x37/0x130
[<ffffffff94ed9c19>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x39/0x60
[<ffffffffc08b30a3>] ? crypto_cbc_init_tfm+0x23/0x40 [cbc]
[<ffffffff94ed857c>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0xcc/0x130
[<ffffffff94edcc23>] ? crypto_skcipher_init_tfm+0x113/0x180
[<ffffffff94ed7cc3>] ? crypto_create_tfm+0x43/0xb0
[<ffffffff94ed83b0>] ? crypto_larval_lookup+0x150/0x150
[<ffffffff94ed7da2>] ? crypto_alloc_tfm+0x72/0x120
[<ffffffffc0a01dd7>] ? ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x67/0x400 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09fd264>] ? ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds+0x84/0x5b0 [libceph]
[<ffffffff950d40a0>] ? release_sock+0x40/0x90
[<ffffffff95139f94>] ? tcp_recvmsg+0x4b4/0xae0
[<ffffffffc0a02714>] ? ceph_encrypt2+0x54/0xc0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0a02b4d>] ? ceph_x_encrypt+0x5d/0x90 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0a02bdf>] ? calcu_signature+0x5f/0x90 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0a02ef5>] ? ceph_x_sign_message+0x35/0x50 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09e948c>] ? prepare_write_message_footer+0x5c/0xa0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09ecd18>] ? ceph_con_workfn+0x2258/0x2dd0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09e9903>] ? queue_con_delay+0x33/0xd0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09f68ed>] ? __submit_request+0x20d/0x2f0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09f6ef8>] ? ceph_osdc_start_request+0x28/0x30 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0b52603>] ? rbd_queue_workfn+0x2f3/0x350 [rbd]
[<ffffffff94c94ec0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x410
[<ffffffff94c951bd>] ? worker_thread+0x4d/0x480
[<ffffffff94c95170>] ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
[<ffffffff94c9af8d>] ? kthread+0xcd/0xf0
[<ffffffff951efb2f>] ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[<ffffffff94c9aec0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190
Allocating the cipher along with the key fixes the issue - as long the
key doesn't change, a single cipher context can be used concurrently in
multiple requests.
We still can't take that GFP_KERNEL allocation though. Both
ceph_crypto_key_clone() and ceph_crypto_key_decode() are called from
GFP_NOFS context, so resort to memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() here.
Reported-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6db2304aabb070261ad34923bfd83c43dfb000e3 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2b1e1a7cd0a615d57455567a549f9965023321b5 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a45f795c65b479b4ba107b6ccde29b896d51ee98 upstream.
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.
There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:
"... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit ae385eaf24dc ("libceph: store session key in cephx authorizer")
introduced ceph_x_authorizer::session_key, but didn't update all the
exit/error paths. Introduce ceph_x_authorizer_cleanup() to encapsulate
ceph_x_authorizer cleanup and switch to it. This fixes ceph_x_destroy(),
which currently always leaks key and ceph_x_build_authorizer() error
paths.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
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There are a mix of function prototypes with and without extern
in the kernel sources. Standardize on not using extern for
function prototypes.
Function prototypes don't need to be written with extern.
extern is assumed by the compiler. Its use is as unnecessary as
using auto to declare automatic/local variables in a block.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Avoid crashing if the crypto key payload was NULL, as when it was not correctly
allocated and initialized. Also, avoid leaking it.
Signed-off-by: Sylvain Munaut <tnt@246tNt.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
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This allows us to use existence of the key type as a feature test,
from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
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This makes the base64 logic be contained in mount option parsing,
and prepares us for replacing the homebew key management with the
kernel key retention service.
Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
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This factors out protocol and low-level storage parts of ceph into a
separate libceph module living in net/ceph and include/linux/ceph. This
is mostly a matter of moving files around. However, a few key pieces
of the interface change as well:
- ceph_client becomes ceph_fs_client and ceph_client, where the latter
captures the mon and osd clients, and the fs_client gets the mds client
and file system specific pieces.
- Mount option parsing and debugfs setup is correspondingly broken into
two pieces.
- The mon client gets a generic handler callback for otherwise unknown
messages (mds map, in this case).
- The basic supported/required feature bits can be expanded (and are by
ceph_fs_client).
No functional change, aside from some subtle error handling cases that got
cleaned up in the refactoring process.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
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