Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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commit 14221cc45caad2fcab3a8543234bb7eda9b540d5 upstream.
Problem:
br_nf_pre_routing_finish() calls itself instead of
br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(). Due to this bug reverse path filter drops
packets that go through bridge interface.
User impact:
Local docker containers with bridge network can not communicate with each
other.
Fixes: c5136b15ea36 ("netfilter: bridge: add and use br_nf_hook_thresh")
Signed-off-by: Artur Molchanov <artur.molchanov@synesis.ru>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 753aacfd2e95df6a0caf23c03dc309020765bea9 upstream.
A single netlink socket might own multiple interfaces *and* a
scheduled scan request (which might belong to another interface),
so when it goes away both may need to be destroyed.
Remove the schedule_scan_stop indirection to fix this - it's only
needed for interface destruction because of the way this works
right now, with a single work taking care of all interfaces.
Fixes: 93a1e86ce10e4 ("nl80211: Stop scheduled scan if netlink client disappears")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b9f700b8cfc31089e2dfa5d0905c52fd4529b50 upstream.
Logic copied from xs_setup_bc_tcp().
Fixes: 39a9beab5acb ('rpc: share one xps between all backchannels')
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7a18c5b9fb31a999afc62b0e60978aa896fc89e9 ]
fib_select_path does not call fib_select_multipath if oif is set in the
flow struct. For VRF use cases oif is always set, so multipath route
selection is bypassed. Use the FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF to skip the oif
check similar to what is done in fib_table_lookup.
Add saddr and proto to the flow struct for the fib lookup done by the
VRF driver to better match hash computation for a flow.
Fixes: 613d09b30f8b ("net: Use VRF device index for lookups on TX")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 57ea52a865144aedbcd619ee0081155e658b6f7d ]
The GRO fast path caches the frag0 address. This address becomes
invalid if frag0 is modified by pskb_may_pull or its variants.
So whenever that happens we must disable the frag0 optimization.
This is usually done through the combination of gro_header_hard
and gro_header_slow, however, the IPv6 extension header path did
the pulling directly and would continue to use the GRO fast path
incorrectly.
This patch fixes it by disabling the fast path when we enter the
IPv6 extension header path.
Fixes: 78a478d0efd9 ("gro: Inline skb_gro_header and cache frag0 virtual address")
Reported-by: Slava Shwartsman <slavash@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7cfd5fd5a9813f1430290d20c0fead9b4582a307 ]
On 32bit arches, (skb->end - skb->data) is not 'unsigned int',
so we shall use min_t() instead of min() to avoid a compiler error.
Fixes: 1272ce87fa01 ("gro: Enter slow-path if there is no tailroom")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1272ce87fa017ca4cf32920764d879656b7a005a ]
The GRO path has a fast-path where we avoid calling pskb_may_pull
and pskb_expand by directly accessing frag0. However, this should
only be done if we have enough tailroom in the skb as otherwise
we'll have to expand it later anyway.
This patch adds the check by capping frag0_len with the skb tailroom.
Fixes: cb18978cbf45 ("gro: Open-code final pskb_may_pull")
Reported-by: Slava Shwartsman <slavash@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5d722b3024f6762addb8642ffddc9f275b5107ae ]
Commit bdabad3e363d ("net: Add Qualcomm IPC router") introduced a
new address family. Update the family name tables accordingly so
that the lockdep initialization can use the proper names for this
family.
Cc: Courtney Cavin <courtney.cavin@sonymobile.com>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suman Anna <s-anna@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit faf3a932fbeb77860226a8323eacb835edc98648 ]
It is perfectly possible to have non zero indexed switches being present
in a DSA switch tree, in such a case, we will be deferencing a NULL
pointer while dsa_cpu_port_ethtool_{setup,restore}. Be more defensive
and ensure that dst->ds[0] is valid before doing anything with it.
Fixes: 0c73c523cf73 ("net: dsa: Initialize CPU port ethtool ops per tree")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5350d54f6cd12eaff623e890744c79b700bd3f17 ]
In the case of custom rules being present we need to handle the case of the
LOCAL table being intialized after the new rule has been added. To address
that I am adding a new check so that we can make certain we don't use an
alias of MAIN for LOCAL when allocating a new table.
Fixes: 0ddcf43d5d4a ("ipv4: FIB Local/MAIN table collapse")
Reported-by: Oliver Brunel <jjk@jjacky.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7ababb782690e03b78657e27bd051e20163af2d6 ]
5.2. Action on Reception of a Query
When a system receives a Query, it does not respond immediately.
Instead, it delays its response by a random amount of time, bounded
by the Max Resp Time value derived from the Max Resp Code in the
received Query message. A system may receive a variety of Queries on
different interfaces and of different kinds (e.g., General Queries,
Group-Specific Queries, and Group-and-Source-Specific Queries), each
of which may require its own delayed response.
Before scheduling a response to a Query, the system must first
consider previously scheduled pending responses and in many cases
schedule a combined response. Therefore, the system must be able to
maintain the following state:
o A timer per interface for scheduling responses to General Queries.
o A per-group and interface timer for scheduling responses to Group-
Specific and Group-and-Source-Specific Queries.
o A per-group and interface list of sources to be reported in the
response to a Group-and-Source-Specific Query.
When a new Query with the Router-Alert option arrives on an
interface, provided the system has state to report, a delay for a
response is randomly selected in the range (0, [Max Resp Time]) where
Max Resp Time is derived from Max Resp Code in the received Query
message. The following rules are then used to determine if a Report
needs to be scheduled and the type of Report to schedule. The rules
are considered in order and only the first matching rule is applied.
1. If there is a pending response to a previous General Query
scheduled sooner than the selected delay, no additional response
needs to be scheduled.
2. If the received Query is a General Query, the interface timer is
used to schedule a response to the General Query after the
selected delay. Any previously pending response to a General
Query is canceled.
--8<--
Currently the timer is rearmed with new random expiration time for
every incoming query regardless of possibly already pending report.
Which is not aligned with the above RFE.
It also might happen that higher rate of incoming queries can
postpone the report after the expiration time of the first query
causing group membership loss.
Now the per interface general query timer is rearmed only
when there is no pending report already scheduled on that interface or
the newly selected expiration time is before the already pending
scheduled report.
Signed-off-by: Michal Tesar <mtesar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0af683407a26a4437d8fa6e283ea201f2ae8146 ]
__skb_flow_dissect can be called with a skb or a data packet, either
can be NULL. All calls seems to have been moved to __skb_header_pointer
except the pptp handling which is still calling skb_header_pointer.
skb_header_pointer will use skb->data and thus:
[ 109.556866] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
[ 109.557102] IP: [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[ 109.557263] PGD 0
[ 109.557338]
[ 109.557484] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 109.557562] Modules linked in: chaoskey
[ 109.557783] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.9.0 #79
[ 109.557867] Hardware name: Supermicro A1SRM-LN7F/LN5F/A1SRM-LN7F-2758, BIOS 1.0c 11/04/2015
[ 109.557957] task: ffff94085c27bc00 task.stack: ffffb745c0068000
[ 109.558041] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff88dc02f8>] [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[ 109.558203] RSP: 0018:ffff94087fc83d40 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 109.558286] RAX: 0000000000000130 RBX: ffffffff8975bf80 RCX: ffff94084fab6800
[ 109.558373] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 109.558460] RBP: 0000000000000b88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000022
[ 109.558547] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: ffff94087fc83e04 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 109.558763] R13: ffff94084fab6800 R14: ffff94087fc83e04 R15: 000000000000002f
[ 109.558979] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94087fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 109.559326] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 109.559539] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 0000000281809000 CR4: 00000000001026e0
[ 109.559753] Stack:
[ 109.559957] 000000000000000c ffff94084fab6822 0000000000000001 ffff94085c2b5fc0
[ 109.560578] 0000000000000001 0000000000002000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 109.561200] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 109.561820] Call Trace:
[ 109.562027] <IRQ>
[ 109.562108] [<ffffffff88dfb4fa>] ? eth_get_headlen+0x7a/0xf0
[ 109.562522] [<ffffffff88c5a35a>] ? igb_poll+0x96a/0xe80
[ 109.562737] [<ffffffff88dc912b>] ? net_rx_action+0x20b/0x350
[ 109.562953] [<ffffffff88546d68>] ? __do_softirq+0xe8/0x280
[ 109.563169] [<ffffffff8854704a>] ? irq_exit+0xaa/0xb0
[ 109.563382] [<ffffffff8847229b>] ? do_IRQ+0x4b/0xc0
[ 109.563597] [<ffffffff8902d4ff>] ? common_interrupt+0x7f/0x7f
[ 109.563810] <EOI>
[ 109.563890] [<ffffffff88d57530>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x130/0x2c0
[ 109.564304] [<ffffffff88d57520>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x120/0x2c0
[ 109.564520] [<ffffffff8857eacf>] ? cpu_startup_entry+0x19f/0x1f0
[ 109.564737] [<ffffffff8848d55a>] ? start_secondary+0x12a/0x140
[ 109.564950] Code: 83 e2 20 a8 80 0f 84 60 01 00 00 c7 04 24 08 00
00 00 66 85 d2 0f 84 be fe ff ff e9 69 fe ff ff 8b 34 24 89 f2 83 c2
04 66 85 c0 <41> 8b 84 24 80 00 00 00 0f 49 d6 41 8d 31 01 d6 41 2b 84
24 84
[ 109.569959] RIP [<ffffffff88dc02f8>] __skb_flow_dissect+0xa88/0xce0
[ 109.570245] RSP <ffff94087fc83d40>
[ 109.570453] CR2: 0000000000000080
Fixes: ab10dccb1160 ("rps: Inspect PPTP encapsulated by GRE to get flow hash")
Signed-off-by: Ian Kumlien <ian.kumlien@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3b48ab2248e61408910e792fe84d6ec466084c1a ]
Final nlmsg_len field update must reflect inserted net_dm_drop_point
data.
This patch depends on previous patch:
"drop_monitor: add missing call to genlmsg_end"
Signed-off-by: Reiter Wolfgang <wr0112358@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4200462d88f47f3759bdf4705f87e207b0f5b2e4 ]
Update nlmsg_len field with genlmsg_end to enable userspace processing
using nlmsg_next helper. Also adds error handling.
Signed-off-by: Reiter Wolfgang <wr0112358@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f5a0aab84b74de68523599817569c057c7ac1622 ]
IPv4 output routes already use l3mdev device instead of loopback for dst's
if it is applicable. Change local input routes to do the same.
This fixes icmp responses for unreachable UDP ports which are directed
to the wrong table after commit 9d1a6c4ea43e4 because local_input
routes use the loopback device. Moving from ingress device to loopback
loses the L3 domain causing responses based on the dst to get to lost.
Fixes: 9d1a6c4ea43e4 ("net: icmp_route_lookup should use rt dev to
determine L3 domain")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f0c16ba8933ed217c2688b277410b2a37ba81591 ]
When we send a packet for our own local address on a non-loopback
interface (e.g. eth0), due to the change had been introduced from
commit 0b922b7a829c ("net: original ingress device index in PKTINFO"), the
original ingress device index would be set as the loopback interface.
However, the packet should be considered as if it is being arrived via the
sending interface (eth0), otherwise it would break the expectation of the
userspace application (e.g. the DHCPRELEASE message from dhcp_release
binary would be ignored by the dnsmasq daemon, since it come from lo which
is not the interface dnsmasq bind to)
Fixes: 0b922b7a829c ("net: original ingress device index in PKTINFO")
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Zhang <asuka.com@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4775cc1f2d5abca894ac32774eefc22c45347d1c ]
We miss to check if the netlink message is actually big enough to contain
a struct if_stats_msg.
Add a check to prevent userland from sending us short messages that would
make us access memory beyond the end of the message.
Fixes: 10c9ead9f3c6 ("rtnetlink: add new RTM_GETSTATS message to dump...")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0df0f207aab4f42e5c96a807adf9a6845b69e984 ]
Since we now use a non zero mask on addr_type, we are matching on its
value (IPV4/IPV6). So before this fix, matching on enc_src_ip/enc_dst_ip
failed in SW/classify path since its value was zero.
This patch sets the proper value of addr_type for encapsulated packets.
Fixes: 970bfcd09791 ('net/sched: cls_flower: Use mask for addr_type')
Signed-off-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Hadar Hen Zion <hadarh@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 628185cfddf1dfb701c4efe2cfd72cf5b09f5702 ]
Shahar reported a soft lockup in tc_classify(), where we run into an
endless loop when walking the classifier chain due to tp->next == tp
which is a state we should never run into. The issue only seems to
trigger under load in the tc control path.
What happens is that in tc_ctl_tfilter(), thread A allocates a new
tp, initializes it, sets tp_created to 1, and calls into tp->ops->change()
with it. In that classifier callback we had to unlock/lock the rtnl
mutex and returned with -EAGAIN. One reason why we need to drop there
is, for example, that we need to request an action module to be loaded.
This happens via tcf_exts_validate() -> tcf_action_init/_1() meaning
after we loaded and found the requested action, we need to redo the
whole request so we don't race against others. While we had to unlock
rtnl in that time, thread B's request was processed next on that CPU.
Thread B added a new tp instance successfully to the classifier chain.
When thread A returned grabbing the rtnl mutex again, propagating -EAGAIN
and destroying its tp instance which never got linked, we goto replay
and redo A's request.
This time when walking the classifier chain in tc_ctl_tfilter() for
checking for existing tp instances we had a priority match and found
the tp instance that was created and linked by thread B. Now calling
again into tp->ops->change() with that tp was successful and returned
without error.
tp_created was never cleared in the second round, thus kernel thinks
that we need to link it into the classifier chain (once again). tp and
*back point to the same object due to the match we had earlier on. Thus
for thread B's already public tp, we reset tp->next to tp itself and
link it into the chain, which eventually causes the mentioned endless
loop in tc_classify() once a packet hits the data path.
Fix is to clear tp_created at the beginning of each request, also when
we replay it. On the paths that can cause -EAGAIN we already destroy
the original tp instance we had and on replay we really need to start
from scratch. It seems that this issue was first introduced in commit
12186be7d2e1 ("net_cls: fix unconfigured struct tcf_proto keeps chaining
and avoid kernel panic when we use cls_cgroup").
Fixes: 12186be7d2e1 ("net_cls: fix unconfigured struct tcf_proto keeps chaining and avoid kernel panic when we use cls_cgroup")
Reported-by: Shahar Klein <shahark@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Shahar Klein <shahark@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a98f91758995cb59611e61318dddd8a6956b52c3 ]
By setting certain socket options on ipv6 raw sockets, we can confuse the
length calculation in rawv6_push_pending_frames triggering a BUG_ON.
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff817c6390>] [<ffffffff817c6390>] rawv6_sendmsg+0xc30/0xc40
RSP: 0018:ffff881f6c4a7c18 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 00000000fffffff2 RBX: ffff881f6c681680 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: ffff881f6c4a7cf8 RSI: 0000000000000030 RDI: ffff881fed0f6a00
RBP: ffff881f6c4a7da8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000009
R10: ffff881fed0f6a00 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000030
R13: ffff881fed0f6a00 R14: ffff881fee39ba00 R15: ffff881fefa93a80
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8118ba23>] ? unmap_page_range+0x693/0x830
[<ffffffff81772697>] inet_sendmsg+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff816d93f8>] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x50
[<ffffffff816d982f>] SYSC_sendto+0xef/0x170
[<ffffffff816da27e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
[<ffffffff81002910>] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xa0
[<ffffffff817f7cbc>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Handle by jumping to the failure path if skb_copy_bits gets an EFAULT.
Reproducer:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define LEN 504
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
int fd;
int zero = 0;
char buf[LEN];
memset(buf, 0, LEN);
fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, 7);
setsockopt(fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_CHECKSUM, &zero, 4);
setsockopt(fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_DSTOPTS, &buf, LEN);
sendto(fd, buf, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *) buf, 110);
}
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 39b2dd765e0711e1efd1d1df089473a8dd93ad48 ]
Socket cmsg IP(V6)_RECVORIGDSTADDR checks that port range lies within
the packet. For sockets that have transport headers pulled, transport
offset can be negative. Use signed comparison to avoid overflow.
Fixes: e6afc8ace6dd ("udp: remove headers from UDP packets before queueing")
Reported-by: Nisar Jagabar <njagabar@cloudmark.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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null
[ Upstream commit 08abb79542c9e8c367d1d8e44fe1026868d3f0a7 ]
Prior to this patch, sctp_transport_lookup_process didn't rcu_read_unlock
when it failed to find a transport by sctp_addrs_lookup_transport.
This patch is to fix it by moving up rcu_read_unlock right before checking
transport and also to remove the out path.
Fixes: 1cceda784980 ("sctp: fix the issue sctp_diag uses lock_sock in rcu_read_lock")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2fa436b3a2a7009c11a3bc03fe0ff4c26e80fd87 upstream.
NL80211_ATTR_MAC was used to set both the specific BSSID to be scanned
and the random MAC address to be used when privacy is enabled. When both
the features are enabled, both the BSSID and the local MAC address were
getting same value causing Probe Request frames to go with unintended
DA. Hence, this has been fixed by using a different NL80211_ATTR_BSSID
attribute to set the specific BSSID (which was the more recent addition
in cfg80211) for a scan.
Backwards compatibility with old userspace software is maintained to
some extent by allowing NL80211_ATTR_MAC to be used to set the specific
BSSID when scanning without enabling random MAC address use.
Scanning with random source MAC address was introduced by commit
ad2b26abc157 ("cfg80211: allow drivers to support random MAC addresses
for scan") and the issue was introduced with the addition of the second
user for the same attribute in commit 818965d39177 ("cfg80211: Allow a
scan request for a specific BSSID").
Fixes: 818965d39177 ("cfg80211: Allow a scan request for a specific BSSID")
Signed-off-by: Vamsi Krishna <vamsin@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 1c3d185a9a0b136a58e73b02912d593d0303d1da upstream.
On drivers setting the SUPPORTS_REORDERING_BUFFER hardware flag,
we crash when the peer sends an AddBA request while we already
have a session open on the seame TID; this is because on those
drivers, the tid_agg_rx is left NULL even though the session is
valid, and the agg_session_valid bit is set.
To fix this, store the dialog tokens outside the tid_agg_rx to
be able to compare them to the received AddBA request.
Fixes: f89e07d4cf26 ("mac80211: agg-rx: refuse ADDBA Request with timeout update")
Reported-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 35f432a03e41d3bf08c51ede917f94e2288fbe8c upstream.
In ieee80211_xmit_fast(), 'info' is initialized to point to the skb
that's passed in, but that skb may later be replaced by a clone (if
it was shared), leading to an invalid pointer.
This can lead to use-after-free and also later crashes since the
real SKB's info->hw_queue doesn't get initialized properly.
Fix this by assigning info only later, when it's needed, after the
skb replacement (may have) happened.
Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1cded9d2974fe4fe339fc0ccd6638b80d465ab2c upstream.
There are two problems with refcounting of auth_gss messages.
First, the reference on the pipe->pipe list (taken by a call
to rpc_queue_upcall()) is not counted. It seems to be
assumed that a message in pipe->pipe will always also be in
pipe->in_downcall, where it is correctly reference counted.
However there is no guaranty of this. I have a report of a
NULL dereferences in rpc_pipe_read() which suggests a msg
that has been freed is still on the pipe->pipe list.
One way I imagine this might happen is:
- message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S1
- rpc.gssd reads this message and starts processing.
This removes the message from pipe->pipe
- message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S2
- rpc.gssd replies to the first message. gss_pipe_downcall()
calls __gss_find_upcall(pipe, U, NULL) and it finds the
*second* message, as new messages are placed at the head
of ->in_downcall, and the service type is not checked.
- This second message is removed from ->in_downcall and freed
by gss_release_msg() (even though it is still on pipe->pipe)
- rpc.gssd tries to read another message, and dereferences a pointer
to this message that has just been freed.
I fix this by incrementing the reference count before calling
rpc_queue_upcall(), and decrementing it if that fails, or normally in
gss_pipe_destroy_msg().
It seems strange that the reply doesn't target the message more
precisely, but I don't know all the details. In any case, I think the
reference counting irregularity became a measureable bug when the
extra arg was added to __gss_find_upcall(), hence the Fixes: line
below.
The second problem is that if rpc_queue_upcall() fails, the new
message is not freed. gss_alloc_msg() set the ->count to 1,
gss_add_msg() increments this to 2, gss_unhash_msg() decrements to 1,
then the pointer is discarded so the memory never gets freed.
Fixes: 9130b8dbc6ac ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Link: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1011250
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 upstream.
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f83f12d660d11718d3eed9d979ee03e83aa55544 upstream.
These fields are 64 bit, using le32_to_cpu and friends
on these will not do the right thing.
Fix this up.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e6f462df9acd2a3295e5d34eb29e2823220cf129 upstream.
When mac80211 abandons an association attempt, it may free
all the data structures, but inform cfg80211 and userspace
about it only by sending the deauth frame it received, in
which case cfg80211 has no link to the BSS struct that was
used and will not cfg80211_unhold_bss() it.
Fix this by providing a way to inform cfg80211 of this with
the BSS entry passed, so that it can clean up properly, and
use this ability in the appropriate places in mac80211.
This isn't ideal: some code is more or less duplicated and
tracing is missing. However, it's a fairly small change and
it's thus easier to backport - cleanups can come later.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This patch adds a check to limit the number of can_filters that can be
set via setsockopt on CAN_RAW sockets. Otherwise allocations > MAX_ORDER
are not prevented resulting in a warning.
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/2/230
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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|
There have been some reports lately about TCP connection stalls caused
by NIC drivers that aren't setting gso_size on aggregated packets on rx
path. This causes TCP to assume that the MSS is actually the size of the
aggregated packet, which is invalid.
Although the proper fix is to be done at each driver, it's often hard
and cumbersome for one to debug, come to such root cause and report/fix
it.
This patch amends this situation in two ways. First, it adds a warning
on when this situation occurs, so it gives a hint to those trying to
debug this. It also limit the maximum probed MSS to the adverised MSS,
as it should never be any higher than that.
The result is that the connection may not have the best performance ever
but it shouldn't stall, and the admin will have a hint on what to look
for.
Tested with virtio by forcing gso_size to 0.
v2: updated msg per David's suggestion
v3: use skb_iif to find the interface and also log its name, per Eric
Dumazet's suggestion. As the skb may be backlogged and the interface
gone by then, we need to check if the number still has a meaning.
v4: use helper tcp_gro_dev_warn() and avoid pr_warn_once inside __once, per
David's suggestion
Cc: Jonathan Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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It is wrong to schedule a work from sk_destruct using the socket
as the memory reserve because the socket will be freed immediately
after the return from sk_destruct.
Instead we should do the deferral prior to sk_free.
This patch does just that.
Fixes: 707693c8a498 ("netlink: Call cb->done from a worker thread")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The check of the return value of sock_register() is ineffective.
"if(!err)" seems to be a typo. It is better to propagate the error code
to the callers of caif_sktinit_module(). This patch removes the check
statment and directly returns the result of sock_register().
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188751
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there
was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header,
and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the
iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is
EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem
prior to v3.19.
This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761
CVE-2016-8399
Reported-by: Qidan He <i@flanker017.me>
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Function br_sysfs_addbr() does not set error code when the call
kobject_create_and_add() returns a NULL pointer. It may be better to
return "-ENOMEM" when kobject_create_and_add() fails.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188781
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Adding space after switch keyword before open
parenthesis for readability purpose.
This patch fixes the checkpatch.pl warning:
space required before the open parenthesis '('
Signed-off-by: Suraj Deshmukh <surajssd009005@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
It has been reported that update_suffix can be expensive when it is called
on a large node in which most of the suffix lengths are the same. The time
required to add 200K entries had increased from around 3 seconds to almost
49 seconds.
In order to address this we need to move the code for updating the suffix
out of resize and instead just have it handled in the cases where we are
pushing a node that increases the suffix length, or will decrease the
suffix length.
Fixes: 5405afd1a306 ("fib_trie: Add tracking value for suffix length")
Reported-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Tested-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
It wasn't necessary to pass a leaf in when doing the suffix updates so just
drop it. Instead just pass the suffix and work with that.
Since we dropped the leaf there is no need to include that in the name so
the names are updated to node_push_suffix and node_pull_suffix.
Finally I noticed that the logic for pulling the suffix length back
actually had some issues. Specifically it would stop prematurely if there
was a longer suffix, but it was not as long as the original suffix. I
updated the code to address that in node_pull_suffix.
Fixes: 5405afd1a306 ("fib_trie: Add tracking value for suffix length")
Suggested-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Tested-by: Robert Shearman <rshearma@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
In function dcbnl_cee_fill(), returns the value of variable err on
errors. However, on some error paths (e.g. nla put fails), its value may
be 0. It may be better to explicitly set a negative errno to variable
err before returning.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=188881
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
Simon Wunderlich says:
====================
Here is another batman-adv bugfix:
- fix checking for failed allocation of TVLV blocks in TT local data,
by Sven Eckelmann
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in
tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to
insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for
even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace,
this issue can be abused by a regular user.
As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should
check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each
processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is
adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid
overflow when calculating bearer MTU.
Fixes: b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
segs needs to be checked for being NULL in ipv6_gso_segment() before calling
skb_shinfo(segs), otherwise kernel can run into a NULL-pointer dereference:
[ 97.811262] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000cc
[ 97.819112] IP: [<ffffffff816e52f9>] ipv6_gso_segment+0x119/0x2f0
[ 97.825214] PGD 0 [ 97.827047]
[ 97.828540] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 97.831678] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost macvtap macvlan nfsv3 rpcsec_gss_krb5
nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4
iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack
ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter
bridge stp llc snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec edac_mce_amd snd_hda_core edac_core snd_hwdep kvm_amd snd_seq kvm snd_seq_device
snd_pcm irqbypass snd_timer ppdev parport_serial snd parport_pc k10temp pcspkr soundcore parport
sp5100_tco shpchp sg wmi i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc
ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sr_mod cdrom sd_mod ata_generic pata_acpi amdkfd amd_iommu_v2 radeon
broadcom bcm_phy_lib i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops
ttm ahci serio_raw tg3 firewire_ohci libahci pata_atiixp drm ptp libata firewire_core pps_core
i2c_core crc_itu_t fjes dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 97.927721] CPU: 1 PID: 3504 Comm: vhost-3495 Not tainted 4.9.0-7.el7.test.x86_64 #1
[ 97.935457] Hardware name: AMD Snook/Snook, BIOS ESK0726A 07/26/2010
[ 97.941806] task: ffff880129a1c080 task.stack: ffffc90001bcc000
[ 97.947720] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e52f9>] [<ffffffff816e52f9>] ipv6_gso_segment+0x119/0x2f0
[ 97.956251] RSP: 0018:ffff88012fc43a10 EFLAGS: 00010207
[ 97.961557] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801292c8700 RCX: 0000000000000594
[ 97.968687] RDX: 0000000000000593 RSI: ffff880129a846c0 RDI: 0000000000240000
[ 97.975814] RBP: ffff88012fc43a68 R08: ffff880129a8404e R09: 0000000000000000
[ 97.982942] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff880129a84076 R12: 00000020002949b3
[ 97.990070] R13: ffff88012a580000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88012a580000
[ 97.997198] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88012fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 98.005280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 98.011021] CR2: 00000000000000cc CR3: 0000000126c5d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 98.018149] Stack:
[ 98.020157] 00000000ffffffff ffff88012fc43ac8 ffffffffa017ad0a 000000000000000e
[ 98.027584] 0000001300000000 0000000077d59998 ffff8801292c8700 00000020002949b3
[ 98.035010] ffff88012a580000 0000000000000000 ffff88012a580000 ffff88012fc43a98
[ 98.042437] Call Trace:
[ 98.044879] <IRQ> [ 98.046803] [<ffffffffa017ad0a>] ? tg3_start_xmit+0x84a/0xd60 [tg3]
[ 98.053156] [<ffffffff815eeee0>] skb_mac_gso_segment+0xb0/0x130
[ 98.059158] [<ffffffff815eefd3>] __skb_gso_segment+0x73/0x110
[ 98.064985] [<ffffffff815ef40d>] validate_xmit_skb+0x12d/0x2b0
[ 98.070899] [<ffffffff815ef5d2>] validate_xmit_skb_list+0x42/0x70
[ 98.077073] [<ffffffff81618560>] sch_direct_xmit+0xd0/0x1b0
[ 98.082726] [<ffffffff815efd86>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x486/0x690
[ 98.088554] [<ffffffff8135c135>] ? cpumask_next_and+0x35/0x50
[ 98.094380] [<ffffffff815effa0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
[ 98.099863] [<ffffffffa09ce057>] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xa7/0x170 [bridge]
[ 98.106907] [<ffffffffa09ce161>] br_forward_finish+0x41/0xc0 [bridge]
[ 98.113430] [<ffffffff81627cf2>] ? nf_iterate+0x52/0x60
[ 98.118735] [<ffffffff81627d6b>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x6b/0xc0
[ 98.124216] [<ffffffffa09ce32c>] __br_forward+0x14c/0x1e0 [bridge]
[ 98.130480] [<ffffffffa09ce120>] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x170/0x170 [bridge]
[ 98.137785] [<ffffffffa09ce4bd>] br_forward+0x9d/0xb0 [bridge]
[ 98.143701] [<ffffffffa09cfbb7>] br_handle_frame_finish+0x267/0x560 [bridge]
[ 98.150834] [<ffffffffa09d0064>] br_handle_frame+0x174/0x2f0 [bridge]
[ 98.157355] [<ffffffff8102fb89>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[ 98.162662] [<ffffffff810b63b2>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x72/0xa0
[ 98.168403] [<ffffffff815eccf5>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1e5/0xa20
[ 98.174926] [<ffffffff813659f9>] ? timerqueue_add+0x59/0xb0
[ 98.180580] [<ffffffff815ed548>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[ 98.186494] [<ffffffff815ee625>] process_backlog+0x95/0x140
[ 98.192145] [<ffffffff815edccd>] net_rx_action+0x16d/0x380
[ 98.197713] [<ffffffff8170cff1>] __do_softirq+0xd1/0x283
[ 98.203106] [<ffffffff8170b2bc>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
[ 98.209107] <EOI> [ 98.211029] [<ffffffff8108a5c0>] do_softirq+0x50/0x60
[ 98.216166] [<ffffffff815ec853>] netif_rx_ni+0x33/0x80
[ 98.221386] [<ffffffffa09eeff7>] tun_get_user+0x487/0x7f0 [tun]
[ 98.227388] [<ffffffffa09ef3ab>] tun_sendmsg+0x4b/0x60 [tun]
[ 98.233129] [<ffffffffa0b68932>] handle_tx+0x282/0x540 [vhost_net]
[ 98.239392] [<ffffffffa0b68c25>] handle_tx_kick+0x15/0x20 [vhost_net]
[ 98.245916] [<ffffffffa0abacfe>] vhost_worker+0x9e/0xf0 [vhost]
[ 98.251919] [<ffffffffa0abac60>] ? vhost_umem_alloc+0x40/0x40 [vhost]
[ 98.258440] [<ffffffff81003a47>] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x180
[ 98.264094] [<ffffffff810a44d9>] kthread+0xd9/0xf0
[ 98.268965] [<ffffffff810a4400>] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60
[ 98.274444] [<ffffffff8170a4d5>] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[ 98.279836] Code: 8b 93 d8 00 00 00 48 2b 93 d0 00 00 00 4c 89 e6 48 89 df 66 89 93 c2 00 00 00 ff 10 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 49 89 c2 0f 87 52 01 00 00 <41> 8b 92 cc 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d0 00 00 00 44 0f b7 74 10 06 66
[ 98.299425] RIP [<ffffffff816e52f9>] ipv6_gso_segment+0x119/0x2f0
[ 98.305612] RSP <ffff88012fc43a10>
[ 98.309094] CR2: 00000000000000cc
[ 98.312406] ---[ end trace 726a2c7a2d2d78d0 ]---
Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
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If some error is encountered in rds_tcp_init_net, make sure to
unregister_netdevice_notifier(), else we could trigger a panic
later on, when the modprobe from a netns fails.
Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit ae148b085876fa771d9ef2c05f85d4b4bf09ce0d
("ip6_tunnel: Update skb->protocol to ETH_P_IPV6 in ip6_tnl_xmit()").
skb->protocol is now set in __ip_local_out() and __ip6_local_out() before
dst_output() is called. It is no longer necessary to do it for each tunnel.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path:
xfrm_output() -> xfrm_output_gso() -> skb_gso_segment()
where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb->protocol to function properly.
This patch sets skb->protocol to ETH_P_IPV6 before dst_output() is called,
fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through an ipip6 tunnel are dropped
when xfrm is involved.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path:
xfrm_output() -> xfrm_output_gso() -> skb_gso_segment()
where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb->protocol to function properly.
This patch sets skb->protocol to ETH_P_IP before dst_output() is called,
fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through a sit tunnel are dropped
when xfrm is involved.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use the correct attribute constant names IFLA_GSO_MAX_{SEGS,SIZE}
instead of IFLA_MAX_GSO_{SEGS,SIZE} for the comments int nlmsg_size().
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data can fail to allocate the memory for the
new TVLV block. The caller is informed about this problem with the returned
length of 0. Not checking this value results in an invalid memory access
when either tt_data or tt_change is accessed.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
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