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commit 2deaeaf102d692cb6f764123b1df7aa118a8e97c upstream.
The standard PCM chmap helper callbacks treat the NULL info->chmap as
a fatal error and spews the kernel warning with stack trace when
CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is on. This was OK, originally it was supposed to be
always static and non-NULL. But, as the recent addition of Intel LPE
audio driver shows, the chmap content may vary dynamically, and it can
be even NULL when disconnected. The user still sees the kernel
warning unnecessarily.
For clearing such a confusion, this patch simply removes the
snd_BUG_ON() in each place, just returns an error without warning.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728 upstream.
snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
__do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d11662f4f798b50d8c8743f433842c3e40fe3378 upstream.
The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.
This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4e7655fd4f47c23e5249ea260dc802f909a64611 upstream.
The snd_use_lock_sync() (thus its implementation
snd_use_lock_sync_helper()) has the 5 seconds timeout to break out of
the sync loop. It was introduced from the beginning, just to be
"safer", in terms of avoiding the stupid bugs.
However, as Ben Hutchings suggested, this timeout rather introduces a
potential leak or use-after-free that was apparently fixed by the
commit 2d7d54002e39 ("ALSA: seq: Fix race during FIFO resize"):
for example, snd_seq_fifo_event_in() -> snd_seq_event_dup() ->
copy_from_user() could block for a long time, and snd_use_lock_sync()
goes timeout and still leaves the cell at releasing the pool.
For fixing such a problem, we remove the break by the timeout while
still keeping the warning.
Suggested-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2d7d54002e396c180db0c800c1046f0a3c471597 upstream.
When a new event is queued while processing to resize the FIFO in
snd_seq_fifo_clear(), it may lead to a use-after-free, as the old pool
that is being queued gets removed. For avoiding this race, we need to
close the pool to be deleted and sync its usage before actually
deleting it.
The issue was spotted by syzkaller.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c520ff3d03f0b5db7146d9beed6373ad5d2a5e0e upstream.
When snd_seq_pool_done() is called, it marks the closing flag to
refuse the further cell insertions. But snd_seq_pool_done() itself
doesn't clear the cells but just waits until all cells are cleared by
the caller side. That is, it's racy, and this leads to the endless
stall as syzkaller spotted.
This patch addresses the racy by splitting the setup of pool->closing
flag out of snd_seq_pool_done(), and calling it properly before
snd_seq_pool_done().
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+aqqy8bZA1fFieifNxR2fAfFQQABcBHj801+u5ePV0URw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f3ac9f737603da80c2da3e84b89e74429836bb6d upstream.
The sequencer FIFO management has a bug that may lead to a corruption
(shortage) of the cell linked list. When a sequencer client faces an
error at the event delivery, it tries to put back the dequeued cell.
When the first queue was put back, this forgot the tail pointer
tracking, and the link will be screwed up.
Although there is no memory corruption, the sequencer client may stall
forever at exit while flushing the pending FIFO cells in
snd_seq_pool_done(), as spotted by syzkaller.
This patch addresses the missing tail pointer tracking at
snd_seq_fifo_cell_putback(). Also the patch makes sure to clear the
cell->enxt pointer at snd_seq_fifo_event_in() for avoiding a similar
mess-up of the FIFO linked list.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 71321eb3f2d0df4e6c327e0b936eec4458a12054 upstream.
When a user sets a too small ticks with a fine-grained timer like
hrtimer, the kernel tries to fire up the timer irq too frequently.
This may lead to the condensed locks, eventually the kernel spinlock
lockup with warnings.
For avoiding such a situation, we define a lower limit of the
resolution, namely 1ms. When the user passes a too small tick value
that results in less than that, the kernel returns -EINVAL now.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 37a7ea4a9b81f6a864c10a7cb0b96458df5310a3 upstream.
snd_seq_pool_done() syncs with closing of all opened threads, but it
aborts the wait loop with a timeout, and proceeds to the release
resource even if not all threads have been closed. The timeout was 5
seconds, and if you run a crazy stuff, it can exceed easily, and may
result in the access of the invalid memory address -- this is what
syzkaller detected in a bug report.
As a fix, let the code graduate from naiveness, simply remove the loop
timeout.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YdhDV2H5LLzDTJDVF-qiYHUHhtRaW4rbb4gUhTCQB81w@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4842e98f26dd80be3623c4714a244ba52ea096a8 upstream.
When a sequencer queue is created in snd_seq_queue_alloc(),it adds the
new queue element to the public list before referencing it. Thus the
queue might be deleted before the call of snd_seq_queue_use(), and it
results in the use-after-free error, as spotted by syzkaller.
The fix is to reference the queue object at the right time.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently the ALSA proc handler allows read or write even if the proc
file were write-only or read-only. It's mostly harmless, does thing
but allocating memory and ignores the input/output. But it doesn't
tell user about the invalid use, and it's confusing and inconsistent
in comparison with other proc files.
This patch adds some sanity checks and let the proc handler returning
an -EIO error when the invalid read/write is performed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The ALSA proc handler allows currently the write in the unlimited size
until kmalloc() fails. But basically the write is supposed to be only
for small inputs, mostly for one line inputs, and we don't have to
handle too large sizes at all. Since the kmalloc error results in the
kernel warning, it's better to limit the size beforehand.
This patch adds the limit of 16kB, which must be large enough for the
currently existing code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The recent rewrite of the sequencer time accounting using timespec64
in the commit [3915bf294652: ALSA: seq_timer: use monotonic times
internally] introduced a bad regression. Namely, the time reported
back doesn't increase but goes back and forth.
The culprit was obvious: the delta is stored to the result (cur_time =
delta), instead of adding the delta (cur_time += delta)!
Let's fix it.
Fixes: 3915bf294652 ('ALSA: seq_timer: use monotonic times internally')
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=177571
Reported-by: Yves Guillemot <yc.guillemot@wanadoo.fr>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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This commit is a fix for Linux 4.9-rc1.
In former commit, a function call of compatibility layer for ALSA sequencer
core was obsoleted by an alternative. Although, the alternative gets a
pointer to kernel stack due to mis-programming. As a result, ALSA sequencer
core unexpectedly refers over kernel stack.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 8ce8eb601c71 ("ALSA: seq: add an alternative way to handle ioctl requests")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Fix a missing \n in a pr_debug message and move the \n to the end
of a pr_err message.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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When checking value of request for copy operation, current implementation
compares shifted value to macros, while these macros are already shifted.
As a result, it never performs to copy from/to user space.
This commit fixes the bug.
Fixes: 8ce8eb601c71('ALSA: seq: add an alternative way to handle ioctl requests'
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Back-merge from for-linus just to make the further development easier.
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When a seq-virmidi driver is initialized, it registers a rawmidi
instance with its callback to create an associated seq kernel client.
Currently it's done throughly in rawmidi's register_mutex context.
Recently it was found that this may lead to a deadlock another rawmidi
device that is being attached with the sequencer is accessed, as both
open with the same register_mutex. This was actually triggered by
syzkaller, as Dmitry Vyukov reported:
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
4.8.0-rc1+ #11 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor/7154 is trying to acquire lock:
(register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341
but task is already holding lock:
(&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff850138bb>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x5b/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:495
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}:
[<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746
[<ffffffff863f6199>] down_read+0x49/0xc0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:22
[< inline >] deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:681
[<ffffffff85005c5e>] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x35e/0x890 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:822
[<ffffffff85006e96>] > snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0x126/0x170 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2418
[<ffffffff85012c52>] snd_seq_system_broadcast+0xb2/0xf0 sound/core/seq/seq_system.c:101
[<ffffffff84fff70a>] snd_seq_create_kernel_client+0x24a/0x330 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2297
[< inline >] snd_virmidi_dev_attach_seq sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:383
[<ffffffff8502d29f>] snd_virmidi_dev_register+0x29f/0x750 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:450
[<ffffffff84fd208c>] snd_rawmidi_dev_register+0x30c/0xd40 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1645
[<ffffffff84f816d3>] __snd_device_register.part.0+0x63/0xc0 sound/core/device.c:164
[< inline >] __snd_device_register sound/core/device.c:162
[<ffffffff84f8235d>] snd_device_register_all+0xad/0x110 sound/core/device.c:212
[<ffffffff84f7546f>] snd_card_register+0xef/0x6c0 sound/core/init.c:749
[<ffffffff85040b7f>] snd_virmidi_probe+0x3ef/0x590 sound/drivers/virmidi.c:123
[<ffffffff833ebf7b>] platform_drv_probe+0x8b/0x170 drivers/base/platform.c:564
......
-> #0 (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}:
[< inline >] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1829
[< inline >] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1939
[< inline >] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2266
[<ffffffff814791f4>] __lock_acquire+0x4d44/0x4d80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3335
[<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746
[< inline >] __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:521
[<ffffffff863f0ef1>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb1/0xa20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:621
[<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341
[<ffffffff8502e7c7>] midisynth_subscribe+0xf7/0x350 sound/core/seq/seq_midi.c:188
[< inline >] subscribe_port sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:427
[<ffffffff85013cc7>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x467/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:510
[<ffffffff85015da9>] snd_seq_port_connect+0x2c9/0x500 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:579
[<ffffffff850079b8>] snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port+0x1d8/0x2b0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:1480
[<ffffffff84ffe9e4>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x184/0x1e0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2225
[<ffffffff84ffeae8>] snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl+0xa8/0x110 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2440
[<ffffffff85027664>] snd_seq_oss_midi_open+0x3b4/0x610 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:375
[<ffffffff85023d67>] snd_seq_oss_synth_setup_midi+0x107/0x4c0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:281
[<ffffffff8501b0a8>] snd_seq_oss_open+0x748/0x8d0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c:274
[<ffffffff85019d8a>] odev_open+0x6a/0x90 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c:138
[<ffffffff84f7040f>] soundcore_open+0x30f/0x640 sound/sound_core.c:639
......
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&grp->list_mutex);
lock(register_mutex#5);
lock(&grp->list_mutex);
lock(register_mutex#5);
*** DEADLOCK ***
======================================================
The fix is to simply move the registration parts in
snd_rawmidi_dev_register() to the outside of the register_mutex lock.
The lock is needed only to manage the linked list, and it's not
necessarily to cover the whole initialization process.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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When a user timer instance is continued without the explicit start
beforehand, the system gets eventually zero-division error like:
divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 27320 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3-next-20160825+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003c9b2280 task.stack: ffff880027280000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [< inline >] ktime_divns include/linux/ktime.h:195
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [<ffffffff858e1a6c>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1bc/0x3c0 sound/core/hrtimer.c:62
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[< inline >] __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1238
[<ffffffff81504335>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x325/0xe70 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1302
[<ffffffff81506ceb>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x18b/0x420 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1336
[<ffffffff8126d8df>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:933
[<ffffffff86e13056>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:957
[<ffffffff86e1210c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:487
<EOI>
.....
Although a similar issue was spotted and a fix patch was merged in
commit [6b760bb2c63a: ALSA: timer: fix division by zero after
SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE], it seems covering only a part of
iceberg.
In this patch, we fix the issue a bit more drastically. Basically the
continue of an uninitialized timer is supposed to be a fresh start, so
we do it for user timers. For the direct snd_timer_continue() call,
there is no way to pass the initial tick value, so we kick out for the
uninitialized case.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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When the stream is in suspended state some applications wait
on "Stream Pipe Error" in response to snd_pcm_avail call to
resume the stream.
In the current implementation snd_pcm_avail() returns zero
when the stream is in suspended state. This causes application
to enter in infinite loop for frames to be available.
"Stream pipe Error" code is getting returned for read/write
call when the stream is in suspended state. Similarly update
snd_pcm_avail to return -ESTRPIPE.
Signed-off-by: Jeeja KP <jeeja.kp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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I got this with syzkaller:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref on address 0000000000000020
Read of size 32 by task syz-executor/22519
CPU: 1 PID: 22519 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2
014
0000000000000001 ffff880111a17a00 ffffffff81f9f141 ffff880111a17a90
ffff880111a17c50 ffff880114584a58 ffff880114584a10 ffff880111a17a80
ffffffff8161fe3f ffff880100000000 ffff880118d74a48 ffff880118d74a68
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81f9f141>] dump_stack+0x83/0xb2
[<ffffffff8161fe3f>] kasan_report_error+0x41f/0x4c0
[<ffffffff8161ff74>] kasan_report+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff82c84b54>] ? snd_timer_user_read+0x554/0x790
[<ffffffff8161e79e>] check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8161e9c1>] kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[<ffffffff82c84b54>] snd_timer_user_read+0x554/0x790
[<ffffffff82c84600>] ? snd_timer_user_info_compat.isra.5+0x2b0/0x2b0
[<ffffffff817d0831>] ? proc_fault_inject_write+0x1c1/0x250
[<ffffffff817d0670>] ? next_tgid+0x2a0/0x2a0
[<ffffffff8127c278>] ? do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff8174653a>] ? fsnotify+0x72a/0xca0
[<ffffffff81674dfe>] __vfs_read+0x10e/0x550
[<ffffffff82c84600>] ? snd_timer_user_info_compat.isra.5+0x2b0/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81674cf0>] ? do_sendfile+0xc50/0xc50
[<ffffffff81745e10>] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x60/0x60
[<ffffffff8143fec6>] ? kcov_ioctl+0x56/0x190
[<ffffffff81e5ada2>] ? common_file_perm+0x2e2/0x380
[<ffffffff81746b0e>] ? __fsnotify_parent+0x5e/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81d93536>] ? security_file_permission+0x86/0x1e0
[<ffffffff816728f5>] ? rw_verify_area+0xe5/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81675355>] vfs_read+0x115/0x330
[<ffffffff81676371>] SyS_read+0xd1/0x1a0
[<ffffffff816762a0>] ? vfs_write+0x4b0/0x4b0
[<ffffffff82001c2c>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8150455a>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x3a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff816762a0>] ? vfs_write+0x4b0/0x4b0
[<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
[<ffffffff810052fc>] ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x16c/0x1d0
[<ffffffff83c3276a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
==================================================================
There are a couple of problems that I can see:
- ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT), which potentially sets
tu->queue/tu->tqueue to NULL on memory allocation failure, so read()
would get a NULL pointer dereference like the above splat
- the same ioctl() can free tu->queue/to->tqueue which means read()
could potentially see (and dereference) the freed pointer
We can fix both by taking the ioctl_lock mutex when dereferencing
->queue/->tqueue, since that's always held over all the ioctl() code.
Just looking at the code I find it likely that there are more problems
here such as tu->qhead pointing outside the buffer if the size is
changed concurrently using SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS.
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Currently, automatic variable of 'union ioctl_arg' type is initialized
by designated initialization. Although, the actual effect is interpretation
of early element of int type and initialization of 'int pversion'.
Therefore the first field corresponding to int type is initialized to zero.
This is against my expectation to initialize whole fields.
This commit uses memset() to initialize the variable, instead of designated
initialization.
Fixes: 04a56dd8ed0d ('ALSA: seq: change ioctl command operation to get data in kernel space')
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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I hit this with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #190
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff88011278d600 task.stack: ffff8801120c0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8ba07>] [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffff8801120c7a60 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 1ffff10023483091 RDI: 0000000000000048
RBP: ffff8801120c7a78 R08: ffff88011a5cf768 R09: ffff88011a5ba790
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffed00234b9ef1 R12: ffff880114843980
R13: ffffffff84213c00 R14: ffff880114843ab0 R15: 0000000000000286
FS: 00007f72958f3700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 00000001126ab000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff880114843980 ffff880111eb2dc0 ffff880114843a34 ffff8801120c7ad0
ffffffff82c81ab1 0000000000000000 ffffffff842138e0 0000000100000000
ffff880111eb2dd0 ffff880111eb2dc0 0000000000000001 ffff880111eb2dc0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff82c81ab1>] snd_timer_start1+0x331/0x670
[<ffffffff82c85bfd>] snd_timer_start+0x5d/0xa0
[<ffffffff82c8795e>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x88e/0x2830
[<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90
[<ffffffff8132762f>] ? put_prev_entity+0x108f/0x21a0
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050
[<ffffffff813510af>] ? cpuacct_account_field+0x12f/0x1a0
[<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200
[<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0
[<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190
[<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0
[<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0
[<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050
[<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
[<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: c7 c7 c4 b9 c8 82 48 89 d9 4c 89 ee e8 63 88 7f fe e8 7e 46 7b fe 48 8d 7b 48 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 04 84 c0 7e 65 80 7b 48 00 74 0e e8 52 46
RIP [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100
RSP <ffff8801120c7a60>
---[ end trace 5955b08db7f2b029 ]---
This can happen if snd_hrtimer_open() fails to allocate memory and
returns an error, which is currently not checked by snd_timer_open():
ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT)
- snd_timer_user_tselect()
- snd_timer_close()
- snd_hrtimer_close()
- (struct snd_timer *) t->private_data = NULL
- snd_timer_open()
- snd_hrtimer_open()
- kzalloc() fails; t->private_data is still NULL
ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START)
- snd_timer_user_start()
- snd_timer_start()
- snd_timer_start1()
- snd_hrtimer_start()
- t->private_data == NULL // boom
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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I got this:
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #189
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff8801120a9580 task.stack: ffff8801120b0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88011aa87da8 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000004f76 RBX: ffff880112655e88 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880112655ea0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88011aa87e00 R08: ffff88013fff905c R09: ffff88013fff9048
R10: ffff88013fff9050 R11: 00000001050a7b8c R12: ffff880114778a00
R13: ffff880114778ab4 R14: ffff880114778b30 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f071647c700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 0000000112021000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
0000000000000000 ffff880114778ab8 ffff880112655ea0 0000000000004f76
ffff880112655ec8 ffff880112655e80 ffff880112655e88 ffff88011aa98fc0
00000000b97ccf2b dffffc0000000000 ffff88011aa98fc0 ffff88011aa87ef0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813abce7>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x347/0xa00
[<ffffffff82c8bbc0>] ? snd_hrtimer_close+0x130/0x130
[<ffffffff813ab9a0>] ? retrigger_next_event+0x1b0/0x1b0
[<ffffffff813ae1a6>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x136/0x4b0
[<ffffffff813ae220>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x1b0/0x4b0
[<ffffffff8120f91e>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0xf0
[<ffffffff81227ad3>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x13/0xc0
[<ffffffff83c35086>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0
[<ffffffff83c3416c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0
<EOI>
[<ffffffff83c3239c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x60
[<ffffffff82c8185d>] snd_timer_start1+0xdd/0x670
[<ffffffff82c87015>] snd_timer_continue+0x45/0x80
[<ffffffff82c88100>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x1030/0x2830
[<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90
[<ffffffff815aa4f8>] ? handle_mm_fault+0xbc8/0x27f0
[<ffffffff815a9930>] ? __pmd_alloc+0x370/0x370
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050
[<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200
[<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0
[<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190
[<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0
[<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0
[<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050
[<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
[<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: e8 fc 42 7b fe 8b 0d 06 8a 50 03 49 0f af cf 48 85 c9 0f 88 7c 01 00 00 48 89 4d a8 e8 e0 42 7b fe 48 8b 45 c0 48 8b 4d a8 48 99 <48> f7 f9 49 01 c7 e8 cb 42 7b fe 48 8b 55 d0 48 b8 00 00 00 00
RIP [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0
RSP <ffff88011aa87da8>
---[ end trace 6aa380f756a21074 ]---
The problem happens when you call ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE) on a
completely new/unused timer -- it will have ->sticks == 0, which causes a
divide by 0 in snd_hrtimer_callback().
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Reuse existing functionality from memdup_user() instead of keeping
duplicate source code.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Former commits change existent functions so that they don't handle data in
kernel space. Copying from/to userspace is done outside of the functions,
thus no need to change address limit of running task.
This commit obsoletes get_fs()/set_fs() and applies corresponding changes.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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In previous commit, a new table for functions with data in kernel space
is added to replace current table.
This commit changes existent functions to fit the table. These functions
are added to the new table and removed from the old table.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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ALSA sequencer is designed with two types of clients; application and
kernel. Operations for each ioctl command should handle data in both of
user space and kernel space, while current implementation just allows them
to handle data in user space. Data in kernel space is handled with change
of address limit of running tasks.
This commit adds a new table to map ioctl commands to corresponding
functions. The functions get data in kernel space. Helper functions to
operate kernel and application clients seek entries from the table.
Especially, the helper function for application is responsible for coping
from user space to kernel space or vise versa.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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This kernel API is used by kernel implementation. Currently, it's used for
kernel clients of ALSA sequencer, while it can be used for application
clients. The difference is just on address spaces of argument. In short,
this kernel API can be available for application client with data in kernel
space.
This commit adds a document about this.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus
ASoC: Updates for v4.8
Not really any framework work this time around (though we have seen one
of the Analog Devices drivers move more to the clock API which is good
to see) but rather a lot of new drivers:
- Lots of updates for the Intel drivers, mostly board support and bug
fixing, and to the NAU8825 driver.
- Work on generalizing bits of simple-card to allow more code sharing
with the Renesas rsrc-card (which can't use simple-card due to DPCM).
- Removal of the Odroid X2 driver due to replacement with simple-card.
- Support for several new Mediatek platforms and associated boards.
- New drivers for Allwinner A10, Analog Devices ADAU7002, Broadcom
Cygnus, Cirrus Logic CS35L33 and CS53L30, Maxim MAX8960 and MAX98504,
Realtek RT5514 and Wolfson WM8758
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Merged 4.8 changes.
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'asoc/topic/adsp', 'asoc/topic/ak4613' and 'asoc/topic/ak4642' into asoc-next
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The chmap ctls assigned to PCM streams are freed in the PCM disconnect
callback. However, since the disconnect callback isn't called when
the card gets freed before registering, the chmap ctls may still be
left assigned. They are eventually freed together with other ctls,
but it may cause an Oops at pcm_chmap_ctl_private_free(), as the
function refers to the assigned PCM stream, while the PCM objects have
been already freed beforehand.
The fix is to free the chmap ctls also at PCM free callback, not only
at PCM disconnect.
Reported-by: Laxminath Kasam <b_lkasam@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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snd_ctl_remove() has a notification for the removal event. It's
superfluous when done during the device got disconnected. Although
the notification itself is mostly harmless, it may potentially be
harmful, and should be suppressed. Actually some components PCM may
free ctl elements during the disconnect or free callbacks, thus it's
no theoretical issue.
This patch adds the check of card->shutdown flag for avoiding
unnecessary notifications after (or during) the disconnect.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The 'dimen' field in struct snd_ctl_elem_info is used to compose all of
members in the element as multi-dimensional matrix. The field has four
members. Each member represents the width in each dimension level by
element member unit. For example, if the members consist of typical
two dimensional matrix, the dimen[0] represents the number of rows
and dimen[1] represents the number of columns (or vise-versa).
The total members in the matrix should be exactly the same as the number
of members in the element, while current implementation has no validator
of this information. In a view of userspace applications, the information
must be valid so that it cannot cause any bugs such as buffer-over-run.
This commit adds a validator of dimension information for userspace
applications which add new element sets. When they add the element sets
with wrong dimension information, they receive -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The user timer tu->qused counter may go to a negative value when
multiple concurrent reads are performed since both the check and the
decrement of tu->qused are done in two individual locked contexts.
This results in bogus read outs, and the endless loop in the
user-space side.
The fix is to move the decrement of the tu->qused counter into the
same spinlock context as the zero-check of the counter.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The sequencer client manager reports timestamps in units of unsigned
32-bit seconds/nanoseconds, but that does not suffer from the y2038
overflow because it stores only the delta since the 'last_update'
time was recorded.
However, the use of the do_gettimeofday() function is problematic
and we have to replace it to avoid the overflow on on 32-bit
architectures.
This uses 'struct timespec64' to record 'last_update', and changes
the code to use monotonic timestamps that do not suffer from leap
seconds and settimeofday updates.
As a side-effect, the code can now use the timespec64_sub() helper
and become more readable and also avoid a multiplication to convert
from microseconds to nanoseconds.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Replace the in order struct initialisation style with explicit field
style.
The Coccinelle semantic patch used to make this change is as follows:
@decl@
identifier i1,fld;
type T;
field list[n] fs;
@@
struct i1 {
fs
T fld;
...};
@@
identifier decl.i1,i2,decl.fld;
expression e;
position bad.p, bad.fix;
@@
struct i1 i2@p = { ...,
+ .fld = e
- e@fix
,...};
Also, removed some unnecessary comments.
Signed-off-by: Amitoj Kaur Chawla <amitoj1606@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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Currently, the avail IOCTL doesn't pass any error status, which
means typically on error it simply shows no data available. This
can lead to situations where user-space is waiting indefinitely
for data that will never come as the DSP has suffered an
unrecoverable error.
Add snd_compr_stop_error which end drivers can call to indicate
the stream has suffered an unrecoverable error and stop it. The
avail and poll IOCTLs are then updated to report if the stream is
in an error state to user-space. Allowing the error to propagate
out. Processing of the actual snd_compr_stop needs to be deferred
to a worker thread as the end driver may detect the errors during
an existing operation callback.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus
ASoC: Updates for v4.7
The updates this time around are almost all driver code:
- Further slow progress on the topology code.
- Substantial updates and improvements for the da7219, es8328, fsl-ssi
Intel and rcar drivers.
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When snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls() is called to the PCM stream to which a
chmap has been already assigned, it returns as an error due to the
conflicting snd_ctl_add() result. However, this also clears the
already assigned chmap_kctl field via pcm_chmap_ctl_private_free(),
and becomes inconsistent in the later operation.
This patch adds the check of the conflicting chmap kctl before
actually trying to allocate / assign. The check failure is treated as
a kernel warning, as the double call of snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls() is
basically a driver bug and having the stack trace would help
developers to figure out the bad code path.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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A switch statement looks a bit cleaner than an if statement
spread over 3 lines, as such update this to a switch.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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We can't return a negative error code from the poll callback the return
type is unsigned and is checked against the poll specific flags we need
to return POLLERR if we encounter an error.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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stream can't be NULL here as we have just taken the address of it, so no
need for the check.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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We have a function that returns the appropriate flags for the stream
direction, so we should use it.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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We can't return a negative error code from the poll callback the return
type is unsigned and is checked against the poll specific flags we need
to return POLLERR if we encounter an error.
Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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